

SENSE - DATA AND J. L. AUSTIN : A RE-EXAMINATION

1. Introduction

1.1 After J. L. Austin's polemics in his *Sense and Sensibilia* many critics are of the opinion that sense-data philosophy is philosophically speaking, redundant. In this paper we shall attempt to re-examine the agency of Austin's argumentation.

2. Austin's polemics

2.1 In *Sense and Sensibilia*¹ Austin develops an argument against the notion of sense-datum which is the centric one in sense-data philosophy. "That all one sees are sense-data," a centric assertion in this philosophy, trades on a confusion between a delusion and an illusion, according to him. To highlight the point, very rightly, he amplifies these two notions—delusion and illusion. In a delusion, for instance, something is conjured up which is primarily subjective and unreal. In an illusion, however, there is something which is really present and public. To this extent Austin is critical; but he attempts to be constructive also. His success will depend on what he offers instead of sense-data.

2.2 The major premis of Austin's thesis is as follows : that contemporary philosophy in the English speaking world is moving on the wrong track as regards "the philosophy of perception." Philosophers such as Ayer, Price, Warnock, etc., have misconceived the phenomenology of perception. He asserts that the notions involved in the philosophy of perception are far more complex and subtle than what these philosophers take them to be. The claim that Austin makes as regards the wrong track on which "the philosophy of perception" moves, is radical and novel. In this connection, he examines the basic doctrine of sense-data philosophy—"We never directly, perceive or sense, material objects (or material things), but only sense-data (or our own ideas, impressions, *sensa*, sense-perceptions, percepts etc.)"²

2.3 One of the tasks of a sense-datum philosophy can be conceived as a possible translation of material-object statements into those about sense-data. Another way of making this point would be to say that the 'translation' in question is a 'linguistic

recommendation.' But, then, what is a linguistic recommendation? Ayer defines it as the theory which asserts that physical objects are logical constructions out of sense-data. That is to say that physical-object statements are equivalent to some set of statements about sense-data. Statements which refer to physical objects can also be expressed by statements which refer exclusively to sense-data, and are called sense-datum statements. In any event, sense-datum statements are different from physical-object statements. One cannot make a mistake if one confines oneself to the former language; for, it involves the incorrigible sensing or experiencing of sense-data. However, one can make a mistake if one confines oneself to the physical-object language, as it involves that which is inferred from sensing of sense-data.

2.4 The 'Argument from Illusion' which is assumed to be the asylum of sense-data philosophy, meets a powerful onslaught from Austin. He considers this argument to be inappropriate. Ayer, when Austin criticises, makes explicit the 'Argument from Illusion' in the following manner. "The argument, as it is ordinarily stated, is based on the fact that material things may present different appearances to different observers, or to the same observer in different conditions and that the character of these appearances is to some extent causally determined by the state of the conditions and the observer."⁴ Refractions, reflections (mirror images), mirages, etc., are cited as examples. These are categorized as illusory perceptions.

2.5 Austin takes Ayer to task for this categorization, by pointing out the basic differences amongst the so-called illusory perceptions. In this polemical argumentation-one of the best parts of Austin's critique-a fine analysis of language is evident. Some of the notions which are current in any perceptual talk such as 'real', 'appears', 'seems', 'illusion', 'delusion', occupy centric status in the analysis. More light, therefore, is thrown on the notion of illusion in particular and the Argument from Illusion in general.

2.6 Two implications follow from the Argument from Illusion: "(a) that all cases cited in the argument are cases of illusion; and (b) that illusion and delusion are the same thing. But both of these implications, of course, are quite wrong" ⁵ He adds: ". . . the argument trades on confusion at just this point."⁶ Austin is quite correct here in pointing out the confusion of illusion and delusion in Ayer's formulation of the Argument from Illusion.

2.7 Admittedly, Austin says, "An illusion (in a perceptual context) does not suggest that something totally unreal is conjured up . . . whereas the term 'delusion' does suggest something totally unreal, not really there at all."⁷ The woman on the stage with her head in a black bag, the rotating wheels, are quoted as instances for the former; while delusions of persecution and delusions of grandeur are cited as cases for the latter. With reference to the latter phenomena he also adds: "delusions are a much more serious matter—something is really wrong, and what's more, wrong with the person who has them. He needs to be cured."⁸ The following points are emphasized in Austin's argument. A delusion is a phenomenon which consists of something conjured up by the person. Again, it is something subjective and basically private. Therefore, it is unreal. Ontologically speaking, there is neither discovery nor endorsement of physicality. In an illusion, however, there is something *really* present—something public. The Ponzo illusion and the Hering illusion can be quoted as examples. At this point Austin says that Ayer conflates these two different notions and so draws a conclusion to the effect that what are perceived are somethings which are there; and that they are non-physical states of affairs. These states of affairs are but sense-data, *sensa*, etc...

2.8 The argument of sense-data as constructed by Ayer, according to Austin, "trades on a confusion." Characteristically, once an analysis of the notions is carried out, the confusion can be removed; *ipso facto*, the Argument from Illusion is also removed. As a result, the perception of incorrigible sense-data or acceptance of incorrigible sense-datum statements remains redundant. From which it follows that inferring physical object from them is redundant also. This is a strong argument against the alleged incorrigible ground-axioms of sensing of sense-data. The adherents of the sense-data philosophy find it difficult to develop a cogent alternative argument against Austin's.

2.9 Austin did not stop at this juncture. He reveals other weak points in the sense-data philosophy. His criticism of certain other aspects of sense-data philosophy is very cogent. For instance, sense-data philosophers assert that sense-data are directly sensed, and the percipient indirectly infers the perception of the physical object from the directly sensed sense-data. In respect of non-

veridical perception such as illusion, hallucination, etc, there is no valid inference involving the notion of physicality. Admittedly, what are sensed in non-veridical perception are also sense-data. This contention affects the claim that the intervention of sense-data as primary, in both cases of perception-veridical and non-veridical. However, both Ayer and Price consistently entertain the above. In contrast to it, Austin attempts to prove the falsity of this assertion. The difference between dreaming and seeing is made use of in this connection. Austin's contention which involves the qualitative-distinguishability of the veridical from the nonveridical is brief. Nevertheless, it is cogent. This again demonstrates the validity of Austin's assertion that the notions that are current in the philosophy of perception are deep, subtle and complex.

2·10 It is also relevant to consider another point that is discussed by Austin. The notion that he brings to the forefront—that of “see...as...”¹⁰ which is derived from the later-Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*. This seems (according to Austin) to be the key to the dissolution of the philosophical worry that involves sense-data. He suggests that the cases which appear as if sense-data is the only answer, can be explained away by the “see...as...” formula. So he adds: “Instead of saying that, to the naked eye, a distant star looks like a tiny speck or appears as a tiny speck, we would say that it is seen as a tiny speck...”¹¹ On this ground, the sense-data interpretation of non-veridical perception becomes spurious.

2·11 Austin also criticises validly another aspect of Ayer's sense-data philosophy. This time, what is emphasized is the so-called implied arbitrary character of Ayer's notion of a sense-datum; “Where we say that two observers are seeing the same material thing, he prefers to say that they are seeing different things which have, however, some structural properties in common. But the facts to which these expressions are intended to refer are in either case the same. In other words, we are not disputing about the validity of two conflicting sets of hypotheses, but about the choice of two different languages.”¹² Against this contention Austin argues: “for, if when one person says whatever it may be, another person may simply ‘prefer to say’ something else, they will always be arguing only about words, about what terminology is to be preferred. How could anything be a question of truth or

falsehood, if anyone can always say whatever he likes?¹³ The criticism is valid. Talk about perception cannot end up arbitrarily; truth must be reached.

3. Onslaught on Austin

3.1 Though Austin analysed the notion of illusion and delusion or subjective hallucination, this is no means a comprehensive analysis of similar notions. Phenomological data associated with the notion, for instance, are not taken into consideration. It may be said that it is difficult to consider all cases of hallucination and delusion—something wrong with the percipient. Seeing mirages in the tropics is a common phenomenon. At noontide heat, one can see mirages (hallucinations) at farthest end of straight roads, across extensive fields, etc. And it is not necessary that the percipient should be a traveller with a crazed brain, exhausted and thirsty. The outer atmospheric conditions project mirages, and they can be called 'objective' in a very primitive sense; yet the fact remains that there is no water there, viz., at farthest end of straight roads or across extensive fields, etc., at noontide heat. If one attempts to find water, then it will be an unprofitable journey. But is it wrong to say that one sees a mirage (hallucination)? Not at all. A centric aspect of the philosophy of perception is not whether one is deceived by the particular phenomena, but what one *sees*: deception is subordinate to what is seen. And then to work out epistemological implications of the notion of 'see.'

3.2 Although certain delusions such as a delusion of persecution, can doubtless be assigned to a sufferer, someone who needs to be cured, not all hallucinations are like this. Some hallucinations are objective, e. g., the tropical mirages just discussed. These constitute a problem in the philosophy of perception. The notion 'see' as a verb of perception plays a centric role in any perceptual talk. Another way of making this point would be to say that the notion 'see' is centric with reference to the phenomenon of objective hallucination.

3.2.1 On this ground, the query as to "What does one see?" is a centric element in perceptual talk. Austin's view is that, as there is a name for delusions, namely, mirages,¹⁴ a new name called 'sense-data' is not necessary. This is perfectly true and to the point, if he means subjective hallucinations alone. However

the notion of subjective hallucination does not exhaust the notion of hallucination altogether. Needless to add that the notion of hallucination involves three types of hallucination—(i) subjective hallucinations, (ii) objective hallucinations, and, (iii) ‘veridical hallucinatory quasi-perceptions.’

3.2.2 A subjective hallucination can be defined in terms of a perception reported (in the absence of any stimulation of the sense organs), in adverse situations such as dreaming, fantasy, starvation, extreme thirst, acute anxiety, fear, madness, delirium tremens, etc. Austin’s term for them is ‘delusion.’ Whereas an objective hallucination can be defined in terms of a perception reported in the presence of certain stimulations of the sense organs. They include mirages in noontide heat at the farthest end of straight roads or across extensive fields or extensive farm country, etc. In an objective hallucination such as ‘seeing a mirage in noontide heat,’ ontologically, a host of other conditions are responsible for its generation, besides those of the percipient. Such objective hallucinations are projected by outer atmospheric conditions. They can be public like the states of affairs accepted as physical objects by philosophers, but with a difference. For, there is no water in concrete there, viz., at the farthest end of straight roads, across extensive fields, across farm country, etc., at noontide heat.

3.2.3 But ‘veridical hallucinatory quasi-perceptions’ are different from both subjective hallucinations just discussed. C. D. Broad describes them in the following manner: “We shall say that a person was having such an experience on a given occasion, if and only if the following two conditions were fulfilled: (i) He was ostensibly seeing, hearing, touching or otherwise sensibly perceiving a certain person or event or state of affairs, as external to his body. Whilst (ii) at that time his eyes, ears, fingers or other receptor sense organs were not being affected in the normal physical manner...”¹⁵ It is clear, therefore, that ‘veridical hallucinatory quasi-perceptions’ are different from objective hallucinations and subjective hallucinations (delusions) just mentioned. If they resemble anything, it must be the subjective hallucinations (delusions); for both types of hallucination are purely pathological conditions. The latter are the result of delirium tremens, extreme thirst, extreme fear, madness, etc. As

Austin noted, they need to be cured. Admittedly, those who undergo 'veridical hallucinatory quasi-perceptions' do not need to be cured. Broad clearly points out the fact that the experient of these latter type of hallucination can very well be sane and awake.¹⁶ It is evident, therefore, that 'veridical hallucinatory quasi-perceptions' are different from both subjective and objective hallucinations. Sense-organs, sensory-apparatus, environmental world, etc., are not involved as regards the former. The notion of 'veridical hallucinatory quasi-perception' falls outside the compass of 'perception-proper.' Austin fails to make this point explicit.

3.3 Again, he fails to show the basic difference between subjective hallucinations and objective hallucinations. The former are pathological conditions (hence do not come within the scope of perception) and the latter are perceptions though different from normal perceptions which discover and endorse physicality. Since Austin does not draw this distinction, it is difficult to note the logical place of the notion of objective hallucination in his analysis. The important point as regards mirages in the sense of objective hallucinations, is the content that is noticed, phenomenologically. It is this content which is significant and not so much the re-naming of it. Austin says that there is no 'difficulty' here. Ironically, though, philosophically speaking, there is a genuine one here.

3.4 With reference to illusions, Austin says, "The cases, again, in which a plain man might say he was 'deceived by his sense' are not at all common."¹⁷ This is true. Again, he adds that the words such as 'real' and 'like' (adjective words)¹⁸ are enough to dissolve some kind of philosophical worry such as the so-called illusions. Therefore, illusions do not cause a serious problem in perceptual talk. The same argument applies to other cases of non-veridical perceptions—delusions. It is quite true that these cases are not very common, and the plain man may not consider these non-veridical perception to be 'illusory' or 'abnormal'. Admittedly, rarity cannot be conceived as a good reason for suppressing them. Non-veridical perceptions such as illusions, objective hallucinations and subjective hallucinations occur very often, and tend to enter serious perceptual talk as a significant conceptual issue. This is not the concern of the plain man.

Primarily, it is left to the philosopher. This may be the centric reason why the plain man is considered to be naive by Price.²⁰

3.5 With reference to the phenomenon of non-veridical perceptions, it must be noted that Austin fails to touch upon the phenomenological aspects of perception—'sensing', 'noticing', 'the sensory apparatus,' 'causal production' etc. Is it supposed that these are not the concern of both the plain man and the philosopher of common sense? It may be the case that this standpoint can dissolve some kind of philosophical worry; yet it cannot be considered a healthy situation in the philosophy of perception. Again, Austin does not attempt a clarification of many important words in any talk of perceptual phenomena — 'perception' (he accuses Ayer of giving an ambiguous definition of this word), 'see,' 'sensation,' 'knowledge,' 'belief,' 'memory,' 'identification,' etc.

3.6 He is on the right track as he attempts clarification of notions such as 'see', 'see as'. But his procedure is puzzling. For instance, he criticizes Ayer's views that the words 'perceive' and 'see' have different senses by asking whether we have to agree that there are two different senses of 'perceive,' and then saying "Well, no, we don't."²¹ Why not? Admittedly, there are two perfectly correct and familiar sense of perceptual verbs such as 'see' and 'perceive.' In one sense they can be used "... in such a way that to say of an object that it is perceived does not entail saying that it exists in any sense at all."²² And it "is also a correct and familiar usage of the word 'perceive' in which to say of an object that it is perceived does carry the implication that it exists."²³ when Fred I. Dretske says, "...way of seeing provides us with an existential implication,"²⁴ he speaks about the latter sense. In this connection we may also quote J. R. Smythies: "...in actual English usage, the word 'see,' 'look,' etc.. are used to describe hallucinatory sense—experiences as well as veridical ones."²⁵

3.7 These assertions evidently suggest two senses in the context of perceptual verbs such as 'see,' 'perceive,' etc.. Again, they refute Austinean contention to the effect that perceptual verbs do not have two senses. Ironically, though, later on he goes on to say that "the implications of 'perceive' may differ in constructions, rather than that there are two 'senses' of perceive."²⁶ Its implication is not clearly worked out. The distinction he draws

between a word having different senses and a word having different implications in different constructions is not free of ambiguity. It is apparent, therefore, that Austin's analysis in this connection lacks clarity and comprehensiveness.

3.8 What emerges explicitly from this for the moment is that the Austinean critique of one of the most venerable bugbears in the history of philosophy, viz., the pursuit of the incorrigible²⁷ seems, basically unconvincing. To sense—data philosopher, there are two types of sentences—(i) material-object sentences, and (ii) sense-data ones. The former need verification, yet cannot be conclusively verified; but the latter are certain and no verification is necessary. Once again, this dichotomy is a direct result of the Argument from Illusion. As shown earlier, to Austin, the Argument from Illusion is spurious. In consequence the dichotomy of material-object sentences and sense-data ones is also spurious.

3.8.1. Material-object sentences need no conclusive verification for their absolute certainty. On the other hand, sense-data sentences are neither certain nor free from retraction. Austin quotes examples for the two cases in question. They are "That is a pig" and 'This looks red.' For sense-data philosophers, material object sentences are open to challenge; but the sense-data ones are free from such a challenge, and, therefore, are certain and incorrigible. Austin is at variance with the above position—the former are not open to challenge whereas the latter are. He is not only the polar opposite of sense-data philosophers, but is also one who finds an absolute certainty in material-object sentences (taking into account the situation in which they are used).²⁸ To put the matter thus would be worth the effort, for, Austin claims that his argument demonstrates the spurious character of the 'incorrigible basis' of the sense-data philosophy.

3.8.2. It is quite true that material-object sentences (depending on the circumstances, of course) in general, need not be verified. But the author forgets the important logical fact that all material-object sentences, open to retraction and challenge. In such cases, demands for evidence are quite valid. As to Austin's two examples (i) As a matter of fact, I live in Oxford,²⁹ and, (ii) This is a pig—although these are considered by him to be absolutely certain, they are not free of all challenge and retraction, and any such challenge or retractions is not self-contradictory,

though it may be self-stultifying. Nevertheless, circumstances can change swiftly and quickly. A possibility of a theoretical challenge, therefore, cannot be analytically ruled out. As an instance, one may take his own example—As a matter of fact, I (Austin) live (lives) in Oxford. This was true then, but is false now. The same is the case with This is a pig. Even if the animal is seen still someone can challenge, epistemology-wise, for evidence, as proof of the case in question. This is neither self-contradictory nor false. Austin supposes it to be false, but the falsity involved is not demonstrated. A possibility of a challenge in the case of 'material-object sentences,' therefore, remains.

3·9 Let us suppose, as a second step, that I want to prove my view-point—that that was a pig and not any other animal. If so, further observation of the case is necessary. So one can see how material-object sentences are open to challenge : but sense-data once are not open to challenge in this way. It is not self-contradictory, therefore, to attempt to demonstrate the possibility of some sort of a general answer for the problems in the area of perception, though Austin earnestly denies such a possibility. "There could be no general answer to the questions, what is evidence for what, what is certain, what is doubtful, what needs or does not need evidence, can or can't be verified. If the Theory of Knowledge consists of finding grounds for such an answer, there is no such."³⁰ This amounts to an assertion "A general answer is just impossible." It is evident that he has taken 'generality' to be 'absolutely unconditional,' which is too much to demand. Admittedly, such demands can make the general laws of the sciences and the generalization arrived at by complex mechanisms completely meaningless, which is an embarrassing conclusion. However, when Austin criticises Warnock's views, he adds: "but this just isn't true in general."³¹ There seems to be an inconsistency here. He shows the cloven hoof when he both denies generality elsewhere and accepts generality at this point. This implies the centric significance of generality.

3·10 In sum, in this analysis, Austinean argumentation clearly demonstrates some sound points that could shake up any conceptual structure of a sense-datum theory. It does not mean, however, that there is nothing in the sense-data philosophy adopted by so many leading philosophers in pre-war and post-war Philo-

sophy. Again, in sense-data philosophy, the contents not only remain rich but are also tightly woven. John Passmore's contention expressed in the following words at this point is very appropriate: Austin says nothing whatever about the argument from physics—from the disparity between things as we ordinarily take them to be and things as the physicist describes them—which many epistemologists have thought to be the most fundamental of all arguments for sense-data."³² Therefore, the following can be safely entertained, namely, Austin's polemics are not that fatal to sense-data philosophy. His criticisms of one of the "venerable bugbears" in the history of philosophy remain unconvincing.

4. Conclusion

4.1 Let us turn, as a third step to note what Austin offers instead of sense-data. Austin's contention is expressed in the words: "...a mass of seductive (mainly verbal) fallacies." This is the extent to which the Austinean exposition is critical. At the beginning, however, we entertained the view that he is constructive as well and that his success will depend on what he offers instead of sense-data. At this particular juncture, it must be said that there are no constructive points in the Austinean polemics. His novel view is evidenced from his critical examination of the contention that "We never directly perceive or sense, material objects (or material things), but only sense-data (or our own ideas,) impressions, sense, sense-perceptions, percepts, etc." Yet he does not prove his point convincingly. "Direct perception of physicality" as understood by ordinary language-analyst like Austin, will have to overcome the implications of logical nuances of the notions such as 'direct perception,' 'indirect perception,' 'immediate perception' etc. They have several meanings.³³ About these notions, Austin should have shown with clarity, either the contradiction involved in several meanings of them or the theoretical inappropriateness of them. He attempts neither. This is a vital drawback in the context of constructive contributions of Austin in the area of "the philosophy of perception", granted he successfully destroys the ground-axioms of the sense-data philosophy.

4.2 The Austinean argumentation in 'Sense and Sensibilia' does not establish the basic assertion that the sense-data philosophy is a mass of seductive (mainly verbal) fallacies. The point we

high-light relates to his failure to establish that the notions involved in the philosophy of perception are far more complex and subtle than what the contemporary sense-data philosophers maintain. In this connection, it is amply justified, if one can show the following—the unanalysed-unclarified notions—utilised by Austin such as 'perception', 'perceive', 'sensing', 'sensation', 'see', 'knowledge', 'belief', 'memory', 'identification' etc. The assertion to the effect that the notions involved in perception are complex is not convincingly demonstrated and by implication therefore the Austinean argument is weak.

4.3 Again, his argument that the conclusion of a sense-data philosophy—that all one sees are sense-data, trades on a confusion between a delusion and an illusion, brings a Gallic clarity and logic to his task. But then it does not dismiss the sense-data philosophy altogether. As pointed out earlier this kind of philosophy was adopted, in the recent past by many leading philosophers in the world—Ayer, Ryle, Russell, Smythies Price, Grice, Smart, Campbell, Garnett etc. Ryle at first exposes the 'myth' of the sense-data philosophy, by saying that it is a logical howler.³⁴ Later in the same book he parts company with this idea: "I have fallen in with the official story that perceiving involves having sensations. But this is a sophisticated use of "sensation."³⁵ The sub-notion of 'sensation' in this sense is implicitly contained in the wider notion of perception. It may be entertained that the sub-notion of 'sensation,' is almost identical with that of 'sense-datum.' To put the point in other words, the notion of sense-datum, indirectly, finds a logical place in any perceptual talk according to Ryle. The centric significance of the notion of sense-datum, in any perceptual talk is thus made explicit. It follows therefore that to talk about sense-data is not an indication to refuse to move with current philosophical trends. To lay bare by analysis the confusion between a delusion and an illusion is not enough to show the illogicality of the ground-axioms of the sense-data philosophy. Ernest Gellner very rightly contends: "...in general truth is not a matter of the ultimate nuance. It may be so sometimes. There is no reason for supposing that it is so always or frequently."³⁶ The argument which necessitated the introduction of sense-data cannot be refuted by an analysis of nuances of notions in the philosophy of perception.

4.4 Finally the Austinean formula—the notion of ‘see...as.’ is not a real key to the dissolution of the philosophical worry that involves sense-data. Indeed it discourages a sort of attitude of some sense-data philosophers—to imply a sensing of ‘an appearance’. If X can be said to see a car, then by necessity, the car is appearing to X in some way. Therefore from the statement,

(i) “X sees a car”

we may infer

(ii) “A car appears in some way to X.”

This can be transformed in the following way as well,

(iia) “A car presents X with an appearance.”

However, it would be fallacious to infer from it,

(iib) “X sees an appearance.”

4.4.1 (iib) is an inference from (i), (ii) and (iia). But by necessity, this is a fallacious inference. One commits this fallacy if from a premiss of the form “X sees a car which appears in some way to him, one infers a conclusion of the form “X sees an appearance.” This is a fallacy because (iib) does not follow from (i) (ii) and (iia). However, if the Austinean formula-‘see...as.’ is accepted the above mentioned fallacious arguments can be discouraged.

4.5 The Austinean formula in question by no means a real key to the dissolution of the philosophical worry that involves sense-data. It is not self-contradictory or fallacious to entertain a sensing-level of sense-data or similar data. Apparently such a possibility is evidenced from contemporary physics. The usual interpretation of the quantum theory leads to a point of view in which physics is said to be inherently restricted in the quantum-mechanical domain and below to the manipulation of mathematical symbols according to suitable techniques that permit the calculation only of the probable behaviour of the phenomena that can be observed in the microscopic domain. These far reaching changes in the conceptual structure of physics have been based on Heisenberg’s principle. However, experiments with particles of very high energy (of the order of 100 million electron volts or more) have led to a bewildering array of new phenomena, for which there is no adequate treatment in the existing theory. Moreover, many new particles—the position, the neutrino, mesons and hyperons

have been discovered. According to David Bohm, "No visible limit to this process of discovering new particles appears to be in sight as yet."³⁷ There are some reasons to contend that there are physical processes which depend on what is happening at the sub-quantum mechanical level. Such processes could, perhaps, be found in the domain of very high energies and of very short distances. The point here is the insistence of two levels—quantum mechanical level and the sub-quantum mechanical level. David Bohm says: "...the laws of the sub-quantum mechanical level, both causal and statistical, are qualitatively different from those of the quantum level, and lead to those of the latter level only as an approximation."³⁸ In short, laws of the sub-quantum level are inapplicable in the case of sub-quantum mechanical level. In an analogous manner, sensing level and a perceiving level can be qualitatively entertained as regards 'perception.' Again, the laws of the sensing level can be qualitatively different from those of the perceiving level. Linguistic expressions in one level, needs to be restricted to that conceptual structure in which it may be interpreted and of which they can then convey information. That is to say, in the fashion of *Knowledge by acquaintance* in the Russellean sense. The theory as to all what one sees are sense-data, therefore, does not trade on a confusion between a delusion and an illusion.

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NOTES

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4. A. J. Ayer, *The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge*, Macmillan, 1940, p. 3.
5. *Sense and Sensibilia* (op. cit.,) p. 22.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 22.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 23-4.

9. Ibid., p. 48.
10. Ibid., p. 100.
11. Ibid., p. 101.
12. *The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge* (op.cit.,) p. 18.
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19. Ibid., pp. 73-5.
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28. Ibid., p. 116.
29. Ibid., pp. 117-118.
30. Ibid., p. 124.
31. Ibid., p. 134.
32. John Passmore, *A Hundred Years of Philosophy*, Gerald Duckworth & Co. 2nd Edition, 1966, p, 462.
33. See also : A. D. P. Kalansuriya, *Research Papers Philosophy*, Lake house Printers, Colombo, 1972, paper II,
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ANNOUNCEMENT

Under the U. G. C. Special Assistance Programme, the Department of Philosophy, University of Rajasthan, is organizing a series of seminars on the work of living Indian Philosophers. The second seminar of the series will be held on the Philosophy of Prof. N. V. Banarjee tentatively sometimes in October-November, 1981. For detailed information regarding the seminar write to Dr. K. L. Sharma, Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur.

Daya Krishna, Director

ANNOUNCEMENT

The Independent Journal of Philosophy announces the move of its editorial and business offices from Vienna, Austria to Paris, France. Effective immediately, all manuscripts, correspondence and subscriptions should be sent to the following address : George Elliott Tucker, General Editor, Independent Journal of Philosophy, 38 rue St. Louis-en-l'Île, F-75004 Paris, France.

Prospective authors should also note the following revised schedule of issues : Vol. IV (1980) : Modernity (1); Vol. (1981) : Modernity (2); Vol. VI (1982) : Historicism Vol. VII (1983) : Eric Voegelin : Essays on the Issues and Themes of his Life-work. Deadline for papers is 1 October of the year before the issue in question appears (e. g. 1 October 1981 for Vol. VI). Further information on the themes to be treated, as well as instructions for preparing manuscripts, should be requested from the General Editor.