Lectures by Amitabha Gupta

• What the course is about ?
  
  In my lectures in the course I would attempt to introduce the main issues in philosophy and history of science and their relationship to issues in epistemology and metaphysics and methodology of science. This involves introducing the central areas of active debate in contemporary philosophy of science and put them in the context in terms of selected Case Studies from the history of the subject.
  
  Course Learning Outcomes:
  
  By the end of the course, students should be able to:

1. see the difference between learning some aspect of science and critically reflecting on it and placing it in a historical perspective,

2. understand the main issues in the philosophy of science and to be familiar with the standard / canonical literature concerning them,

3. critically engage with the contemporary literature in the philosophy of science,

4. undertake original work in the philosophy of science of a professional standard,

5. apply philosophical insights to scientific work,

6. connect these issues with scientific concerns and the issues.

• Introduction

1.1 Final product and the process of scientific inquiry
1.2 Process of scientific inquiry: Epistemology, Metaphysics, Conceptual Evolution and Cognitive   Processes
1.3 Scientific Reasoning: Induction, Deduction, Retroduction, Analogical Reasoning, Model building
1.4 Linking science pedagogy with History and Philosophy of Science through Cognitive Science: Importance of

the case studies approach

2.1 Philosophy and History of Science and their relationship to issues in Epistemology and Metaphysics

Scientific Knowledge and Epistemology: What is Epistemology ?, Scientific evidence and Justification, Epistemic Reliability, Scepticism

Alan Musgrave, Common Sense, Science and Scepticism : A Historical Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge

Science and Metaphysics:
(i) What exists? What is real?
(ii) General approach to understanding natural phenomena / “world-view,” e.g. mechanical vs.  teleological,
(iii) presuppositions / assumptions that guide scientific inquiry – Thematic Presuppositions

E.W. Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science
Gerd Buchdahl, Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science
Gerald Holton, Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought: Kepler to Einstein

·History of Science: Chronological vs. conceptual evolution, Internal vs. External
T.S. Kuhn, “The History of Science” in Essential Tension
Stephen Toulmin, Foresight and Understanding

2.2 Some of the standard problems in Philosophy of Science

Nature of Scientific Knowledge:
The Demarcation Problem, Falsificationism and Inductivism
Scientific Method: what is it and indeed is there a single method at all in all the different branches of science? Is scientific theory change rational?

Growth of Scientific Knowledge:
Scientific Revolutions
Scientific Observation and Experiment: the relationship between theory and evidence – theory choice and the problem of under determination

Theoretical entities:
Realism, Instrumentalism and Anti-realism
Confirmation of Scientific Theories: Bayesianism – a celebrated account of confirmation which focuses on the quantifying the degree to which a particular piece of evidence supports a particular theory

Scientific Explanation:
Hypothetico-Deductive Model

The Nature and Status of Scientific Laws:
Laws and Accidents, the Regularity Theory of Laws, Ceteris Paribus Laws, Laws as natures’s capacities and their measurements

Objectivity and Subjectivity

Useful references:

a) B.D. Klemke, “what is philosophy of science?”
b) M. Brodbeck, “The nature and Function of the Philosophy of Science”

An Example of the treatment of a topic in the traditional approach

Nature of Scientific Knowledge: Various characteristics of scientific knowledge and method of scientific inquiry are discussed and evaluated. Some of the characteristics that are conventionally attributed to scientific are universality, objectivity, cumulating nature, and rationality. The various models of methods in science traditionally discussed are Inductivism (Mill, William Whewell), Falsificationism (Popper), Hypothetico-Deductivism (Nagel, Hempel), Paradigm Based Research (Thomas Kuhn), Methodology of Scientific Research Program as developed by Imre Lakatos, and Research Tradition in Science as developed by Larry Laudan.

a) relevant excerpts from the writings of John Stuart Mill and of William Whewell
b) relevant excerpts from the writings of Karl Popper
c) relevant papers by Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lalatos, Paul Fayerabend and Larry Laudan

• Three different “turns” in Philosophy of Science
  
  Logical, ahistorical approach : E. Nagel, C.G. Hempel
  Historico-social turn : T.S. Huhn, S. Toulmin, P. Feyerabend, E. Lakatos
  Cognitive-historical turn : J. Piaget, R.N. Giere, N.J. Nersessian, P. Thagard, P.M. Churchland
  
  Cognitive / intellectual / historical processes involved in: concept formation, categorization, scientific observation and experiment and the interpretation of data, building models, inferencing, belief / theory revision, scientific discovery and imagination.
  

• Case-study as an Approach to Understanding Science
  
  a) “Understanding Science” – J.B.Conant
  b) “Introduction”, Science, Technology and Social Change, p. Science, Technology and Social Change
  (eds.) Agashe, Gupta, Valicha
  
  4.1. On Early Astronomy (Egyptian, Babylonian, Indian and Greek contributions):
  4.1. (i) Issues: Practical Problems requiring “accurate” observation; solution of practical problems leading to the distinction between techniques of forecasting /prediction and understanding/explanation, distinction between Apparent and Real Motion, modeling: “Saving the Appearance.”
  4.1.(i)
  1. Accurate” observation and description of the various celestial bodies: development of co ordinate systems, mathematics: spherical geometry, arithmetic
  
  2. Solutions of practical problems leading to the distinction between Concrete and Abstract Science :forecasting / prediction and understanding / explanation
  3. Distinction between Apparent and Real Motions: Early attempts to Scientific Modeling
  4. The view on the nature of scientific theory: “Saving the appearance”.
  
  Reading Materials
  
  a) “On Understanding Science: A Case Study Approach Based on Early Astronomy” – Amitabha Gupta
  b) “Concrete vs Abstract Science” – Amitabha Gupta
  c) Sleepwalker – Arthur Koestler
  
  4.2 Galileo (1564 – 1642)
  4.2. Issues:
  
  Mathematical modeling; accommodating both empiricism and rationalism, observation / experiment and the axiomatic proof-based rationalistic approach for providing adequate justification for scientific knowledge claims; defense of realism
  
  4. 2. (i) Science of Motion
  4.2.(i).1 Aristotelian Science of Motion and its role in the science of mechanics:
  Demonstrative Science, Inductive-Deductive Method, Teleological Paradigm, Aristotelian Doctrines
  4.2.(i).2. Aristotelian First Principles of Motion and Laws of Motion
  4.2.(i).3 Difficulties with the Aristotelian Paradigm
  4.2.(ii) Galileo and the Galilean Paradigm for the Science of Motion
  4.2.(ii).1 Galileo’s Medieval Precursors and their contributions: Classification of motions, introduction of mathematics in representing physical phenomena, formulation and proofs of key Theorems
  4.2.(ii).2. Galileo’s new science of “local motion”: geometrization of nature, mathematical modeling: DDI concept of scientific model; axiomatic proof-based rationalistic approach in his “demonstrative science” providing adequate justification for his scientific knowledge claims by accommodating empirical, observational, experimental approach
  4.2.(ii).3 Galileo’s Axiomatic framework for: Uniform motion, Freely falling motion and Projectile Motion. Proofs of some important Theorems
  4.2.(ii).4 Galileo’s Philosophy of Science: Distinction between Primary and Secondary Qualities, Role of mathematics and experiment in Galileo’s science, Galieo’s Realism and opposition to Instrumentalism.
  4.2.(ii).5 Views on the growth of scientific knowledge: Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos
  
  Reading Materials
  
  a) Third Day” in Dialogues and Mathematical Demonstrations Concerning Two new Sciences Pertaining to Mechanics and Local Motions - Galileo
  b) Galileo and the Beginning of Modern Sciences” –H.Dingle in Science, Technology and Social Change (eds.) S.D.Agashe, A.Gupta, K.Valicha, pp.87-101.
  
  4.2.(iii) Realism, Instrumentalism
  
  Issues: Realism is a blend of metaphysics and epistemology. Metaphysically, realism claims that there is an observer-independent world; epistemologically, it claims that we can gain knowledge of that very world.
  
  In relation to science, realism asserts that, independently of our representations, the entities described by our scientific theories exist and that the theories themselves are objectively true (at least approximately). Opposed to scientific realism are a variety of antirealisms: instrumentalism, constructivism, empiricism.
  
  Reading Materials
  
  a) Introduction – B.Brody
  b) Popper: Falsifiability and Realism
  c) Natures Capacities and their Measurements – Nancy Cartwright
  
  4.3 Newton (1642-1727)
  
  Issues
  
  4.3 (iii) “Hypothesis-free Science”:
  4.3.(iii).1 Huygens (1629-1695), Leibniz (1646-1716), Descartes (1596-1650) versus Newton
  4.3.(iii).2 Hypothesis in First (1687) and Second (1715) edition of Philosophie Naturalis Princia Mathematica and its structure.
  4.3.(iii).3. Empiricism of Locke (1632-1704), Berkeley (1685-1753), Hume(1711-1776) and Positivism of Auguste Comte (1798-1857), Mach
  4.3.(iii).4 Deductive, Demonstrative Science of mechanics involving ether vortices by Descartes (1596-1650) versus Newtonian laws inferred from “phenomena and rendered general by induction”.
  4.3.(iii).5 Speculative hypothesis of Descartes versus agent-causal / dispositional explanation of concepts of “attraction”, “centripetal force”, “gravity”: the role of induction and “retroduction”.
  4.3.(iii).6 Newton’s Method of Analysis and Synthesis
  4.3.(iii).7. Hypothesis in Optics (1704)
  4.4 Robert Boyle (1627-1691)
  4.4.(i) “New Experimental Philosophy”: Emergence of the new experimental tradition and concept formation
  4.4.(i).1 The charter and the establishment of Royal Society (“Invisible College): 1663
  4.4.(i).2 Francis Bacon (1561-1626) and his Novum Organum (1620), New Atlantis (1627): Classical Experiment alism and Baconian experimentalism and the image of co-operative scientific inquiry.
  4.4.(i).3 Boyle’s “New Experiments – Physico-mechanical touching the Spring of the Air and its effects made for the  most part in a new pneumatical engine” (1660) and the examination of the “Furnicular Hypothesis” (1662 edition)
  4.4.(i).4 Introduction of the concept of “Air Pressure”: Boyle’s experiments with J-tube and Pneumatic Engine, his original data and formulation of his Law.
  
  Reading Material
  
  a) “Touching the Spring of the Air” – J.B.Conant
  4.5 Joseph Priestley (1733 – 1804) and Antoine Lavoisier (1743-1794)
  4.5.(i) The Phlogiston – Oxygen Controversy and the Chemical Revolution: Joseph Priestly versus Lavoisier
  4.5.(i).1 The Aristotelian (Chemical) Paradigm: Classification scheme for naturally occurring substances,
  transformation
  4.5.(i).2 The Phlogiston Theory of Becher (1685-1682), Stahl (1660-1734), Bayen 1680, and Priestly:
  Corpuscularism and the explanation of chemical reaction (Combustion, calcination, and smelting)
  4.5.(i).3 Is Phlogiston Theory a Theory? Fit with the Aristotelian Paradigm, Anomaly: Justification of phlogiston in terms of “negative weight”
  4.5.(i).4 Same experiment two conclusions (1774 -75) by Priestly and Lavoisier
  4.5.(i).5 Lavoisier’s memoir “Reflections on Phlogiston” (1777): His experiments (1774 – 1777), his hypothesis and mental set, quantitative measurement, back up experiments and consistency / coherence test
  4.5.(i).6 Lavoisier’s arguments for Oxygen theory: logically inconsistent in Phlogiston theory, simplicity of the Oxygen Hypothesis and explanation
  4.5.(i).7 Under-determination of theory by facts: experiment and observation; logic of Abduction and
  Reintroduction: N.R. Hanson and C.S. Peirce
  4.5 (ii) Scientific Evidence and the Problem of Theory-ladenness:
  
  Issues:
  
  We argue for the theory-ladenness of evidence (rather than brute “observation” [ N.R. Hanson, C.R. Kordig]. We do so by employing and analysing an episode from the history of eighteenth century chemistry. We delineates attempts by Joseph Priestley and Antoine Lavoisier to construct entirely different kinds of evidence for and against a particular hypothesis from a set of agreed upon observations or (raw) data. Based on an augmented version of a distinction, drawn by J. Bogen and J. Woodward, between data and phenomena it is shown that the role of theoretical auxiliary assumptions is very important in constructing evidence for (or against) a theory from observation or (raw) data. In revolutionary situations, rival groups old radically different theories and theoretical auxiliary assumptions. These are employed to construct very different evidence from the agreed upon set of observations or (raw) data. Hence, theory resolution becomes difficult. It is argued that evidence construction is a multi-layered exercise and can be disputed at any level. What counts as unproblematic observation or (raw) data at one level may become problematic at another level. The contingency of these constructions and the (un)problematic nature of evidence are shown to be partially dependent upon the scientific knowledge that the scientific community possesses.
  
  Reading materials
  
  (a) “Observation” –N.R.Hamson
  (b) “The Theory-Ladenness of Observation” – Carl R.Kordig
  (c) Bogen, J., & Woodward, J. (1988). Saving the phenomena. The Philosophical Review, 97, 303–352
  
  4.6 Charles Darwin (1809 – 1882) and Gregor Mendel (1822 – 1884): The Science of Biology:
  4.6.1 Darwin’s early observations and On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life (1859) : Tree of Life and Natural Selection
  4.6.2 Gregor Mendel’s “Experiments in Plant Hybridization” (1865): the Law of the formation and development of hybrids – “constancy of forms”.
  4.6.3 Epistemological Issues: The Tree-of-life Hypothesis and testing hypothesis about common ancestry or genealogical relatedness ; testing the adaptive hypothesis (Natural Selection)
  4.6.4 Metaphysical Issues: Tree of Life and the nature of biological species: Natural Kind and Essentialism: Are species Natural Kinds? The role of chance in Natural Selection.
  4.7 Nature of Scientific law, Theory
  
  Issue:
  
  Regularity theory of law. Recent views.
  
  a) “Law” John Hospers
  b) “Concepts” –G.Holton in Sicnece, Technology and Social Change (eds.) S.D.Agahse, A.Gupta, K.Valicha, pp.168-194.
  c) Ceteris Paribus Laws, Laws as natures’s capacities and their measurements
  
  4.8 Philosophy of Social Science
  
  Issue:
  
  “Epistemology and Social Science” a book chapter to be published (2003) in (ed.) A.V. Matas, Spain, Foundations of Social Science
  
  Abstract
  
  The epistemological theory of the Logical Positivists aimed at giving an account of the paradigmatic nature of scientific knowledge in terms of a two tier language, within an axiomatic framework, and with strict adherence to empiricism and the logic of induction. The reasons for the dissatisfaction with this approach are well-known. The present paper (i) explores a new set of reasons for further exposing the weaknesses of this brand of epistemology, especially because of the fact that it obscures a number of cognitively significant features of social scientific knowledge especially when it concerns unobservable entities and mechanisms, (ii) looks for its alternative in a local contextulist epistemology grounded in doing science, getting involved in actual issues faced by a given science and taking a natural ontological attitude, and (iii) provides two good illustrations of what counts as local contextulist epistemology from the works of Amartya Sen and M.N. Srinivas.
  
  4.9 Philosophy of Mathematics
  
  “Axiomatic Mathematics and Godel’s Incompleteness Theorem”
  
  Abstract
  
  The response to the crisis in mathematics that led to the belief that formalisation of the axiomtic theories in mathematics would be the appropriate solution. The triumphant march in the axiomatization of various domains in mathematics - Geometry, Arithmetic - and their formalization became the order of the day. Increasingly this led mathematicians to form a deep-rooted conviction that the entire totality of truths or valid statements in a given branch of mathematics can be derived purely formally from a few axioms and that such formal axiomatic systems would be entirely free from contradiction and capture all truths in that domain. It turned out that this conviction was not well founded. One of Gödel's significant contributions precisely demonstrates this.
  
  (Amitabha Gupta)