HARE ON IMPERATIVE LOGIC AND INFERENCE

The present paper is an attempt to examine whether it is possible to have an imperative logic while maintaining the position of Professor R. M. Hare. I do not wish to maintain that an imperative logic is impossible, nor do I want to maintain that moral reasoning is impossible. My aim is to examine the possibility of the interpretation of imperative logic as put forth by Hare without making any attempt to develop a method of moral reasoning.

Hare believes that he has developed a technique of moral reasoning. His technique depends mainly on the distinction between *phrastics* and *neustics*. He recognises two values in his logic : *assenting to* and *dissenting from*. The sentences that fall under the scope of his logic are not merely commands, but also indicatives. He believes that both commands and indicatives are disposed to have either of the values of "assenting to" or "dissenting from". The logic which Hare proposes is two-valued.

The technique he suggests may be described broadly as follows : There should be at least one imperative present in the set of premises of an imperative inference. The conclusion has to be derived from the premises by making use of the phrastics that are present in the set of premises, and the appropriate neustic is added to the conclusion later.

My objections to Hare's technique of moral reasoning are on many points. Firstly, I wish to bring out the ambiguities that are involved in the definition of a phrastic by examining his own example. Secondly, I wish to show that Hare's interpretation of imperative logic is in fact four-valued, though, he claims that it is two-valued. Moreover, Hare fails to find any common value for both the indicatives and the imperatives. Thirdly, I wish to show the impracticability of Hare's interpretation of imperative logic by making use of the conclusions that I have drawn previously. The first five sections are expository, and remaining three consist of analysis and criticisms.

1. Statements and Commands

The important distinction that Hare makes in most of his writings is that between descriptive and prescriptive language. In order to maintain this distinction he maintains a distinction

between indicative and imperative sentences. He also maintains that moral judgements and principles are prescriptive in nature, and are generally in the imperative mood. The significant differences between indicative and imperative, apart from their moods, are : (i) an indicative sentence can be in any tense, whereas, an imperative sentence cannot be in the past tense,[1] (ii) an indicative sentence tells us that something is the case; an imperative sentence tells us to make something the case.[2] As a result, any appropriate answer to a question "What is the case?" will be in the indicative mood, and any appropriate answer to a question "What am I to make the case?" will be in the imperative mood.

Hare firmly believes that the language of morals is significantly different from descriptive language. He maintains that "no moral judgement can be a pure statement of fact."[3] However, he believes that it is possible to develop a technique of moral reasoning analogous to the technique of reasoning concerning descriptive language.

2. No Imperative can be Derived from Indicative

Since Hare believes that the indicative and imperative sentences are significantly different in their nature, he believes that no imperative sentence can be derived from merely a set of indicative sentences. He maintains that merely from the knowledge of what *is* the case, one cannot come to the conclusion as to what *ought* to be the case.

The scope of an interpretation of logic depends on the values which it assigns to the sentences. Any sentence which cannot have one of the values of a logic falls outside the purview of the interpretation of that logic. For example, a two-valued logic which recognises only 'true' and 'false' as its basic values limits itself thereby to indicative sentences only, and will have no place for imperative sentences. Therefore, Hare reasonably maintains that no imperative sentence can be derived from a set of indicative sentences only, as indicatives and imperatives are significantly different in their nature. He writes :

> ..from a series of indicative sentences about 'the character of any of its objects' no imperative sentence about what is to be done can be derived, and therefore no moral judgement can be derived from it either.[4]

3. Two Basic Values of Imperative Logic

Anyone interested in developing a technique of moral reasoning has to pursue one of the following lines : (i) apply an interpretation of logic which deals only with indicatives to moral judgements by interpreting moral judgements in such a manner as to be able to ascribe to them the same values which indicative sentences have, (ii) interpret logic differently and devlop an independent technique of moral reasoning by recognising different rules of inference and treat both indicatives and imperatives similarly by ascribing the same values to both. Hare can be said to have followed the second method in *The Language of Morals*.

Imperative logic recognises two values; namely, *assenting to* and *dissenting from*. Hare believes that both the indicatives and the imperatives are disposed to have one of these two values. He explains one of the two values of his logic :

> If we assent to a statement we are said to be sincere in
> our assent if and only if we believe that it is true (believe
> what the speaker has said). If, on the other hand, we
> assent to a second-person command addressed to ourselves,
> we are said to be sincere in our assent if and only if we do
> or resolve to do what the speaker has told us to do......[5]

In the absence of a precise definition by Hare of the other value' namely "dissenting from" a statement or a command, we can construct the definition in the following manner on the consideration that the imperative logic is two-valued: If a statement or a second-person command addressed to ourselves is not assented to, then it is a case of dissenting from.

4. Phrastics

Hare thinks that though imperatives and indicatives are different in nature that does not make evaluative inference impossible. He believes that an imperative and its corresponding indicative have the phrastic in common. 'Shut the door' is an imperative and 'You are going to shut the door' is an indicative sentence. These sentences "are both about the same thing, namely, your shutting the door in the immediate future; but they are used to say different things about it".[6] Hare defines the term "phrastic"[7] as that part of the sentence which is shared by both imperatives and indicatives. In

the above example, he considers 'Your shutting the door in the immediate future' as common to the sentences "Shut the door" and "You are going to shut the door."

It is Hare's contention that moral reasoning is possible because of the phrastics present in the set of sentences that form an argument. He supports his view in the following way :

> For example, let us suppose that a logician quotes the familiar syllogism which begins 'All men are mortal'. This syllogism could be rewritten :
>
> <div align="center">
>
> Let all men be mortal.
> *Let Socrates be a man.*
> ———————————————
> Let Socrates be mortal.
>
> </div>

and would remain valid, for the reason that its descriptiors,[8] which are the same as those in the indicative syllogism form a valid inference :

<div align="center">

Let men mortal :
Socrates man :
————————————
Socrates mortal : [9]

</div>

He emphasises the same point when he writes :

> Let us rather repeat our main conclusion, that since logic is mainly about descriptors, and commands contain descriptors, commands are a proper concern of a logician.[10]

5. Imperative Inference

Hare believes that inference is possible both in indicative and imperative logic, because of the occurrence of some logical concepts like 'if', 'or' etc. in the set of sentences that form an argument. If this is true, then it is possible to work out an interpretation of imperative logic as these concepts occur in the phrastic of imperatives. He believes that it is only a matter of careful investigation. He writes :

> It would seem possible in principle, since the ordinary logical words occur in the phrastics or imperatives, to reconstruct the ordinary sentential calculus in terms of phrastics only, and then apply it to indicatives and imperatives alike simply by adding the appropriate neustics.[11].

Hare's imperative inference consists of both imperative and indicative sentences. The set of premises includes at least one imperative, and the conclusion will always be an imperative. He makes it a rule that there must be at least one imperative in the premises in order to derive an imperative conclusion, because, according to him it is not possible to derive an imperative only from indicative sentences.[12] The imperative logic is deductive in nature, and therefore, the conclusion will be implicitly present in the set of premises. A good example of such an inference is :

Take all the boxes to the station.

This is one of the boxes.

∴ Take this to the station.[13]

6. Phrastics Reconsidered

Hare believes that the meaning of prescriptive sentences is partly descriptive and partly prescriptive, whereas, indicative sentences have only descriptive meaning.[14] For the same reason, he argues that in the context of indicative sentences, there is a close logical relationship between meaning and criteria. One cannot know the meaning of a sentence without knowing the criteria; whereas prescriptive sentences do not have the same property and the relationship between their meaning and criteria are of a very loose kind: one can know the meaning of a prescriptive sentence without knowing the criteria.[15] Hare's contention that logic belongs to that part of the meaning of a prescriptive sentence (imperatives are one kind of prescriptive sentences), which he calls descriptive, has led him to interpret logic in a certain manner and construct imperative technique of reasoning on the basis of phrastics. He thinks that all the logical connectives that can occur in indicative sentences can also occur in imperative sentences, but only as the part of phrastics of the sentences.[16]

Hare thinks that there must be something that is common to these two sentences, namely, "Shut the door" and "You are going to shut door in the immediate future", because, he thinks that both are *about* your shutting the door in the immediate future. The word "about" is quite ambiguous here. Given the fact that commands are used to bring about some change in the state-of-affairs, but indicative sentences are not used for the same purpose; and they are used to describe a fact or a thing; it is difficult to

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understand as to what the word "about" would mean in this particular context.   It is equally difficult to see as to what can be that common property between both commands and indicative sentences which Hare calls phrastic, except the trivial characteristics that both the kinds of sentences can be effectively used only in appropriate contexts or that they have to be grammatically correct or there must be someone who uses them etc. The word "about" is ambiguous because, it is not clear whether Hare is referring to something that is linguistic which is common between a statement and a command, or something which is extra-linguistic.   On the one hand, if the phrastic is something that is relevant to the topic of inference and validity, which Hare thinks is the case, then it appears that what is common has to be something that is, in a broad sense linguistic in nature, namely, meaning.   On the other hand, the use of the word "about" in the above context suggests that he must be referring to something which is extra-linguistic, namely, the referent of the sentence as something that is common between the indicative and the imperative sentences.

However, let us give the benefit of the doubt and consider the possibility of such an interpretation of imperative logic based on the phrastic on either interpretation.   Let us consider first that it is the meaning that Hare had in mind when he said that both the indicative and the imperative are about your shutting the door in the immediate future.   It is quite difficult for me to conceive of an effective formal method for testing the validity of an argument merely based on the meaning of the sentences without referring to the truth-values or the values of the logic.   Such a method would warrant the establishment of a certain kind of logical relationship between meaning and truth of a sentence which seems to be quite difficult.   I believe that Strawson has very effectively argued that meaning and truth do not have certain logical relationship.   He argues that the same sentence having the same meaning can have different truth-values.[17]   If we were to work out a formal method of testing imperative inferences on the guidelines provided by Hare, we would have to presuppose that meaning and truth-value of a sentence are logically related in a definite way so that we can operate with meaning rather than the truth-values[18] in the proposed formal mehtod.   The suggestion that we may operate with meaning instead of the truth-values in a formal method, is itself absurd.   We can

formally present only the structure of a sentence and not the meaning.

Perhaps Hare was not suggesting what I made him out to be. It could be said that he was only working out the logical possibility of constructing a formal system not operating with meaning, but operative with some values, though not certainly with truth-values. This is possible, because he considers *assenting to and dissenting from* as values of his interpretation of imperative logic. However, the difficulties pertaining to these values I shall discuss later.

Now let us consider the second interpretation of the word "about". According to this interpretation, what is common to the imperative "Shut the door" and "You are going to shut the door in the immediate future" is the act which is yet to be performed, of your shutting the door in the immediate future. The question "How can a sentence refer to non-existing being ?" which troubled Russell,[19] Strawson,[20] Quine[21] and many others, will trouble us now. How can it be possible to refer to an act which has not been performed yet ?

If it is the case that the phrastic is the descriptive meaning which is common to both imperatives and indicatives, then it seems to me that the analysis of the examples that he provides is inadequate. On the other hand if I take the analysis of the examples that he provides as reflecting his position more truly, then it appears that his claim that the phrastic is the descriptive meaning common to both imperatives and indicatives is not tenable. We notice that 'assenting to' or 'deissenting from' are not part of descriptive meaning of a sentence according to Hare. Assenting to the command "Shut the door" is not the part of the descriptive meaning of the command itself, nor assenting to the statement "You are going to shut the door" is the part of the descriptive meaning of the sentence itself. The value of a sentence cannot be a part of the meaning of the sentence. It appears, therefore, that it is well within the framework of Hare to replace the phrase "Your shutting the door in the immediate future" by "Your not shutting the door in the immediate future" as the descriptive part of the meaning of the sentences "Shut the door" and "You are going to . . . ." If my suggestion is acceptable, then what follows is that "Your shutting the door in the immediate future" cannot be the part of the meaning

of the sentences "Shut the door" and "You are going to....",
because the same pair of sentences cannot have "Your *not* shutting
the door in the immediate future" also as a part of the meaning of
the sentences unless both the sentences are ambiguous, which
obviously is not the case.

Let us consider now the possible grounds for not accepting
the conclusion of the above argument. The only ground that I
can think of is that when the two sentences "Shut the door" and
"You are going to shut the door" are used in certain contexts, one
has to normally presuppose that the uses were intentional. The
intention behind the use of sentence "Shut the door" under normal
circumstances would be that the person addressed should shut the
door : bring certain specified changes in the state of nature. And
when one uses the sentence "You are going to...." under normal
circumstances would be of describing a future state-of-affairs truely
or predicting. It is not unlikely that Hare considers the intention
as the part of the meaning of a sentence. However, it should be
noted that such intentional meaning is not likely to be the part of
the descriptive meaning for Hare. For, he has categorized
"nodding" a sentence as neustic, and it is highly probable that even
intention comes under the category of neustic. Hare writes while
talking about neustics :

> It is something that is done by anyone who uses a
> sentence in earnest, and does not merely mention it or
> quote it in inverted commas, something essential to
> *saying* (and meaning) anything.[22]

Though, there may be something that is common so far as the
intention of using the sentences "Shut the door" and "You are
going to....", that cannot form the phrastic of the sentences as the
intention does not belong to phrastic, but to the neustic. Even
if "Your not shutting the door in the immediate future" is against
the very intention of the uses of the sentences, there cannot be any
logical reaosn to say that why it cannot be the phrastic of the
sentences. To repeat, either of the phrases "Your shutting...."
"Your not sutting...." fits very well as the phrastic of the sentences
"Shut the door" and "You are going to shut the door in the
immediate future", implies that either of them can be the phrastic.

However, it is baseless to say that the meaning of the phrase
"Your shutting the door in the immediate future" is shared by the

sentences "Shut the door" and "You are going to shut the door". On the basis of the fact that both are about the same thing, one cannot argue that there must be descriptive or otherwise, meaning that is common to both the sentences, unless one is working under the framework of referential theory of meaning. Moreover, even on the basis of the fact that the same word is being used in two sentences, we cannot conclude that the two sentences must have a meaning in common. There does not seem to be any logical ground in the claim that the two sentences "Shut the door" and "You are doing to shut the door" have "Your shutting the door in the immeigate future" as the meaning in common.

It appears to me that Hare's notion of phrastic is very wide, and as a result it blurs the distinction which ought to be maintained for logical purposes. While remarking on the nature of indicative and imperative sentences Hare writes:

> But if we realize that commands, however much they may differ from statements, are like them in this, that they consist in telling someone something,..[23]

He writes subsequently:

> I shall call the part of the sentence that is common to both moods ('your shutting the door in the immediate future') the *phrastic;* and the part that is different in the case of commands and statements ('yes' or 'please') the *neustic*..Both words are used indifferently of imperative and indicative speech. The utterance of a sentence containing phrastic and neutsic might be dramatized as follows: (i) The speaker points out or indicates what he is going to state to be the case or command to be made the case; (ii) He nods, as if to say, 'It *is* the case,' or 'Do it'.[24]

Note that Hare treats both the act of indicating what one is going to state and commanding someone to make something the case, as similar by calling them phrastic . The difference between indicative and imperative sentences, he will bring under neustic, though he thinks that there has to be further similarity in the neustic of an indicative sentence and an imperative. The neustic element in the sentences will enter only when we use the sentences, and not other-

wise. What he calls the 'nodding' of a sentence occurs only in the context where one uses a sentence, "and does not merely mention it or quote it in inverted commas."

I am not very clear as to what Hare would maintain regarding the sentence-meaning of a command if it is not used. Regarding commands he maintains that if they are used, they will have both descriptive and prescriptive meaning, and the commending part, i.e., the neustic is the prescriptive meaning. When one merely mentions a command, certainly he is not prescribing anything, hence the command cannot have prescriptive meaning, or in other-words, as he has not used the command, the neustic element cannot be present in the sentence; therefore, it appears that Hare would say in this context that the command has only descriptive meaning, i.e., the phrastic. Similarly, I think that it is not unfair to Hare if I say that Hare's thesis commits himself to the position that when someone merely mentions the sentence "You are going to shut the door", has only phrastic element in it, but not neustic. The phrastic, i. e., the descritpive meaning of an indicative or imperative, which is the only thing that is present and common to these two sentences "Shut the door" and "You are going to shut the door" if they are merely mentioned is: Your shutting the door in the immediate future, neglecting other unimportant differences, e. g. the number of words that occur in each sentence. This is to say that when the sentences "Shut the door" and "You are going to shut the door", if merely mentioned, which is the usual case when we talk about synonyms, then they are synonymous. This conclusion, I think, is not acceptable to most of us. This conclusion appears to be the result of not keeping the distinction between descriptive meaning of an indicative and that of an imperative if there is any.

Hare does not necessarily have to commit himself to the position that there is something called sentential meaning. He has the option of maintaining that words or sentences when they are not used have no meaning, and only statements have meaning. However, such a position is quite weak and one has to answer many questions before one can accept this as plausible. I list some of these questions below : (1) If words have no meaning, how are we to choose our words to express certain thoughts ? If the

answer to this question is that we have learnt to associate certain words with certain thoughts, then, how creativity within language is possible has to be answered. (2) How are we to be sure of a sentence as appropriate when we want to express a thought ? (3) What is the relationship between a sentence and a statement? (4) If meaning belongs to the relam of statements, then semantics has to belong to the realm of statements. Can we intelligibly talk of semantics of statements ? (5) A statement cannot have multiple meaning unless the person wanted to say many things in one breath. If we admit that a statement can have multiple meaning, then thereby we have admitted that a statement can have more than one truth value, and at times may be opposite values. How are we to account for ambiguities in language ?

Sometimes, though not very often, we issue a command without believing that it will be obeyed. The intention of issuing such a command can vary; I want to prove to somebody that the person referred to is not sincere to me; or I wanted to have an excuse, so that in some other occasion I can use this and excuse myself from doing any favour to him. In these situations, it is perfectly all right to say "Shut the door" and "You are not going to shut the door", and one will not be inconsistent even if one uses them together. If Hare were correct that "Shut the door" and "You are going to shut the door" have descriptive meaning (the phrastic) in common, then the pair of sentences "Shut the door" and "You are *not* going to shut the door" (the opposite of "You are going to shut the door) should have been inconsistent. The fact that they do not form a set of inconsistent sentences and they can be used together in certain contexts, would support the view that "Your shutting the.." is not the descriptive meaning that is common to the command "Shut the door" and the statement "You are going to..", and therefore, it becomes the ground for rejecting any logical possibility of indicatives and imperatives having a common meaning.

7. 'Assenting to' and 'Dissenting from' Reconsidered

Accoring to Hare we assent to a statement if and only if we believe that it is true (believe what the speaker has said). This is the same as saying that when we assent to a statement, we believe that the statement is true. And he maintains that we assent to a second-person command addressed to ourselves if and only if we

do or resolve to do what the speaker has told us to do. Hare can now define 'dissenting from' either as a statement or a command. He thinks that he has found out two basic values, namely 'assenting to' and 'dissenting from' which is applicable to both indicative and imperative sentences.

My contention is that Hare's interpretation of imperative logic involves four values. The criterion to say that I have assented to a statement is that I believe the statement to be true. But this criterion cannot be used to say that whether I have assented to a command, for I can neither *believe* nor *disbelieve* a command to be true. The criterion for saying that I have assented to a command is only when I do or resolve to do what the speaker has told me to do. Again, this criterion cannot be used to find out whether I have assented to a statement. I can neither *do* nor *resolve to do* what a statement says. Such a talk is unintelligible because "no one, in seeking to explain the function of indicative sentences, would say that they were attempts to persuade someone that something is the case"[25]. Similarly, we can take wo different criteria, one for dissenting from a statement and the other for dissenting from a command. Thus in all, we have four criteria to determine whether someone is assenting to or dissenting from eihter a statement or a command. While making remarks on assenting to either a statement or a command he writes:

> It is indeed true of imperative sentences that if anyone, in using them, is being sincere or honest, he intends that the person referred to should *do* something (namely, what is commanded). This is indeed a test of sincerity in the case of commands, just as a statement is held to be sincere only if the speaker believes it. And there are similar criteria, as we shall later see, for sincerely assenting to commands and statements that have been given or made by someone else[26].

It is evident that I cannot assent to a command in the *same sense* in which I can assent to a statement and vice versa. If it is in the same sense that I assent to a command and a statement, then it must make sense to say "I believe that a command is true and I do or resolve to do what a statement tells me to do". That this does not make sense, implies that there are two senses of the term "assenting to" involved. It is worth noting that these two

senses are mutually exclusive. When I assent to a statement a belief is at work and when I assent to a command no belief is involved, but a certain activity (the act of promising or obeying the command) is involved. A similar point can be made regarding 'dissenting from'.

However, it may be argued that with one and the same criterion one will be in a position to say whether someone has assented to or dissented from a statement. And similarly, one may argue further, that we need only one criterion to determine whether someone has assented to or dissented from a command. I have no hesitation in accepting such a view as this basically does not go against the point I tried to make. If one criterion is used to determine the values of a command, and yet another for a statement, then a command and a statement cannot have a common value. It is possible to use words ambiguously, and I maintain that the phrases "assenting to" and "dissenting from" have been used ambiguously. Hare does not seem to notice their ambiguity and thinks that he has found two suitable values which are common to both imperatives and indicatives; in fact they involve four values.

A sentence can be said to belong to an interpretation of logic only when it has a disposition to have one of the values of that logic. If it is an interpretation of logic having two-values, then two sentences can be either consistent or tautologous or contradictory. An imperative and an indicative, it should be noted, can never be contradictory or tautologous in a certain interpretation of logic. This brings out a point which is of some interest.

What would be the importance of showing that in certain interpretation of logic no imperative can contradict an indicative and vice versa ? It suggests that one cannot have and indicative sentence which necessarily has a value that is opposite to an imperative, and vice versa. This would also imply that there cannot be any necessary logical relationship between an indicative and an imperative namely analyticity or contradiction. This indirectly supports the thesis that Hare's interpretation of imperative logic is not a two valued logic.

8. Imperative Inference Reconsidered

If we take the following suggestion seriously, perhaps, we have to give up the hope of achieving anything in the field of imperative inference. Hare writes :

> Since the 'descriptive meaning' of moral terms does
> not exhaust their meaning, the other elements in their
> meaning can make a difference to the logical behaviour
> of these terms in inferences[27].

If what Hare says is true of moral concepts, then it must be true of moral judgements as well because of the occurance of moral concepts in them. Descriptive meanings of both moral and non-moral concepts that occur in a moral judgement determine the phrastic of the judgement. I may validly derive a conclusion from a set of premises with the help of only the phrastic as suggested by Hare, but may find to my surprise that the argument turned out to be invalid when the proper neustic is added.

In the last section I have tried to show, though not very convincingly, that Hare's interpretation of the imperative logic involves four values. I admit that imperatives can be two-valued as are indicatives when interpret them in a certain way but I am afraid that they do not have the values in common in Hare's interpretation of imperative logic. If that be so, the obvious question is: Can sentences belonging to different interpretations of logic be used to construct a valid inference ? It appears to me that the answer has to be in the negative, since it is very hard to conceive of any method of testing the validity of inferences without referring to some value that is common to both the premises and the conclusion within an interpretation of logic.

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NOTES

1. Hare, R. M. : *Practical Inference* (MacMillan, 1972), p, 5.

2. *Practical Inference*, p. 7, and also see *The Language of Morals* (Clarendon Press, 1952). p. 5 by the same author.

3. *The Lauguage af Morals*, p. 29.

4, *The Language of Morals*, p. 30. The same point is being made repeatedly in part II of the book.

5. *The Language of Morals*, pp. 19 and 20.

6. *The Language of Morals,* p. 17, and also see p. 5.

7. *The Language of Morals,* p. 18. He calls it " descriptive meaning " in *Practical Inference,* see Ch. 2.

8. By " descriptors " Hare means almost the same as " phrastics ".

9. *Practical Inference,* p. 17, and also see *The Language of Morals,* p. 28.

10. *Practical Inference,* pp. 18 and 19.

11. *The Language of Morals,* p. 26, Note that by " neustic " Hare understands that that part of the meaning of the sentence which is other than the phrastic.

12. *The Language of Morals,* p. 28.

13. *The Language of Morals,* pp. 25 and 27.

14. Hare, R. M. : *Freedom and Reason* (Oxford University Press, 1963) Chs. 1 and 2, and also see *The Language of Morals,* Ch. 7.

15. See *The Language of Morals,* Chs. 6 and 7.

16. *The Language of Morals,* p. 21.

17. Strawson, P. F. : " On Referring " in *Contemporary Readings in Logical Theory,* I. M. Copi & J. A. Gould (ed.) (The MacMillan Company, New York, 1967), 105 ff.

18. In recent books on logic, the validity of an argument is defined in terms of truth-values: An argument is valid if and only if it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion be false, though the argument is supposed to be valid because of the very *form* it has.

19. Russel, B. : " On Denoting," see *Contemporary Readings in Logical Theory,* 93 ff

20. See "On Referring".

21. Quine, W. V. O. : "On What There Is", see *Contemporary Readings in Logical Theory,* 163 ff.

22. *The Language of Morals,* p. 18.

23. *The Language of Morals,* p. 15.

24. *The Language of Morals,* p. 18.

25. *The Language of Morals,* p. 13.

26. *The Language of Morals,* p. 13.

27. *Freedom and Reason,* p. 22.