DOES VERBALISING ACROSS CULTURES EMBODY QUINEAN MULTICULTURALISM?

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"(Translations) are (not) diverse verbal embodiments of some intercultural propositions or meaning, --- (nor are) they better seen as the merest variants of one and the same intercultural verbalism" (W.V.O. Quine, 1960).

The Quinean equivalent for translation is called verbalising across cultures. Theorising across languages is not as much culture-bound as verbalising across cultures is. Theory is a culture-free term. That is to say, sciences can go across cultures. Nevertheless, the translation must be thought of as an eponym of the theory. Theory is a culture free artifact whereas languages are not. This is as it should be. This is especially so, since language is a culture bound phenomenon. This is yet another way of saying that theory is holistic (in Quinean terms) and languages (in plural) are not. The apparent opposition between language and theory is only benign. If you choose a term, then we can call it inter-holistic. This is a pointer in my understanding. That is, translation is a process by which acculturation in a different culture becomes a genuine possibility, especially in the domain of science. If it were so, then questions like 'what is language?' or 'what is translation?' can never be answered within the confines of one's own language except in terms of a theory, that moves in and out of one's own language. That is the reason why they become genuine benchmarks of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism entails the view that one does not use one's own culture or language as the standard. Rather it allows culture to be as much enveloped as in theory. Nor can it accept that there is an archimedean point from which one can judge one as a

better translation than the other. One can include a theory of meaning, or even so, analytical philosophy also into its fold given their scientific credentials so far as it is able to inaugurate theory of meaning on scientific terms. But we cannot identify any domain of religion because the divisive forces are too rampant to overcome.

Quine's animadversions about meaning has a unique fall-out: meaning is not culture-bound, but culture-free so long as it forms the holistic part of theory. So considered, according to recent defence of Quine (Michael McDermott, 2001), his critique of ASD (analytic-synthetic distinction) has something 'real' about it (977). This is because, it does no damage to intuitive notions of synonymy and analyticity. Hence, an 'elite' class of analytical sentences can be interlingual in the specific sense that it agrees with the intuitions of the speakers of those languages. McDermott's strategy is to argue that the premise about holism cannot be said to work because of revisibility of some sentences in response to recalcitrant experiences. Consequently, the argument from holism is invalid in either cases of analytic or synthetic set. This may have an immediate fallout not only on the possibility of interlingual translation, as those elite sentences are culture-free. They are more 'semantically important' A fortiori, there are a class of analytic sentences, that can be carried across languages. For me, of course, it points to yet another extraordinary gesture: there is a subtle undercurrent of social theory of multiculturalism in Quine's doctrine of indeterminacy of translation (Of course McDermott cannot accept the way I relate meaning and translation, but that apart, he will, I am sure, relish my reading of the matter). We can Christen it as verbalising-across-cultures type of multiculturalism, which I propose to be a viable alternative to other types, even more so, than multilingualism (A. Kanthamani, forthcoming). Its prospects for a third world like India needs fresh examination. Multiculturalism is a special case of multilingualism. Multilingualism places no constraints on what is being carried across the languages, and suffers indeterminacy. Multiculturalism generates an arc of science across languages while leaving a specifiable form of indeterminacy. It can free whatever science does from one's own language. Let me confine myself to the supporting nuances for holding Quinean verbalising across cultures embodying Quinean multiculturalism in this

modest essay.

Let me consider a scenario that is entirely different from that of McDermott in the sequel. As against the linguisticsless view of science advanced by Quinean indeterminists of translatability, the Katzian rationalistic realist school of linguistics claims that there is a repertoire of sentences in a Platonist heaven of grammar, which will uniformly fall beneath and get distributed into every language on earth. Such a realistic extension of the Chomskyan conceptualism of universal grammar is claimed to complete the revolution of transformational grammar with its specific dimension of bilingulism as providing an empirical condition of translatability. *A fortiori*, there ought to be an *episteme* about translatability. Such a strong theoretical or metanarrativist plea sits ill with cross-cultural understanding. As I argue the point, it does not provide necessary and sufficient condition for multiculturalism, whereas multiculturalism needs a Quinean narrative of verbalising across cultures. Besides, it is dubious assumption to believe that Chomsky's universal grammar denies unique traits of languages and hence it denies variations among different languages. (Thus I will take strong exceptions to the many of the theses advocated by Ashok Gangadeen (1998) in his recent theory of global reason. I will set forth my conclusions on a different occasion). Can Quineans be fought over by Katzians and whether the former is a cultural isolationist are the two questions that we are principally concerned in the sequel.

Starting with the effability assumption that holds that the expressive power of each language remains the same, Katzians counter the argument for radical translational indeterminacy. They make a *reductio* of indeterminacy. It is difficult to know whether effability goes in tandem with translatability. The term effability is often understood to work for languages in the same way as expressibility works for a particular language. Neither of these assumptions is true. The Platonist thinks that he has no reason to believe that they radically oppose each other. This is so especially when translatability can be considered to augment the resources of effability. Hence, this can only serve as an initial assumption which leaves translatability as an open-textured activity. The claim to that indeterminacy can be countered with the *reductio* of the 'symmetric argument', is due to Jerrold Katz:

1.   Radical translatablity is a limiting case of actual translatability
      (symmetry assumption),

2.   There is an implicit identity between radical and actual translatability
      (Quinean premise).

3.   Since they are continuous, they have no distinguishable status as
      such (Quinean conclusion).

4.   But, sense-oriented interlingual sentences are actually translatable
      (Katzian Premise1).

5.   No such identity therefore can even be presupposed (Katzian
      Premise2).

6.   Intentionalists are actual (virtual) translation theorists (Katzian
      Premise 3).

7.   Intentionalists theory is not identical with radical theory (Katzian
      Conclusion).

8.   Therefore, radical translatablity is discontinuous with actual
      translatability.

9.   Therefore, radical translatablity is not a limiting case.

The above argument, in my understanding, establishes the last line of the argument (9) by *reductio* of (1). If we assume that the identity is the only thing that divides the lines of the argument, then it cannot go through when the identity is denied, the very thing Katz requires to establish interlingual identity. Premise (5) is proved to be a stumbling block irrespective of the efficacy of others like (4) for example. But this is not a butteresing point for Quineans. Katzian bilingualism does not collapse on the mere denial of identity. For, Quine also declares that the practice of 'actual translation must go on'. Therefore, he has no reason to deny any discontinuity. Therefore, he might accept premise (8) and by the same reasoning he can also agree to the conclusion about the discontinuity. So the argument can go no more further than that only to establish something which is quite compatible with Quine's first thought experiment of radical translation. Does it mean that the line that divides Quine and Katz is thinned out?

I am forced to think that it must be so. One major reason for thinking

along these lines is that meaning and translation must be freed from the constraints of culture. This is best achieved by moving theories across cultures. Since this is not easily an available option, translations do not succeed. Quine's point is to be interpreted as assuming that meaning is culture bound with other cognate ingredients. Translation is moving theories across *sans* culture. Quine's point is that we cannot carry across the board theory that will make translation also to fall under it. Katz, on the other hand, thinks that freedom from the constraints of culture can be made *ex hypothese* true. For Quine therefore, verbalising is verbalising across cultures whereas for Katz, verbalising is verbalising across languages. The former entails that either we move theories across or face constraints of culture. Culture is what we inherit of which theory forms a larger chunk. Quine's point is about theory in the above sense and Katz's effort lies in broadening it to cover non-theory as well. There are in-betweens.

Such an interlingual identity, according to Katz, is only warranted by a cognitive definition of bilingualism. Construed in this way, bilingualism means that thinking in two languages is made possible. Theory of bilingualism can explain the practice of translation. Quine's point about bilingualism is to be counterposed to the above since its emphasis is on practice. It may be taken as embodying an idea that holds that it is not possible to separate bilingualism from interactivity of two speakers (Dummett). This is especially so since it is bound up with theories. The real opposition consists in the way one offers primacy to theory in contradistinction to the other which offers primacy to practice. Quine's bilingualism is about theory where interactivity of theory is to be freed from cultural constraints, whereas Katz's bilingualism presupposes that there is a theory which governs this very activity.

If this much is agreed, then it proves that they are not in principle in disagreement with each other, except for the reason stated in the culture-clause. That is, a speaker thinking in two languages and two speakers engaging themselves in interactive communication are symbiotic to each other. Quine's only objection is that the secured *episteme* is not as empirical as any other scientific theory. No theory could tell us how to move sentences across cultures unless they are movable across theories. Quine offers the two following thought-experiments. The first holds that there is

no fact of the matter to consult in making a choice between many translations. If follows that there is no culture-neutral space within the choice of the theory. Alternativism becomes a genuine possibility. And the second argues for a case of holophrastic indeterminacy, where there is a methodological way of achieving this feat in the culture-free space. Alternativism becomes a virtual possibility. That is, such an alternativism may have agonal prospects. For Katz, on the other hand, a theory is a virtual possibility to tell us how to move across languages. Bereft of the agonal content, there is no reason why they should not become compatible with each other apart from the culture clause. This must also be understood to be nearer to the second thought experiment Quine suggests in his holophrastic indeterminacy. It has a positive potential in that it dwells only on the possibility of translation as resting upon the possibility of interaction without carrying an *episteme* acorss the board for both meaning and the same meaning. Translations are not vehicles of *episteme*. An interesting consequence is that our *episteme* is culture-free.

Gibson (1999), who is recognised as the most authentic interpreter of Quine, will face trouble if the above observation is agreed upon. Gibson sharply distinguishes Quine's theory of radical translation from Davidson's theory of radical interpretation on the grounds that Quine cannot identify indeterminacy of translation with indeterminacy of meaning. Consequently, the latter speaks of an *episteme* of understanding, and depends more on meaning, while the former speaks of an *episteme* of translation and depends only on 'same' meaning. Since translation requires same meaning and interactivity, meaning may not require interactivity, these epistemologies stem from two distinct notions namely meaning and same meaning (interlingual synonymy or analyticity). The former can be categorised as more broader than the latter. Such an argument can never be sustained as it will have a 'feminist' counterexample. The *episteme* of feminism may not fail to overlap with the *episteme* of the subaltern. The female principle cannot be carried across the board. The subaltern needs 'translators' as well as interpretation. There is a Quinean translational space for feminists (Sara Ahmed, 1998). Quinean bilingualism, I suggest, might entail an agonal feminism (Kanthamani, 1999).

Be that as it may, the immediate fall-out of the above argument

which thrives on a certain distinction is said to be that Quinean bilingualism has the least prospects in comparison to Davidson's. This is so even if it is granted that both lead towards some sort of *episteme*. In other words, the former has to consult the linguistics of meaning while latter can allow translation even without it. Since there is no linguistics to consult, there is no intermediary of meaning, but only sameness of meaning. Quine needs less of interaction while Davidson needs more of it. Quine's indeterminacy entails how holistic nature of science significantly moves in and out of language, Davidson's indeterminacy highlights the arguments against the individualising the language and hence moves in the direction of literary theory. There is an obvious difference between the different 'cognitive' domains to which they address. While the 'cognitivism' suggested by a radical translation looks at science, the 'cognitivism' suggested by a radical interpretation goes in tandem with literary criticism.

This way of looking at it may not be too convincing as it needs the assumption which holds that meaning and same meaning are distinct. In a sense, Gibson is quite opposed to Dummett's way of reading which goes against this. If we agree with Dummett's reading, then it is easy to construe that both need interaction. But the difference is not much substantial since Davidson's theory is a special case of the former. That is, we can reach Davidson through the route provided by Dummett. Gibson's confusion is that since Davidson is a Tarskian, he is more on the side of semantics while Quine is not. Quine needs interlingual synonymy and analyticity, while Davidson is nowhere near to it. This is not too convincing as Davidson must be understood to provide a case from an angle which is designed to tell us how to ascribe from other people's cases rather than from one's own case. Such Davidsonian space is created by carrying the *episteme* across the board of truth and meaning. This means that the distinction is much more sharper or rather, much less as there is no sharp distinction between truth and meaning. Their dependence is not so much clear. Consequently, the distinction between the projects cannot be spelt out in the way Gibson construes. Quine's bilingualism will have definite prospects to succeed.

Quine, Davidson, and Dummett form a trinity with no deviation from theory that is recognised to be part of language as an articulated structure.

This is what determines the post-analytical turn which has languages rather than language in focus (see for a different 'deconstructive' reading of this trinity proposed by Samuel Wheeler III). But Katz accepts this clause but deviates from theory while arguing for translation in natural language. Davidson's idea is that we can attribute truth values to sentences spoken by others once we know how to construct a theory of truth for *that* theory. Presented thus, Davidson's theory becomes a variant of simulationism in cognitive theory (This is not the only point of difference between Quine and Davidson; other differences are: Davidson's strong anti-individualistic account of language and his overtures towards a broader spectrum that includes literary theory). For Davidson, it is theoretically possible to do so, once we hold other people's beliefs as constant (This may not be agreeable to McDermott). If this is a point that is worth considering, then the rift between Quine and Davidson is not as wide as between Quine and Katz. The point about holophrastic indeterminacy allows us however to reinforce the idea that there is not much incompatibility between Quine and Katz.

Katz's perspective is woven around the acceptance of three metanarratives namely translatability, metaphysics and grammar and his point about the determinacy of translation arises on account of a combination of these three streams. Though Katz's idea of the third has its ancestry in the notion of universal grammar, it remains at the level of a metanarrative and it can very well be called a deadwood today for the very reason that the systems of deviance of each particular language change the parameters. I take this to be the main philosophical merit of recent minimalist claims of Chomskyan grammar. Accordingly, languages can be differentiated according to the ways they have access to expert knowledge systems. The underlying principles may remain the same but they could be subjected to individual variation. The syntax of particular languages may be individualistic, because the parameters of those languages warrant this. But the semantics may not after all be indifferent to transfer across languages.

To hold therefore that effability requires that there is some possible world in which it could be expressed, is to point only at the virtual possibility. This goes against the spirit of Chomskyan linguistics. The merit of Chomskyan linguistics is that it makes a fundamental distinction between

languages and the way we have access to expert knowledge systems. Katz is willing to collapse such a distinction. For Katzians, what all it boils down to is that expressive powers of a given language could be augmented by carrying it across the board. We must remember that there is a wide spectrum of possibilities: there may be sentences that are not inter-translatable, or there may be approximations and near perfection as well. But there cannot be what is called exact one-to-one translation. This is the major bone of contention for Quineans. If this were so, then the 'Exact Translation Hypothesis' fails. That is, we cannot provide a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for an exact translation. Nor could we say that translations are always inexact. The practice of translation goes on and on. Thus, there is a hiatus between theory and practice. This really seems to be a point against Katz since he invariably thinks that translatability, like computability, is equivocal with that which is translated. In other words, there is a theory, which tells us how to translate each sentence of object language to some sentence in the target language.

That this is so is evidenced in the following dictum which holds that translation opens one's linguistic and cognitive practices across cultures different from his own and enables us to mutually verbalise thereby carrying across a chunk of our theory of the world. This is because each language may have a distinct *Weltanschauung,* carving up the world in a different way than others. This is sometimes enunciated as the linguistic relativity hypothesis. Each language bespeaks of a distinct hypothesis about its metaphysics. This is the classical social scientific model which needs a thorough revamping today. we can understand that Quine is poised to achieve this in one way and Katz is trying to achieve it in yet another way. We will suggest a new thought experiment. This starts with an assumption that we think in languages. We think in formal/natural languages. That is, we think in our languages. We think in natural languages alone. Each one of the obove conveys a distinct dimension of understanding language. Nevertheless, it is difficult to differentiate between them. We know what it is to think in a formal language. Does it distinguish formal from natural languages? We have no idea of what it is to think in natrual languages. Unless we know how to explain this we have no means by which to distinguish natural from formal languages. Once we have some idea, the

fall-out will be greater. That is, we can proceed to accept that there are analytical truths (Peter Carruthers 1996). Quine's denial of analytic-synthetic distinction may not matter. If translation is quite a possibility, we can inferentially go from one language to another. That might run parallel to the way we carry inferential mechanism with other speakers of the same language. For Quineans, however, to make it work, we need to posit certain 'analytical mechanism' by which we execute such a transfer. This is the rug on which Quineans also hang their clothes. This is exactly where they pick up the bones of contention with Katzians.

Can we assert that translation is essentially indeterminate? It is a hard question to answer. A challenge such as the above has been issued by philosopher Quine (1960, 1970, 1987 and 1995). It is directed against our pre-theoretical practices or what is called the proto-theory. Within Quine's corpus, one comes across two distinct thought-experiments. His earlier thought-experiment was poised to argue for a radical indeterminacy of translation between two radically different languages (English and Junglese). It expounds the thesis according to which, between competing translation manuals, it is difficult to decide with reference to empirical standards, which one is the correct one: symmetrical translations may turn out to be incompatible.To say that 'x is a dog' and to say that 'x is alife-long filament of a dog that occupies space-time' are two distinct ways of expressing the ontological features of the world. That ontologies are relative is a direct consequence of this. To say that 'Neutrinos have no mass' and to say that 'Neutrinos have a mass' are two ways of differentiating the ontological features though they look contradictory to each other. As far as I know, no one has succeeded to refute this (McDermott discusses the example of 'If philogiston exists, it is an element' along with another example from Lewis: 'If unobtanium exists, it is an element'). The second thought experiment argues for holophrastic indeterminacy. The argument goes through the following motions, starting with the thesis about ontological relativity:

1.   Ontologies are relative to each other.

2.   The indeterminacy has to do with the internal structure of sentences.

3.   Observation sentences are indifferent to ontology.

4.   Each one translation is holophrastic in the sense that it may have
      independent yes/no verdicts (this is different from the first type of
      indeterminacy in which the truth values are radically changed),

      Katz (1978, 1988, 1990 and 1992) however is an exception with
regard to the first, and hence his objection to the second premise is that
such an indeterminacy can be actually overcome by being more holophrastic
than Quine as he is not against holism as such. If we agree that the third
premise also goes through, then there could possibly be only a minimal
disagreement between them. In a sense, therefore, the second premise is
compatible with Katz's semantic markers which hypothesise gavagai as
rabbit, in a rather circumscribed way by asking more questions with the
native. So, I take there is deep agreement between them. Nevertheless,
Katz always claims himself to be an architect of new intentionalism, trying
always to meet the foregoing challenge. His plea is directed against the
first part of the obove quote. Calling it a 'slippery slope argument', he has
devised an elaborate methodological machinery to prove that *contra* Quine,
translation is essentially determinate. Other critics harp on the ranking of
hypotheses. Accordingly they hold that we can rank the hypotheses of
many translations, by means of a 'contrastive analysis' and this can show
that Quine stands refuted on his own grounds (Dorit Bar-On 1993). This
brings to the fore the differences between cultures. But Katz carries on
the campaign against Quine for the last twenty years in a more or less
consistent way by premising on the assumption that there need not be
variations among different cultures (Kanthamani, 1989).

      Consider the word '*Kāla*' that is carried across the cultures, only by
retaining its original link. It might be translated into 'time', 'temporality',
'continuum', 'eternal time', 'intimations of time' etc. A similar case arises
when you carry across the sentence 'Neutrinos lack mass' into a culture,
which has not reached the optimum level of scientific conceptualisation.
Carry it across as we must but there is no guarantee that it has succeeded
to augment the cognitive activity of the native. Especially so, when they
lack requisite concepts or they know too little physics. On the face of it,
this appears to be too much to ask. But the point must be intuitively obvious.
Augmenting it must inevitably pull the native across the cultures and force
them to think in the source language as well. May be the skilled bilingual is

a go between who can make the cultural boundaries look fuzzy. Nevertheless, the resources of the target language cannot be as much helpful as the resources of the source language. There is no language-neutral theory so much so that sentence of one language can receive an automatic meaning-transfer or sense-transfer. Translation across radically different languages is indeterminate. Two sentences are inter translatable if and only if there is a linguistically neutral meaning, which is expressed in both of these languages. Such a cultural artifact is simply non-existent. Meaning is what they share, but it does not have any entitative status whatsoever. Quine's argument is not going from 'meaning is indeterminate, to saying that translation is indeterminate (Dummett, 1978), but it goes in the reverse direction: since translation is indeterminate, same meaning is indeterminate. A *fortiori*, since translation is indeterminate, meaning is indeterminate, since the only plausible way of making sense of meaning is through same meaning. Meaning and translation are thus inseparable: methodically, semantics is to be modelled on translation: meaning and translation are their flip sides (Kanthamani, 1993). Quinean bilingualism cannot be denied simply on the grounds that there is no linguistics of meaning to consult. Translation needs as much interaction as meaning does, It is inconsistent to deny one without the other.

Synonymy of terms as well as sentences is the scourge. The problem here is one about substituitivity of synonymous (coextensive) expressions for one another. The usemention confusion cannot be ruled out here for two sentences like

(1) The morning star = the evening star (use)

and

(2) The morning star is the same as the evening star (mention)

They do not meet substitution criteria unless they flank identity sign. But what about synonymy of sentences which are equivalent in meaning? The above distinction makes them vulnerable again. They violate use-mention distinction. Translation of the first sentence and the second sentence will show a marked difference. The latter invariably quote the two words. They fail to capture the same sense if they are paraphrased or translated. Their analyticity cannot therefore be established. For logicians of the

Quinean bent, synonymy of sentences can be defined only by the analyticity of the biconditional as in (1) above. But the problem here is that we cannot make such a biconditional between sentences (1) and (2) without violating use-mention distinction. Further, linguists admit that synonymy is non-inferential, but they are reluctant to allow logic to have monopoly. This is exactly where Katz's theory barges in. So for them, the inferentiality squarely depends upon the underlying sense structure (sense 0_1 = sense 0_2). Katz's argument is premised on the idea that synonymy can be carried across languages. So, if this is granted then sense in L1 and sense in L2 are equivalent. Hence, they can be said to be analytic in a weak sense. In order for the theory to succeed, Katz requires that the above notion of sense has a certain autonomy on the one hand, and an all-inclusive bilingual sense of sense on the other so as to prove that it is partly independent from both reference as well as truth of the languages in question. Such a claim appears to be too metanarrativist and hence its feasibility is dubious.

There is no guarantee about its success, if the above objection is held valid. For Frege's solution in terms of sense offers no guarantee. by parity of reasoning, Katzian solution is likely to pose probems. So, Katz does not use meaning as key for the simple reason that sense includes both meaningfulness as well as meaninglessness (ambiguity is a trait of natural language). Accordingly, the decompositional sense structure of bachelor is given in terms of <male>, <adult>, <unmarried> and that of spinster is given as <women> <never>, <married>. This provides answer to the above question only on condition that translation is made to depend squarely on decompositional structure of sentences belonging to different languages. Such an argument looks vulnerable and is open to objection. Katz has an alternative argument which suggests that the idea is to manage redundancy of sense, as shown in the following:

John is a bachelor

John is an unmarried bachelor

Now, the above two sentences are equivalent in meaning but not synonymous but linguists call it as semantic redundancy. From this, Katz deduces that synonymy cannot be defined in terms of the analyticity of the biconditional. This will not do. Katz counterposes this with an argument

which holds that it is analyticity (in his sense) of the biconditional that is defined in terms of synonymy (some such clause is operative in McDermott as well). Synonymy must be categorised as having the same sense structure (not necessarily meaning structure). It is by no means clear that Katz is working with language as an articulated structure or languages which bank on interaction. His sense of effability is aimed to do a limited job. When identity of meaning is replaced by identity of sense, inferential relations can go from

<p style="text-align:center">John is a bachelor</p>

to

<p style="text-align:center">John is unmarried.</p>

With this, the claim can succeed. But such a uniform substitution of identity in statements is, according to Quine, cannot escape a major objection as illustrated in the following counterexamples:

<p style="text-align:center">'Tully' has five letters,</p>

<p style="text-align:center">Tully =Cicero,</p>

<p style="text-align:center">Therefore, Cicero has five letters (false).</p>

Moreover substitution in oblique contexts leads to false conclusions as shown by

<p style="text-align:center">I believe that Mt. Everest is Mt. Everest.</p>

<p style="text-align:center">Mt. Everest is Chomolungma.</p>

<p style="text-align:center">Therefore, I believe that Mt. Everest is Chomolungma (false).</p>

It was this that led Frege to make a distinction between sense that is the mode of presentation and reference which speaks about the mountain. Linguists are wary of such a distinction. It fails the Church's test of translatability (Kenneth Taylor, 1998). But for Katz, the reasons are different. Frege's intentionalism has no value, because his (plant-in-the-seed) sense of analyticity is too broad. What we need is a narrow (beam-in-the house) sense of analyticity. Natural languages are better understood with help of the latter rather than with the former. Translation turns on this specific sense of analyticity to which Quine is directly opposed. This much is argued for in Katz's writings, but its plausibility remains dubious. The difficulty about this is that analyticity, broad or narrow, might also face

empirical reckonings. It suffers from the same confusion as use-mention and hence they cannot cut across languages.

Let me capture the above thesis with the help of a second thought-experiment, which is aimed to disturb the coherence of translated sentences: suppose two field linguists spent long years in a remote valley without seeing each other. And they try to learn the original language from the native. While doing so they compile translation manuals that tell us how to translate the native language into target language which is English. A translation manual is a set of hypotheses, which tell us how to go from one language to another. Using these two manuals, now alternately, if we translate a native sentence, can we presume that we will have a coherent translation? That is, we take one sentence from one translation and the second sentence from the second translation, and the third from the first and so on. Let us present the case by saying the first translator decides to adopt a policy according to which the sentences are properly combined so as to preserve meaning. Whereas the second translator thinks that it is worthwhile to split the sentences if only to preserve the meaning. Now suppose that our combined translation shows crack, will we be able to pin-point which manual is defective. In all probability, we may not.

What exactly the challenge does it throw over Katz's bilingual assumption? Bilingualism of this type assumes too much. Firstly, it assumes that one and the same speaker can think in two languages at one and the same time. Secondly, there is a certain coherence about the set of sentences thus thought of. Thirdly, there is no flaw in the coherence. Besides it contains the metaphysical presupposition of a subject as a speaker of the language. Quine's challenge forces us only to think of the same scenario as involving two speakers engaged in communication or better put, two translators translating them differently. His point is that the coherence of the above can hardly be checked by means of interlingual structures, but he can concede that they require a check by means of intralingual structures. This is what is augmented by the expressive power of the interactive chip, so to say, which therefore provides empirical support from a computational cognitivist point of view of interactive computing (Kanthamani 1999). The point to be understood here is that chips need the notion of understanding that is essential for interactivity. Quine can very well draw support from

interactive computing which needs understanding which is not after all computational (Hence I think that McDermott's proposal which hypothesises that his holism is a functionalist holism, needs to be given a wider thrust of cognitivism). This is for the precise reason that even a bilingual should think only in the pattern of monolingual mode, though the sentences may be picked up from two distinct languages. Thus, it does not look like a formidable challenge any more than the former. On Katz's understanding, we can settle on the question and hence, this poses no challenge to Quine. It transpires therefore that the dispute about *episteme* seems to be a mere verbal quibble.

Is it plausible to think that Quine's challenge is met with his effability? I guess that the answer must be negative. Katz makes synonymous sense structures as equivalent to the metaphysics that underlie natural language. Such a trans-metaphysical assumption, seen from the linguistic relativity thesis, requires us to take natural languages as embodying sentences, which remain the same for each of the languages. This may not be true at all, if linguistic relativity hypothesis is true. People who believe that there is an underlying metaphysics that governs each one's way of carving up the world, therefore, commits a fallacy in that they equivocate the underlying structure of language with metaphysics. The underlying structure is grammatical or syntactical and at the most it is logical. Keenan challenges the claim that the sameness of syntactic or semantic structures will do for exact translation. No doubt grammar may be isotopical with logic. But no globality is thereby implied. Science can bend the primary conceptual system. The only metaphysics we can imagine in this conext is one that binds language to a theory of the world. That is, the way we cognise about the world. Natural languages are amorphous. Alternately, we can see language as an articulated structure. Thus, the basic logical structure is the only conceptual system we have, but we are constrained by expert systems to bend it, even rejecting logical laws in the process. That is, whenever we regiment language for the purpose of science, we may change its course. Thus, we have to find ways for science to express in that system. Consequently, our linguistic and cognitive practices are subject to change in a language as an articulated system. Grammar has no parallel to semantics. The hypothesis about the allegedly buried underlying semantic

structure of language may be agreeable only on condition that it works like Quine's primary system but it is not agreeable when it is supposed to lend credence to an additional metaphysics. That is, grammar can be a theory of language only in the sense that such a 'theory' can be carried across the board. But since we cannot do so, grammar cannot be regarded as a theory. Grammar, in other words, can be carried only as much as a theroy can be. Katz's message is that by positing a sense-structure, we can presume an underlying thought structure, that is common to many or every language for that matter. Nothing flows from such a structure, unless it is presumed run along the lines of Quine. It appears that the incompatibility between them may be only a facade. This is the reason why Chomsky does not say much about the semantic structure of language. Syntax can be represented in an axiomatic system, and to some extent semantics follows suit. No parallel has ever been suggested. Axiomatic system is found to be wanting because, it cannot posit meaning postulates such as Carnap admitted. Carnap's Strategy is worked out as follows:

(x) (If x is a bachelor, then x is unmarried)

John is a bachelor

Therefore, he is unmarried

The first step is called 'meaning postulate' by virtue of which the conclusion is deduced. Quine is not satisfied on the grounds that extensionally equivalent terms cannot imply intentionally equivalent ones (e.g. creature with a kidney and creature with a heart). Like Frege's old intentionalism, Carnap's old intentionalism is also dismissed by Katz. The defect of each is that it is restricted to extensionalist analysis of language. Katz's new intentionalism, on the other hand takes the buried decompositional structure of sense as contributing towards the understanding of any logical property of language and hence it is the only one in the market that is available today. There is a specific argument which goes against it.

Analyticity is only redunadant predication and analytic entailment is redundant entailment. All these may not vitiate the alleged *episteme* unless it is strongly presupposed that there is no close correlation between language and expert systems of knowledge and hence they can be disjoint. Quine is obviously opposed to this idea. He intends to bring the idea of language as

an articulated structure to become closer to the languge of expert systems, especially science as seen from the holistic character of theory. For Katz, the structure of ordinary language is poised to sense-transfer between them. This is achieved by valorizing one unique expert system of knowledge namely mathematics. For Katz, this is the model for considering language as abstract objects. This might seem to be a totally dubious move since it embodies a narrowed down version that *ex hypothese* excludes other expert systems from its purview. If their linguistics of sense does not survive, so much is the worse for the linguistics of translation. Whereof the linguistics of sense cannot work, thereof linguistics of translation is to remain silent.

NOTES

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