

EXPERIENCE AND REFLECTION*

Science, Philosophy and Social Life

I shall make three assumptions. These assumptions are : (1) there is a world which exists in its own right, i. e. whether or not one knows that it exists. (2) There is a 'subject' by which I mean a knower *of the form* 'you,' 'he', 'she', 'they' or 'I'. And (3) this knower is able to know the world. The word 'know' is very ambiguously used. It may, as psychologists say, mean perceiving, inferring, enumerating etc., but it may also point to or presuppose some kind of practical activity like walking, talking, doing, eating etc. It is true that ordinarily such a practical activity is not knowing in the first sense. Nevertheless, 'awareness' is presupposed in a 'conscious' practical activity, and so 'knowing', is not altogether absent in human action. What we call knowing in the second sense is the knower's ability to comprehend either the objects or the activities, which either go beyond himself or which belong to himself being parts of his identity.

Man continuously lives in this world and also acts as long as he lives. He is walking, eating, breathing, desiring and thinking of the world. The first few things like walking etc., come under doing, desiring comes under willing and feeling, breathing is neither and thinking is reflecting on all these. In all these activities and happenings, man is continuously gathering experience. If he lives for a hundred years his experience is also of a hundred years duration. But this may be an understatement. He has memory and he has awareness. The memory and awareness which can be distinguished but not separated from him, take him beyond himself to the experience of the previous generations and if he lives for a hundred years it does not mean that his experience is also of a hundred years only. (I have used the words 'he lives'. This is ambiguous for, the knower as such cannot live for a hundred years. But I shall try to clarify this point later). On account of this awareness through his memory and knowing which largely and at least initially comes from his doing, he gathers his experience. But in so doing he is selective. While he remembers a few things

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EDITORIAL NOTE

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Editors

he forgets many more things and although the forgotten things are parts of his experience he can systematically make a story of only the remembered experience which is (consciously or unconsciously) selective. If this experience of a hundred or more years is to be narrated, it does not require a hundred years. The whole process of storing knowledge seems to be a 'shortening of the duration' of the experience. This 'shortened duration' could be even the logical limit of duration. On account of this shortening, the history of a hundred or more years could be understood or narrated in a much shorter time. In this process there are two elements: (1) selectivity and (2) shortening of duration. Both these presuppose that the knower, in his self-reflectiveness, discards a few things and accepts a few other things. Where there is discarding something and accepting some other thing, there is also the activity of judging, which arises in the reflective shortening of duration. Selecting is judging, although every judging is not selecting.

Why does he do all this?. I shall not be able to give any philosophical answer to the question, but psychologically this seems to be the case in any activity, whether it is human or just animal. We have such phrases in our language as bird's eye-view, turning back to perceive as in the case of a lion. They all point to judging. An individual who is born is, so to say, 'walking' throughout his life. Although he is walking to an unknown place or destination he gets accustomed to the places which he has already covered. He is trying to make estimates of the places he has not visited from the ones he has already covered. He wants to find out whether the 'road' he has covered is the 'correct' road, whether the road he is yet to cover will lead him to the 'village' where he wants to go. Reflection on experience is not only judging but is also evaluating. In the very process of rejecting and accepting he is evaluating. Not merely that, but he is evolving certain norms also. History becomes his guide for further activities, his evaluation becomes a judgement, a critique of his activities and sometimes his critique is not only a critique of his activities but is also a critique of his judgement.

In this effort he has taken for granted that there is some world. The questions "What is the nature of this world" and "how is he related to this world" assume importance gradually. Is the world as he perceives it the real world or has he merely assumed

some such world or has he superimposed something on the world that exists in its own right?. If something is superimposed, how much is superimposed and how much is given? Similarly, I assume that there is a knower. This knower must also be a part of this world. Can we separate the knower qua knower from the world? What is the nature of this knower?. On these questions will also depend the relation between the knower and the world.

II

I have said earlier that man is continuously experiencing and preserving a part of his experience. Ordinarily it is thought that what is conveyed by this experience is entirely external to him (or the knower). But as I have said earlier, man does not simply receive the impressions from the outside. He is also continuously evaluating and modifying them. For, he is essentially concerned with action or what Marxists would call praxis. There cannot be an action unless the thing acted upon is theoretically or practically modified. The realists did not take note of this when they conceived the relation between the knower and the world as some kind of external relation like a relation between unconscious atoms or things. They did not realise that perception is not just a print of the object imprinted on the knower. The print is also coloured by the knower. The idealists, on the other hand, also misconceived this relation and in fact denied it by confusing between knowing and the object of knowing. I feel that when we put the issue in terms of 'knowing' and the relationship between the knower and the object, we have unduly 'mechanised' the problem. It is an over simplification of the situation. For, the so called knower is not just a knower, he is an enjoyer, modifier, constructor, builder, critic and appreciator of the total situation simultaneously. These different roles of the 'knower' can be distinguished but not separated. I think it is to the credit of Gaudapada that he pointed out that instead of using the model of the knower and the known we should use the model of 'Bhokta' and 'Bhojya'. But usually the activity element in our life is ignored with the result that the problems we pose are only about the possibility of knowledge, and not about the total experience. It is forgotten that the theory of knowledge is only an element in the total experience-situation. From this point of view the Vaishesikas were on the correct track. For, their scheme of Padarthas or categories was an analysis of

experience and was not merely concerned with knowing as in the case of Locke or even Descartes.

If these different roles of the 'knower' are taken into consideration and if it is accepted that man, in addition to being a knower, is a gestalt or a unified temporal whole of action then his role as a critic and appreciator would be clearer. This role requires that he should recognize that he is *continuously modifying that which is given*. He is constructing, creating, superimposing a new world on the old. The role of a scientist like that of an ordinary man is different. He takes this two-track world as a one-track-objective world and discovers the laws of this world. These laws, in a sense, are objective but *the frame in which laws are expressed, codified, is not necessarily objective*. The framework of these laws, since they involve concepts, categories and the relationships between them, is a man-made fabric. It is not a personal subjective frame, it is an impersonal, *intersubjective one*. But there is definitely a difference between something being objective and something being *impersonal and intersubjective*. Again, all the laws of the scientist are not *necessarily objective*. They are, to a great extent the laws of his experience also. However, what is important is that when a man discovers these laws he does not simply discover them and stop at that. He also expresses them, codifies them, creates a machinery for communicating them. *He does this* by the process of abstraction, by thinking away (removing) space and time out of experience. All these activities can be distinguished from the nature of the actual phenomenon that he is handling.

III

Man's role as a knower and doer or creator requires that he is not just a passive observer outside the process of creation but that he is a part of the creative process itself. His uniqueness is that he can patiently observe the process and be a critic of it although he is a part of the process. He is a part of the process because he is a product of the process, because he is governed by the *cosmic* laws. He can be a detached observer because of the awareness that arises in the process itself. It is this awareness which makes him a universe by himself, capable of looking upon the rest of the universe to which he actually belongs, as different from himself. The formation of his self-identity and alienation (or the otherness) from the rest of the universe take place simul-

taneously like the two ends of the sea-saw, one going up and the other going down. But what is important is that his otherness or *alienation* from the rest of the world and formation of his own identity make the knower different from the known or the given; he is now able to think and know of the rest of the world as an outside observer. This leads to the study of the sciences and formulation of the theory of knowledge.

But once this happens the knower or the man is able to look at what is given, either with emotion or without emotion. In this process, however, he forgets that the whole universe including himself, is a gestalt of movement and action and the dynamism which is integral to the universe is lost. Of course, although the dynamism is lost, man is also able to take away a slice of this universe out of the main stream and look at it as a proto-universe. He can look at it as a static system of laws or he can also look at it as a part of a total process though segregated from it for practical reasons. This attempt at segregation is the beginning of knowledge and even the beginning of the sciences. Furthermore, this process has also to be communicated to others. This requires a further segregation; it requires looking at the different segments of the process as static points or lines. This leads to abstraction, conceptualization, universalization. These *three* are different. I have discussed the difference of these three elsewhere. But what is important to understand is that what we do in experiencing and understanding, is segregating the segment of the total process out of it. Similarly in expressing also we do the same thing. This is necessary for communication. The total process of segregating is both the process of alienation and the process of identity creation.*

IV

Philosophers and Scientists put in all their efforts in search of reality. But the reality they want to search is either an abstract idea or a system of ideas either in the Platonic sense or in some psychological sense; or the world is conceived as some static object in which space and time have no involvement or where, at any rate, time has no involvement. In the second alternative we begin to think that the world consists of minute formless atoms or even more minute elements than atoms, and we forget that if a thing

* What in logic is called (the law of) identity is a name given to a product of segregation.

could be divided into parts it does not mean that the parts are the final elements which exist in their own right and out of which the whole is created. Here one is reminded of Sankaracarya's criticism of atomism. If atoms are the minutest particles then they must not have length, breadth and thickness. Such atoms will only be 'round' (having Parimandalya) and collection of such atoms would never give different shapes that solids have. Sankaracarya is right in holding that the minutest imaginable parts would have no length, breadth or thickness and would thus be 'round' i.e., dimensionless. But he, like the atomists, forgot that in this division what was employed was not the parameter which could measure concrete things but a parameter which would measure only mathematical entities, like mathematical points, collection of any amount of which would not yield any volume. Whereas it is possible in mathematics to have infinite divisibility, it is not practically possible to divide physical elements infinitely. Another thing which is equally important to remember is that the world which the philosopher or the scientist wants to study is the world as a whole in which time and space are involved as internal and integral to it. Space and time are not outside this whole. It is, therefore, quite right to say that the *World is not in space and time*. Atleast it is idiomatically inadequate to say that the *World is in space and time*.^{*} But we also use the word, world, in a pluralistic sense, in the sense that it is an aggregate of *all* things. In this sense every particular thing is in space and time. But from the fact that we cannot legitimately talk of the world as a whole as in space and time, one could not jump to the conclusion that when we divide the world into its parts, the parts are also without spatial or temporal properties. But unfortunately this is what Philosophers have done. Thus, in reality, both the realists and the idealists treat the world as if it is bereft of space and time and although a realist may accept the reality of space and time, he only thinks of Space and Time as external to the elements of the world, for his use of the word, world, is only distributive in character. Thus what he analyses is a flash picture of the world and it is this kind of thinking which leads to atomism. Idealists, on the other hand, simply neglect to see that we can use the words, 'Reality' and 'World' in a pluralistic sense and in this sense time and space cannot remain ignored or unheeded. It is such kind

* It does not mean that the world is beyond *Space and Time*.

of thinking on the part of either Realists or Idealists which leads to the epistemology of the present form where linguistic structure becomes the basis of ontological structures and the subject and object are regarded as separate, with either the object being regarded as existing independently of the subject or the subject being regarded as independent of the object and the object a mere quality, of the subject. The fact, however, is that the world is the world which has both the subject and the object as inseparable constituents, but they may be regarded as independent constituents only from the point of view of practical convenience. It must be clearly understood that I do not mean that the objective world does not exist independently of the mind. What I mean is that awareness is also a factor of the objective world and it makes the knowing of the world possible. It is awareness with which we, so to say, mentally separate the knower and the known. The things that are known may be independent of knowing but *awareness* definitely has a part to play in relating the object known to the knower. (Neither the knower, nor the known, nor the awareness are outside the world). It is this awareness which has a clear temporal dimension. But if this temporal dimension is recognized then it will be proper to say that although we are distinguishing space, time and matter from the knower, space, time, matter and the knower(s) form a whole. This total whole may be considered as a system of movements (the cosmocentric point of view) or as a system of actions along with correlated movements (the anthropocentric point of view). Human constructions of meaning and value are superimposed over the dynamism of this real world. We may consider the world apart from such constructions, in which case we would be having a picture of nature or the world in itself; or we could have an idea of the human constructions in their pure order and meaning or we could take the two together in the form of the world as it is for us. But although we may divide the world in this way, man's involvement in the world cannot be denied. Its proportion may vary. You may, e. g., try to discover the laws of physics and in so doing you may merely use names or mathematical formulae in describing the objective world or you may describe the laws of man's awareness or you may evaluate the relationship of one man with the other or man with the world. It must be remembered that man's experience of the world cannot be the world although without such experience

man cannot think of the world. Experience forms part of man's ability to communicate or express. The expression and communication also continuously modify man's experience. Thus man's involvement in the form of awareness may vary more or less or may give rise to expression and instruments of expression and both these may be systematized more or less. Where man's involvement is the least we get the physical sciences, where man's involvement is considerable, we get the social sciences, for social reality is the subject matter of these sciences. It is *man's construction over nature*. Where we are concerned with instruments of expression we get languages, arts and mathematics. Sometimes there is again *Adhyasa* and what is instrument of expression is regarded as objective. This has happened in the case of mathematics and even logic. But in all these what man really gets is a static picture of a dynamic reality.

Every investigation of man is either a reverie of his experience or is a judgement on the experience. When it is a judgement on the experience it becomes a philosophical investigation. When it is an experience of the phenomenon external to man it becomes an inquiry in natural sciences. When it is an inquiry in which he and his species are involved, it becomes an inquiry in social sciences. But in all these cases the experience is, so to say, codified and in this act it has become static. If experience is a picture of what has happened *it is a static picture and in this picturing or even judging the time element is completely eliminated*. If we are thinking of succession we are substituting time in a different form. But the attempt is to eliminate time. The time element comes in again only because it is not possible for man to look at the events simultaneously. In this process even the space element is eliminated. But when the events are brought before the mind's eye, they are not abstract (events), they are visualized as spread in space. What we now get are not the events but the ideas of events in some imagined space. But all these investigations are epistemic and as I said earlier they are possible because of man's ability to have consciousness of consciousness. In this investigation consciousness which, in a way, belongs to the universe gets its own identity. The consciousness or the consciousness of consciousness is a function of a certain body, but it begins to control that body and acts as a proto-universe. A living body does not merely remain a living body and from

this we get two concepts of knower. One is a whole of body, consciousness and consciousness of consciousness or reflective consciousness. When a man acts, say, e. g., walks, it is this whole which acts and it ceases to act when the whole breaks, because the elements of the whole distintegrate. But we have another concept of the knower. This concept arises because the consciousness which controls the body creates an impression that it is distinct from, separate from, and external to the body. Thus it is reified. It takes the form of a thing itself, although *it is not a thing*. This consciousness-cum-self-consciousness is presupposed in all thinking and if thinking is regarded as some kind of theoretical activity, it is not directly concerned with the body; it is directly connected with self-consciousness and its connection with the body is forgotten. This gives rise to another concept of knower as 'I'. This 'I' has no bodily base; this is merely an assumption of knowledge and its base is awareness. Now, two possibilities emerge. One is to regard this 'I' as non-existing because it is not connected with the physical whole. The other possibility is to regard it as always existing, because it can never wither or die, each 'I' being situated in a proto-universe. This 'I' again, is not a psychological 'I'; for each living person has such an 'I' and there is a possibility of communication between this 'I' and the other 'I's, the other 'I's being you. This is what would bring about society or Lokavyavahara. This 'I' is a necessary presupposition of all epistemological investigations. This 'I' is created of its own accord, it is Svayambhu and this cannot be killed by any weapon nor can it be burnt by any fire (Nainam Chindanti Sastrani) But it cannot undergo such changes because no concept can be divided or burnt. But in the process of the creation of this 'I' the world itself is 'divided' into two; the I and the world or the Visayi and the Visaya and this I is never regarded as the part of the world.*

But this 'I' and 'the proto-universe' which requires a body are usually mixed up in ordinary language and we use the expression 'I', also for the physical whole. In practice the 'I' is the physical whole and when we think about it, it is only the other 'I' the epistemological presupposition. Out of this systematic ambiguity the epistemological and the religious problems and beliefs arise.

* This is the genesis of what is called Atman.

However, when we talk of experience we usually presuppose a pluralistic universe, i. e., we have divided the world into parts and also think that the proto-universes and the other parts of the world can be comprehended together. The problems of 'in the universe' and 'out of universe' do not arise here. We investigate these several experiences, systematize them and in this act we forget that we have also added something to them by way of naming or by way of (understanding their) forms. These inquiries are regarded as objective though they are only quasi-objective. For, they are only assertions and judgements about the world. I said earlier that pluralism is presupposed in such enquiries. This is so because in the very act of division of the knower and the known, the *cosmic world* is divided into cosmocentric world and anthropocentric worlds and the cosmic world is coloured by the anthropocentric worlds.

This experience of ours is expressed in the form of assertions which represent our impressions. But the intensity of impressions may vary from pure naming to new creations. If we merely give names we would say that what we have done is a discovery. If we have created something it may mean an invention, construction etc. As I have said earlier, it is not one proto-universe which is created, there are several proto-universes and communication amongst them is possible, by what we call language. But in the communicative acts several rules and forms of behaviour arise either in regard to themselves or with regard to their relation with the cosmocentric world. Such studies usually take the form of social sciences. In such social studies we are not only concerned with naming and describing but are also concerned with constructing, planning and even destroying.

I shall now try to explicate further the relation of philosophy to the natural and social sciences. But this I shall do by partly summarizing what I have said so far. Both Philosophy and Science are expressions of man's experience and so both of them spring from the same source, namely, the man and the reality. Thus in a way both of them have a *formative identity* or the identity conferred by an act of thought. But philosophy is a judgement or evaluation of the expression that is science. Thus in its critical aspect philosophy is different from science. At the same time it may be realized that this difference is only a difference of degree, for a critical attitude, the attitude which passes judgement is not

totally absent in scientific activity. Thus although philosophy and science are different they share a similarity of attitude and direction both in formative and critical characters.

I shall now consider how this happens. First, as I said earlier, the knower or the one who acts is separated or alienated from the world. This alienation or separation* which may be mental seems to be natural to consciousness. Consciousness acts by discriminating and finally it discriminates within itself. This alienation from itself *splits consciousness* in a unique way. Consciousness is seen in two aspects, consciousness and self consciousness. This gives a special nature to the knower-and-actor. He is also seen in two ways : (1) he who is merely an observer and does not act, has also alienated himself from the body (though not separated from the body), and (2) he who acts, and wants co-operation from the body as a means to act. Body is regarded as external to the first kind of knower and since body has spatial dimension even space is regarded as external to him. The selfconscious observer-knower is a must in any knowledge activity and hence he is supposed to exist. But this lame, inactive knower cannot act. One has also to think of an active knower — a knower who is in space and time and who has a body and therefore is not merely a knower but is also one who acts. It is this kind of knower, a non-epistemic knower, who is needed in every human activity and creation. This knower is at the back of all scientific creations also. This dichotomy of two kinds of knowers creates a muddle in philosophical thinking, if the one is misunderstood for the other. It is likely to be forgotten that the self-conscious inactive knower has no independent existence, his status being only epistemic. He is merely an inseparable part of the active knower. This *inactive knower is an abstraction* and so is knowledge. The ability to abstract the objective universe gives us mathematics and logic although I have a feeling that this abstraction is also of more than one kind. In this abstraction either the space and time are eliminated or they are independently studied or sometimes they are only partly eliminated. In mathematics space and time are independently studied. When we try to find out universals in logic, entities are abstracted from space and time. In induction neither the space-time nor the individual entities are abstracted, only their special characteristics are abstracted.

* Objectively separation but epistemically alienation.

The knower as a living being also knows that there are other living beings and he is able to differentiate between beings and things. He is able to communicate with other beings, co-operate with other beings, quarrel with other beings. Self-preservation is always regarded as more important than co-operation. From the dialectics of self-preservation and co-operation arise other studies. They may either be the studies of beings or studies of things in relation to beings. This gives rise to different sciences when properly systematized. But in a way all sciences are preservation of experience or judgements on such preserved experience. Although preservation of experience is possible without it being communicated to others, such preservation would only be private and would wither away with the annihilation of the knower. Judgement on the other hand requires some instrument for communication. Although it need not take a linguistic form it would require greater capacity to discriminate and reflect and this is not possible without symbols and concepts. It means that *the instruments of communication arise in the process of alienation itself*. Man communicates usually with the help of language and sometimes with the help of art. But *that which is communicated is different from how it is communicated*. The how of communication takes the form of assertion or creation and here again it is either describing or systematizing our experience or modifying our experience and creating new structures. The different sciences which may be more or less systematic arise out of this and create a social reality which either is a relationship between one active knower and another or a relationship between the knower and the phenomena belonging to cosmic world. It is the cosmic world as understood by man. This is the world of science and sciences are therefore divided into natural and social. To understand this nature of science, their relationships with one another and their relations with man is the object of philosophy. Philosophy passes a judgement, evaluates these sciences and along with them evaluates itself. To say the least it is a critique of communication. This critique is in fact a form of life and also a critique of the form of life. If sciences are systematic judgements, philosophy is a critique of such systematic judgements. Philosophy tells us that in social sciences we discover the laws of actions and in natural science we discover the laws of motions and movements.

V

If all that I have said above is correct it should follow that one could not think of man without philosophy. Philosophy, in fact, would be theorization of what man does, for man is nothing but a gestalt of his actions—self-conscious actions and a critique of his actions. Philosophy in this understanding would be a comprehension of man's practice. Since man himself is a gestalt of thought and action, the philosophical activity would form an essential moment of actualization of man's nature. In this manner, philosophy would be an essential part of a training for life. Unfortunately this image of philosophy is lost sight of. Kant, in his preface to the Critique of Pure Reason, while talking of philosophy as the queen of sciences, said, "now it is the fashion of the time to heap contempt and scorn upon her". The state of affairs vis-a-vis philosophy particularly in India today, is not very different from one described by Kant. What are the reasons for such a state of philosophy? I feel the reasons are two-fold. First, philosophy is confused with theology, religion, mysticism. When the discipline which aims at the rational understanding of the universe is misunderstood for blind beliefs, pious hopes and magic, nothing else can be expected. In fact, for many, philosophy is nothing but a kind of sorcery and magic. It is thought that nothing could be simpler than philosophy. One has simply to turn into a Baba and whatever he utters, sense, nonsense or irrelevant, becomes philosophy. The growth of such philosophy is even more than the growth of population in our country. Critical Philosophy like family-planning, is required for checking this growth. Secondly, the bad days of philosophy are also due to the fact that people belonging to other disciplines, economists, political scientists, as also the rulers of this country do not quite realise the importance and significance of philosophy. They do not understand that philosophy is the very life-blood of man, that it penetrates every action of man, that it cannot be separated from him. If we try to act without understanding the philosophy behind it our actions will be purposeless, meaningless. But this is unfortunately happening on the social horizon of our country. We are trying to understand our social reality without caring for the philosophy behind it. How big should be the states? What is meant by democracy? Should slogans be distinguished from doctrines and principles? Who is a democratic person? Is he one

who gives merely democratic slogans? What should be the perspective of our industrial growth? Whether we should go all out for mechanization? Can these questions be answered without reference to philosophy?

The way the society and its leaders are neglecting philosophy gives an impression that philosophy is not relevant to human life, thought and progress. A question is generally asked, "what is the use of Philosophy?" The question, of course, has to be answered at various levels. It is indeed true that philosophy does not give direct explanations of the phenomena that man comes across. And in a way, what is generally termed as knowledge is different from what philosophy does. From what I have tried to say above about philosophy it would appear that philosophy is like a margin of a page, that philosophy is only assumed as a background when a common man or a scientist talks of knowledge. But is not 'sub-conscious' important when we are discussing 'knowledge'? Does not sub-conscious interfere with our modes of conscious actions? Does not sub-conscious enrich our knowledge by way of recollection and recognition? Will the knowledge be complete unless the sub-conscious background or the depths of knowledge are taken note of? Will a Chemist, Physicist, or a Biologist be able to take his subject to perfection without taking note of its background philosophy? Incomplete knowledge is only incomplete knowledge. No knowledge will be complete unless its philosophic background is acknowledged. To say that there is no extension of knowledge beyond science does not appear to be convincing. It is like saying that there is no other side of the moon because we do not have its perception. We cannot talk of one part of knowledge as relevant to society and the other part as irrelevant. It is the total which makes a whole. If a subject is considered under different aspects and the special problems are separately studied it is only for the sake of convenience and division of labour. When a man knows, he certainly knows something, but his knowing that he knows something is different from and richer than his merely knowing something. In the same way when man does philosophy he is becoming self-conscious of the pursuits he is otherwise carrying on. This self-consciousness not only produces philosophy but also integrates all his knowledge. In fact, in the absence of such integration the incomplete knowledge is likely to be dangerous. Today we talk of corruption, immorality

and the lack of character in the society. This happens because man becomes selfish; he begins to care for his narrow interests and does not care for the total interest of his society; he does not understand the implications of the fact that there are other individuals also. This is natural because he does not get the total picture of the total situation. In this sense I could even say that the social disease in our country is philosophic. A person who thinks of his own rights without caring for the rights or freedom of others, a man who cares for his own interests without caring for the interest of the whole nation or society, a man who first decides against a particular person or a group and then knits a web of rationalization against him in the name of some so-called principles—all these are due to unhealthy attitude of man which again is due to incomplete knowledge. Similarly those leaders of the society who think that philosophy does not serve any purpose are also instances of the same attitude. This animosity against philosophy, as I said earlier, is reflected even in the behaviour of scientists, social scientists and administrators. Why should not philosophy have a place in The Indian Council for Social Science Research? If philosophy does not come under social sciences, why should not there be a separate council for philosophic research? If philosophy is not job-oriented but if it is still important for social reconstruction, why should not Government or Industrialists protect philosophy by employing at least some philosophers in Government or Industries? Is not the concept of human relations important? Do not the Government and Industry require people who would treat the situation in a human manner? Will not the discipline of philosophy be important here? Will not a person trained in social and moral philosophies, be useful for settling disputes between management and labour, which are only two sides of the same culture? If the answer to all such questions is the negative Government and Universities should take a ruthless step and banish philosophy from all curricula. But if the answer is in the affirmative it is equally necessary to give up the present negative attitude and protect the budding philosophers of India. Philosophy is like salt. It need not be consumed in the same quantity as other commodities. There need not be the same number of teachers and students for Philosophy as for other subjects. But if philosophy is necessary it should not be neglected in the manner it is being done at present. In fact a proper nurturing of philosophy

is specially necessary, particularly because a bad philosophy can grow not only in the streets but also in the laboratories of Scientists, Natural and Social.

Preservation of philosophy is necessary also to preserve the memories and works of our masters. Are we to simply discard the heritage of the philosophy coming down to us from Nyaya and Vaisesika, Buddhists and Jains, Grammar and Yoga and Ayurveda and Music? It is these philosophies which have given us culture we can boast of and we cannot give up what we have received by way of heritage. In fact philosophers also must do something on their own which would make such preservation possible. For example, as in the West, should not philosophers take a step to build an archive of philosophical writings? Should we not preserve, before they are lost, the manuscripts of our masters like Raja Ram Mohan Roy, Jyotiba Phule, Ravindranath Tagore, Mahatma Gandhi, K. C. Bhattacharya, Radhakrishnan, R. D. Ranade, G. R. Malkani, R. Das, D. M. Dutta and also of the doyens of the present generation like N. V. Banerjee, T. R. V. Murthy, D. D. Vadekar, Kalidas Bhattacharya, T. M. P. Mahadevan, C. T. K. Chari and several others. Let me now conclude. According to me Man is the central figure behind all pursuits of knowledge. It is he who has discovered or invented Religion, Science and Technology. But in this attempt he has also created a Fanatic, a pseudo Scientist and a Technician, who has forgotten the man. Man is now alienated from himself. He is lost. We may talk of values but even values have become external to us. We have forgotten that man is the source and the measure of all values. Let it dawn on us that we have to find out this lost man. Philosophy is a search for this Man.

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