

THE CONCEPT OF ADHYASA AND THE VEDĀNTA OF ŚAṄKARA

I

In the preface to his commentary on the Brahma-sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa, Śaṅkara brings in the concept of *adhyāsa* as furnishing the clue to an understanding of the philosophy of the upāṇiṣhads, embodied in what he calls, 'the *Vedānta Vākya*s'.¹ He does not lay any claim to discovery of a 'new' truth, nor does he claim to have expounded a philosophy of his own independent of, and unrelated to, what tradition has regarded as the 'revealed truth' of the scriptures.² His greatness consists in presenting the vedāntic truth as absolute non-dualism (*advaita*) against other possible versions of it by means of a masterly interpretation of the texts which is compelling in its logical force. But the fact remains that unlike most philosophies, Śaṅkara does not start with 'first principles', of his own reflective thought, and, thereafter, attempt a logical deduction. It is the method of free and unbridled reflective thinking (and not free imagination)³ with no anchorage in the intuitions or revelations embodied in the vedānta texts⁴ that both Bādarāyaṇa and Śaṅkara, acting upon certain express statements of the upāṇiṣads themselves unambiguously repudiate.⁵ The Śāṅkhya philosophy which Śaṅkara himself regards as a superb rationalistic system and as the strongest rival in the philosophic encounter⁶ can by no stretch of imagination be characterised as a system of purely fanciful speculation and on that ground meriting Śaṅkara's condemnation in that context. Now the bare suggestion of Śaṅkara's affiliation to the vedāntic tradition of the upāṇiṣads as also of his espousal of the revealed authority of the scriptures as an independent and extraordinary source of knowledge (*alaukika pramāṇa*) is treated by some with utmost contempt and is looked upon as inconsistent with Śaṅkara's status as a great philosopher.⁷ The argument of these modern exponents of Śaṅkara's philosophy has taken the following direction. Since

Śaṅkara has to be regarded as a great philosopher, he must be understood to be a free and independent thinker unfettered by any tradition.⁸ He cannot have accepted, therefore, the scriptural authority as a *pramāṇa*, that is, as an instrument of valid knowledge,⁹ not to speak of, as an extraordinary or *alaukika pramāṇa*, impervious and self-dependent, which no conventional *laukika pramāṇa* can either assail or contradict. The bogey of the so-called *śāstrapramāṇa* has to be treated as an illicit and unwarranted imposition, worked upon the purely logical, non-factual and linguistic analysis of Śaṅkara by unenlightened tradition. Or since the expressions, *śāstrapramāṇa*, *āgama*, and *śabda* are found to have been used interchangeably, what Śaṅkara speaks of as an organ of supreme enlightenment and consequently, as a means of liberation, must be *śābdapramāṇa* in the sense of a 'critique of language'¹⁰ currently known in western philosophy as linguistic analysis. Moreover, as Śaṅkara is after all a philosopher, and no philosopher worth the name can take any interest in any 'factual' question regarding the nature of existence and the world of facts which undeniably form the special subject-matter of science, therefore, it follows logically that Śaṅkara could not have evinced any interest in any factual question and an understanding of Śaṅkara in any other light must be sheer misunderstanding.¹¹ Against such fundamental misrepresentation of Śaṅkara vedānta by tradition and the traditionalists this group of Indian writers have not only voiced their emphatic denunciation but they have also attempted a revision and 're-appraisal' of Śaṅkara's philosophy in their newly discovered light.¹² Since this clamour for re-interpretation of the philosophy of Śaṅkara has acquired some momentum it may not be out of place to give a dispassionate consideration to the above thesis vis-a-vis the traditional interpretation of Śaṅkara and his philosophy.

There is no absolutely settled and, therefore, one single tradition in philosophy. Nor is it philosophically sound to judge merit of a philosopher by reason of his supposed adherence to one particular tradition in philo-

sophy. What philosophy is, or is to be, is an open question. That metaphysical philosophy is nonsense, or that philosophical problems all arise from misuse of language, is only one specific view on the subject. There may be, and have been, other views on the matter. To understand a philosophy and to judge its merit or demerit it is necessary to read it in its own peculiar context and to hold it in the light of the tradition, the point of view, to which it belongs. No praise or blame proceeding from faulty supposition can throw any light upon a philosophical system or its proper appraisal.¹³ Śaṅkara is an *Indian* philosopher. In the Indian tradition, philosophy is essentially a view of life and philosophic wisdom consists, not in knowing the world of 'neutral' facts, — its nature as also its laws, but in understanding life as it is given, and in examining the possibility of remoulding and reforming it in the light of what is ascertained as the *truth* about all existence. In this, precisely, lies its specific direction, its orientation towards what is conceived as a supreme end or goal — *parama puruṣārtha*. This is a general characteristic of all systems of Indian philosophy, and the *advaita* philosophy of Śaṅkara is the most striking example, and *not* a remarkable *exception*.¹⁴ There is no place for purely theoretic interest in Indian philosophy. The '*atha*' (thereafter) and '*ataḥ*' (for this purpose) are inalienable features of philosophic enquiry in India. Indian philosophy did not aim at mere informative knowledge. It aspired to become *transformative* wisdom. Not that it is non-informative, disinterested or indifferent to the question as to *what is there*. It looks for information in order to *utilise* that knowledge for the purpose of transformation of the person from within with a view to effecting an ideal adjustment to the truth of the situation. This may be looked down upon as a vain-glorious fanciful programme, and wisdom which the word 'philosophy' literally signifies may be interpreted to stand for a critical understanding of some sort, devoid of any ostensible practical aim. But the fact remains that Indian philosophy is *not* a philosophy in that sense. That philosophy has no genuine problems to solve, that all its accredited problems are pseudo-problems—

arising from linguistic confusion, and that the proper function of philosophy consists not in *solving* but only in *resolving* such problems,— ‘in showing the fly the way out of the fly-bottle’, cannot be meaningfully uttered in the context of Indian philosophy. Wittgensteinian wisdom is out of its depth here. In the Indian context, philosophical problems relate to the problems of life, the problems that beset human existence. Does life have any problem? or can the Wittgensteinian magic make them evaporate?

The life we live, looks like an arena of test and trial. Man is at war not only with his surroundings, but also with himself. He is constantly thrown off his balance. This is evil. For healthy living, regaining the balance, is indispensable. This gives peace. In peace, the person is quite at ease with and within himself. Man needs peace and rest most of all. This, then, can be called the supreme object of his desire, his supreme end — *parama puruṣārhta*.¹⁵ Indian philosophy in its various schools, and in course of its various theories, provides *alternative* planning for realisation of this supreme end. This is its primary objective; all other enquiries are ancillary and are, therefore, of secondary importance. Wisdom consists not in knowing simply, but in knowing how to live an ideal life. While reflecting on life, Indian philosophy reflects on the varied experiences which life unfolds. It analyses these experiences, and in course of such analysis, also reflects *on*, or postulates *about*, what may be their objective determinants, on concomitant manifestations. Logic and psychology, epistemology and metaphysics, ethics and religion, even logical grammar and linguistic analysis, are commissioned to play their appropriate roles as integral parts of the total enquiry. But none is allowed to outstrip its legitimate limit. In its critical reflection on life, in its analysis and evaluation of the varied experiences which it embodies, in the rational ascertainment of the truth of existence which can fulfil its practical demand, Indian philosophy like other brands of philosophy pursuing their special programmes, has employed a wide variety of methods. There are Indian systems which accept guidance of extreme posi-

vistic logic which insists on direct verifiability in term of the person's own immediate perceptual experience as the test of truth. There are, again, systems which follow the logic of inferential reasoning and some that follow postulational logic¹⁶ of primary concepts and first principles, and admit indirect verifiability, not necessarily in term of direct experience, but in term of fruitful deductions, predictability, and even logical conceivability as a method of proof. There are, again, some sysetms which follow a logic which accepts guidance of extraordinary 'impersonal' experiences and intuitions (*āgamānusāri tarka*)¹⁷ in addition to, and not in illegitimate and wholesale supersession of, the testimony of ordinary experience — some sort of a synthetic logic of adjutsment and reconciliation. This is not a logic of exclusion, not a logic which accords recognition to only one type of facts, only one kind of experiences. It accords to each type a place within its legitimate sphere and shows how opposition and even contradiction in or among them may disappear once we take a total view of things. This spirit of accommodation, recognition of the presence of opposites in a total view is reflected in these well-known lines of the upaniṣads: 'where there is duality, as it were, there one sees another, there one smells another, there one hears another. . . where, verily, everything has become just one self, then whereby and whom would one smell. . . then whereby and whom would one understand. . . Lo, whereby would one understand the understander?'¹⁸

Logic is not, and cannot function in any clime, as an organ of knowledge, as a pramāṇa. It is only a method of proof or disproof. In this function it has unconditionally to fall back upon 'given' knowledge of some kind since it has its roots deeply laid in that ground. Logic originates from experience, and can work *logically* only under the guidance of 'given' knowledge or experience. It does not drop from the clouds, nor can it exercise itself in vacuum. This simple truth, unfortunately, is very often lost sight of. Indian philosophy does not commit this mistake. In the distinction drawn between *jñāna* and *jñapti*,¹⁹ it keeps in clear promi-

nence this distinction between a *pramāṇa* (an organ of knowledge) and *prāmāṇya parīkṣā* (process of proof). It is also to be clearly noted that Indian logic does not admit sanctity of purely formal inference. The *vyāpti* which roughly corresponds to the major premise of western syllogism is a factual premise, supported by an illustration from the world of facts and experience which is admitted and accepted by the proponent and the opponent alike. In the face of this, it is idle to talk about an Indian philosopher's raising, or indulging in, a purely formal, and in that sense, a purely logical question as distinguished from a factual question.²⁰

Generally speaking, western philosophy accords no recognition to *pramāṇas* other than perception and inference. The same is not true of quite a large number of Indian systems. Some of them, besides admitting other *pramāṇas* accord a place of honour to testimony or authority. This has laid them open to the charge of dogmatism from many quarters. Something must, therefore, be said in defence of this Indian standpoint. No man is born of himself, nor is he born in an uninhabited globe. Man is born as a social animal and three-parts of all he knows come from social contact and, therefore, from authority. It is true that much of that which we receive from that source is subject to correction by the knowledge we acquire from personal experience as also by inference. But the same can also be said about such individual experience and what is inferred on that foundation. Human knowledge is an organic whole in which the parts modify and correct each other in order to present a coherent system. As contradiction forces correction and reformation of the system, so also non-contradiction or absence of any *actual* clash and conflict gives to it an apparent imperviousness and stability. Bare possibility of contradiction in future does not stand in the way of our acceptance of it as knowledge and truth any more than the bare possibility of indigestion leads us to abstention from all food and nutrition. Corrigibility is not, therefore, any special disadvantage of that kind of knowledge which we

derive from others. All the same, the source of this kind of indirect knowledge must be authentic and reliable. This led the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas to define *śabda* or authoritative utterance as *āpta vākya*,²¹ that is, sentence originating from a person of unimpeachable veracity (*yathārtha vaktā*). This authority is, again, distinguished by the schools into ordinary or human (*laukika*) and *vaidika* or scriptural. None of the two forms is regarded self-evident (*svataḥ pramāṇa*) by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, as they do not accept self-validity of any form of knowledge whatsoever. But when we come to the orthodox systems like the Mīmāṃsā and the Vedānta the case becomes different. These two schools regard all knowledge as self-valid, in the sense that the conditions determining the origin of knowledge determine its validity or truth also, and that a knowledge does not require to be validated or confirmed by some other knowledge or by extraneous reference in order to be accepted as a true knowledge. That knowledge once accepted as true may be subsequently falsified is admitted by them. But this relates, they argue, to the process of invalidation or falsification of one knowledge by another and so extraneous reference (*parataḥ*), and not to validation. The Mīmāṃsakas and the Vedāntists commonly make, however, a *special case* for the *revealed* scriptural authority. This is absolutely infallible. The vedic statements are not liable for correction either in themselves, or by anything that our usual *pramāṇas*, the *laukika pramāṇas*, such as, perception, inference, etc., can deliver or testify. The ground of this special treatment shown to the vedic and upaniṣadic statements is not, however, temperamental or psychological. It is logical. These statements are to be treated as infallible since they are reveal and being so, are impersonal²² (*apauruṣeya*). They do not have any authorship, human or divine. Although the truths which they embody get expression, or manifest themselves, in personal consciousness, they are as themselves, transpersonal, and are not subject to any personal, subjective and psychological factors of the mind in which they are revealed. They are not revealed in the sense of being communicated by any superior authority. No god and no enlight-

ened liberated soul is their origin. They do not have any origin. These truths are eternal (*nitya*). These are truth-experiences which are not subject to the limitation of space, time and causality. They are universal and always. They are not like Plato's universals the 'stuff' of the intelligible world and the 'forms' of the sensible. They are not objectivities. Nor are they subjective experiences. They are trans-subjective and trans-objective. Although they are revealed in human consciousness, in the intuitions of sages and seers, they are *self-revealed*. Personal consciousnesses 'have' them when they open up to them, but do not create or manufacture them. They are truths, spiritual and extraordinary, and therefore, the statements or verbal forms in which they are expressed constitute an *alaukika* or extraordinary *pramāṇa*. Unfolding transcendental truths as they do, they do not state anything which belongs to the order of things known through the *laukika* or ordinary *pramāṇas*. Therefore, the very possibility of their coming into conflict with the *laukika pramāṇas* is completely ruled out.²³

That which is *impersonal* cannot be the conventional, cannot be supposed to have any human origin. On the same ground, it cannot also be regarded as *traditional*. That the good and the pleasant cannot be identical, that ignorance and knowledge belong to opposite poles, that duties, if attended to in a detached way, cannot give rise to any infatuation, are truths limited not to any particular tradition. These are neither old nor new; these are truths for all ages. Illustrations may be multiplied limitlessly. Nor can these be regarded as sectarian dogmas. By holding on to them we pass beyond ourselves, beyond our normal limitations defined by personal prejudices, and sectarian beliefs. These impose no limitations; they remove all limitations. The fear voiced by some loudly, and entertained by some others among our westernised contemporaries in somewhat docile and apologetic fashion, that any emphasis on Śaṅkara's affiliation to the upaniṣadic trend is likely to act as a censure and to prove him to be a dogmatist, a traditionalist and as sectarian seems to be groundless.²⁴

The simple admission of testimony or authority as one of the *pramāṇas* cannot render a philosophy open to the charge of traditionalism or dogmatism. That charge can be sustained only if the system admitting testimony as a *pramāṇa* admits also its personal origin and, at the same time, regards it as absolutely infallible and sacrosanct. Such a loop-hole is not present in any of the classical systems of Indian philosophy. Systems like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Sāṅkhya, while regarding testimony in either of its two forms — *laukika* and *vaidika* as *āpta-vākya*, make its acceptance conditional upon its being amenable to reason or logical understanding.²⁵ The Vedānta and the Mīmāṃsā, although subscribing to the view of self-validity of all forms of knowledge at the origin, do not regard testimony or authority of every form as absolutely infallible. That claim of absolute incorrigibility and, therefore, of absolute infallibility is defended in respect of the revealed testimony of the Vedas and the Upaniṣads only, on the ground of their being *apauruṣeya* (impersonal) and *nitya* (eternal). Even, this sanctity does not attach to their verbal forms precisely, since as verbal statements they are subject to the rules of cogent interpretation, such as, *upakrama*, *upasamhāra*, *abhyāsa*, *apūrvatā*, *phala*, *arthavāda* and *upapatti*,²⁶ but to the themes, to the truths they convey. Discrepancy or conflict in the instruction if any, will have to be taken, not as discrepancy or conflict among the truth-experiences they embody, but in their verbal forms only, and this is to be remedied by internal reference only, by the law of inner harmony (*samanvaya*), and not by any external test, such as, reference to any of the *laukika pramāṇas*.

The reason is that the *śruti* texts constitute an *alaukika pramāṇa* in so far as they deal with a subject-matter not accessible to any ordinary means of knowledge.²⁷ The extraordinary *pramāṇa* and the ordinary *pramāṇas* do not have any common subject-matter or concurrent jurisdiction.²⁸ That being so, in any disputation regarding transcendental matters, no *laukika pramāṇa*, can function as a referee. As there can be no interference on the part of a *laukika pra-*

māna in transcendental matters, so also in phenomenal matters, within the legitimate jurisdiction of the *laukika pramāṇas*, the *śrutis* cannot exercise any prerogative powers. This is brought out clearly in the view defended by both the Vedānta and the Mimāṃsā that *Śrutis* cannot be *anuvādaka* of what is accessible to any ordinary means of knowledge, since that would render them redundant and useless (*anarthaka*). It is in this context that the observation, such as, even one thousand scriptures cannot render an earthen pot into a piece of cloth — a statement placed by Vācaspati in the mouth of the *pūrvapakṣa* (opponent) of Śaṅkara in the introductory remarks of his glossary on Śaṅkara's *adhyāsa bhāṣya* becomes significant.²⁹ Śaṅkara's own comment in the *Gīta bhāṣya* that even hundreds of *śrutis* declaring fire to be cold or dark (*aprakāśa*) cannot constitute a legitimate source of valid knowledge³⁰ will have to be read in a similar context. In this, Śaṅkara, temperamentally non-coercive as he is in his approach, makes certain concessions to *pūrvapakṣa* in order to delineate the special province in which *śrutipramāṇa* or *śāstrapramāṇa* enjoys absolute unchallengeability. This and similar observations made by Śaṅkara and his classical commentators are not Śaṅkara's concluding remarks in this connection are recorded in the third paragraph of his commentary on B.S. 2.1.6, where Śaṅkara says "āgamamātrasamadhigamya eva tu ayaṁ artho, dharmavat", that is, oneness of reality being a transcendental theme, has to be grasped in the light of the *śruti*, the extraordinary *pramāṇa*, although it is an existential content (*pariniṣṭhita*) and not like *dharma* a content that is yet to be (*bhavya*). The *laukika pramāṇas* in such context can only have supporting role, but no role in opposition.³⁴ Missing his mark and direction in the maze of Śaṅkara's argument, another scholar characterises Śaṅkara's attitudes in this connection as ambivalent, and comes out with the shocking discovery that in the event of a clash with other means of valid knowledge, *śruti* has (necessarily) to be taken in a secondary sense, and that *śruti*, according to Śaṅkara, 'in the sense of authority, is merely

subordinate to other means of valid knowledge'.³⁵ Poor Śaṅkara is not allowed to speak for himself!

Both the Mīmāṃsā and the Vedānta regard the śrutis as *apauruṣeya* (without a personal origin) and in that sense, *revealed*. Unlike *āptavākya* which is testimony originating from some reliable person and which for that reason forms part of *laukika pramāṇas*, the revealed authority of the śrutis constitutes an extraordinary (*aldukika*) *pramāṇa*. The śrutis relate to transcendental matters which are not accessible to any ordinary *pramāṇa*. Negatively speaking, they do not inform or enjoin in matters decidable by the ordinary *pramāṇas*. Had not this been the case, had they imparted any knowledge or instruction which is also available through our conventional *laukika pramāṇas*, they would simply become repetitional (*anuvādaka*) and for that reason, useless and redundant (*anarthaka*). Taking his cue from this classical distinction, a modern scholar brought up in the tradition of contemporary analytic philosophy, may argue that since the *laukika pramāṇas* deal with all the 'facts' or 'states of affair' that can be there, so the *sāstra pramāṇa*, the other name of which is *śabdapramāṇa*, must be dealing with formal linguistic questions or logical questions as distinguished from factual questions. Under the spell of an alien tradition, he may overlook what the relevant texts actually mean or signify; he may even venture to read his own thoughts into the Mīmāṃsā and the Vedānta and come out with the declaration that the *śabdapramāṇa* of these systems is nothing but a critique of language and that tradition has committed a glaring and unpardonable mistake by taking it in esoteric and quixotic sense.³⁶ The Mīmāṃsā, the most conservative and extremist among the vedic systems, for example, although it leaves the realm of the *actual*, of existential things (*bhūtavastu*) and accomplished facts (*pariniṣpanna viśaya*) to be treated and decided by the *laukika pramāṇas*, harnesses the extraordinary *sāstrapramāṇa* and *sāstravākya*s to the nonsensuous world of *dharma* (merits or spiritual excellences) which is yet to emerge as a consequence of performances of enjoined actions (*Karma*)

and abstention from prohibited actions. Taking the revealed testimony of the *śrutis* in this sense, the Mīmāṃsā regards all vedic statements principally as injunctive (*codanā*) in their import and advises that those which are not apparently so, will have to be taken as ancillary to the main trend in some way or other.³⁷ The Vedānta, on the other hand, makes a distinction between the earlier part of the *śrutis* called the Karmakāṇḍa and the later part which is called the jñānakāṇḍa. The upaniṣads, principally, constitute this latter part, the subject-matter of which is Brahman, the Absolute Reality — which though existential, self-complete and unnegatable, is not for that reason, accessible to any ordinary means of knowledge. Not being an extremist, the Vedānta school, however, concedes the Mīmāṃsā contention in part — that the earlier part of the Vedas is ritualistic, and that *dharma* is their object-matter. But the Mīmāṃsā and the Vedānta, in all their schools, commonly admit the absolute infallibility and, therefore, incorrigibility of the revealed authority of *śrutis* in their special jurisdictions.

But the Mīmāṃsā has one advantage which the Vedānta, in any of its various schools, does not share. The sphere of non-sensuous *dharma* and *adharmā* being characteristically different from the world of sensuous facts and objects, the 'ought-to-be' or 'yet-to-be' (*bhavya*) being radically different from that *which is* or *exists* (*bhūta*), amity between the *laukika* and the *alaukika pramāṇas* can be preserved on the principle of non-interference. This is not so easy of accomplishment as far as the Vedānta is concerned. Even inside the province of the transcendental non-sensuous, the Vedānta, besides admitting the *bhavya* of the Mīmāṃsā in the ritualistic part of the Vedas, installs an existential reality, such as, Brahman, as the *viśaya* (subject-matter) of the jñānakāṇḍa of the Vedas, called the upaniṣads. So, there are *two* kinds of existential reality, the sensuous and the non-sensuous, and so, the question arises how to provide an amicable settlement between them. Moreover, and this is more fundamental, the Vedānta, not only

means the end-part of the Vedas but also the culmination and *consummation* of all knowledge — the *final* and *absolute* knowledge. Such being the case, the Vedānta has not only to reconcile all forms of knowledge, including the knowledge of *dharma*,³⁸ and provide a rational basis of their explanation, but has also to meet and satisfy the rival claims of the two forms of existential reality — the *given* sensuous and the 'discoverable' but transcendental non-sensuous. Moreover, the Vedānta, as the supreme and the final wisdom about all existence, is not to be *one* philosophy among a host of infinite other forms, but it has to justify its claim and title to absolute knowledge, to be *the* philosophy paramount. *It is to achieve this singular purpose, it should be clearly noted, that the Vedānta refuses to be guided by the free logic of conceptual speculation* adopted by the other schools, *and opts for the guidance of revealed truths, of non-sensuous intuitions (cf. Kant), and the logic which is inherent in them.* Only by this means, the non-finality, the undecidedness (*apratisthitatva*) and the consequent insatiety (*avimokṣa*) of the logic of speculative reason can be escaped.³⁹ The revealed truths which are not 'ideas of reason',⁴⁰ not also the elements of any conceptual frame-work⁴¹ manipulated by speculative reason, are expected to provide that stable basis which an absolutistic philosophy badly needs.⁴² As impersonal intuitions, that is, as deliveries of an 'impersonal' and extraordinary *pramāṇa*, these have claim to absolute incorrigibility, limited as they are not in space and time, affected as they are not by psychological conditions and personal factors of the mind in which they are revealed. With us initially, they are no doubt, the intelligibles of faith but they are also capable of being interpreted, elaborated and defended by thought,⁴³ and it is this kind of thought or thinking which can be called '*āgamānusāri tarka*'.⁴⁴ The *śruti*s themselves call this reflective and analytical logical process '*manana*' and Śaṅkara has given it the name '*Vākyaṛthavicāraṇā*'.⁴⁵ This '*manana*' or '*vākyaṛthavicāraṇā*' constitutes the middle and the intermediate stage of the whole philosophical process which is to render the 'indirect contents' of *śravaṇa* into 'direct contents' of '*anu-*

bhava, avagati, or of what *vācaspati* calls '*tattvasākṣātkāra*' through '*nididhyāsana*' (meditation), culminating in what *Śaṅkara* names as *adhyavasāna*⁴⁶ (elimination of ignorance). This logical interpretation of the vedānta *vākyas* (*vedānta vākyārthavicāraṇā*) is not itself any knowledge. It is interpretation of the '*sense*' or '*meaning*' of the vedānta *vākyas cogently* and *harmoniously* as a means to the indirect knowledge of what is meant by them. Once the sense is *understood*, the *vākyas* become the *pramāṇa*, i.e., means of knowledge of the meant.

Cuttack (Orissa)

S. K. Chattopadhyaya

NOTES

1. The purpose of the vedāntasūtras, says *Śaṅkara*, is to knit together the various vedānta *vākyas* in the form of a garland — '*vedāntavākya-kusumagrathanārthavāt sūtrānām*. He expounds his vedānta philosophy by quoting and explaining relevant vedānta, *vākyas* as illustrations in connection with his interpretation of the sūtras — '*vedānta vākyāni hi sūtrairudāhṛtya vicāryanté*. B.S.B., 1.1.2. This disproves the contention of Dr. G. Misra that *Śaṅkar* had nothing to do with the śruti texts as revealed authority, that his *śabdapramāṇa* does not mean *śrutipramāṇa*, as misunderstood by one and all before him, but that *śabdapramāṇa* means a critique of the structure and function of language in the way Russell and Wittgenstein have done. See his Analytical studies in Indian Philosophical Problems, pp. 1-14, also G. Nayak — A reappraisal of the Vedānta of *Śaṅkarācārya*, Ind. Phil. Quarterly New Series Vol. I, No. 1, pp. 65-66.
2. Messrs Misra and Nayak trace his greatness to his complete independence of the tradition of the śruti-pramāṇa, to his unorthodoxy that dismisses such traditional fads as '*revealed truth*', '*intuition*', '*mysticism*' and practical fulfilment such as liberation in '*spiritual*

- realisation'. Liberation that Śaṅkara speaks of is emancipation from faulty linguistic habits and enjoying intellectual delight in the knowledge of the logic of language. *Ibid.*, Misra, pp. 1-14, Nayak, pp. 58, 60-61.
3. G. Nayak, *Ibid.*, p. 64 — Utprekṣā and śuśkatarka condemned by Śaṅkara is 'imagination' according to Nayak.
 4. B.S. 2.1.11 and S.B. 2.1.6.
 5. See Śaṅkara's quotations of śruti texts condemning logic unsupported by śrutis as means of supreme knowledge. B.S.B. II. 1, sutras 1-6 and 11.
 6. B.S.B. 2.1.12, also 2.1.3.
 7. Messrs Misra and Nayak. Analytical Studies — Logical Foundation of Śaṅkar Vedānta also Ind. Phil. Quarterly, Vol. I, No. 1, pp. 65-67.
 8. *Ibid.*
 9. *Ibid.*
 10. G. Misra — Analytical Studies, p. 9. Here, he raises a funny point. He asks how could tradition in Indian philosophy regard śabda as having anything to do with authority or scripture as a source of valid knowledge when in a text like the Vedānta Paribhāṣā all that one can find in the Chapter on Śabdapramāṇa is discussion on rules of syntax? Evidently, he does not see the difference between the problem of *meaning* of sentences and that of *knowledge*, that is, what significant sentences seek to *inform* or *communicate*. This, indeed, is missing the wood in the trees. Does perception as a pramāṇa stand for analysis of perception?
 11. G. Misra — 'Śaṅkara's doctrine of adhyāsa. Ind. Phil. Quarterly, Vol. II, No. 3, 1975, p. 229 — See also Nayak's paper referred to already.
 12. Dr. Misra advocates revision, Dr. Nayak — reappraisal.
 13. This has been shown to be the case with both Dr. Misra and Dr. Nayak towards the end of this paper.
 14. See Nayak's paper, pp. 56-61.
 15. This is the general characteristic of 'mokṣa' as understood by the systems. Quotations are too numerous to be reproduced.

16. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Sāṅkhya are examples on the point.
17. The Mimāṃsā and particularly the vedānta are instances on the point.
18. Br. Āraṇyak. 2.4.14.
19. See D. M. Datta — Six ways of knowing, p. 329.
20. See the Criticisms of Drs. Misra and Nayak that tradition has done the greatest disservice by showing Śaṅkara as dealing with factual questions which are not philosophic questions at all as per contemporary trends of western philosophy. They have undertaken to salvage Indian philosophers out of such pitfalls as self-appointed guardians.
21. Tarkasaṃgraha, Ch. IV, 'āptavākyaḥ śabdaḥ, āptastu Yathārthavaktā..
22. According to the Vedānta and the Mimāṃsā no imperfection or blemishes can vitiate the 'impersonal', independent as it is of a person's disposition, training and cultural affiliation.
23. Elaborately treated in Mimāṃsā and Vedānta literature. See subsequent explanation attempted in this essay.
24. See Misra and Nayak — Ibid. (writings already referred).
25. The Nyāya and the Sāṅkhya follow this attitude. Cf. Nyāya theory of prāmāṇya. The Sāṅkhya insists on 'yuktimatvacanaṃ' Cf. Aniruddhavṛtti, i. 26.
26. See vivaraṇaprameya saṃgraha (Bengal Ed.) by M. M. P. N. Tarkabhuṣaṇa, pp. 9-13.
27. B.S.B. 2.1.1. 'na ca atīndrjyānarthan śrutimantareṇa kascidupalabhata iti śakyam śambhāvayitum, nimittābhāvāt.'
28. Otherwise, there would be charges of 'ānarthakyaṃ' and 'anuvādatvām'.
29. Vācaspati — Tīkapaṛāmbha. 'nahyāgamāḥ sahasramapi Ghatam patayītumiśate'.
30. Gītābhāṣya, Ch. 18, śloka 66.
31. G. C. Nayak evidently misreads the situation when in his paper he comments that 'wherever śruti comes to

- clash with other means of valid knowledge Śaṅkara suggests that it be taken in a secondary sense', that śruti in the sense of authority, is merely subordinate to other means of valid knowledge, *Ibid.*, p. 66. Where clear-cut distinction of spheres has been made, it is idle or playful to talk about a *virodha*.
32. Prof. W. S. Barlingay seems not to go through all the connected sentences in his quotation of the passage from Śaṅkara's bhāṣya on śloka 66, ch. 18 of the Gītā. See his paper on Śaṅkara in *Ind. Phil. Quarterly*, Vol. II, No. 3, p. 275. Dr. Nayak exhibits the very same impatience when in his caricature of his professor he suggests that in the passage quoted by him from B.S.B. 1.1.1. either his professor or Śaṅkara himself rested on an argument proving self-evident character of the self. This is misreading the situation. The point at issue was whether Ātman was *prasiddha* or *aprasiddha* since in either case there was no necessity of Brahmajijñāsā. The argument quoted by Dr. Nayak represents the popular view-point. Śaṅkara's own view in the context is that although known *superficially* (as that argument shows) it is not known in its true essence—*tad viśeṣam prati vipratipatteḥ*. So a close enquiry is needed to ascertain its true nature. In the passage cited by him from B.S.B. 1.1.4 he leaves out that part specially on which poor A. C. Mukherjee wanted to show him the force of Śaṅkara's argument—'tatsākṣitvena pratyuktatvāt'. And in respect of this part Ayer's argument or Nayak's own against Descartes' 'cogito' would be spurious and irrelevant. See Nayak's paper pp. 54-55.
33. B.S.B. 2.1.4. The offender here is Prof. W. S. Barlingay, *Ibid.*, p. 275, 288, note no. 8. But it may be added in fairness to him that his argument has not so materially affected Śaṅkara's view as Nayak's has done.
34. Cf. 'Tadarthagrahaṇadārdhyāya Vedāntavākya-virodhi anumānamapi pramāṇam bhavati na nivāryate; śrutyaiva ca sahāyatvena tarkasyābhyupetatvāt. S.B. 1.1.2, also 'Virodhe tu anapekṣam syāt asati hyamumanāni' quoted by Śaṅkara from pramāṇalakṣana in S.B. 2.1.1.

35. Cf. The above note 34 with Nayak's discovery, *Ibid.*, p. 66.
36. G. Misra — Analytical studies etc. pp. 1-14; G. Nayak— 'Śaṅkara has been misunderstood by one and all in so far as they have taken him to have discovered some new fact, albeit of a different kind. His was not a factual discovery . . .', *Ibid.*, p. 54, pp. 66-68.
37. 'Amanāyasya Kriyarthatvāt ānarthakyaamatadarthānām', M.S. 1.2.1 and 'vidhinā tvekavākyatvāt stutyarthena vidhinām syuḥ' M.S. 12.7.
38. From the opposition emphasized by Śaṅkara between 'bhavya dharma' and 'bhūta-vastutā' of Brahma (B.S.B. 1.1.1, 1.1.2) as also between jñāna and karma in B.S.B. 1.1.4, a confusion has arisen in many quarters that, according to Śaṅkara, dharma is no object of knowledge. This is a palpable mistake. Vastutantratā of jñāna is not equivalent to bhūtavastuviśayatā. Nor is it correct to interpret Śaṅkara's 'pramāṇam tu yathā — bhūtavastuviśayaṁ' (B.S.B. 1.1.4) as meaning 'pramāṇam tu bhūtavastuviśayaṁ'. See my paper 'vastutantra, codanāntantra and Puruṣavyāpāntantra'. Śaṅkara does not deny pramāṇya of vedic statements in the Karmakāṇḍa. There the object of knowledge is an 'ought' — in jñānakāṇḍa it is an eternally accomplished fact. Śaṅkara himself says "Bhavyaśca dharmó jñānsyo na jñānakāle asti puruṣavyāpāntantravāt'. Ya hi codanā dharmasya lakṣaṇaṁ sa svaviśaye nijuñjānaiva puruṣam avavodhayati, brahmacodanā tu puruṣam avavodhayati eva kevalam'. S.B. 1.1.1. This shows dharma also as an object of knowledge although here the object is not an accomplished fact, but a value or merit yet to be acquired.
39. B.S. 2.1.11. 'Tarkāpratisthānadapyanyathānumeyamiti cet' evamapyavimokṣaprasaṅgaḥ.
40. Cf. Kant — Transcendental Dialectic.
41. G. Misra — His paper in *Ind. Phil. Quarterly*, Vol. II, No. 3, p. 229.
42. It is to provide that absolute basis for knowledge of a reality not accessible to ordinary pramāṇa that instead of depending on reasoning, Śaṅkara brings in the testi-

mony of the 'revealed truths' of the śrutis. 'Ekarūpeṇa hyavasthito yo'rthaḥ loke tadviṣayaṁ jñānaṁ samyak jñānamityucyaté, yatharagniruşṇa iti. Tatraivaṁ sati samyagjñāne puruṣāṇāṁ vipratipattiranupapannā, Tarkajñānānāntu anyonyavirodhāt prasiddha vipratipattiḥ, S.B. 2.1.11. It is really unfortunate that this remarkable passage supporting revealed truths of śrutis as furnishing absolute basis for transcendental knowledge is misread and misniterpreted to support the claim of sensuous perception alone as providing basis for vastutantra jñāna.

43. Cf. K. C. Bhattacharyya — *Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 65.
44. B.S.B. 2.1.11 last sentence, also 2.1.6 'śrutyanugrhita eva hyatra tarkonubhavāngatvenāśriyate'.
45. B.S.B. 1.1.2.
46. B.S.B. 1.1.2. 'Adhyavasāna' may mean either ascertainment (niścayajñāna) or elimination of the hindrance of ignorance. The second meaning is more appropriate and is adopted by vācaspati.

LATEST BOOKS ON PHILOSOPHY & PSYCHOLOGY

- AVERILL, James R.** : Patterns of Psychological Thought
(Halsted Press — Wiley) \$22.50
- BOWES, Pratima** : Hindu Intellectual Tradition
(Allied Publishers) Rs. 48.00
- BOWES, Pratima** : The Hindu Religious Tradition
A Philosophical Approach
(Allied Publishers) Rs. 68.00
- CATTELL, Raymond B.** : Handbook of Modern Personality Theory
(Halsted Press — Wiley) \$37.50
- KHWAJA, Jamal** : Quest for Islam
A Philosopher's Approach
(Allied Publishers) Rs. 50.00
- MILLER, Gustavus Hindman** : 10,000 Dreams Interpreted
or What's in a Dream
(Ernest Benn) — Paper \$3.95
- NOTT, C. S.** : Teachings of Gurdjieff
A Pupil's Journal
(Routledge & Kegan Paul) £2.50
- PIAGET, Jean** : The Development of Thought
Equilibration of Cognitive Structures (Blackwell) £8.50
- RAMSEY, F. P.** : Foundations — Essays in
Philosophy, Logic, Mathematics and Economics
(Routledge & Kegan Paul) £9.50
- STABLEFORD, Brian M.** : The Mysteries of Modern Science
(Routledge & Kegan Paul) £4.95

ALLIED PUBLISHERS PRIVATE LIMITED

BOMBAY * NEW DELHI * CALCUTTA * BANGALORE
