

## ONTOLOGICAL NON-BEING (ABHĀVA) VS. PHILOSOPHICAL-BEING [ INDIAN CONTEXT ]

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### I

Being (*Bhāva*) and non-being (*Abhāva*) as metaphysical concepts have been central issues widely discussed by the philosophical systems of the West and the East but very rare attempts are made there to view them independently of physiological, psychological and ontological pursuits. These concepts, in relation to the nature of language, are chiefly approached in two different ways-1: By taking language as referring tool that stand by proxy for the things-in-themselves as we find in the approaches made by most of the ontological philosophers of the East and the West and 2: By taking language as (*Vācaka*) by nature and being and non-being as expressed (*Vācya*) of it. *Pāṇinian* Grammarians, in general, and *Bhartṛhari* in particular approach these concepts, as they are revealed in the mind by language in usual communication. Here, in this paper, we propose to present a critique of negation (*abhāva*) in the light of *Bhartṛhari's* monumental work entitled *Vākyapadīya*. The novelty of this presentation lies in cognitive holistic approach to the concept of negation-an approach for which cognition, communication, philosophical reflections and investigations are not only based on but are confined to the language - the expresser and the meaning - the expressed revealed non-differently by it. Language reveals the meaning by itself and independently of ontological beings and our allegiances to them.<sup>1</sup> This approach is relevant in removing many of the philosophical controversies arising out of assuming or refuting being and non-being as metaphysically real or unreal.

## II

Language, for our philosophical concern, is a foundational being of awareness by nature. The term used by *Bhartṛhari*, for it, is 'sphoṭa'<sup>2</sup>: an indivisible, inner and ubiquitously given unit of awareness that reveals a complete meaning non-differently by itself. By the term 'complete meaning' we mean a unit that extincts further expectancy involved in the completion of cognition of a unit - meaning or the unit that satisfies further expectancy involved in the cognition of a complete meaning. Language is a being cognoscible and communicable by nature and communication, for us, is the cognition revealed by language in the mind. Thus, unlike Chomsky<sup>3</sup>, we give due importance to language comprising cognitive and social forms of behaviour as foundational being of communication. We do not overlook the significance of language-token because communication cannot ordinarily be accomplished without language - tokens, gestures and other marks learnt by us by the observation of their forms, tones, diction, their uses, etc. by the elders of the community in which we are born.

We simply make a difference between the real or meaning-revealing language (*sphoṭa*) and the language-token which helps manifestation of *sphoṭa* ubiquitously given in the mind of the speakers and hearers. We view that knowledge is not revealed by language token and that language is not confined to uttering and hearing of the utterances only. It is the revelation of cognition by the real language. As language token is learnt by the observation of its uses by the elders of the society in which we are born, it is a social phenomena and as the real language is a unit of awareness which reveals its meaning in the mind of the audience, it is inter-subjective being foundationally given to all rational animals. The tokens learnt, though, philosophically they are only instrumental in manifestation of the real language, are ordinarily taken as language only due to their instrumentality in the manifestation of the real language. How can instruments reveal cognition or do any thing by itself? Dr. John D. Kelly rightly remarks 'why should we imagine that signs have meaning? Do tools have gardening, fighting or cooking<sup>4</sup>? The real language i. e. *sphoṭa* is defined by *Bhartṛhari* as *grāhya-grāhaka* or *prakāśya* and *prakāśaka* by nature. It illuminates itself its own nature in the mind first and then its meaning as well. From the point of view of speakers, tokens are manifestations of it and from the

point of view of cognition accomplished by the audience, it is manifested by the tokens and it is due to inter-subjective and inter-social specificities of language that our view is distinguished from that of mentalistic approach to it. As it, for us, is a foundational being of awareness in character i.e. it reveals awareness of objects and the self awareness as well, we differ from those inter-subjectivists who attach awareness and self - awareness with a subjective or trans-subjective consciousness.

*Bhartṛhari's* observations, on the nature of cognition as shot through and through by language and on the limit of cognition as confined to the language ubiquitously given in the mind as expressor and to what it expresses non-differently in the mind, provide a sufficient cognitive ground to accept that the being and non-being as things- in themselves are untouched by language. *Such an observation helps to find out that the main cause of the controversy and confusions, regarding the determination of being and non-being, lies in the nondiscrimination of the philosophical intelligible- being (Upacāra-sattā) which figures non-differently by language in the mind and that of the things -in-themselves which are untouched by the language.* What figure in the mind by language are beings, concepts or thought objects to which our philosophical reflection, investigation, cognition and communication are confined. In *Bhartṛhari's* terminology it is *upacāra-sattā* (intelligible being figured/revealed non-differently by language in the mind) which comprises the being of language (*sphoṭa*) and that of meaning non-differently revealed by it (*pratibhā* non-differently by language) *Bhartṛhari* apparently holds that the language, as such, does not illuminate or express things-in themselves and the experiences of them are only instrumental in manifestation of the language in the mind. What is revealed by language is not a metaphysical thing in its character, rather, it is the inner-being of awareness in character (*upacāra-sattā*). Even the mind-in-itself is beyond the grasp of mind because it grasps only the meaning 'mind' non-differently revealed by language in the mind (consciousness in itself) which on the other hand is known by implication or by presumption, as the ontological substratum of the meaning 'mind' revealed non-differently by language 'mind'<sup>7</sup>.

Cognitive-holistic interpretation of *Bhartṛhari* in the present paper,

accepts language as concept. All sentences and single word expressions, for *Bhartṛhari* are concepts and all concepts are beings i.e., intelligible or philosophical beings. All sentences assertoric as well as negative are distinct beings because distinct and discriminate knowledge of them is revealed. He takes knowledge as infused with language<sup>8</sup>. The principle of the non-difference of the being of language and the meaning and that of the non-difference of language and cognition serves as the foundation of *Bhartṛhari*'s cognitive holistic philosophy for which sentence is not confined to the uttering and hearing only but is an indivisible and foundational being of awareness in character. So far this cognitive-holism is concerned, it takes sentence as inner, indivisible and given unit of cognition which reveals meaning non-differently when revealed by itself first. It considers all sentences as ubiquitously given, indivisible and distinct units conveying a complete meaning of their own and, thus, it does not hold proper to accept that assertoric sentences are original and that negative sentences are constituted out of them. In *Bhartṛhari*'s indivisibility theory of language<sup>9</sup> and of language infusing cognition there is no ground to hold that assertoric sentences form a constituent of another sentence by negating the original sentences as *Frege*<sup>10</sup> thinks because veridical-cognition, not only by assertoric sentences but by negative sentences also, is revealed and distinctly cognized and that is why communication by them is accomplished irrespectively of existence or non-existence of external referents.

Language is expressive or revealing force. It reveals meaning independently of things in themselves. We view that our cognition is confined to the units revealed by language in the mind and it is only this way that one can properly estimate the language as expressive being. We frequently use negative expressions, straightforwardly, for expressing negation, The sentence 'The tree does not exist' is an indivisible unit and is expressive of its meaning by itself independently of the assertoric sentence 'The tree exists' (which is another separate indivisible unit). As common parts of an indivisible unit or awareness do not occur, no two sentences are common and as the unit of communication is a unit, and, as all units are revealed indivisibles, there is no possibility of the common parts. The word 'Tree' in the expression 'The tree exists' and the word 'tree' in the expression 'The tree does not exist' are not common. They are expressive of their own

meanings respectively in those sentences. It is only for the sake of syntactical understanding of the indivisible sentences that we by ignoring the difference or their identity and unity of awareness as unit take them as common parts. But, from the point of views of cognition, distinctly expressed by the two separate indivisible sentences conveying distinct indivisible meanings, the idea of the common parts of the sentence does not stand significant. As no real division of awareness, which is a complete unit, is possible, the idea of common sentence or common parts of a sentence is baseless if the language as indivisible expressor of indivisible meaning is taken into account. The being of language and that of the meaning, non-differently figured in the mind by it, are the only objects of our cognition and cognition of the two as identical conception or as non-different is the foundational principle of *Bhartṛhari's* cognitive holism. As the language, for *Bhartṛhari*, is self-illuminated and illuminating being ubiquitously given in the mind as a principle of awareness of the identical conception, the relation between the language and meaning is taken by him as eternal fitness of the language i.e. *Yogyatā*<sup>1</sup> which is eternally dependent relation between the two-the illumined and the illuminated being to which our cognition, communication and philosophical reflections are confined. These beings are philosophical beings as they are the beings cognized and are communicable by nature.

In very brief, it appears clearly that *Bhartṛhari* and his commentators Helārāja and Puṇyarāja are of the opinion that *there is no possibility of philosophical solution to the problem of cognition of the being and of the non-being if the ontological being and non-being and those of the philosophical are not distinctly viewed and if the latter is not taken as the object proper of philosophical investigation.* not only that but if they in themselves are taken into account, the problem of relation between a linguistic unit i.e. expression and the non-linguistic unit i.e. things in themselves will be difficult to solve and ultimately the accomplishment of cognition and communication by language will be impossible if the two are taken as completely different in nature.

### III

Now, to begin with the *Vaiyākaraṇas* philosophy of abhāva cognition, as a cognitive problem par excellence, we are to explain that *Bhartṛhari*

following his great masters, has categorically mentioned two sorts of beings i.e. : 1. *Mukhya-sattā* or things in themselves which are beyond the grasp of language and of cognition as well and 2. *Upacāra-sattā* (intelligible being revealed by language in the mind) to which our cognition is confined<sup>12</sup>. *Upacāra-sattā* figures equally as being and as non-being in the mind when presented so by language. It is the latter category of being with which we are primarily concerned, here in.

The words like Śāśasṅga (hare's horn), Vandhyāputra (barron's son). Khapuṣpa (sky-flowers) etc. having no referents in the empirical world, are used frequently in usual communication. Those who are habitual of seeking referents in the empirical world as the import of words may reject them as meaningless or as mere imagination of mind or as pseudo-words having no sense or as empty-concept. In fact, these consideration regarding words like hare's horn, etc. are non-philosophical. If by empty-concept one means the concept having no empirical content, it will be, philosophically, contradictory because it leads to the assertion that a linguistic unit possesses a non-linguistic empirical content and, hence, denied. If it means a content free awareness and if one by content means 'sense-data' or abstraction, it adds nothing of any philosophical signification because sense-data is abstracted by mind from perception and, overall, it is only instrumental in manifesting the real language (*sphoṭa*) by which concepts are revealed. The abstraction, if not restrained or revealed by language in the mind, may not be known as a being and if it is taken as revealed being then it is not abstraction but the being revealed by language which is the self-restrained being the form of which is the content of meaning. The cognition revealed by language is neither the sense data nor the abstraction made on their basis but the form of the meaning revealed non-differently by language in the mind and if it is taken as the content of the cognition then there is no cognition possible without contents. Even if there is some sense of the term 'empty-concept' apart from the form of its meaning, it would not be known so if not revealed by the term and in that case the expressive character of language will be put in question also. On the contrary, the words like hare's horn are empty concepts and are frequently used and communication is accomplished by them i.e. they are obviously expressive of their meanings. Do their meanings not figure positively in the

mind? Is communication not accomplished by them? If, it is yes, how can the object of cognition revealed by these words be denied? If it is not, how can they be known so? Do they not reveal their meanings as hare's horn or as empty-concept or as negation independently of referents? They do, and, therefore, communication is accomplished by them.

In order to clarify the issue, we may start our investigation with a counter question : does the cognition revealed by the word 'being' figure positively and that of the word 'non-beings' does not figure? *Bhartṛhari* holds the firm view that meaning positively figures in the mind non-differently by all words viz. being, non-being, empty-concept, etc.<sup>13</sup>. The words are words as they express their meaning and that is why communication by them is accomplished. Description of them as concepts with or without contents as referable entities can be made but it hardly adds any difference to the position of cognition which is revealed positively in the mind by those words independently of referents. Even the cognition by the terms with content, without content, meaninglessness etc. also figures positively as their expressed (*vācya*). As we have already mentioned that what figures in the mind by language is taken by *Bhartṛhari* as a being (innerbeing) or a thought object i.e. expressed (*vācya*), there is no cognition free from awareness of object (thought-object) and in some cases, the word (revealed by utterances) itself may be the object as we find in cases of numinous recitation (*mantras*).

Just as illumination is the nature of light, just as the consciousness is the nature of mind, Flash of understanding or awareness, revealed and infused by language, is the nature of being and of non-being as well and that is the reason *Bhartṛhari* defines it as *pratibhā*. It is called *upacāra-sattā* as it is the being who figures in the mind by language and who, in contrast with the *mukhya-sattā* (things-in-themselves) for which the word *sattā* is popularly used, is called *upacāra-sattā* (intelligible being). Things-in-themselves (ontological or psychological) are not intelligible in character and the data acquired, on their basis, are only instrumental and, hence, are not beings. By being, we mean, here, the intelligible-being revealed, independently of things-in-themselves, by language in the mind i.e., *upacāra-sattā* which is the only being of our philosophical concern.

*Upacāra-sattā* is not mental construction as *Mādhyamika* Buddhists assume. It is not the modification of mind as *Yogācāra* idealists accept. It is not the abstraction of mind from the things-in themselves. It is self-restrained being or idea revealed non-differently by language in the mind and that there is no philosophical need to accept any other content of cognition except the from of the beings figured in the mind by language. It is only for the sake of children and ignorant that the indivisible, inner and intelligible being is made understandable to them with reference to the things in themselves as the content of cognition.

All words, for *Bhartṛhari*, are concepts and, hence, *universals-Universals in the sense that identical cognition conception in all their occurrences and instances is revealed and not in the sense of them as abstraction from various occurrences and instances*. It is ubiquitously given as unit of awareness and is revealed by itself in communication when manifested by utterances. In case of *abhāva* (non-being) and hare's horn etc., as there is no individual for the inherence of universal of non-being, the question : how can it be justified to accept them as concepts if the concepts are taken as universal, may naturally be asked.

Solving the problem *Helārāja* writes, '*Abhāvasyāpi buddhyākāreṇa nirūpaṇāt*'<sup>14</sup>. As per the statment '*Abhāva*' (non-being) also figures in the mind positively as being (of non-being) and as veridical and identical cognition by the world non-being, in its several occurrences and instances, is accomplished, it is universal. Not only that but as *abhāva* is presented in the mind differently by language and is, accordingly, classified in four of its kinds viz. 1. *Prāgabhāva* (non-existent of it in its cause prior to its production=pre-non-existence), 2. *Pradhvansābhāva* (non-existent of the effect after its destruction =post-non-existence), 3. *Anyonyābhāva* (*mutual non-existence of one in another*) and 4. *Atyantābhāva* (exclusively non-existent), it (non-being) as universal, inhering in all its categories, is admitted as the import of the word *abhāva*<sup>15</sup> (*abhāvaścātvaraḥ ityatrāpi nīrūpakhyātam sāmānyam kalpanīyam*). That which figures in the mind is also a being and thus non-being like being is also a being frgured in the mind by language and it is this being (of non-being) on the basis of which communication regarding non-being by language is accomplished. In grammar, same rules are applied for the being



and for the non-being as well. For example, dative case for the being is used with the word 'dadāti (*viprāya gām dadāti* - he gives a cow to a *Brāhmin*) and (*viprāya gām na dadāti* = he does not give a cow to a *Brāhmin*) also. Both of the being and non-being can neither be expressed nor be known simultaneously. 'The tree exists' and 'The tree does not exist' are different expressions distinctly expressing the being and non-being of a tree without a reference to its external-being and non-being respectively. Both of the being and non-being have their distinct cognitive or intelligible-beings. i.e. *upacāra-sattā* of which no expressive being is ever deprived of (*na sattām padārthovyabhicarati*)<sup>16</sup>. *Upacāra-sattā* of being and of non-being is not contradictory to each other. They are so known as they are distinctly revealed by the respective expressions. The possibility of their simultaneous cognition is not acceptable to *Bhartṛhari*.

What figures in the mind by language is a being i. e. *Upacāra-sattā*. It is the proper object of our cognition, for, what is revealed non-differently by language is the only object of our cognition. Thus, it is obviously proper to accept that philosophically non-being is also a being as it is revealed immediately by the language in the mind. It is the inner-being of 'non-being' on the basis of which expectancy for negative expressions is made possible and the cognition of it by those expressions is accomplished<sup>17</sup>. *Extremely non-existent or empty-concepts are also known thus as they are presented so by language in the mind*. It is this fact of cognition viewing which *Mahābhāṣyakāra* has given his verdict '*na sattāmpadārtho Vyabhicarati*' according to which no existence is ever deprived of its inner-being i.e. *upacāra-sattā*. *Bhartṛhari* has also come to the same conclusion regarding the inner-being of 'non-being'<sup>18</sup>. The relation between the language expressing 'non-being' and the expressed (non-being) is equally eternal as it is there with the being expressed by the language 'being'. Overall, being and non-being as things-in-themselves are beyond the touch of language and of cognition since our cognition is confined only to the beings expressed by the language.

According to the ontological perspective of *Bhartṛhari*'s holism, being and non-being are not the realities separate from consciousness which is the ultimate principle of all of them. Even the consciousness-in-itself, philosophically, requires cognition of it, as revealed by the expression, as

its cognitive base. Cognitively, this cognitive base is foundation for their inference as the ontological apposition of the cognition. As philosophical being and non-being are known as are revealed by language, they are defined by *Bhartṛhari* as *upacāra-sattā*. *Bhartṛhari* is very bold in accepting that even consciousness is cognized as being or as non-being only when presented so by language<sup>19</sup>.

Being and non-being are not ontological transformations of consciousness<sup>20</sup> but are the flashes of consciousness figured differently, as being and non-being by the language, i.e. if communicated as a being existent in present it is known as *bhāva* (*being*) and if communicated as associated with past and future, it is revealed as *abhāva* (*non-being*). As the beings, communicated as associated with past and future, are not the object of sensory perception they are taken as non-being but, *cognitively, non-being is also a being given ubiquitously in the mind and is revealed by language as inner and intelligible being*. The memory of recognition of past and the implication (*utprekṣa*) of future are not possible if these inner-beings are not accepted as given. The pragmatic arguments may also be given for proving the pleasure and pain and, in such a situation, it is difficult to deny them only on the basis of their non-perceptibility. Philosophically, *bhāva* and *abhāva*, for *Bhartṛhari* are not ontological realities, but are cognitive beings or flashes of awareness (in character) as they are known as revealed in the mind by language.

Theory of ontological-commitment of language<sup>21</sup> and the theory of language as referring tool of concrete and abstract entities are based on opinion that language in a system is related to experience and from this relation meaning follows or that it presents even an entity non-linguistic in character and that the predicative use of language is governed by referents. It may be said that to use language is to respond the world in a certain way as *Quine* thinks but it is only a mistaken way to view meaning as identified with sense-experience. The language, for philosophy of language, must have the world of its own independently of the metaphysical world of our experiences. Philosophic world is confined only to the world of language i.e. the language and the meaning it reveals non-differently in the mind. It is a self-restrained world of awareness in character having its own law of awareness and autonomy of expressing itself and the meaning. It is

expressive by nature. The autonomy and the expressive character of language cannot properly be estimated if it is taken as committed to experiences of ontological beings, which for *Bhartṛhari* are beyond the touch of and against the autonomy of language. Language, the being expressive by nature, has its own freedom and autonomy in expressing beings independently of any commitment to ontological or psychological experiences. We can say that to accept the idea of ontological commitment of language is to deny the autonomy and freedom of the expressive character of language as a unit independently expressive of itself and its meaning as well. That is the reason communication, without a want of them or independently of their experiences, is accomplished by language itself. Ontological entities are beyond the touch of language and the experiences are only instrumental in manifesting inner-language which being manifested by them, expresses its ownself first and then its meaning independently of things-in themselves. Meaning could not be taken as something which follows from our experience of the metaphysical things because in that case there will be nothing to distinguish semantic units from the experiential or stimulus tools.

It is only by imposition of the cognition, revealed non-differently by language on our allegiances with the ontological things and theories, that the ontological commitment of language gets importance in a system. If *Bhartṛhari's* trend of philosophy is taken in view, it becomes difficult to think as to how language, having a non-ontological character and which, being expressive by nature, expresses the meaning independently of ontological entities, is committed to ontological real or unreal in a system. The theory of ontological-commitment of language leads to a very disputable contention that language and meaning, which for *Bhartṛhari* are awareness in character, are vitiated by the presence of the entities (metaphysical, psychological or physical) of a non-awareness character. Unlike, *Quine*, language for us, ceases to be language if it does not express meanings independently of empirical-real and meaning ceases to be so if identified with experience. Unlike what *Quine* thinks, meaning is not inter-subjective and real in the empirical sense. It, for us, is a self-restrained being of awareness in character and, thus, inter-subjective and real in the cognitive sense of the world of awareness revealed by language which is ubiquitously

given to all human beings. The autonomy and freedom of language in expressing cognition by itself, independently of ontological real or unreal, apparently, reject the idea of ontological commitment of language as futile. Against autonomy of language and meaning, language is not based on a theory as it is self-restrained being and the meaning does not follow from the connection of language to experiential contents which are physical facts but with the language which is a revealing unit.

#### IV

According to *Bhartṛhari's* analysis if the effects (pot, etc.)\_ are taken real as things-in-themselves, there are two situations in which they may be taken so. They, prior to their birth, may either be real or unreal. (1) The systems of *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika* and *Mīmāṃsakas* accept the effects, prior to their birth, as unreal while (2) the *satkāryavādī* system of *sāṃkhya* assumes them as real even prior to their birth. The effect may be taken differently as real or unreal, prior to its birth, but it is accepted by both of them as real. In order to analyse the issue, we are taking first the *Satkāryavādin's* arguments given in favour of non-being as a thing-in-itself. Objecting to *Satkāryavādin's* theory of 'manifestation of unmanifested effect', *Bhartṛhari* argues-if the effect prior to the acting on of the cause is existent, the acting on of the cause for producing that effect will be useless. Something may be achieved as produced by the causes, applied for the purpose, if there is an occasion for acting on of the causes but there is no possibility of such as occasion in the theory of *Satkārya* because the effect, for it, is already existent inherently there in the causes. If the effect is taken as real prior to its birth, the expression of birth of it or the expression of the achievement of something already produced will be impossible as there will not be any expectancy for the expression of the birth of a thing already existent<sup>22</sup>.

It may be assumed by *Satkāryavādin's* that the effect, though it is real, is unmanifestedly inherent in its cause and is manifested by the acting on of the cause. Now the point for consideration is : whether the effect (inherent) is different or is non-different from that of the manifested effect (manifestation of the unmanifested effect)? If it is taken as different or separate from the latter then the question is: Is it real or is non-real in its cause prior to its manifestation? *Satkāryavādin* take it as real. Now if it is

real then there will not be any meaning of the expression regarding its manifestation by the causes. If it is taken as already manifested (effect) then there will be no expectancy for the expression of the manifestation of that which is already manifested and then expression of the manifestation of already manifested will just be a useless repetition. Nonetheless, nothing new is taken to be produced which can be called as effect and, thus, there will be a case of the uselessness of the acting on of the causes and the production of the effect as well<sup>23</sup>.

It is clear from the aforementioned arguments that the acting on of the causes according to *Satkāryavādins*, causes the manifestation of the effect (inherent previously as unmanifested in the cause). *Helārāja* refutes *Satkāryavādin's* assumption on the ground that the same argument may be applied for the manifestation of the latter also. Does that (the former) ontologically different from the latter or non-different? Any answer on this point may lead either to infinite regress or to a contradiction. It raises the question regarding the nature of difference and non-difference also. The issue of the nature of difference and non-difference will be discussed after few paragraphs. Presently, it is suffice to say that the manifestation of already manifested is a contradiction in term and since the manifestation, logically, cannot be taken as real before its birth, it may be taken as unreal. If it is unreal, the expression of the birth of the unreal is against their theory of *satkārya*. Not only that but there is no ground for the difference of predestined manifestation (effect inherent in its cause prior to birth) and of the consequent manifestation (latter) also. It is not justified to accept the previously inherent manifestation (effect in its inherent from) as unreal and the latter manifested manifestation (effect) as real. *Helārāja* comments that it is the pot, etc. (effects) and not their manifestation which is produced as effect of the causal function<sup>24</sup>. The effect cannot be taken identical (*ananya*) with the manifestation as, in that case, the effect will only be another term for the manifestation. If otherwise, the effect will be a new production out of causal functions and this will amount to *Asatkāryavāda*<sup>25</sup>.

Philosophers who assume the duality of *bhāva* (being) and *abhāva* (non-being) as ontological realities claim their reality on the basis of their separate causes i.e. the cause of *bhāva* is different from the cause of *abhāva*. It has already been mentioned that *satkāryavādins* accept the

effect as inherent in its cause, prior to its birth, and, hence, real while the *asatkāryavādins* assume an effect as a new production but both of them equally accept them as separate having different causes.

## V

Asatkāryavādi Vaiśeṣikas accept negation as an independent category to be known by inference. According to them, the effect prior to its birth is non-existent in its cause. It is a new production. The pot is absent in the clay before its formation. According to their *Ārambhavāda*, the effect is produced by the destruction of its non-existence (*prāgbhāva*). In this system, the effect is defined as counterpart of its *prāgabhāva* (*Kāryam*) *prāgabhāva pratiyogī*. That which has a birth can only have the end. The effect produced has to be destroyed and after destruction it is non-existent (*pradhvansābhāva*). The being and non-being are not only non-different but are mutually included in each other also but *vaiśeṣikas* take them as ontologically separate in character. It, as *Bhartṛhari* analyses, is not right to say that the non-being becomes being and the being again becomes non-being. Rather, the non-being, according to *vaiśeṣikas* can never be a being and the vice-versa because nature cannot change. If they are taken to change their nature, it will be difficult to define them either as having a character of being or of a non-being<sup>26</sup>. *Abhāva* as *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas* assume is a *padārtha* (category) and is separate from *bhāva*. *Abhāva* cannot be cognized without *bhāva* as its counterpart which is substratum of it. Similarly *bhāva* without *abhāva* as its counter part cannot be cognized. Now coming to an examination, it can be said-that, as the theorists accept the duality of *bhāva* and *abhāva*<sup>27</sup> their mutual dependency for their cognition cannot be accepted. According to *Helārāja*, the notion of duality of being and non-being as ontological entities is against the authority and that communication cannot be explained if they are taken as entities having separate ontic realities. Nonetheless, the mind does not know the thing-in-itself and what is known as being and non-being is revealed in character i.e. revealed by language in the mind.

*Abhāva*, for *Vaiyākaraṇas*, is a formless being. Now, if the effect prior to its birth is non-existent (*abhāva*) and if the '*abhāva*' is formless

as *Vaiyākaraṇas* assume, it cannot be produced as being even though there is a presence of a cause<sup>28</sup>.

Explaining *Bhartṛhari's* view, *Helārāja* comments if the effect prior to its birth is extremely non-existent, there can be no incentive for producing the effect since the cause acts on according to the purpose involved in producing an effect. If the effect is non-existent, it cannot be the purpose to be achieved by cause and in the absence of the specific purpose, the incentive for producing an effect by a cause will not take place. To whom will the cause aim? Who causes incentive for production? If it is said that universal of the effect serves as the cause of incentive for producing the effect, it will not be conducive to *Vaiyākaraṇas* theory since transient individuals - pots, etc. can only be the effect and the universal, being eternal, cannot be taken by them as caused. What is caused is individual effect and not the universal. Logically, a non-existent cannot be taken as the effect desired to be caused<sup>29</sup>. If it is said by *asatkāryavādins* that though the effect, prior to its birth, is non-existent in its cause and it is the presence of that cause that acts on for the appearance of the effect, the effect will only be an appearance (and not the real) on the basis of which it can rightly be said that the explanation of cause-effect as a real relation between the two is not justified (A detailed account of the arguments given for the refutation of *asatkāryavāda* may be consulted from *sāmkyā kārikā* of *Ísvarakṛṣṇa*).

Ontologically, the non-being cannot be real because a real can never be non-existent (*abhāva*). Being and non-being as ontological entities cannot mutually prove themselves (*vipratishedha*). The nature of something which is not born cannot be related with something like being. Being and non-being in-themselves are opposite in character and, therefore, it is contradictory to accept non-being as a being or real. *Śridhara* in his *Nyāyakandalī* has mentioned *abhāva* as something having a form (*rūpavāna*) and, hence, real by nature. Contrary to it, *Bhartṛhari* accepts non-being-in-itself as *niḥsvarūpa*. For him, the mention of a formless as having a form is false.

*Abhāva* cannot be taken as unreal. The word '*Asan*' (the qualifier) is used with the being intended as qualified but it is not possible to use the qualifier '*Asan*' (existent) for the non-beings. The being may, ontologically,

be taken as opposite to or as counterpat (*pratiyogī*) of non-being but non-being, as it is formless, can be taken neither as *pratiyogī* nor as *Anuyogī* of the being. The word, 'non-real' as qualifier is used for non-existent but it as *Helārāja* says, does not amount to its being as ontological real.<sup>31</sup>

The sequence and simultaneity are possible only in the cases of the beings having form but how can these qualities be possible in a formless non-being? The sequence and simultaneity in a non-being are not possible either with the contrast of non-being itself or with a counter (contrast) of it by another non-being. Not only that but the destruction of a formless non-being by itself is also not possible. As there is no possibility of the perceptibility of sequence of a formless non-being either by itself or by another counter part of it, there is no occasion for any division in a formless non-being, even with the expectancy of another non-being because it is a discrete being<sup>32</sup>. By simultaneity *Bhartṛhari* means - 1. The cognition of the two events at the same part of time and 2. the presence of two events at same part of time with the expectancy to something other. Both of the aforesaid meanings of simultaneity are not applicable to a formless non-being. Over all, *Bhartṛhari* does not accept the simultaneous cognition either of beings or of non-beings or non-being and being both at a time. On the basis of the aforementioned arguments, *Bhartṛhari* contends that the existence of non-being as an entity separate from that of being as a counter entity cannot be proved by arguments and, hence, the theory of the difference of being and non-being as ontological reals is baseless.

Can *abhāva*, as having a form of its own, be proved by arguments? Are the arguments given by Vaiśeṣikas successful in settling *abhāva* as a thing-in-itself? These are the questions that invite focal attention presently for discussion. *Abhāva*, according to *Vaiśeṣikas*, is a separate *padārtha* (substance), a counter part of *bhāva*. Sky-flower, etc. are utter void of *bhāva* and are taken by them as *tuccha* (empty). *Vaiśeṣikas* take the negation of pot (*ghaṭābhāva*) as a counter part (*pratiyogī*) of the existence of pot (*ghaṭa*) and, thus, they consider that there is no question of the void of the existence of *abhāva*. *Abhāva*, for them, is not without a form or formless but as having a form like that of the being. The form of the non-being is known by the same sources by which the form of a *bhāva* is known (*Ye nendriyen yadgrhyate tenaiva tanniṣṭha*



*jānistadābhavaścāpigṛhyate*). There is sense-object contact in the comprehension of *abhāva* also.

Objecting to the arguments given by *vaiśeṣika*, *Bhartṛhari* says that their arguments, given against *abhāva* as formless, are themselves improper and are not sufficient even for proving their own theory of *abhāva* also. *Abhāva*, having a form of its own, can neither be negated nor be identified with *bhāva*, for they, themselves accept them as two different ontological entities (substances). According to *Bhartṛhari* their own arguments accept that a being is born when its *prāgabhāva* is destroyed. Now, if the being and non-being are two kinds of entities having different character, how can the being be taken as caused by the destruction of the *prāgabhāva* of the being? Similarly, how can being be destroyed after the birth of *pradhvansābhāva*? If they are mutually discrete two things then how can one be taken as that which negates the other and how can the birth of one is possible in the absence of other? *vaiśeṣikas* may accept the destruction of *bhāva* with the *sannidhi* of *bhāva* and the birth of *bhāva* after the destruction of *prāgabhāva*. According to *Bhartṛhari's* analysis, the notion of *abhāva* as of having a form and the idea of destruction and birth of *abhāva* by birth and destruction of *bhāva* are mutually contradictory. If *abhāva* is an entity with a form, it by its association, cannot be cause of birth and that of the destruction of *abhāva* by its dissociation as well and if it is taken as the cause of them it can, then, not be taken as entity with a form. If the two are identical then *abhāva* will not be a separate entity i.e. separate from *bhāva*. In such a circumstance, *Vaiśeṣikas* are bound to face a contradictory position if they follow their own arguments based on the theory of *asatkārya*. *Abhāva* if taken as formless, only then, the birth and destruction of being after the destruction and birth of a non-being can well be interpreted as a being (of non-being) figured by language in the mind.

As we have seen in the earlier pages, *Bhartṛhari* has refuted the being of non-being as a counter part of being as an ontological entity. The question arises : Is it real as a counterpart (*pratiyogī*) of non-being or as non-different from non-being? *Bhartṛhari* says that being, either as separate or as non-different from non-being as ontological entity is not known; they-in-themselves are trans-cognitive and the being and non-being which are

known to us are not things-in-themselves but are intelligible beings (*upacāra-sattā*) which are not destroyed as they are the objects of our cognition, memory and recognition. Their presence as *upacāra-sattā* cannot be denied in cases of past and future beings also as it flashes or figures in the mind as being or as non-being when presented so by language. The being and non-being, as intelligible-objects figured in the mind by language, are, by no means, known as counterpart of one another. The being, by definition, is that which is not destroyed and such a definition of being is applicable only to the context of intelligible being (*upacāra-sattā*) which is opposite neither to a being nor to a non-being and which is eternally given in the mind.

Being cannot be taken as real in the ontological sense of the term the criterion of which is its pragmatic function i.e. the real is that which is capable of producing effects. On the contrary, that which is not capable of producing effect is unreal. The 'pot' may be real if it is capable of containing water but may not be real if it is capable of other activities like concealing etc. excluding capability of containing water, It cannot be unreal in ontological sense as it is, for *Vaiśeṣikas* perceived by senses or as it appears to senses. As we have already seen in the previous, pages, sequence and simultaneity are also not possible if the being as trans-cognitive entity is taken into account. All communication regarding being and non-being as real unreal. With sequence-without sequence, simultaneity, discrete, opposite, etc. is concerned only with beings figured in the mind by language and not with a trans-communicative ontological entity.<sup>34</sup>

*Vaiśeṣikas* may again argue that there is difference of being and non-being based on the difference of time and that of awareness. They are known separately in different time. 'Difference of consciousness of being is different from that of non-being' is closely associated with the difference of time.

*Vaiśeṣikas* may say that something previously non-existent is born and later on comes into existence. Before coming into existence, it is something yet to be born (i.e. future in which there is *prāgabhāva* of the being). Extremely non-existence, when it comes into birth by acting on of the causes, is called *prāgabhāva*. Non-existence gives birth to existence (present). That which is born is destroyed and when destroyed it causes

non-being (*abhāva*) i.e. *pradhvansābhāva*). The being, in present when destroyed, gives birth to past (non-being) and, thus, the being and non-being, for *Vaiśeṣikas* are different as they are associated with different parts of time<sup>35</sup>. It can also be added that difference can never be absent because of the reason that it is always present and found all the time.

Considering the last of arguments that difference is never absent, supported by *Navya naiyāyikas* also, it can be said, from the side of *Bhartṛhari* that difference in that case will always be existent. In that circumstance both of the existence and non-existence will be present or existent which is not acceptable to them. Not only that but the birth of non-being out of the destruction of being and that of the being out of destruction of non-being will not logically be possible also. If both of them will be present, to accept non-being as present (i.e. existent) is a contradiction in terms. The two will be accepted as present only in the case of them as they figure in the mind by language and not in case of them as ontological beings.

Analyzing *Vaiśeṣikas* arguments regarding difference of them with the difference of parts of time, *Bhartṛhari* asserts if we accept that difference is ontologically real that can never be absent then association of non-being with all three division of time is not possible and similar is the case with the being also<sup>36</sup>. Association of being with time is expressed by *asatkāryavādins* in two ways-1. With a contrast of or with a reference to non-being (*prāgabhāva*) a state before birth of the being and a posterior to its destruction (*pradhvansābhāva*) and 2. with itself without any reference to a non-being. In the former case, as *Helārāja* comments, association of being with all the three parts of time is not possible because of the formlessness of non-being. That which is non-existent and formless cannot be associated with existent that is present. Now, as *abhāva* is not associated with present, it cannot be associated with past and future also because the difference of past and future is dependent upon present. Thus the division of past, present and future is not possible in connection to *abhāva*, which is formless and non-existent. As there is no division of time in regard with *abhāva* there is no division of it in *abhāva* also. If the two are taken mutually as counterpart, it has to be accepted that the time division of non-being is dependent upon the same of the being. The future *abhāva*

is dependent upon the future non-being of *abhāva* and similar is the case in regard with past and present also. Objecting to the aforementioned arguments of *Vaiśeṣikas*, Bhartṛhari says as there is no room for the division of a time in non-being, there is no possibility of the time division of *bhāva* also and thus, it needs hardly be mentioned that the division of present serving as the cause of *prāgabhāva*, *pradhvansaabhāva* etc. is also not possible because of the formlessness of *abhāva*. There is no, possibility of the division of time in a being dependent upon non-being as its counterpart. As there is no, possibility of divisions of ontological being of past and of future the question of their being (present) does not arise.

We have already mentioned in the previous paragraphs that neither the non-difference nor the difference of being and non-being in ontological sense of real is possible substantively, cognitively, as the being and the non-being-in-themselves are beyond the grasp of language and of cognition they cannot be known as non-different also. The non-being as *Vaiśeṣikas* conceive, is *pratisiddha rūpa* (having no form) while the being is positive in character. As they are taken as entities having opposite characters, the expression of them as unity or as difference may amount to contradiction in the nature. As they are quite opposite in character they cannot be mutually related and hence, they cannot be accepted as the cause of each other and thus communication on the basis of their mutual dependence, is not possible. On the basis of the same logic they cannot be taken as separate also and there is no possibility of a third alternative as the entities, according to *Vaiśeṣikas* may either be existent or be non-existent Negation cannot be taken as non-apprehension of the being (*bhāva*) as this may be predicative to a being and not to a non-being. A being may be apprehended or non-apprehended but it cannot be denied that they, in such a context have being and not non-being as their concern. If non-apprehension is taken as cognition in view, it must be the apprehension of the non-apprehension and, thus, as the being of apprehension of non-apprehension the negation is known distinctly and independently of the apprehension of the being. Non-apprehension as apprehension of the non-apprehension is contradiction in terms if being and non-being are taken as external real but it is not so if they are taken as beings figured in the mind by language.

As transcendental entities are beyond the touch of language and as

their experiences are only instrumental in manifesting language, there is no possibility of expressions without the objects revealed non-differently by language. Being and non-being and their difference if taken as ontologically real, can neither be expressed nor be the object of cognition. Anything can be called different from some other thing only if it is known so. Things-in themselves and their experiences are not the objects of cognition, and hence, the expressions of being and non-being as ontologically different from each other can also not be possible in the absence of objects of incentives to them and as incentive to expression is caused by the objects figured in the mind and not by the external existents there will be no cause of incentives of being and of non-being if they are taken as external existents<sup>37</sup>.

Cognitively, not only past (being which is destroyed) and future (being which is yet to be born) but the present being, which is externally existent, also requires to be revealed by language in the mind and it is the inner-being which when revealed in the mind of the speaker, serves as the cause of the incentive for these expressions. If the 'tree' in the expression 'The tree exists' is taken as external-being it will then be a being independently of language but as we have seen earlier, even the external-being in order to be known requires to be figured in the mind by language. If it does not figure in the mind, what will serve as the cause of expectancy for the expression : 'The tree exists'? Not only that but as external-being of 'tree' is given as already existent, the expression 'The tree exists' will amount to *petitio principii*. There will be no justification for the use of the word 'exists' with the word 'tree' which as external-being is already existent.

The relation of the accessory and action is also not possible if external-being is taken as the cause of the expectancy for expressions. The action to be denoted by *tiñ* (verb-termination) is of a non-finished character and so it cannot be taken as external-being which is of an accomplished character and, in the circumstance, the expressions, denoting action, will also not be possible if external-being is taken as the causes of the expectancy for expressions.<sup>38</sup>

The expression relating to qualifier-qualified beings will also not be possible if external-being is taken as the cause of their expectancy. For

example *nīla* (blue) and *utpalam* (lotus) in the expression '*nīlotpalam*' are expressed as qualifier-qualified but they are never perceived as separate things. What is *nīla* is *utpalam* also. It is the *upacāra-sattā* of *nīla* and *utpalam* on the basis of which they are distinctly known so by the expression without a want of them as separate entities - *nīla* and *utpalam*. Now, it is proper to conclude that all being are the object of cognition in their inner forms revealed by language in the mind and it is the inner-beings which serve as the cause of the expectancy for expressions<sup>39</sup>.

The possibility of the difference of being and non-being as ontological entities cannot be explained even on the basis of the use of the word '*bhāvan*' (beings) and '*Abhāvan*' (non-being) also. It may be argued by *Vaiśeṣikas* that it is the difference of being and non-being on account of which the words '*bhāvan*' and '*Abhāvan*' are used respectively. That which 'happens to exist' is '*bhāva*' and that which 'happens to non-exist' is '*Abhāva*'. According to *Bhartṛhari*, the difference based on the uses of '*bhavan*' and '*Abhavan*' is fit from the point of view of communication but not trans-communicatively. The idea 'that which does not exist is negation' does not touch the trans-communicative ontic form of non-being. Non-being means destruction which is not applicable to externally-existent transcendental entities. That which is utterly formless cannot be taken to be destroyed and that which exists cannot be said to be non-existent. Therefore, *abhāva* cannot be defined as an entity which does not exist<sup>42</sup>. It can be said, from the side of *Vaiśeṣikas* that *abhāva* as a being having a form of its own, cannot be denied. *Bhartṛhari* rejects the argument mentioned above by saying that logically, the form of the being like that of non-being is also not possible either by itself or by any other means<sup>40</sup>. That which already exists by itself cannot be said to exist by others. The expression of existence of an already existent does not add anything new and that there will be no cause of expectancy for such an expression also. Thus '*the notion that difference of being and non-being as ontologically 'real-difference' cannot be proved (HR on VP. 3 3 70) on the ground of the impossibility of the expectancy for expressions also.*

## VI

Conclusively, the casual relation between the being and non-being as

ontological real or unreal can be explained as real neither by the theory of *satkārya* nor by the theory of *asatkārya*. We have repeatedly said that being and non-being are not known as ontologically real (existents), and, thus, the question of the ontic reality of *prāgabdhāva* and *pradhavasābhāva*, as such, does not arise. As there is no birth, the question of its death (prior non-existence = *prāgabdhāva*) and its destruction (*pradhvasābhāva*) does not arise (*Itham ca kāryatā niṣedhāt prāgabdhāva pradhvasābhāvapi kṛtakavastu viśyounastah*)<sup>41</sup>. Cognitively, being and non-being in-themselves are known neither as real nor as unreal but are only presumptive. From this point of view, the whole ontological world defined by *Bhartṛhari* as 'Vivarta,' is presumption and is explained as inferred as creations of the *Śabda-Brhman* as the ultimate principle who, through the powers like prevention and permission of the time (which is an independent power of the *Śabda-Brhman*) manifests all the entities grouped into the categories of birth, existent, growth, increase, decrease, and destruction (non-existent). The *Śabda-Brhman* and its powers are eternally existent and it is through the functions of permission and prevention of the time power of *Śabda-Brhman* that the birth and destruction of things in the world are perceived and are wrongly conceived by ignorants and children respectively as separate beings and non-beings of ontological character. In this metaphysical explanation being and non-beings are taken as outcome of the constant operation of permission and prevention of the eternal *Śabda-Brhman*. Metaphysically, the *being, eternally given, is taken as being when permission is in operation and is taken as non-being when prevention is in operation*<sup>42</sup>. However, this description is concerned with the metaphysical speculations of the reality or entities -in- themselves. Philosophically, being and non-being as things-in-themselves are not the object of cognition. They are not the objects revealed by language and that our cognition is confined to the beings the language reveals non-differently in the mind. From this point of view, being and non-being even '*Śabda-Brhman*-in-itself is also trans-cognitive and is only presumed as the ontological substratum of the cognition and the objects of cognition revealed respectively in the mind by language. They are described as ontologically real or unreal, being or non-being only by implication or presumption and as philosophical reflections are concerned

only with knowledge revealed by language, things-in-themselves, being trans-cognitive, are not the objects of philosophical reflections but of religion or practice with which we are not particularly concerned here. On the contrary, the objects communicable and cognizable by nature can be said neither as ontologically real nor as non-real but always as cognitive-real. Cognitively, only the beings revealed in the mind by language are intelligible beings (*Samvṛtta-upacāra-sattā*). As non-being also figures in the mind by language, it is very much a being cognizable and communicable by nature. If it is not so, it cannot be known, expressed and cognized thus (*Samvṛtten turūpeṇa sarvan Bhāvātmakam, avastunaḥ pratyaya yogāt*.<sup>43</sup>) and hence, a case of impossibility of accomplishment of communication may arise if the being or non-being as ontological real or unreal is taken in view.

*Bhartṛhari* philosophy of metaphysical non-dualism (*Śabdādvaitavāda*) accepts *Śabda-principle* as the ultimate, non-dual ontological reality who being consciousness by nature manifests all the diversities. The diversity is an outcome of analysis. Transcendently, there is no question of duality. *Śabda-Bṛhman* is an indivisible whole without a real part in it. It is for the sake of analysis and explanation on the ordinary plane that the whole without part is made understandable through parts. If otherwise, no explanation of the indivisible whole can be possible. *Helārāja*<sup>44</sup> remarks that without analytical device nothing can be said either about the things-in-themselves or about the indivisible cognition as well. The problem of ontological real and cognitive real as well can be reconciled and cognitively be justified only if his sentence-holism is given prominence in view. However, *the problem of duality from both of ontological and cognitive views does not arise in Bhartṛhari's holism for which ontological beings are all the same Śabda-Bṛhman and cognitively non-being is also known as being revealed non-differently in the mind by language.*

According to sentence-holism, the indivisible sentence, ubiquitously given in the mind as illumined and illuminating force (*sphoṭa*) is known as *vācaka* when it is revealed and the meaning is revealed non-differently by it as *vācya*. Our cognition is confined to the *vācaka* and the *vācaka* known non-differently as revealed in the mind by the *vācaka* itself. The *vācaka* and *vācya* as *upacāra-sattā* (intelligible-beings) are the only objects of



cognition and as the *vācaka* is non-different from the *vācya* it reveals, there is non-duality. The indivisible, inner sentence, for the sake of understanding and explanation, is divided artificially into piecemeal i.e. letters, words, roots/stems, suffixes etc. and their meaning are decided accordingly by grammar.

The cognition revealed by language in the mind is foundational even in the presumption of the ontological entities. As sentence reveals itself and the objects of cognition (i.e. ideas=meanings) which are only intelligible being and as the being and non-being are revealed by language in the mind, they are cognitively neither separate nor contradictory to each other. There is no question of contradiction of an awareness, unless and until there is an awareness revealed by a sentence of contradiction. The thought revealed by a sentence and another thought (just contradictory to the former) revealed by another sentence are two distinct being and so far cognition by the respective sentence is concerned, there is no contradiction. Even 'contradiction' is also known thus as it is revealed by language so in the mind. Various ideas are revealed in the mind and are known without contradicting themselves. As *Bhartṛhari* does not accept the simultaneous cognition there is no room for such a contradiction in a knowledge distinctly revealed by sentence. They are known as contradictory to one another only when contradiction of them is revealed by a separate sentence (the two are contradictory). They are two separate thought objects and the two separate ideas, revealed distinctly by respective sentences, from the point of view of logical consistency, are taken as contradictory if the two are not logically possible in a cohering context. It is only by inference that two cognitions are construed as contradictory but so far cognition is concerned, it is revealed distinctly by sentences (assertive or negative) and is a self-veridical.

Overall, there is no contradiction of awareness revealed immediately by the separate sentences and the 'awareness of contradiction' is also revealed uncontradicted and that is why the veridical-cognition by the word 'contradiction' is accomplished in communication. The veridical cognition by non-being like that of the being is revealed in the mind and that is why they are distinctly known so and communication is accomplished by them. Non-being like being also figures in the mind by language positively as a

being and the two beings are known distinctly. The being figured by the sentence 'non-being' is the intelligible-being of non-being and the being figured in the mind by the language 'being is the intelligible being of the being and it is due to this fact that all cognition by language are distinct. The idea revealed by the sentence, 'The tree exists' and the idea revealed by the sentence 'The tree does not exist' are two indivisible distinct ideas mutually uncontradicted. They, as such, are the flashes of the understanding revealed by language, and thus, it is improper to accept that one flash contradicts the other in the very moment of the cognition. Both of them are distinct and illuminative of their own selves. They are taken contradictory only by inference made on the basis of coherence, correspondence and other pragmatic situations.

The criterion of truth and falsity of sentence on the basis of corresponding referents is given importance by ontologists who think that the truth value of a sentence is based on its referent and that as the negative sentences are lacking them they are void of truth-value. They may think so but, philosophically, the idea of truth value of a sentence based on the availability of a referent is prerequisite based on the verity of cognition revealed by language first in the mind. How can non-linguistic referent be the basis of the truth condition of a linguistic unit? Overall, the cognition revealed by language is always a veridical-cognition and this verity for the sake of explanation, in terms of ontological view of availability of referents, is described by inference as truth or otherwise according to the verifying condition. *The truth condition of an assertion serves only as a line of demarcation of the sentences having referents and of those lacking referents.* But the meaning, the language reveals non-differently in the mind, is independent and autonomous of truth and falsity and, cognition, as such, needs interpretation in terms of truth-values only by proxy of referents. Is it proper to hold that a sentence having referent is true and others lacking referents are false? Communication by both sort of assertoric and negative sentence is accomplished Conclusively, it is not philosophical to decide the truth-value of a linguistic unit (sentence-negative or assertoric) on the basis of availability of non-linguistic referents (things-in themselves) which are beyond the touch of language. We are admitting the fact that the logic of referents for truth-value of sentences/propositions

is important for logical reasoning for which referential use of language is primary. However, it overlooks the philosophical value of the veridical-cognition revealed by a sentence (assertoric or negative).

We have already discussed in the previous pages that non-being like being is also a being revealed non-differently by negative expressions in the mind. It, as such, is a self-determined or self-restrained being as communication is accomplished on its own basis independently of corresponding referents in the external world of experience. The cognition, revealed by negative expression is also veridical. There is no question of it as an abstraction or as an imagination of mind. There is no room for the sense-perception of the formless non-being and that the sense-perception itself, in *Bhartṛhari's* philosophy, is accepted only as instrumental in the manifestation of foundational inner-sentence which when manifested by sentence-token reveals itself and its meaning independently of physical, psychological or transcendental entities. It can neither be taken as mental construction as it is a revealed being nor be taken as a counterpart of the being as ontological entity because it is a being awareness in nature.

It is obvious from the discussion made in the earlier pages that non-being as ontological entity cannot be proved as the object of cognition on the basis of reasoning and experience based on real, unreal, identity difference, sequence-sequencelessness. It can be said neither similar to nor dissimilar to the being for the reason that it has no concrete form. It is essentially formless and hence imperceptible. It is neither *anuyogī* as it is not similar to an other non-being nor *pratiyogī* (counterpart) of the being as ontological entity and, thus the controversy regarding the form of non-being, its perceptibility, its subjective or objective existence which are considered by ontological theories as significant philosophical problems, doesn't properly arise if we take non-being as a being figured non-differently by language in the mind.

Language infuses cognition and the beings revealed non-differently by language in the mind are the only beings to which our cognition is confined. Communication, by these beings, independently of referents in the empirical world, is accomplished and, hence, it seems, cognitively, justified to accept non-being as a being revealed non-differently by language. *It is*

*the inner being of non-being which is the being of our philosophical concern*<sup>46</sup> The view of philosophical being and non-being discussed in earlier pages, not only emphasizes the autonomy and freedom of language as expressive power that reveals cognition independently of ontological entities and our allegiances to them but also presents a purely philosophical account of them by considering language and what it reveals non-differently in the mind as the only concern of our philosophical reflections and investigations. Law of contradiction, verity of cognition, truth-value of negative sentences used independently of the assertive sentences can properly be explained only if the inner being of non-being non-differently revealed by the language is taken into consideration.

#### NOTES

*I am, grateful to Professor Daya Krishna, Jaipur, for giving valuable suggestions and raising many queries regarding Negation in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system in a discussion with me at his residence in summer 1998 that prompted me to write this paper.*

1. In the book entitled '*Bhartrhari; Philosopher and Grammarian*' edited by Soroja Bhate & J. Bronkhorst, Motilal Banarasidass, 1992, John D. Kelly, in his paper entitled '*Meaning and the limits of analysis : Bhartrhari and the Buddhism and the post structuralism*', pp. 171-192, has looked upon *Vakyapadiya* as an argument about the limitation of a formal system of analysis to explain or even to describe linguistic phenomena. Soroja Bhate, in her paper, edited in the same book, entitled '*Bhartrhari on Language and Reality*', pp. 63-73, has observed it as the argument about the limitation of language to describe reality.

In this paper, I have observed it as an argument about the limitation of philosophical reflection to explain reality. As philosophical reflection, for our observation, is confined to the beings revealed by language in the mind and as philosophy is concerned with analysis of those cognitive-beings *Vakyapadiya* can be observed as an argument about the limitation of language to describe Reality and the argument about the limitation of a formal system of analysis to explain or even to describe linguistic phenomena as well.

2. The word *sphoṭ* derived by *sphuṭ-* added with suffix *ghañ* used in the sense of an accomplished character means flash. The flash of awareness in character which reveals itself and its meaning by itself, in the mind, is a cognitive being par excellence. See, also 'cognition, being and the possibility of expressions : A *Bhartṛhari* an Approach' by D. N. Tiwari *JICPR* Vol. XIV Number 1, 1996, p. 91. Notes no. 6.
3. For N. Chomsky's mentalistic account of language, see *Reflection of Language*, 1976, *Language and Mind* 1972, *Syntactic Structure*, 1957
4. John D. Kelly, 'Meaning and Limits of Analysis : *Bhartṛhari* and the Buddhists and post structuralism' *Bhartṛhari -Philosopher and Grammarian* p. 192, edited by Saroja Bhate and Johannes Bronkhorst, Motilal Banarasidass 1994.
5. The term *Upacāra-sattā* is used by grammarian in general and by *Bhartṛhari* in particular in a technical sense of the being revealed in the mind by language (*Buddhistha-sattā*) of which no meaning is ever deprived of. vp. 3/3/51 and *Mahābhāṣya* 5/2/94. As both of the language (*vācaka*) and the meaning (*Vācya*) are beings revealed by language they are known as *upacāra-sattā*. *Upacāra-sattā* is the only being to which our philosophical reflexions and investigations are confined. For a detailed description of *Upacāra-sattā* see, my paper entitled '*Bhartṛhari* on language being and cognition' pp. 46-49, Published in the *Visva-Bharati* journal of philosophy, Vol. XXXVII number 1, August 1995-Feb 1996., Santiniketan-Calcutta, and also 'cognition, being and possibility of expressions. PP. 74-85 *JICPR* Vol. no. XIV November 1-- 1996 edited by Dayakrishna, New Delhi.
6. *Pratibhā*, for *Bhartṛhari* is the meaning, a determinate and distinct meaning revealed non-differently in the mind by *sphoṭa* for a very clear and brief account of *Pratibhā* see, my review article of '*Śabda*'. A study of *Bhartṛhari's* Philosophy of language' by Tandra patnaik, published in *JICPR* Vol. XII number 3, 1995 pp. 173-174 New Delhi.
7. *Tathā hi buddhyānirūpitavastuviśayāḥ śabhāḥ. Buddhisca bahirasatyapyarthe Svabhāvāsanāparipākavaśāvagraharupopajāyate Vaikalpiki.*  
*Śabdaparāmarśamantareṇaiśūpasansparsyābhāvāt. Helārāja on vp. 3/3/39* edited by Bhagiratha Prasad Tripathi Śāstri', *Varanaseya Sanskrit*

- Viśvavidyalaya 1974.*
8. *Na so sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamādṛte anuviddhamiva Jñānam sarvām Śabden bhāṣate vp. 1/123* edited by Bhagirath Prasad Tripathi Varanaseya Sanskrit Viśva vidyalayaya, Varanasi 1976.
  9. See, Bhartṛhari on the indivisibility of single word expression and subordinate sentences, D. N. Tiwari, *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. XXIV April 1997, University of Poona, PP. 197-216 Pune.
  10. See, *Frege : Philosophy of Language* -- M. Dummett pp 420-423 second edition, Gerald Duckworth & Company Limited, New Delhi 1973
  11. Vp. 3/3/4 & 29-39 see, also, *Bhartṛhari Philosophy of Relation Between Word and Meaning*, D. N. Tiwari JICPR. Vol. XI Number, 1994, pp. 43-54 New Delhi- 2
  12. Kaiyaṭa, *Mahābhāṣyapradīpa 5/2/94* edited by Guru Parasad Sastri, Varanasi, 1939 & *Pravṛtīhetuṃ sarveṣāṃ śabdānāmaupacārikām, vp. 3/3/50 and Etām sattām padārtho hi na Kaścidativartate. sā ca Samprati Sattāyah pṛthagbhāṣye nidarśitā.* Helārāja's commentary on vp 3/3/51
  13. VP. 3/3/40-42
  14. Helārāja on VP. 3/1/34
  15. *Abhāvascatvāraḥ ityatrāpi nirūpakhyātam Sāmānyam Kalpanīyam, Mahābhāṣyadīpikā, 1/2/46*
  16. *Mahābhāṣ ya, 5/2/94*
  17. For a detailed account of the possibility of expressions see, "Cognition, being and possibility of expressions : A Bhartṛharian approach" by D. N. Tiwari, *JICPR* Vol. XIV number-1, pp 77-85, 1996.
  18. *Etām Sattām Padārtho hi na kaścidativartate. VP. 3/3/51.*
  19. *Ekasmādātmano nanyaubhāvābhāvau vikalpītau. VP. 3/3/61*
  20. Helārāja on VP. 3/2/15.
  21. For a detailed description of Quine's theory of ontological commitment of language, see, *Ontological Relation and Other Essays*, Columbia University Press, Newyork, 1969, see also *Theones and Things* by W. V. Quine, Harward University Press, Cambridge, Mass 1981.
  22. Helārāja on VP. 3/3/62.

23. *Ibid*, 3/3/62.
24. *Abhivyaktauca kāraṇavyāpārāt kāryasya kāryatā na syāt*, *ibid* 3/3/62.
25. *Koyam Janyajanakayoḥ Sambandhaḥ? Tattvépyabhi Vyaktau tajjanyāyām tadviśayaḥ Kāraṇavyāpāro na syāt. Kārye naiva tasyā jananaṭ, tathā kāryasya janane tadviśayo pikāraṇavyāpāronasyāt... Tathā ca tasy āsato janane satkāryaprasangaḥ-- Helārāja on VP. 3/3/62.*
26. *Nābhāvo jāyate bhāvo naiti bhāvo nupākhyatām. VP. 3/3/61.*
27. *Nyāyabhāṣya 1/1/1.*
28. *Ananyatve bhivyakteḥ kāryāt.... Sankato yam Panthāḥ. Helārāja on VP. 3/3/62.*
29. *Abhivyaktauca kāraṇavyāpārāt kāryasya kāryatā na syāt* *ibid* 3/3/62.
30. *Ibid* 3/3/62.
31. *Asattvamapyasya tadrūpatvādeva vyatiriktam bhāvavannopapadyate. Evam hi bhāvatāprasangaḥ, Helārāja on VP. 3/3/67.*
32. *Ibid*, 3/3/67.
33. *Yato 'bhāvasyetathamanupapadhyamānatā, ten bhāvo' pyevam paramārthato nopapadyate. Ibid. 3/3/68.*
34. *Ittham sarvavyavahārāvikalpapparighatitā evetibhāvābhāvāvpi tathā vijñeyau... Sā ca tattvānyattvābhyāmanirvācyeti. Helārāja on VP. 3/3/68.*
35. See, *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra 2/2/9.*
36. *Abhāve triṣu kāleṣu na bhedasyāsti sambhavaḥ, tasminnasati bhāve pi traikālyam nāvatiṣthate. VP. 3/3/69.*
37. *Pravṛtīhetum sarveṣām śabdānāmaupacārikīm. VP. 3/3/50.*
38. "Cognition, being and possibility of expression : A Bhartṛhariian approach" by D. N. Tiwari, *JICPR Vol. XIV number - 1, pp 77-85, 1996*
39. *Helārāja on VP. 3/3/50.*
40. *Āmatattvam tu parataḥsvato vā nokalpate, VP. 3/3/70*
41. *Helārāja on VP. 3/3/63.*
42. See, Concept of Time in the Philosophy of *Bhartṛhari* by D. N. Tiwari, *JICPR Vol. XIV number - 1, pp 25-37, 1988.*
43. *Helārāja on VP. 3/3/63.*

44. *Vyavahāraśca lokasya padārthaiḥ parikalpitaiḥ. Śāstre padārathaḥ kāryarthā laukikaḥ pravibhajyate, VP. 3/3/88 Helārāja comments "idam ca laukikānāmeva śabdānāmanuśāsanam śāstram, Tadatralokaprasiddhaivapadārthaprakriyāsamāsrayaṅīyetyakhaṇḍād vākārthāt kriyāvacanodhātuḥ sattvapradhānāni nāmāni, pratyāyakaḥ pratyaya ityādi sastrīyakāryaprasiddh yartham laukika eva kriyādravyaguṇādilakṣaṇo poddhārapadārthah pravibhajyata iti HR on VP. 3/3/88.*
45. *VP. 3/1/104 and Helārāja's commentary on it.*
46. *HR on VP 3/3/59.*