

REVIEWS

A SYNTHESIS OF PHILOSOPHY. By Harold J. Dumain.
185 pages, Philosophical Library, New York. \$ 6.00

Hegel was once asked to explain his philosophy while standing on one foot. In this wide ranging serious study the author has attempted a task of like difficulty. He begins with a valuable criticism of the crisis of civilization and the retreat of much modern thought from true metaphysics. Philosophy, he writes, "has turned its back on metaphysics, oftentimes concerning itself mainly with problems of logical analysis." He goes on to point out the importance of knowledge of the past, the misunderstanding of modern science, that there is no need of it, that everything has begun anew. A thread of Platonism runs through his thought.

In chapter two, a search for solutions, mention is made of Communism as an important factor in the intellectual dilemma of Modernity. But of greater importance by far is the much earlier Cartesian revolution which Hocking rightly stresses at length in his **COMING WORLD CIVILIZATION**, for Descartes is infinitely more important for philosophical understanding than Marx, especially in a brief survey such as this one. Descartes is, of course, later discussed in chapter three, "Theory of Knowledge And Reality," perhaps the most rewarding part of the book.

We are indebted to the author for his important remarks on Greek science and wish he had extended his study of Heisenberg's now rather famous Atlantic article "From Plato To Max Planck" which every student of Greek philosophy should read. It first appeared in the "Birthday issue" of Atlantic, Nov. 1959. This section abounds with great insights. To quote one: "The divine mind to the extent that it is incorporated into culture may directly influence human behaviour and build human values." Here the author agrees with John Boodin that the structure of value is eternal. Again he seems to approach Boodin's concept, mind and matter as aspects of some higher Being, in this case Deity. It seems singular that Dumain omits mention of any important recent American

philosopher. In his chapter on Ethics he is close to J.S. Mill's ideas yet does not refer to him.

Critical Idealists will take exception to the attempt to build a road to Cosmic Theism on a synthesis of materialism and idealism. For mind is the truth of nature and Theism more securely rests on a thorough and corrected Idealism, freed from the vagaries of 19th century Romanticism.

We have here a reasoned case for what might be called a theistic Naturalism, freed of the fallacies of materialism. The idealist school must agree with him: "The success of the Platonic philosophy and of science thus far does give at least a glimmer of hope."

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IDENTITY AND THOUGHT EXPERIMENT By Suresh Chandra, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Simla, (pp. x + 108) Price Rs. 18.50.

The book under consideration is a piece of good and shrewd philosophy. It is a good piece of philosophy for it tells the philosophers to pull the reigns of their imagination, it tells them not to mix up what is scientifically possible with what is imaginatively possible. It is a shrewd piece of philosophy for it does not discuss anything more than what is required.

It is a collection of four independent essays, namely, "Scepticism, Identity and Interrupted Existence"; "Seeing and Tasting after-images"; "Man in Science Fiction"; "Personal Identity and Medical Possibility". The first two articles are the revised versions of the articles already published in *Indian Philosophical Quarterly* and *Knowledge, Culture and Value*. The original versions of the last two articles were read at the seminars held at the Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Simla and the Visva Bharati University, Shantiniketan, respectively. What unites all these articles into one organic whole is the fact that all of them directly or indirectly are concerned with the problem of identity.

In the first chapter the author has successfully refuted the view, that identity is the same as spatio-temporal continuity, held by Strawson, Hume, Price and a host of other contemporary British philosophers. He has, with the help of the examples of "drum-world" — a world in which no other sorts of particular except drums find a place, and of hallucinatory objects and after-images proved (i) negatively that any philosopher who reduces the concept of identity to that of continuity commits a mistake, and (ii) positively that the concept of identity is consistent with both the concepts—the concept of continuity and that of discontinuity. One is here reminded of Thomas Reid who also, in chapter IV entitled "Identity", of *Essays on the Intellectual Power of Man*, tries to show by taking the example of pain and time that the concept of identity is compatible with the concept of interrupted existence. However, in this chapter, the author has examined in details the arguments put forward by Strawson alone. One would

want him to examine the arguments put forward by Hume and Price also in details.

The second chapter in the words of the author is "a by-product of the first chapter". Here he refutes the views held by some philosophers that after-images are bodily sensations. To do so he examines in details the general status of after-images. The originality and novelty of this chapter lies in the fact that in his discussion he does not confine himself only to the analysis of the after-images of seeing alone to which the British philosophers have generally paid attention, but also analysed "after-taste" in terms of "tasting after-image"—a field in which no work has so far been done. In this analysis, he claims, he has not confined himself to abstract thinking but has made actual experiments with different varieties of wines and other food-stuffs, and invites everyone to verify his results.

In the third chapter the author points out the fact that the modern science fiction exaggerates the potentialities of science. He has by taking the examples of Mary Shelly's *Frankenstein* which is supposed to be the pioneer work in science fiction, George Orwell's *1984*, H. G. Wells's *Russia in the Shadows*, *The War of Worlds*, *The Time Machine*, Aldous Huxley's *The Brave New World*, and Stevenson's *Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde* shown that these works of fiction have tried to give their uncontrolled flights of imagination the respectability of science by importing a few terms of science dictionary in their works. He has shown that all that is imaginable is not scientifically possible. One, however, fails to appreciate why he should have attempted to answer some of the problems like "How long are we going to retain the institution of family?", "Should we have the institution of marriage?" etc., which have no bearing on the problem of identity. He could have either shortened this chapter, or alternatively restricted himself to the science fiction which deals with human psychology, and therefore, has a direct bearing on the contemporary philosophical discussion of identity.

There is a tendency in the modern philosophers to ignore the simple common-sensical facts and construct and live in some complex world of their own fantasies. The result is that they are caught

in their own web. The problem of personal identity is the living example of such a tendency. In the fourth and the concluding chapter the author has taken up the imagined cases of brain-transfer, fusion of bodies, division of bodies, memory duplicators put forward by Shoemaker, Wiggin, Porfit, Williams, Miri, Long and Perry and has shown that all these examples rest on the ignorance of the distinction between scientific and medical possibility, and miraculous and magical possibility. The facts which these philosophers imagine could be performed by a surgeon, or a physician or a chemist, can only be performed by a *Messiah* or a prophet or a magician.

The book is uniformly interesting and stimulating. As a whole it contains much of value, though it may not greatly excite those who believe in having philosophical problems for their own sake. But it contains a hint for them too. It is, that there is no necessity for them to construct out of their imagination fabulous creatures or fabulous machines; instead they can take cases of actual scientific achievements like the sex-change and discuss their philosophical repercussions. The other theme of the book which is not explicitly mentioned by the author but is implicitly contained is that the philosophers should not try to create problems where there are none. They should try to see things as they actually are, not as they might, could or should be.

So much about the content of the book; now a word about its form. The book, though, has an elegant get up, it is full of typographical errors. These errors cause an obstruction to a smooth reading.

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Ashok Vohra

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Jude P. Dougherty, Editor

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Twenty-Year Cumulative Index, 1947-1967 is available for

\$3.00 a copy.

LOKHANDE, Ajit, *Tukārāma, His Person and His Religion*, a religio-historical, phenomenological and typological enquiry, Bern: Herbert Lang, and Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1976, 208 pages photo-mimeograph, cms 15 × 21, no price. (European University Papers, Series XX: Philosophy, Vol. 22.)

This informative and comprehensive study of Tukārāma and his theology by a Maharashtrian scholar now settled in W. Germany deserves consideration. Tukārāma, indeed, is a central figure of the *bhakti* tradition at a time of transition and reorganization, when Hinduism begins to reassert itself as a religious, social and political force over against the waning Moghal power, and his mark on the religious and literary heritage of the Maratha people is indelible. However, relatively little critical study has been done concerning his person and his religious thought. This monograph is an important step in that direction.

After a first chapter about the background of Tukārāma (*bhakti* movement in Maharashtra, achievements of Dnyāneshvara, Nāmadeva and Eknātha, leading personalities and poet-saints of the Vārakarī Pantha) the second chapter investigates the sources of Tukārāma's life and gives a critical account of various manuscripts of his compositions. His life is presented against the backdrop of the religious forces (Vaiṣṇava *bhakti*, *Vārakarī*, *Mahānu-bhāva*, Jainism and to some extent Islam) and the socio-political situation of his time, including King Sivaji's relationship with the *Vārakarī* movement and with Tukā himself.

Chapter three analyzes his idea of God and the implications of image-worship. Unlike some authors, Lokhande makes no attempt to reconcile the contrary trends of formulation (non-dualistic, theistic, polytheistic present in Tukā's hymns (*abhang*)), but rather awakens an understanding of the complex tradition inherited by Tukārāma and of the existential setting of his hymns. Concluding this analysis, the author says: "Tukā is convinced that God is one and a personal Being although he is above and beyond the world (not identified with it). For Tukā there are not many gods as the highest Beings but just one: Viṭhala, the incarnate Viṣṇu. All the other gods are false gods. Stones or metal images cannot be identified with God. They point to God. They are his

vicarious representations. They deserve special respect because they are in a special way related to God. But they do not replace Him. One can serve God and love him even without these images. One can contemplate and meditate upon Him and reach Him without the help of images. But for Tukā himself and other simple people God has made himself manifest; he is become incarnate. Tukā remains, first and last, a *Bhakta*. Almost all the *abhaṅgas* are a colloquy with, a contemplative prayer to, or praises of the *saguna* God". (p. 103)

The same chapter shows how from this conception of God Tukā derives a very humble view of himself as a sinner ever begging for divine forgiveness and a sense that his very need for it enriches God with the title of saviour. It further explores his consequent idea of the world. This is on the whole a positive idea rarely found in the older Hinduism. The world, no doubt a stormy sea to be crossed with detachment but "on its farther side stands the generous one with his hands upon his hips". Living creatures and material goods could lead us astray but in themselves they are valuable and have their own place and role appointed by God. Tukā says, "To use the world according to the divine rules is equal to renouncing it". His apprehension of the world is marked by the duality of use-and-renunciation. "As a bhakta Tukā wants and needs the world as a means to serve and love his God. As a mystic he feels apathy towards it when religious and moral values are concerned". (p. 114) Yet, it is never for him a play of *māyā* (illusion), a mere *līlā* (play) of god.

Chapter four continues these considerations. Tukārāma accepted meekly enough the four-varṇa system of society and his lot in it as a mere Śūdra. He performed his caste-duties faithfully but he took his real refuge into the casteless Vārakarī Pantha. "A Vaiṣṇava is one who loves God alone" — Tukā says, "His caste may be anything at all". Among the Vārkarīs alone he found the true society of saints, the moral rather than legal society that mattered to him.

Chapter five is devoted to the phenomenological study of the personal religion of Tukārāma. Lokhande examines here the numinous experiences of Tukā, his belief in the coming of God as the Viṭṭhala of Paṇḍharpura and his iconographic description in the language of the *abhaṅgas*. He analyses also his view of the Vārakarīs as a group, as a 'discipleship' and a 'brotherhood'.

The final chapter contains a typological study of the personality of Tukārāma as mystic and prophet. As a mystic of the most intimate union of man with God, Tukā uses at times non-dualistic expressions but his mysticism is not a mysticism of knowledge (*jñāna*) or even of vision but of devotion and touch. It can be seen as 'bride-mysticism' but without the overtone of emotionalism. Compared to the Kṛṣṇa-*bhakti* of the Caitanyas or the Vallabhas, it is quite sober. It is a theistic and even monotheistic mysticism of union with God as master, lord, mother, father, brother and friend, a perfect 'I-Thou' mysticism which, yet does not shun such expressions as 'I have become the pervading spirit.' And the union it tends to and experiences even now is a unique and ineffable experience of sweetness, pleasure ever new, innermost perception. For Tukā, all creatures and the world around him are included in this experience of union so that he is filled with happiness from within and from without. Yet, although nature is involved in his mysticism, Tukārāma is not a nature-mystic. "Tukārāma's commerce is directly with God; he *meets* his God and experiences *Him*; or rather he experiences himself in God. In other words, he experiences the mystical union of the spirits. It is far different from being happy in the company of God as 'revealed' in nature." (p.187) As to his personal attitude in prayer it is more contemplative (*cintana*) than meditative (*manana* or *dhyāna*) and it culminates in an innermost mystic union which he does not analyse but just relishes.

Typologically, Tukārāma is also a prophet, i.e., a messenger of God, an organ of his revelation. He has experienced a call and puts the whole responsibility for his speech on God: "I speak only as God sets me speaking." However unworthy and unqualified he feels to be, he speaks boldly as the mouthpiece of God. He speaks of himself as Viṭṭhala's 'branded slave', 'stamped servant' and 'sealed' as Viṭṭhala's own. As such he suffers no rival to his God and rebukes those who turn their faces away from Viṭṭhala.

Dr. Lokhande's book is not only a finely written and solidly grounded introduction to Tukārāma but it offers lovers and scholars of this great poet-saint a rewarding and at times challenging study conducted with critical understanding but also with appreciative sympathy throughout.

CORRECTIONS

- (1) In the October 1978 issue of this Quarterly read the 22nd line in the last paragraph on page 123 as follows : We use "our bodies and their natural powers....". Similarly the address of the writer should be read as "Bhairab Ganguly College, Calcutta".
- (2) In the October 1978 issue of this Quarterly the name of our Individual Life Member Dr. (Miss) B. Mukherji has been printed. Her address is as follows :

Dr. (Miss) B. Mukherji,
G/30 Arvind Colony,
B. H. U.
VARANASI-211 005

CHEMPARATHY George, *An Indian Rational Theology: Introduction to Udayana's Nyāyakusmāñjali*, De Nobili Research Library, Vienna, 1972, distributed by Gerold and Co., Vienna; E.J. Brill, Leiden; M. Banarsidass, Delhi, 204 pages, Rs. 40.

The pioneer of modern studies of Udayana was E.B. Cowell who knew only the verse portion (*kārikā*) of his N. Kusumāñjali. He was followed by Faddegon, Jacobi, K. N. Jha, U. Mishra, S. Mookerjee, M. Hiriyanna, L. Suali, G. Tucci, Radhakrishnan, E. Frauwallner, S. V. Sastri, A.S. Kuppuswami Sastri and D. C. Bhattacharya. Taking up from the results attained by them, Dr. Chemparathy has devoted many years of research on Udayana's seven works the mature fruit of which he now offers us in this introduction to N. K.

Unconvinced by D.C. Bhattacharya's arguments for placing Udayana in 1050-1100 A.D., he retains the generally upheld date (between 950 and 1050) but hopes to carry on further research on this point. He is able to provide (p. 23) the probable chronological order of U.'s 7 works. His estimate of U., a Maithilī Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika (who, however, does not mix the two darśanas) is high on good grounds he sets forth on p. 26. Apart from being a respectable logician whose contributions to Indian epistemology are not minor, U. is the staunch defender of N.V. theism who, besides commentatorial works, composed independent treatises which reveal him to have been a systematic thinker, an indefatigable controversialist but also a man of deep faith in Śiva's grace whose saving effect he hoped to see extended even to his atheist opponents.

Indeed, the concluding prayer of the fifth *stābaka* (chapter) of his N.K. is worth quoting in this regard: "Thus, O Lord, kind and compassionate, although their hearts are bathed again and again by the overflowing waters of the Vedic and ethical teachings, you can find no place in the hearts of those men and they remain hard as rocks; still, because in the very act of opposing your existence they have sincerely thought of you, may they in time solely through your kind mercy cross over to the shore of salvation." And the verse that follows which recalls the *inquietum est cor* of St. Augustine: "Thou art beautiful by nature; although our minds are, indeed, since long immersed in thee, O Source of bliss, still I.P.Q....20

they are even today restless and unsatisfied. Hence, O Lord, hasten to show thy mercy so that, our minds being fixed solely on thee, we may not attain a hundred times the torments of Yama." (see-29-30)

As an ardent devotee of Īśvara, he wrote more as an act of worship than as pure philosophic speculation. This is seen in the introductory and concluding verses of his works, especially those of the five *stabakas* of N.K. But as a controversialist, he handled his logical weapons with utmost skill and did not spare his opponents towards whom he could be caustic or even sarcastic. In N.K. he rarely mentions them by name or quotes from their works so that there is difficulty in identifying them. But he often uses an opponent's formulation to refute him step by step. While many of the atheists from the past, especially Sāṃkhyas and Mīmāṃsakas, were then tempering their opposition, he still had to face the quite lively Buddhistic atheism of a Jñānas'ri and a Ratnakīrti.

Up to the 7th century, commentators of N. S. IV, 1, 19-21, treated of Īśvara's existence, nature, attributes and motives of activity and established proofs based on different middle terms (*hetu*). The grounds of opposition of their adversaries were chiefly the fact of suffering, the inequality of living beings and the inconsistencies of theism (summarised in note 95, p. 77). Then, Dharmakīrti in line with developments in logic inaugurated by Dinnāga made his famous radical attack against any possible logical argument for the existence of a Lord. Hence, the consequent emphasis of the Naiyāyikas, especially Trilocana and Vācaspati, on overturning this attack. Udayana's concern is similarly to prove Īśvara's existence rather than to expatiate on his nature and attributes. His main thrust is directed against Kumārila Bhaṭṭa probably because Mīmāṃsā belongs to orthodoxy and, hence, deserves special refutation. He wages no controversy with Vedānta but he is not a Vedāntin.

U. establishes a clear plan for each *stabaka* and follows it with occasional excursus. His fivefold division refers to 5 erroneous opinions (*vipratipatti*) rather than to 5 schools and within his treatment of each such opinion he considers the relevant schools. The subject of N.K. is Paramātman "whose worship the wise consider to be the path towards heaven and liberation." Scriptural belief in this Lord is not sufficient; he is to be made the object of

rational reflection (*manana*) so as to invalidate the atheistic objections (in the first 4 stabakas) and positively prove his existence (in the 5th).

U.'s "ecumenical" attitude is patent in his prose introduction where he suggests that practically all Indian religious sects and philosophic schools of his time actually believe in the Lord interpretatively insofar as they worship some ideal figure or idealised founder (see 81-82). Yet many fail to recognise the true aim of their veneration and reject explicitly the Śaiva belief in the one supreme Lord.

In the first stabaka, U. discusses mainly with the Cārvākas who deny the *adṛṣṭa* or *apūrva*, i.e., the metempirical and unprecedented power of action (*karma*) to produce its fruit through a series of rebirths. By refuting them U. obtains a ground for his theistic argumentation since *adṛṣṭa* being unconscious needs to be guided by a conscious agent who could be none other than Īśvara. The latter alone, indeed, is the supra-mundane (*lokottara*) person directly perceptive of all things (*sarvānubhāvi*) including those no man can perceive. (82-83)

The second stabaka follows up with a discussion of the means of accumulating meritorious *adṛṣṭa*. This means consists of the rituals and sacrifices prescribed in the Veda. The latter, however, cannot be eternal (as upheld by Mīmāṃsā) because of the non-eternal nature of speech and the periodic recurrence of cosmic dissolutions and creations. Hence, it must be produced anew with each new creation, and who but the Lord could be its utterer? (83)

In the third stabaka, U. shows that none of the accepted *pramāṇas* could ever disprove the existence of the Lord who, being imperceptible, escapes the scope of the first five; as to *Śabda* (scriptural authority) its explicit assertions amply counterbalance some apparent denials allegedly found in the Veda. Further, he establishes (in the footsteps of Trilocana and Vācaspati) that the necessary relation between effect and agent can be determined beyond all doubt and, hence, inference (*anumāna*) from the visible cosmic effect to its invisible agent, the Lord, is valid. (83-84)

The fourth stabaka corrects the opponents' erroneous idea of valid cognition so as to show that authentically valid cognition is

possible in Īśvara. Thus the first 4 stabakas pave the way for the 5th which works out their results and formulates directly U.'s theistic arguments. (84) A few of these arguments are also found in another two of U.'s works. For U. all the arguments he proposes in N.K. are valid and "it is not the fault of the post (*sthānu*, also a name of Śiva) if the blind man (*andha*) does not see it".

In the first verse of the fifth stabaka, U. clearly sets forth the probandum (*sādhya*), namely, an omniscient and immutable Lord, and the logical reasons (*hetu*) of these arguments. There are 9 *hetus*. The Lord is proved (1) from the existence and nature of effects (*kāryatvāt*); this ancient proof is reformulated carefully in the line of Vācaspati (86-90); (2) from the combining (*āyojanāt*) of the unconscious atoms (90-92); (3) from the need for a support (*dhrteḥ*) of the weighty earth, etc. in space (92-94); (4) from the dissolution of the universe (*samharaṇāt*) (94-95); (5) from the skill of speech, etc. (*padāt*) in which men have to be instructed at the beginning of each creation (95-97); (6) from the authoritativeness (*pratyayāt*) of the scriptural tradition (97-98); (7) from the general acceptance of the Veda (*Śruteḥ*) in spite of its having no empirical basis (98-99); (8) from the connection (*anvayataḥ*) of its words into meaningful sentences (99-103); (9) from the difference in number (*samkhyāviśeṣāt*) of the atoms required to form dyads, triads, etc. (104-108). These *hetus* lead to the existence of Īśvara as creator or more exactly as combiner of simple and timeless constituents into a complex universe (1,2,9), as preserver (3), as destroyer (4), and as primordial teacher (5,6,7,8).

The same 9 *hetus*, interpreted differently, thanks to the *śleṣa* or *double entendre* of Sanskrit words, are made by U. to provide another series of 9 proofs. The reader will find its elucidation pp. 109-132. All these 9 *hetus* aim at proving against the Mīmāṃsakas that the Vedas have necessarily Īśvara as their author.

In examining the convincing value of both series of proofs, the author rightly remarks that they are time and culture-bound. They represent the end-product of centuries of reflection by eminent thinkers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika darśana. I may be permitted to remark that this rational theodicy is often thought to contain all that Indian thought has elaborated on this subject. But from Śaṅkara onwards the theologians of the Vedānta have proposed

arguments of another type whose probative force deserves careful assessment; and apart from Madhva they have centered them on a Paramātman who is not only the *Nimitta-kāraṇa* arranging pre-existing constituents into an orderly universe but is the total Cause, both *Nimitta* and *Upādāna Kāraṇa*, of the cosmos.

U. holds with his own tradition that the Director (*adhishṭhātṛ*) of the cosmos is conditioned by Time, Space, the souls' merits and demerits. This limits his omnipotence but offers an easy solution to the 'problem of evil'. He directs living beings so that in accordance with their past *karma* they can exercise their own causality and thus experience (*bhoga*) the fruits of their merits and demerits. (140 and 148)

He is bodiless (*aśarīrin*) because in spite of the opinion of any past Indian thinkers agency does not demand the possession of a body. The Lord can act 'through mere thinking' (*abhidhyānamātrāt*) which U. explains as *samkalpamātrāt*, 'through mere volition' (140-147). But to teach beings at the dawn of a creation he takes up a merely instrumental body (*upākaraṇaśarīra*) which is only a 'body of artifice' (*nirmāṇakāyā*); interestingly this is a term borrowed from Buddhism. The theoretical reasons why Naiyāyika could concede this are conjectured pp. 152-153. Of the specific qualities of *ātman*, only cognition, desire and effort are applicable to *Īśvara*. Mere desire does not suffice for his causing, there must be effort (*prayatna*) in the form of an outburst of volition. Of these qualities he is the substrate (*āśraya*), [not the causal *samavāyi kāraṇa*, and his eternal, non-plural cognition is in *samavāya* relation to him. The apparent multiplicity of his desire (in itself one, *eka*) comes from the diversity of its terms, i.e. from the difference of its *upādhis* (a term favoured in similar regards by Śaṅkara). (140-175)

The qualities *dharma* (merit) which both Pakṣilasvāmin and Jayanta admitted, and *sukha* (pleasure), admitted by Jayanta, are not really found in *Īśvara* because they depend on *karma* of which he is free; yet he is the repository of bliss (*ānanda-nidhi*) understood as total absence of pain. (177-178) His immutability in absence of all adventitious specific *guṇas* or accidents. (179) The Lord's relation to generic qualities (*sāmānyaguṇaḥ*) is discussed pp. 179-182. The case of *samyoga* (conjunction) deserves mention

since it seems to be demanded by the Lord's all-pervasiveness. Although the Naiyāyika Uddyotakara admitted an eternal 'unproduced conjunction' (*aja samyoga*) between all-pervasive substances U. follows the Vaiśeṣikas who, beginning with Praśastapada' denied such a possibility. The Lord can only be in indirect conjunction with the souls through the intermediary of substances of limited size, such as the atoms. (181-182)

In his concluding remarks, the author, while admitting the large debt of U. to his predecessors, denies that he simply reiterated their arguments and shows in detail his originality in rethinking, understanding anew and updating them against new opponents, besides formulating arguments of his own (such as 3 and 4 and the whole second series). (183-185) Then he fittingly concludes his study with a quotation from U.'s *Ātmatattvaviveka* which is an epitome of his doctrine:

"Salutation to that Father, the Lord of the worlds, the foremost of the ancient teachers, whose lordship is innate; who, having at the beginning created the worlds, thereafter maintains [them]; who causes [in the living beings] proficeincy [in the usage of words, etc.]; who effects the injuctions with regard to what is salutary and the prohibitions with regard to what is not salutary; whose truthfulness of speech is congenital [i.e., natural to him]; whose compassion is unconditioned; whose effort has [only] that [i.e., the worlds, especially the living beings] as its aim".

Dnyānadeepa Vidyāpeeth,
Pune 14.

R. V. DeSmet