

HEGELIAN IMPACT ON DEWEY'S CONCEPT OF MORAL OBLIGATION

In his essay, "John Dewey in Search of Himself",¹ L. R. Ward strongly argues that Dewey was never actually a Hegelian. Dewey perhaps thought he was one, and that he sincerely believed it, say from 1877 to 1885. "Then he began to have doubts about his committment to Hegelianism. By 1905 it was clear to all that Dewey was not a Hegelian. Using a simple distinction in another connection by Dewey between what one conventionally says is good art and what one really enjoys and really believes is good art, we would have to say that Dewey, influenced and somewhat denatured by Hegel, never was and never could have been a Hegelian."² This interpretation is certainly subject to grave doubts for at least two main reasons. First, Dewey's testimony that he *was* a Hegelian in the early years of his life should not be underestimated. We should at least take what he says into serious consideration, for his attraction to Hegel's philosophy was not merely accidental or necessary; it was also subjective. Hegel supplied for him "a demand for unification that was doubtless an intense emotional craving, and yet was a hunger that only an intellectualized subject-matter could satisfy. It is more than difficult, it is impossible, to recover that early mood."³ Second, despite Dewey's *gradual* drift from Hegel, who left a permanent deposit in his thinking,⁴ he retained, almost unyieldingly, Hegel's fundamental insight that the world is a living organism and that no basic element or feature of it can be fully grasped except in its relatedness to the world: "the sense of divisions and separations that were, I suppose, borne in upon me as a consequence of a heritage of New England culture, divisions by way of isolation of self from the world, of soul from body, of nature from God, brought a painful oppression—or, rather, they were an inward laceration. My earlier philosophic study had been an intellectual gymnastic. Hegel's synthesis of subject and object, matter and spirit, the divine and human, was, however, no mere intellectual formula; it operated as an immense release, a liberation. Hegel's treatment of human culture, of institutions and the arts, involved the same dissolution of hard-and-fast dividing walls, and had a special attraction for me."⁵

I am inclined to think that this is not the only insight which has lingered in Dewey's later thought from his Hegelian period; and one could discuss this question in some detail elsewhere. Here I am anxious to stress that so much of Dewey's analysis of moral experience in general, and of moral obligation in particular, has remained Hegelian in character. In what follows I intend to focus attention on the basic elements of moral obligation in Hegel and Dewey. The premise which I hope to defend is that Dewey's conception of moral obligation is essentially Hegelian in nature.

I. Hegel's Conception of Moral Obligation

1. Conditions of Moral Obligation

Hegel rejects the view that the basis of moral obligation is an external source or power, e. g., God, the state, public opinion, the church, etc.⁶ He insists that the individual as a rational, free, moral being is the ground of obligation. In the *Philosophy of Right* he argues that in order for an act to be moral it must be free, responsible, and purposeful; it must also promote the well-being of man both as an individual and as a universal nature.⁷ In what follows I shall briefly discuss the conditions of moral action in general and then proceed to a treatment of the basic ingredients of Hegel's concept of moral obligation.

An act cannot be moral unless it can be imputed to a moral agent; but it cannot be imputed to a moral agent unless he can be responsible for it; and he cannot be responsible for it unless it springs from his will. Thus an act is not moral unless it is performed by a free will.⁸ But man is finite. He is not always aware of all the forces which act upon him, nor can he foresee all the consequences of his action. For the action is an external, public event; as such, it is "a prey of external forces which attach to it something totally different from what it is explicitly and drive it on into alien and distant consequences."⁹ Thus (1) an action has a large number of consequences; (2) we cannot precisely determine which of these consequences are accidental and which are necessary. Accordingly we cannot hold a man responsible for those consequences of his action which are beyond his purpose, i. e., foreknowledge and control. This is the first right of the moral will; it "is the right to know."¹⁰ But, again, we should not view the consequences of the moral action as something external or indifferent to the action itself;

for they are the outward form of the purpose which the moral agent has before his mind in the process of moral reflection. They are not, in other words, merely consequences, for they belong to the action itself, and the action becomes actual through them. This is why the dicta "Ignore the consequences of action" and "Judge actions by their consequences and make these the criterion of right and good" are abstractions of the understanding.¹¹

The purpose which the moral agent seeks to realize takes the form of an isolated event; its truth, however, is universal.¹² Thus purpose expresses the universal side of action, viz., intention. It expresses the general disposition or character of the individual. Accordingly the action of a man must not be viewed piecemeal, discretely, but as moments in the realization of the self as a whole. Intention is the soul of action. Thus an action is not moral unless two conditions are fulfilled : (1) the agent should explicitly know and intend his action; that is, the action should, as I said earlier, spring from his subjective will; (2) the action should be viewed as willed, i. e., purposed, by the agent. Moral consciousness, Hegel thinks, should recognize this fact as a right of the moral will; it is the right of intention.

Intention, then, is the subjective condition for the realization purpose, and purpose is the external objectification of intention. It is also the condition of subjective satisfaction and freedom. As the universal character of action intention is the architect of realized purpose : "the fact that this moment of the particularity of the agent is contained and realized in the action constitutes subjective freedom in its more concrete sense, the right of the subject to find his satisfaction in the action."¹³ But in acting the self does not merely satisfy immediate or concrete ends; it also satisfies its general aims or ideals. The satisfaction of these aims is welfare or happiness. There must be room in moral conduct for individual satisfaction, and moral consciousness should recognize this as another right of the moral will; it is "the right of the subject's particularity, his right to be satisfied, or in other words, the right of subjective freedom."¹⁴ Recognition of this right is the pivot of the difference between the classical and modern periods. It is best expressed in Christianity; here it has become "the organizing principle of a new form of civilization."¹⁵ Yet it is expressed narrowly when, in some movements, love, conscience, eternal salvation of the indi-

vidual, or the constitution of the state become the supreme principle of conduct.

The right to particularity, however, is not morally valid unless self acts freely; hence it cannot make claims which are inconsistent with its universal moral nature : "this moment of universality, posited first of all within this particular content itself, is the welfare of others also, or, specified completely, though quite empty, the welfare of all."¹⁶ Thus the promotion of the well-being of others is an essential factor in the realization of the self as an individual. It would, consequently, be a mistake to judge the rightness or goodness of an action primarily on the basis of a 'moral intention' behind it. Intention is not enough; we should realize what we intend : "*in magnis... voluisse sat est* is right the sense that we ought to will something great. But we must also be able to achieve it, otherwise the willing is nugatory. The laurels of mere willing are dry leaves that never were green."¹⁷

2. Ground of Moral Obligation

We have so far seen that from the standpoint of purpose the will seeks to realize a particular, immediate end; and from the standpoint of intention it seeks to realize itself as a general moral nature. These two standpoints do not adequately reveal the true moral aspect of the will. This aspect is fully revealed when the will also aspires to actualize itself as a universal; for only in this aspiration can it attain its complete freedom. To do this the will should identify itself with absolute goodness. It is here in this relation to the highest good that we find the source and locus of moral obligation.

As the highest object of desire the good is the principle of the will; it is the ultimate standard of moral distinction and evaluation. It is the "Idea as the unity of the concept of the will with the particular will. In this unity, abstract right, welfare, the subjectivity of knowing and the contingency of external fact, have their independent self-subsistence superseded, though at the time they are still contained and retained within it in their senses. The good is thus freedom realized, the absolute end and aim of the world."¹⁸ Abstract right and personal well-being can not be the principle of the will, for the good is its substance; it is the universal which determines purpose and action. Thus when personal well-being cuts

itself loose from the good it loses its character as right. But "welfare without right is not a good. Similarly, right without welfare is not the good; *fiat justitia* should not be followed by *pereat mundus*."¹⁹ Personal well-being cannot, on the other hand, be neglected or ignored by the good, for the good would remain abstract, and consequently empty, unless it is actualized through a particular will: "consequently, since the good must of necessity be actualized through the particular will and is at the same time its substance, it has absolute right in contrast with the abstract right of property and the particular aims of welfare."²⁰

Now since the good is the universal principle of action and does not as such contain any determinate content, it is the onus of the particular will to translate its essence concretely. Indeed the subjective will has dignity and value only in so far as its intention is in harmony with the essence of the good. Thus as abstract Idea the good remains an ideal to the subjective will. In this way the will stands in a definite relation to the good; and "the relation is that the good *ought* to be substantive for it, i. e., it ought to make the good its aim to realise it completely, while the good on its side has in the subjective will its only means of stepping into actuality".²¹ Thus (1) since the good is an object of the will, and since it is its universal essence, it is the *duty* of the will to seek and realise it in its action, and (2) since the good *qua* duty is abstract it should be done for its own sake. But what is one's duty? How can we realize the universal essence of duty in actual conduct?

Hegel advances two guidelines for the determination of concrete duties; one should (1) do what is right, and (2) promote his as well as the general well-being of others. The concrete realization of good, however, passes in three stages. First, the moral agent should know and will the good as a particular. Second, he alone should determine the goodness and the sort of consequences implied in the act. Third, he should specify the quality of the act "as infinite subjectivity aware of itself".²² This inward specification of the good is *conscience*. Before I proceed to an analysis of conscience as the faculty of moral obligation I should here stress that in the process of moral evaluation the agent assumes full responsibility for the judgement which he makes. This, as we have seen earlier, is the right of insight; "the right of the subjective will is that whatever it is to recognize as valid shall be seen by it as

good, and that an action, as its aim entering upon external objectivity, shall be imputed to it as right or wrong, good or evil, legal or illegal, in accordance with its *knowledge* of the worth which the action has in this subjectivity." ²³ But although the moral agent is to be held responsible for his act only *in so far as* he (1) freely chooses the act, (2) knows, intends, purposes the Act, and (3) succeeds in the empirical evaluation of the factual elements of the concrete moral situation, still this does not mean that he cannot be wrong in his judgement; for against the right of insight and self-determination there stands another right, viz., the right of reason *qua* objective. This is the right to be objective in the assessment of the moral situation. And what decides the validity of the moral judgement in such cases is reason as such; for "whoever wills to act in this world of actuality has *eo ipso* submitted himself to its laws and recognized the right objectivity." ²⁴

3. Feeling of Moral Obligation

When Hegel speaks of conscience he does not mean a faculty of moral sense, or some kind of moral monitor or voice, naturally or divinely implanted in human nature, by means of which we discover what is right and wrong and then act accordingly. He, rather, means the tendency of the individual to will that which is absolutely good, not merely abstractly but also concretely. Apart from the concrete determination of the good, conscience is only the "formal side of the activity of the will, which as *this* will has no special content of its own."²⁵ At this level it is an infinite, abstract self-certainty; it is, in other words, the general feeling that *one ought* to realize the good in his action. True conscience, however, is "the expression of the absolute title of subjective self-consciousness to know in itself and from within itself what is right and obligatory, to give recognition only to what it knows as good, and at the same time to maintain that whatever in this way it knows and wills is in truth right and obligatory."²⁶ Thus conscience is the absolute subjective, inward certainty in which a person translates, concretely determines, the universal content of good in the moral situation; or, put differently, it is action in accordance with duty, action which does not realize this or that duty, but knows and does what is concretely right and good.

Conscience, then, is a reflective, deliberative faculty. The moral agent cannot determine what he ought to do unless he, first,

knows the various elements which constitute the moral situation within which the act will take place: his emotions, values, beliefs, sentiments, interests, desires, awareness of social reality, etc.. Knowledge of these and similar elements extends, in short, "backwards into thier conditions, sideways in their associations, forwards in their consequences."²⁷ This knowledge, however, is incomplete, and the conscientious mind knows this fact; yet at the moment of decision it acts *in so far* as it knows. And though the knowledge is incomplete it is under a given set of circumstances sufficient, because it is the mind's own knowledge.²⁸ This is perhaps why Hegel repeatedly insisted that for its own part conscience "finds its own truth to be in the direct certainty of itself."²⁹

But, second, the moral agent should *assess* the factual elements of the moral situation in terms of the moral law: that is, what ought to be done should conform to the moral law as such. This law does not come as an external alien command but as an expression of the agent's universal moral nature; for in moral reflection he determines, intuitively, the moral aspect of the prospective act, and this in view of what the law prescribes. How? As a universal moral consciousness the self is the principle of action; it is an ultimate essence. And as conscience "it lays hold of its explicit individual self-existence (*Fürsichsein*), or its self."³⁰ In this twofold role, i. e., as a universal nature and as a concrete reality, the self comprehends and translates the fact of action which it encounters into a concrete moral content; here the distinction between the universal and the particular is resolved, for "the agent's own immediate individuality constitutes the content of moral action; and the form of moral action is just this very self as a pure process, viz., as the process of knowing, in other words, is private individual conviction."³¹

Thus conscience is the unity of subjective knowing, i. e., conviction, with the universal content of the law. But we can establish whether individual conscience conforms to the Idea of Conscience only after the act is performed, i. e., after we examine the sort of good which the act has realized. What is morally right or obligatory, however, is that a particular individual should realize in his act the good which the moral law prescribes. Thus conscience, or the judgement of moral obligation, can be true or false. It is

false inasmuch as it fails to promote the true good and yields to the inclinations, desires, or interests of the moral agent : "what is known as duty is carried out completely and becomes an actual fact, just because what is dutiful is the universal for all self-consciousness, that which is recognized, acknowledged, and thus objectively *is*."³² Three consequences follow from this account of conscience. (1) What ought to be done is not something imposed upon the agent from outside; for in the process of moral evaluation the moral agent adopts the moral law as his own, as issuing from his own will. (2) In any situation of duty there is only one right, or correct, judgement of moral obligation; for the judgement is based on and refers to the various elements which constitute the moral situation. These elements are *facts* which the agent confronts immediately. (3) Although the judgement of obligation, e. g., "I ought to do X", is normative, in the sense that it *prescribes* a certain course of action, 'ought' is not merely a feeling, a concept, or a metaphysical reality of some sort, nor is it an empirical element, an 'is', which is discovered in the process of moral reflection. It is rather the consciousness, the certain knowledge, that a course of action is right, and that it would, if performed, realize the highest amount of good. This consciousness is what arouses in the moral agent the feeling of moral compulsion. In Hegel's words : "the particular subject is related to the good as to the essence of his will, and hence his will's obligation arises directly in this relation."³³ Thus as a moral phenomenon 'ought' originates in the process of moral evaluation. It is a unique reality creatively made in response to a moral problem which faces the moral agent in the concrete situations of life. 'Ought', then, cannot be reduced to an 'is', for it is what guides, modifies action; it is the basis of the normative aspect of the judgement of moral obligation. It is not, moreover, an essence or a command imposed upon the agent from outside; yet it is inconceivable apart from the objective, factual elements of the moral situation; these elements are its basis and *raison d'être*.

Again, it is not, as I insisted earlier, some kind of reality super-added to the moral situation; for if this happens (a) this reality would, as a principle of duty, be indifferent to the well-being of the moral agent as an individual, (b) the moral act would not be an act of self-determination; it would not, consequently, be a morally responsible act. Thus 'moral obligation' refers to the

feeling of compulsion which we experience when we discover that a course of action is morally good. It is this knowledge which creates the moral claim, i. e., ought, and consequently the *feeling* that the act ought to be done.

II. Dewey's Concept of Moral Obligation

1. Ground of Moral Obligation

From what has been said so far we can formulate four main propositions which are crucial to Hegel's concept of moral obligation. (1) The moral agent is a rational, free, self-determined being. (2) The good is the ground of moral obligation; that is, promotion of the good concretely is what warrants the feeling of moral obligation. (3) The judgement of moral obligation is an intelligent, reflective act. (4) 'Ought' refers to the feeling that the moral agent is *obliged* to perform a certain act; and the conviction that the act is right, and that it would realize the intended good, is conscience. Now I intend to show that these four propositions constitute the basic elements of Dewey's concept of moral obligation. I am aware that the method as well as the conceptual equipment which Dewey employs in his analysis of the concept are to a measurable extent different from the ones which Hegel employs. What I am anxious to stress, however, is that the Hegelian logic and insight into the meaning of obligation substantially linger in Dewey's formulation of the concept. This is perhaps why it is possible to say that Dewey's conception of moral obligation is Hegelian in character.³⁴

Dewey holds that the idea of right is in principle independent of the idea of good; a morally good act, e. g., is not *ipso facto* right. Yet it is hoped that right acts are conducive to some good or satisfaction. Essential to the idea of right, however, is the element of demand or exaction; that is, the Right contains the idea of authoritative claim, and only when this claim is present can a good act become right. Thus the good usually attracts us, but the right "is that which asserts that we *ought* to be drawn by some object whether we are naturally attracted to it or not".³⁵ Accordingly right acts are obligatory, and their authority is independent of our wishes or inclinations. But what is the source or ground of this authority?

Like Hegel, Dewey rejects the view that the ground of obligation is an external power or agency like, the state, social opinion,

God's Word, the church, etc., for at least three reasons; (1) the principle of duty, and consequently of the moral act, would be indifferent to the moral agent, i. e., to his desires, interests, goals, or natural tendencies; (2) an act done out of fear of an external authority is not autonomous and, consequently, not moral, for "mere compulsion has no moral standing;"³⁶ (3) "We split man into two disconnected parts if we say that there is a law or principle of duty which has nothing to do with our natural impulses and purposes and which yet is supreme over them."³⁷ On the contrary, Dewey insists, (1) an act of moral obligation is autonomous; (2) the principle of duty or right is social in character:

It requires no further argument to show that obligation is at once self-imposed, and social in its content. It is self-imposed because it flows from the good, from the idea of the full activity of the individual's own will. It is no law imposed from without; but is his own law, the law of his own function, of his individuality. Its social content flows from the fact that this individuality is not mere capacity, but is the capacity *acting*, and acting so as to comprehend social relationships.³⁸

It is thus erroneous to believe that an account of moral obligation is inadequate if we do not locate its basis in a divine or transcendental domain. That is, the term 'moral' does not derive its meaning from reference to a divine or transcendental reality but from a consideration of the principle and end of action: "the first step in ethics is to fix firmly in mind the idea that the term moral does not mean any special or peculiar kind of conduct, but simply means practice and action, conduct viewed not partially but in connection with the end which it realizes."³⁹ To violate this principle would be to commit the fallacy that moral action means something other than action itself. For example, a child may be obliged by his parents to perform a certain act. The obligation may arise from an arbitrary will: but it does not have to proceed from such a will. It may conceivably proceed from the very nature of the relations and condition of his family. As such, the obligation does not fall upon the child as an arbitrary or despotic command, but as an expression of the value or general good which is essential to the material and spiritual existence of the family. In this atmosphere which inspires trust the child responds willingly and respectfully

to the command of his parents even though the performance of the prescribed duty may be contrary to his most felt wishes or desires. Thus, "because of inherent relationships persons sustain to one another, they are exposed to the expectations of others and to the demands in which these expectations are made manifest."⁴⁰ Right, then, is only a general term which refers to "the multitude of concrete demands in action which others impress upon us, and of which we are obliged, if we would live, to take some account. Its authority is the exigency of their demands, the efficacy of their insistencies."⁴¹ Thus if we view the moral law as divorced from the existential condition of men it would not have an intrinsic impact upon the life of the individual; it would not express or satisfy his desires, interests, or ideals. It would, in short, render conduct non-moral in character. But how do we determine the rightfulness of concrete acts; or the specific claims and demands imposed by society or the state? What is the relationship between a concrete law or injunction and the general idea of right? In other words, what is the principle by which we justify acts of obligation?

The question is important because law and lawfulness are not necessarily identical with a given law. The latter is always questionable, for it "is but a special means of realizing the function of law in general, namely, the institution of those relations among men which conduce to the welfare and freedom of all."⁴² Thus although the concept of right is an independent moral category this concept does not by itself contain or show what is right concretely. Accordingly in determining the lawfulness or rightness of a given rule or course of action we should appeal to a higher principle; and this principle, Dewey contends, is the *common good*. Indeed the idea of right as such expresses this good: "In principle, therefore, Right expresses the way in which the good of a number of persons, held together by intrinsic ties, becomes efficacious in the regulation of the members of a community."⁴³ This position is based on the assumption that man is basically a socio-cultural being. He cannot live apart from society. His desires, interests, aspirations, preferences, general outlook upon life, or values are largely the result of social education. His life, in other words, is possible only in a social milieu. The same applies to individuality: "the human being is an individual because of and in relation with others. Otherwise, he is an individual only as a stick of wood is, namely, as spatially and numerically separate."⁴⁴

Rights and obligations express the interests of the members of society, not as isolated but as social human beings. They express, in other words, the common good of those members which are held by intrinsic ties. For example, "the legislator, judge, assessor, sheriff, does not exercise authority as his private possession, but as the representative of relations in which many share. He is an organ of a community of interests and purposes."⁴⁵ This is not to say, however, that conflict may not arise between already established rights and obligations or newly legislated ones and what should be right or obligatory. When such conflict arises the criterion by which we decide objective right and obligation is the common good. The claim which Right imposes is that "even if the thing exacted does not appeal as his good to the one to whom it is addressed, he *should* voluntarily take it to be a good; that, in short, it should *become* his good, even if he does not so judge it at the time. This element of the 'should' or 'ought' is what differentiates the idea of Right from the Good. But it does not cut the idea wholly loose from that of the Good, for what 'should be' is that an individual should find the required conduct good."⁴⁶

2. Feeling of Moral Obligation

Man does not possess a unique faculty, e. g., conscience, which legislates or determines acts of moral obligation. Accordingly 'ought' does not justify itself; i. e., one does not know beforehand what he ought to do in a given moral situation. Men feel *obliged* to behave in a certain way simply because of the practical, actual social relations and demands amongst which they find themselves. Corresponding to these relations and demands there grows in the individual a sense of obligation. At first this sense is connected with definite personal, family, or social relations. But as the individual matures morally a general sense of obligation develops "In distinction from any particular situation."⁴⁷ It becomes later on the principle of acts of duty. This sense is in a way a generalization from the various concrete acts of duty which he has performed during his moral growth; it is, in Hegel's terms, a tendency to seek and realize the good concretely. It generates in the individual an attitude or disposition to look for or cope with new moral situations.

The sense of obligation is not final in its judgement; it is primarily a guide or working hypothesis to solve the moral problem at hand. It sums up the judgement of past moral experience : of how previous moral problems were solved; what sort of satisfaction or frustration was involved in the solution of each problem; the effect of such moral solutions on the community; etc. Thus it does not have a ready made answer for each new moral situation, primarily because each moral situation is always changing and novel. The answer is made possible by a reflective consideration of the factual elements which constitute the moral situation and the consequences of the act. In this process the moral agent translates, determines, what ought to be done concretely in terms of the moral law as the supreme principle of moral goodness; he translates, so to say, the universal character of the law into concrete content, i. e.; judgement. This translation is not a mystical or unconscious act; it is an empirical, intelligent, deliberative activity.⁴³ This is exactly why Dewey, like Hegel, held“(first) that the ‘ought’ always arises from and falls back into the ‘is’, and (secondly) that the ‘ought’ is itself an ‘is’—the ‘is’ of action.”⁴⁹ The ‘ought’, first, arises in the course of moral reflection because it is not given as a ready made reality or prescription. It is determined creatively, concretely. In this determination the moral agent sees to it that the good which the prospective act will realize is not only personal, individual good; he should also judge it as a common good : “if the claim is, then, of the kind which he himself puts forth, if it serves a good which he prizes for himself, he must, in the degree in which he is fair-minded, acknowledge it to be a common good, and hence binding upon his judgement and action.”⁵⁰ Second, ‘ought’ is the ‘is’ of action because the elements as well as the conditions of moral reflection are empirical in character, i. e., because the act and its consequences are public events. But how does ‘ought’, according to Dewey, arise from the factual elements of the moral situation? The term ‘ought’ does not refer to a metaphysical or some sort of conceptual reality, but to the feeling that a person is *obliged* to perform a certain act. The feeling is aroused when the person knows, discovers, that a specific course of action is right, i. e., promotes the general good concretely. This is the very essence of conscience.⁵¹

Like Hegel, then, Dewey holds that (1) autonomy is a necessary condition for moral obligation. That is, one cannot be morally

obliged to perform an act unless he can be responsible for it; and he cannot be responsible for it unless he is the author of the act—or, put differently, unless the act springs from his will. (2) Promotion of the good in the life of the individual and society is the ultimate principle of moral obligation. (3) The judgement of moral obligation is a deliberative, purposeful act. (4) 'Ought' is creatively formed in the process of moral reflection; it refers to a concrete feeling of moral obligation. This feeling is aroused in the moral agent when he discovers that a certain act is right. Thus, if we take into consideration seriously Dewey's acknowledgement of his Hegelian heritage, and especially the close similarity between them of the (a) logic and (b) insight into the meaning and a ground of moral obligation, we should then entertain the plausible claim that Dewey has fundamentally retained Hegel's novel intuition of the essential nature of moral obligation.

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NOTES

1. L. Ward, "John Dewey in Search of Himself," *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 19, No. 2, 1957. See also J. Maritain, *Moral Philosophy* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964), Chapter 14, and J. Ratner's Introduction to *Intelligence and the Modern World* (New York: The Modern Library, 1954).
2. "John Dewey in Search of Himself," pp. 208-209.
3. J. Dewey, "From Absolutism to Experimentalism," in *The Golden Age of American Philosophy*, edited by C. Frankel (New York: George Braziller, 1960), p. 389.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 391.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 389-390.
6. Cf. G. W. F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind* translated by J. Baillie (New York: The McMillan Co., 1961 pp. 81-86; *History of Philosophy* translated by Haldane (London, 1892), Vol. III, pp. 362, 403 ff.
7. Thus I disagree with W. A. R. Ley's assessment that, for Hegel, self-realization is "filling in the blank scheme of some undefined, purely general self." On the contrary, Hegel does stress in the *Philosophy of Right* and *The Phenomenology of Mind* that (1) one cannot act morally

except in a state where what is determined concretely by means of law and custom; (2) no act is moral unless it (a) expresses the will of the moral agent and (b) satisfies his interests as a concrete reality. See also G. W. E. Hegel, *Philosophy of History*, translated by J. Sibree (New York : Dover Publications, Inc., 1956), pp. 38 ff.

8. *Philosophy of Right*, pp. 79 ff.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 80.
10. *Ibid.*
11. *Ibid.*
12. *Ibid.*, p. 81.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 82.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 84.
15. *Ibid.*
16. *Ibid.*, pp. 84-85.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 252.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 86.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 87.
20. *Ibid.*
21. *Ibid.*
22. *Ibid.*, p. 253.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 87.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 88.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 91.
26. *Ibid.*
27. *The Phenomenology of Mind*, p. 652.
28. Cf. *Ibid.*
29. *Ibid.*, p. 648.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 649.
31. *Ibid.*, pp. 648-649.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 651.
33. *Philosophy of Right*, p. 89.
34. In developing this section I have made use of some passages from my essay, "Dewey on Moral Obligation," which will appear in the 1976 Winter issue of *The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy*.
35. J. Dewey, *Theory of the Moral Life* (New York : Holt, Rinehart & Winst, 1960), p. 68.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 68.
37. *Ibid.*
38. J. Dewey, *Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics in the Early Work of John Dewey*, edited by J. A. Boydston (Southern Illinois University Press, 1969), Vol. 3, p. 336.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 342.
40. *Theory of the Moral Life*. p. 69. On page 175 of the same work Dewey writes: "moral conceptions grow naturally out of the very conditions of human life." See also *Outlines*, pp. 320—323.
41. J. Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York: The Modern Library, 1930), p. 326.
42. *Theory of the Moral Life*, p. 79.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 81.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 80.
45. *Ibid.*
46. *Ibid.*, p. 82.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 85.
48. See *Ibid.*, pp. 132-136.
49. J. Dewey, "Moral Theory and Practice," *The Early Works of John Dewey*. Vol. III, p. 105.
50. *Theory of the Moral Life*, p. 83.
51. *Ibid.*, pp. 132 and ff.