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THE MYTH OF NEUTRALITY

I will argue that for important domains of the social sciences 'value neutrality,' as jargon has it, is not only not something which does not obtain, it cannot obtain. That is to say, in certain important respects the social sciences are not and cannot become normatively neutral. Perhaps the same thing holds for the natural sciences, but I shall make no such strong claim, though I will claim that, as a matter of fact, considerable ideological distortion often enters into the natural sciences. But I shall not argue that such non-neutrality is intrinsic to the natural sciences.

Left just like that, my above remarks are dark sayings. I shall attempt to make my intent clear as I proceed.

However, I shall first show why, what I have called 'the myth of neutrality,' has such a powerful grip on intellectual life. Here my remarks shall be limited to the social sciences and I should say, autobiographically, that I was for a very long time taken in by that myth. One of my earliest papers was in defense of the essential normative neutrality of the social sciences.[1] Among our academics it once attained the status of a dogma and it was thought rather odd that chaps like C. Wright Mills would attack it.[2] Now it is fashionable to attack it. Not caring at all about fashion, I first want to make you feel the force of what I have tendentiously called 'the myth of the normative neutrality of the social sciences.'

First note that it is one thing to say 'Hitler had a black mustache' and it is quite another to say 'Hitler had a black soul.' It is one thing to say 'Franco was a vile man' and it is another thing again to say 'Franco was a powerful figure in Spain' or 'Franco is dead.' It is one thing to say that the 'Waffle ought not to have been expelled from the Ontario N. D. P.' and it is another thing again to say 'There was a friction between the Waffle and the Trade Union Leadership.'

To fasten on the latter part first, it is evident enough that the statement about the tension between the Waffle and the Union Leadership is a statement that could be made within the domains of political science or political sociology, and we know how to go about, in a plainly empirical manner, finding out

whether it is true or false. But the 'Waffle ought not to have been expelled from the Ontario N. D. P.' is not a part of the domain of any social science. It is a straight-forward value judgment, which one may accept or not. Moreover, unlike our sociological statement, it is not a statement, whether we accept it or not, such that we have any clear idea about how we would go about ascertaining its truth or falsity. We know what would go toward establishing the truth or falsity of our statement about the tension between the Waffle and the Trade Union Leadership, but we do not know how to go about in a similarly straight-forward way the testing of the truth or falsity of the statement concerning the propriety of the Waffle's expulsion. The trouble here is not simply over the fact that many of us would disagree about whether it ought to have been done, for the same type of difficulties would emerge about statements concerning which we would all be in agreement, to wit 'Hitler's slaughter of the Jews was vile' and 'Hitler had at least four million Jews killed'. We know how to go about verifying the latter statement, but it is far from evident that we could similarly, if at all, *establish* the truth of the first statement. We unhesitatingly assent to it, but we are not confident that we know how to verify it, so that we can prove someone mistaken who doubts it.

Such differences, and others as well, tempt us to say : we have two kinds of claim here, on the one hand, empirical claims testable by the methods of science and, on the other hand, moral claims which are not part of any science and are claims concerning which each person must finally make up his own mind. These latter, it is also tempting to believe, either are themselves decisions of principle or rest on such decisions. As such they can neither just be seen to be true or false, as it could have been seen to be true or false that Hitler had a black mustache, nor can they be indirectly verified, as it could be indirectly verified that class had more influence than religion on the decisions by Germans to become Nazis.

There are two further related distinctions which reinforce what I have called 'the myth of value neutrality'. There is, firstly, a very considerable difference between, on the one hand, a statement such as 'The Arepesh believe that infanticide is a morally tolerable practice' and, on the other hand, either 'Infanticide is a morally intolerable practice' or 'The Arepesh

are justified in practicing infanticide'. The first statement—the statement about what the Arepesh *believe* is a perfectly proper anthropological statement that might appear in an anthropological monograph. It is not a moral statement but a statement *about* someone's moral beliefs which is itself morally neutral. We learn from it what the ethnographer believes are the moral beliefs which the Arepesh in fact have and, if what the ethnographer says is in fact so, we also learn what moral beliefs the Arepesh have, but in learning these things we learn nothing about the moral belief of the ethnographer, we learn nothing about which moral beliefs, if any, are justified and, as part of this, we learn nothing about whether the Arepesh themselves are *justified* in believing that infanticide is permissible. In what is social science here, namely ethnography, we learn something about what a certain culture believes to be right or wrong, but we do not ourselves learn what is right or wrong. We learn *about* normative matters but we do not learn anything *normative*: that is to say, we do not learn what is right or wrong or desirable or undesirable to do, though, of course, if we had no understanding of moral matters, we could not even learn about them in this scientific way; that is, we could not understand the ethnographer's talk about the moral beliefs of the Arepesh.[3] But the social scientist can tell us about someone's moral beliefs without agreeing with them. Indeed, we typically would not know what the anthropologist's moral attitude is toward the Arepesh in this matter and we could understand him and come to agree that what he said was so, while either agreeing or disagreeing or even remain indifferent to any claim that infanticide for the Arepesh or for anyone else, including ourselves, is justified. The statement about the moral beliefs of the Arepesh is simply a statement of putative ethnographic fact and, as such, it is normatively neutral. It is simply a statement about what is the case with the Arepesh. It is not a statement about what to make the case or about what should be the case. By contrast 'Infanticide is a morally intolerable practice' or 'The Arepesh are justified in practicing infanticide' are plainly moral statements. To accept them commits one morally—commits one in certain circumstances to try to act in a certain way—and they are statements, whose truth or falsity is not readily ascertainable, not because we do not have the empirical facts about the Arepesh,

but because we do not know what empirical facts, if any, would or even could establish the truth or falsity of these propositions. They simply could not stand as parts of an ethnographic monograph. They would not be a proper part of an anthropological report. They do not appear to be a part of the domain of science at all.

Similar contrast should be made between 'a matter of fact' and 'a matter of policy'. As a matter of fact, Alberta natural gas sells at such and such a price in Ontario, but formulations of policy are not statements of fact but are either recommendations or directives about how somebody is to proceed. A policy statement would be the following sort of statement. 'We should charge 16 cents per thousand cubic feet in Alberta and 20 cents per thousand cubic feet in the rest of Canada'. This could either be a policy recommendation by some economic advisors or financial councillors. It recommends that the provincial government adopt a certain way of acting; that is what makes it, when uttered in the right circumstances by the right people, a policy statement. But it does not state a fact, though, if this recommendation were to be adopted, the following quite distinct statement would become a true factual statement : 'Natural gas costs 15 cents per thousand cubic feet in Alberta, while it costs 20 cents per thousand cubic feet in the rest of Canada'. Economists can, of course, and indeed do, make policy recommendations to governments or industry, but their policy recommendations, normative as they are, are not a part of the corpus of their science anymore than a recommendation to cap a certain oil well at a certain time is part of the science of geology, though in both instances such policy recommendations are made partially on the basis of certain bits of scientific knowledge in economics and geology. But the recommendations made on the basis of this knowledge should be distinguished from the factual scientific knowledge itself. The policy, it is claimed, is "determined in the light of the facts, but it is not deduced from them."[4] Social scientists can make testable assertions about the likely consequence of adopting certain policies, but the policy recommendations are distinct from these assertions. Policy questions can be and indeed, with a certain amount of ideological mystification, often are stated as if they were purely technical questions. Thus, if we ask 'How can we get the Indians off the reserves and to

assimilate ? It sounds (superficially viewed) as if it were a purely technical question, but actually to ask it in anything more than a purely hypothetical way shows a commitment to a certain Indian policy, namely that it is a good thing to break up the reserve system and to get the Indians to assimilate. As John Passmore has pointed out, "Scientists sometimes profess to be giving 'merely technical advice' when in fact they are tacitly assuming a particular social policy."[5] But we can always distinguish, so the claim goes, the theoretical, factual and analytic structure of the science in question from the policy recommendations which are made in the light of it.

The defender of normative neutrality in the social sciences need not and indeed should not deny that morality is an integral element of our social life and the social systems he studies. He need only point out that in order to study morality, it is not necessary to moralize about it. The social scientist, as Passmore points out, should not leave moral issues alone in the sense of avoiding any question which involves them, for they are often of central importance in understanding social life. Moral claims are not themselves facts, but it is a factual matter that such and such people for such and such reasons make such and such moral claims and these facts can be and should be studied in a perfectly normatively neutral way. If they are ignored, the social scientist will be ignoring some of his most important data. "What he has to do," Passmore remarks, "is to produce theories about the structure of morality which are genuinely theories and do not involve the advocacy of any particular social policy."[6] But such a theory will not tell us what we ought to do anymore than physics will tell us whether we ought to go to the moon or build still bigger jets.

In the pattern of my argument so far, I have exhibited a tolerably crucial part of what defenders of what I have called the myth of value neutrality have wished to maintain in maintaining this once rather traditional position. Underlying it are some fundamental philosophical claims that have also been rather solidly entrenched until recently in the Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian philosophical traditions. Historically they were doctrines held in common by Hume and Kant. I shall summarize them in the following three propositions:

1. Facts and values are distinct; their respective claims belong to different domains of discourse.
2. Science (its mathematical and analytical machinery apart) is exclusively in the domain of factual discourse and is expressive of purely factual beliefs.
3. It is impossible to deduce a categorical moral claim from any statement of fact or conjunction of statements of fact. (This has sometimes been called 'Hume's Law.')

All of these traditional philosophical claims have been under heavy fire in recent philosophical discussion and indeed from some of the most 'scientifically oriented' philosophers themselves.[7] In trying here to show that this putative myth is indeed a myth, in trying indeed to exorcise a philosophical view that once had a profound grip on me and indeed is a view which I still feel ambivalent about, I shall not try to show that one can derive an 'ought' from an 'is,' for where the solid logical connection of entailment is at issue and the statement to be derived is an atomic categorical ought and the premisses unambiguously purely factual, I am at sea as to whether this really can be done.[8] I shall not make my arguments here turn on whether in such a strong sense one can derive an ought from an is. Moreover, while I believe that in certain important respects the distinction between fact and value has been oversimplified and that it is impossible adequately to characterize human actions and social structure in terms of two mutually exclusive domains of discourse, on the one hand, purely descriptive morally neutral factual talk and, on the other hand, normative commissive talk which does not make factual truth claims, it still seems to me patently evident that there is a distinction between fact and value and that any philosophical account which denies that there is such a distinction must be mistaken.[9] That is to say—to translate into the concrete—we do draw a distinction between saying 'Fred is a good person' and 'Fred is a brick layer,' between, 'people often not to drive over seventy miles an hour' and 'People often do drive over seventy miles an hour,' between 'It is desirable that Canada pursue a more independent policy from that of the United States' and 'It is likely that Canada will, in the future, pursue a more independent policy from that of the United States.' It is often only when we know that people do

in fact do a certain thing that we say that they ought not to or that it would be a good thing for them not to do it. Science is concerned with describing, predicting, retrodicting and explaining, among other things, what people have done, do, are likely to do, and what happens to them when they do these things. This knowledge is often obviously very relevant to what morally speaking we ought to do, but, it is not itself moral knowledge: that is knowledge of what we ought to do or have done or ought to aspire to be, of what is desirable or what is admirable. Morality is not itself science and cannot become a branch of science, for, by definition, science states or attempts to state what is the case or what is reasonable to believe is the case or might in time become the case or have been the case. And this, in virtue of what science is, must—logically must—be normatively neutral. Morality, by contrast, and again by definition, is concerned primarily with guiding behaviour. It tells us what to make the case and how it is we are to live or how to have lived or what to try to become. Given such different rationales, there must be a distinction between fact and value.

We can be more confident that this is the case than we can be of any paradoxical philosophical theory which would deny the reality of such a distinction. I only want to question whether that distinction requires the traditional autonomist interpretations that have been given to it and I want to question whether in accepting this common sense distinction, built into our very language and thought, we need to conclude or indeed should conclude that all that is genuine social science must be normatively neutral.

II

It will be the main burden of my argument to establish that in the social sciences there are some crucial and indeed indispensable elements that cannot be rendered normatively neutral and that thus this standard and in certain ways rather compelling picture of the social sciences must be in part mistaken. However, before I turn to that, I want to exhibit some *extrinsic* but politically and socially important ways in which the scientific enterprize—natural and social—is not and is unlikely to become neutral.[10] Though less interesting philosophically than the considerations I shall turn to later, these considerations are very

important ideologically and politically. They do not show how in an *intrinsic*, conceptually necessary, way science is in virtue of its very structure non-neutral but they do show how very massively the scientific establishment is in fact committed to the *status quo* and is in that important, but still extrinsic, way normatively non-neutral.

What I have in mind by these *extrinsic* ways in which science, natural and social, is non-neutral is the myriad ways in which research priorities and indeed research facilities are set not by ends intrinsic to science or even by the interests of scientists themselves but by the interests of industry and government. Vast amounts of research, particularly in tne United States, is in the service of the corporations and the military. Even in the university where one would expect that the scientific enterprize would be the purest, it is the case that in the United States, which probably provides the grossest examples of this, more than two thirds of the university research funds come from the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission or the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.[11] The United States Congress appropriates very considerable sums for scientific research. This is given in various ways to universities, including Federal contract research centres. With them the links are forged between the United States defense agencies and the universites. These research centres have 1.2 million dollars of research funds annually and almost all of this is sponsored by the American Department of Defense or the Atomic Energy Commission. Physics for military hardware aside, in 1968 the Defense Department of the United States spent fifty million dollars on projects related to developments in United States foreign policy. Scientists carried out studies designed to show how propaganda devices could be used to manipulate the internal policies of foreign countries and additional money was given to social scientists to study ways of pacifying Blacks. Sociologists, political scientists and anthropologists have done studies on counter-insurgency and indeed even in Canada, psychology professors have done psychological indoctrination projects for the Pentagon and at McGill University, professors sit on the boards of war-producing electronics corporations.

In sum, scientific research does not tend to be a disinterested search after truth. Business, government and the University with

its scientific facilities tend to form a troika in a symbiotic relationship where governments, which are in considerable measure tools of corporate capitalism, together with the industries themselves, set the goals of research by their funding. Modern science often needs extensive funding to do its work. But what its work shall be is in large measure determined by interests *extrinsic* to science itself. And these interests are the interests of a small but powerful ruling class who own and ultimately control the great multi-national corporations. The scientific enterprize in such a situation cannot be normatively neutral.

It will, however, be replied, and indeed appropriately, that this does not show that there is anything intrinsic to science itself in virtue of which it cannot be normatively neutral. It shows that the scientific establishment readily serves alien masters and that research will flourish which serves the dominant politico-economic power structures and that research which does not serve these structures and particularly research which might have effects tending to undermine these structures will not flourish. But still the conceptual distinctions made in the previous section are not at all touched by the recognition of these sociological facts. Whatever *motives* lead scientists to make certain discoveries do not make these discoveries themselves either moral or immoral. The following scientific discoveries, whatever the motives of those who made them, are *in themselves* normatively neutral, though the uses of them are something else again : (1) that a certein technique will pacify Blacks, (2) that a certain type of fragmentation bomb dropped on an area with a certain population density will tend to have such and such effects, and (3) that a certain type of governmental intervention in the economy at certain times will prevent depressions. I say that *in themselves* they are normatively neutral, for statements which state what these discoveries are, state facts and say nothing about what we are to do or about what is admirable or despicable. Their truth or falsity is not at all effected by one's ideological framework or by moral or political convictions. Quite apart from how we feel about them or what we believe should be done about them, they are either true or false, depending on whether or not what they assert to be so is or is not so. Validity and indeed even truth is not dependent on origin.[12] That Hitler said so and so will happen does not make it false, though

until we had some independent evidence for it, it would be well to be sceptical. The scientific facts are what they are no matter what motives led people to discover the facts or what nefarious uses they or others will make of this knowledge. It is plausible to contend that the scientific claims, as long as they are genuine scientific claims, cannot *in themselves* be anything but normatively neutral though the motives that led to their discovery or the purposes to which this knowledge is put are often anything but normatively neutral. Moreover, there is nothing in the very idea of science or scientific knowledge itself which makes it necessarily the case that science must be such a tool of the dominant political and economic powers. It is *logically* possible, though sociologically very unrealistic, that the scientific enterprize or better the scientific establishment could free itself from such extraneous influences, for it at least appears to be the case that there is nothing in the very concept of science itself which makes it non-neutral and value-laden.

To this it should be replied that it is a piddling argument to show in such a context that something is a logical possibility. It is indeed a *logical* possibility that I might sprint from Ottawa to Calgary in five minutes, but that is hardly an interesting or significant possibility. All kinds of absurdities are logically possible.

The point of these sociological arguments concerning the *de facto* normative commitments and ideological bias of the scientific establishment is that, if they are well taken, as I believe they are, this means that we cannot reasonably expect that scienece will in fact be a disinterested and objective search for truth but that it will, very extensively, though hopefully not entirely, serve the ruling interests and powers of the society within which the scientists in question live and indeed that it will sometimes even provide ideological mystification for these interests. This is a very important political and ideological claim and the fact that it is *logically* possible that science might be otherwise is in itself of no significance.

III

I want now to turn to the conceptually most demanding part of my task, namely to my attempt to show that certain significant areas in the social sciences are in part *necessarily* and

unavoidably normative. I am not claiming now that just, as a matter of fact, they have a certain normative orientation or reflect certain ideological interests, but that there is something *intrinsic* to their very structure which makes it impossible for them to be normatively neutral. It is important to remember that this is (a) a much more controversial argument than the previous one and (b) a purely conceptual or philosophical argument. Our above sociological argument, note, left perfectly intact the dominant theory that scientific claims *in themselves* are purely factual and non-normative, that facts are facts, and as such are non-normative, that values are values, and as such are not a part of science, and that scientific theories are one thing and policy recommendations (made in the light of them) another. In fine, the above sociological critique did not at all challenge the standard picture of the conceptual structure of science. Without wanting to throw the baby out with the bath water, I want now to show how an important portion of that standard picture can be successfully challenged.

Let us concentrate on political science or what is sometimes called political sociology. In the work of such influential political scientists as Lasswell, Dahl and Lipset, there is the traditional aspiration to have a value free social science, but it is also the case that in their own accounts there are distinctive theoretical and conceptual frameworks. They, do not limit themselves to a non-interpretive description of what is going on. Rather they attempt to explain, interpret and categorize political and social realities. But to do this is already to commit oneself to a certain cluster of norms. We could only keep our political sociological account normatively neutral if it were possible to give an account of what is going on in society which would be non-interpretive and not commit one to a given conceptual framework with its implicit or explicit norms. But one cannot do this without severely limiting and trivializing one's subject matter. Moreover, by limiting it to such non-interpretive or minimally interpretive and unsystematized descriptions, we would hardly have anything which would count as a science.

Suppose, to work with deliberately oversimplified but I hope instructive example, a social scientist is trying to explain the difference in labour militancy in Quebec and Ontario. He can remain normatively neutral as long as he limits himself to descri-

ptions of the order: so and so many workers are unionized in Quebec and so and so many in Ontario, so and so many strikes occurred in Quebec and so and so many strikes occurred in Ontario, the level of unemployment in Quebec is such and such while the level of unemployment in Ontario is such and such. But political sociology is not such a laundry list. It also aspires to be explanatory, interpretive and to provide a conceptual framework. Suppose a political scientist says that the greater militancy of the Quebec workers is attributable to their greater class consciousness which in turn is a result of their longer and sharper history of exploitation. In New France they experience exploitation both at the hands of their aristocracy and their clergy and then again, as a defeated and despised people after the English victory, by both their own clergy and the English and finally in their present situation triply, still by their own clergy, by Anglophone branch plant managers and by the Americans who now really call the tune. In short, their greater class consciousness and consequent militancy obtains in virtue of the Quebecois being in effect the most oppressed non-native peoples in their *de facto* but not *de jure* status as second class colonials in what is in reality an American colony. How this is plainly a very theoretically ramified account and its claims are most surely challengeable. However, I am not interested in the present context in its accuracy but in its illustrative value as the kind of accout that might be given by at least some political sociologists.

Concerning such an account two things should be immediately obvious. First, sociological accounts which theorize and operate at such levels of abstraction and interpretation inescapably have normative commitments. Second, a theoretical and interpretive account of such a general type must be given to explain the difference in labor militancy in Quebec and Ontario. In genuine sociological accounts, more complicated, qualified and sophisticated than the sample account I have just given, these features would not be so evident but they would be there all the same. [13]

However, it is instructive with respect to my simplified sample account to see just how it is normative and how rival accounts would likewise be normative. The very talk of ' class consciousness', ' exploitation,' and being in effect ' colonized ' commits one to a Marxian or quasi-Marxian framework. This framework is both highly interpretive and carries with it normative and ideological

commitments. The first and I believe naive response to this is to say: what we should do is simply *tell it like it is* without using such normatively freighted concepts. But what is it 'to tell it like it is' here and still accurately explain the differing degrees of labor militancy? Suppose we say we must get rid of the suspect concepts of class and class consciousness with their attendant conceptions of the role of class struggle. But how then are we to explain the difference between the Quebec worker and the Ontario worker? How does the Quebec worker see himself ? If we do not, in some alternative conceptual framework, have the concept of class but alternately talk of status, we could say that he feels more keenly than his Ontario counterpart his lack of status. We could alternately not talk of class and class-consciousness or even of status, but of his *anomie*, his enhanced feelings of disenchantment with the system because of his different religious and cultural affiliations. He becomes increasingly aware of his distinctness in north America and sees his identity ever more forcefully threatened. Similarly, we could drop the word 'exploitation' and talk of work under harsh conditions for minimal wages or could speak of the American economic penetration in Quebec or still more weakly of extensive American investment in Quebec.

However, the crucial thing to note is that there is no generally agreed on vocabulary which just tells it like it is without an interpretation which also involves an evaluation exhibiting very fundamentally the scientist's own conception about how the society really functions, about the quality of its institutions and the nature of human life within those institutions. Our various and often conflicting images of society, together with our conceptions of what are crucial human needs and genuine human potentialities, go into the theoretical frameworks we will adopt to explain and interpret such phenomena.[14] But all of these notions are highly evaluative.

Many end-of-ideology liberals and conservatives would have us believe that in this domain the most commonsensical ordinary language discourse is the safest, most accurate discourse—the kind of discourse most likely to be really telling it like it is. The more radical sounding talk, they would have us believe, is more ideological, emotive and distorting. But this is, to put it minimally, all very questionable. It is true that to most people, educated in

a certain way, such commonsensical talk, free from conceptions such as class-consciousness or charismatic leaders or anomie, is more familiar and more comfortable. But that in itself proves very little. In *such domains*, it may well be that Gramsci is right in thinking that to choose to so limit oneself to such commonsense vocabulary and conceptions is in effect to accept, though often unwittingly, the ideological orientation of the ruling class. That is to say (translating now into the concrete), to talk of the present American relation to Quebec as simply a matter of extensive American investment in Quebec and not in terms of exploitation and colonization or attempted colonization is to, wittingly or unwittingly, adopt the ideology of the ruling class with its network of normative commitments. It is not just neutrally and commonsensically to describe the situation. A Marxist alternative description is, of course, also interpretive and norm-laden. But what is necessary is careful argument, involving the use of both theories and evidence, to make any claim stick as to which claim is the more accurate or at least the least non-distorting. The point is, that here we are in, what Charles Taylor has aptly called a hermeneutical or interpretive circle with no way or at least not evident way to break out.[15] When we try to say something complex and important about society, such as to give an explanation of why Quebec workers are more militant than Ontario workers, we are not able to give explanations in a normatively neutral vocabulary which all or even most fair minded and careful observers would agree accurately describes what needs to be said. We find ourselves involved with theoretical conceptions embedded in conceptual frameworks which are not normatively neutral. Sometimes we can find a more antisceptic framework, which would be generally agreed on and would be thought to describe the situation as accurately as the more contested, ramified frameworks, but often, indeed probably, this is not the case. Instead, we find ourselves with conflicting norm-laden conceptual frameworks which are essential for our saying usually what we want to say and with no normatively neutral way of deciding between thes frameworks. Such frameworks are unavoidable in any social science which achieves any theoretical adequacy; such frameworks are not normatively neutral; and any choice between conflicting frameworks involves a normative choice. Because of such considerations social science cannot be normatively neutral.

If this, as it appears to be, is inescapably so in key areas of social science, then social science is unavoidably interpretive and normative.

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NOTES

1. Kai Nielsen, " Reason in the Social Sciences, " *Phylon*. Vol. XIX (Fall, 1958).
2. C. Wright Mills, *The Sociological Imagination* (New York : Oxford University Press, 1959). See as well the essays by Alvin W. Gouldner and Abraham Edel in *The New Sociology*, ed. by Irving Louis Horowitz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965).
3. Peter Winch has convincingly argued the case for the priority of the participant's discourse and understanding in his " Social Science." *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. VII (March, 1956), pp. 18-33. *The Idea of a Social Science* (New York : Humanities Press, 1958), and " Understanding a Primitive Society," *American Philosophical* Quarterly (1964), pp. 307-24.
4. John Passmore, " Can the Social Sciences be Value-Free ?" in *Readings in the Philosophy of Science*, ed. by Herbert Feigel and May Brodbeck (New York : Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953), p. 675.
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ibid.* p. 677.
7. Charles Taylor, " Nautrality in Political Science," in *The Philosophy of Social Explanation*, ed. by Alan Ryan (London : Oxford University Press, 1973) and "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man" *The Review of Mataphysics*, Vol. XXV, No. 1 (September, 1971). See as well my ' Social Science and American Foreign Policy," in *Philosophy, Morality and Internalional Affairs*, ed. by Virginia Held, Sidney Morgenbesser and Thomas Nagel (New York : Oxford University Press, 1974). In addition many of the articles collected in *Social Structure and Political Theory*, ed. by William E. Connolly and Glen Gordin (Lexington, Massachusetts : 1974) are useful in this context.

8. There is a vast literature on this topic. One of the most useful in the present context is Richard Norman, "On Seeing Things Differently." *Radical Philosophy* 1 (1972). For some exacting general discussion of the problem of deriving an ought from an is, see the essays collected by W. D. Hudson (Ed.), in *The Is-Ought Question* (London : Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1969) and the essays by Alison Jaggar, " It Does Not Matter Whether We can Derive " Ought from ' Is ', " and R. M. Martin, " What Follows from ' I Promise .. ? ' " both in the *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. III (March, 1974).

9. This has been powerfully argued in various well-known articles by Philippa Foot. In a set of lectures, *Fact and Value*, which unfortunately are unpublished, Peter Herbst has simply and trenchantly argued this position, sorting out, as he goes along, many of the central issues.

10. This is powerfully argued in the essays collected by Robin Blackburn (Ed.) under the title *Ideology in Social Science* (London : Fontana, 1972). Blackburn usefully summarizes and simplifies many of these arguments himself in his " Defending the Myths : The Ideology of Bourgeois Social Science, " in *Up Against the American Myth*, ed. by Tom Christoffel, *et. al.* (New York: Holt-Rinehart-Winston, 1970), pp. 154-69.

11. Kai Nielsen, " Politicized Universities, " *Journal of Educational Thought*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (August, 1974).

12. That this matter is not as simple as it seems is brought to the fore in the work of Jurgen Habermas, particularly in *Theory and Practice* and *Knowledge and Interests*. Yet it can hardly be the case that complicated analysis can gainsay the rather simple distinctions appealed to above.

13. See the examples developed by Taylor in the essays listed in footnote 7.

14. Charles Taylor, " Interpretation and the Sciences of Man, " *The Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. XXV, No. 1 (September, 1971).

15. *Ibid.* See my discussion of this in my " Social Science and American Foreign Policy, " in *Philosophy, Morality and International Affairs*, ed. by Virginia Held, Sidney Morgenbesser and Thomas Nagel.