

REFORMULATION OF THE JTB ACCOUNT: AN EVALUATION

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Ever since Gettier presented his hypothetical counter-examples¹ to the tripartite analysis of knowledge, there has been a profusion of attempts to reformulate the analysis. The Gettier-type counter-examples has led epistemologists to question virtually every aspect of the traditional analysis. The greatest effort has gone into the attempt to revise the traditional analysis in ways that will render it immune to the problems raised by Gettier. While some philosophers have been prompted to investigate theories concerning the nature of epistemic justification, still others have been inspired by the new arguments for radical forms of skepticism concerning knowledge and justification. Epistemologists have taken the task of first refining the traditional analysis to take into account the Gettier examples and then of devising subtler Gettier-type counter-examples targeted against the latest revision.

The reformulations of the JTB (justified true belief) may be classified into three groups: (1) Conservative reformulations, (2) Less Conservative reformulations, and (3) Least conservative reformulations. In the first category, namely, the conservative reformulation, attempts are made to conserve the traditional conditions and the relevant sense of justification is restricted, so that the Gettier-type counter-examples are ruled out. In the less conservative category, those reformulations are included which add an additional fourth condition to the existing three conditions in order to protect the analysis from counter-examples. The least conservative reformulations supplant some newer conditions for the traditional conditions and remain untouched by those notorious counter-examples.

The aim of the paper is to analyse and assess the validity of the above reformulations which is attempted in the first three sections. In the fourth section, an attempt is made to see whether externalism can be a solution to the above problem.

I

Conservative Reformulations

Early attempts to revise the traditional analysis by taking into account the role of false proposition in one's evidence or in one's reasoning from the evidence fall under the category of conservative reformulations. These attempts are meant to strengthen the connection between justification and knowledge by reducing truth to a justification-making characteristic.

In his attempt to retain the traditional definition, Chisholm singles out a class of proposition, which he terms as, 'non-defectively evident' propositions. A non-defectively evident proposition, Chisholm observes, will have a self-presenting basis which makes no falsehood evident for S. To be precise:

H is non-defectively evident for S = *df* Either *h* is certain for S, or *h* is evident for S and is entailed by a conjunction of proposition each having for S a basis which is not a basis of any false proposition for S.²

All those propositions that are not non-defectively evident are to be considered as defectively evident. Having defined the concept of non-defectively evident Chisholm proceeds to redefine the traditional analysis thus: *h* is known by *s* iff *h* is accepted by S: *h* is true; and *h* is non-defectively evident for S.

In the Gettier-counter example, the proposition *e* is true, is believed by Smith and it is equivalent to conjunction of propositions and of which is non-defectively evident for Smith. But the *h* of Gitter's example, 'Jones own a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona', is defectively evident. "The only set of self-presenting", Chisholm clarifies, "that makes *h* evident for Smith is one that also makes evident for Smith the false proposition *f*, that Jones owns a Ford"³. Therefore, with this repaired definition of knowledge, we are not required to say Smith that he knows *h* to be true, unlike the original traditional definition.

Chisholm acknowledges that the analysis proposed by him has at

least this disadvantage in common with other attempts to solve the Gettier problem that it is not immediately obvious that the definition is correct. In other words, the definition is one that must be defended. Chisholm himself anticipates a few objections which he puts forth in his defense. The first objection is set forth against the thesis that a non-defectively evident proposition has a self-presenting basis which makes no falsehood evident for S. Suppose S knows that ninety nine percent of the balls in an urn are black and that many drawings from the urn that are about to take place are to be random ones. This will surely make it evident to S that *h*: 'Most of the drawings will be of balls that are black'. But although *h* is true, it is false that *f* 'The next ball to be drawn will be black'. The self-presenting propositions that constitute a basis for *e* and therefore also for *h* here does constitute a basis for *f*.

Responding to this objection, Chisholm points out that although the man's evidence *e* may well make reasonable for him the false proposition *f* it can hardly be said to make it evident. At the same time *e* definitely makes *h* evident. To see the difference between the epistemic status of *h* and *f*, all that we need to do is to put ourselves in the same epistemic situation as the man in question. We would really grant him the right to say, "I know that most of the drawings will be black". But if he goes on to say, "And what is more, I know that the next ball to be drawn will be black", our reaction would be: "Either you are mistaken or else you have some evidence other than *e* that we do not have".⁴

The second objection comes in the following argument. Suppose a man has adequate evidence for propositions, which he might express as follows:

- (a) "Whenever the factory whistle blows, it is 5 P. M."
- (b) "Whenever the factory whistle blows, the bus will appear within five minutes".
- (c) The factory whistle is now blowing".

We may assume that in such a case, the following will also be evident:

- (d) "It is now 5 P. M."
- (e) "The bus will appear within five minutes"

Now imagine that it is in fact 5 P. M but this time the bus had a break down and hence will not appear. Referring to this situation, Chisholm's definition might be questioned in the following manner. (For the sake of convenience, we shall number the arguments):

- (i) Surely the man knows that it is 5 P.M.
- (ii) (d) is made evident to him by (c)
- (iii) the directly evident propositions that make (c) evident for the man, will also be the ones that make (d) evident,
- (iv) (c) also makes evident the false propositions (e) that the bus will now appear.
- (v) Hence, the self-presenting propositions constituting the man's basis for (d) also constitute basis for a false proposition.⁵

Chisholm here clarifies that in this argument the mistake lie in steps (ii) and (iii). It is a mistake to say in (ii) that it is now 5 P.M. is made evident to him by the fact that the whistle is blowing. In fact, it is made evident for him by the conjunction of (c) and (e). Analogously for step (iii), the false proposition (e) is made evident not by (c) above, but by (c) and (b). "The directly evident proposition that make (d) evident for the man are those that make evident the conjunction (a) and (c). But those that make evident the false proposition (e) are those that make evident the conjunction (a) and (c)"⁶. Hence step (v) of the argument is false; it is not the case that the self-presenting propositions constituting the man's basis for (d) also constitute a basis for false proposition.

Thus, the conservative reformulations though they make an appreciable attempt to reform the standard analysis within the given framework of the traditional definition, they unfortunately do not have anything much to offer to check the Gettier-type counter-examples. Probably it is not possible to form a standard analysis that is immune to Gettier type counter-examples by remodeling this tripartite analysis.

II

Less Conservative Reformulations

Under this category, falls those reformulations which advance a fourth condition in addition to the existing three conditions for a proper

analysis. The major analysis in this division are: (i) The presence of relevant falsehood, (ii) Epistemic explanation, (iii) Truth resistant evidence, and (iv) Defeasibility analysis. Let us discuss each of them briefly.

(i) *The presence of Relevant Falsehood*

A simple diagnosis of what has gone wrong with Gettier-type counter-examples is that the initial belief that *f* from which the true justified belief that *h* is inferred, is false. So we might add to the tripartite analysis the fourth condition that nothing can be known which is inferred from a false belief, or from a group of beliefs, of which one is false. Dreher has attempted to develop this approach to the Gettier problem. He presumed that a standard analysis of knowing employs the phrase 'justified belief' to mean believing on good evidence, in a sense of 'evidence' in which there can be no such thing as false evidence.⁷ In other words, there can be no such thing as a false proposition describing the evidence for something. The standard analysis would then be: S knows that *p* iff (i) *p* (ii) S believes that *p*, (iii) S is justified in believing that *p*, (iv) There is no relevant falsehood in S's justification for *p*.

Dreher applies his analysis to the Gettier-type counter examples in order to establish its validity. In the Nogot example Dreher observes, the false proposition *f* 'Mr. Nogot owns a Ford', cannot be a good evidence for proposition *h*: 'Some one in the office owns a Ford'. Letting *e* describe the evidence concerning Mr. Nogot's behaviour, Dreher points out that the conjunction of *e* and *f* also cannot describe evidence for *h*, since the conjunction is false."⁸ Thus, the only remaining candidate to describe evidence for *h* is *e*. If *e* is a good evidence for *h*, it is so only because *e* is a good evidence for *f* and does not support *h* directly.⁹ Thus even though the teacher who does not know that *f* is false may mistakenly think that *e* describes good evidence for *h*, the falsity of *f* prevents *e* from describing evidence for *h*. Therefore, the subjects in the counter-examples do not know.

Such a conclusion is too extreme from many point of views. Many philosophers have thought it unexceptionable to regard *e* as describing good evidence for *h*. The suggestion is too strong in the sense that it might make it impossible for any of us to know anything at all. We all of us

suffer from numerous false beliefs which have some role in an inferential processes. As per this suggestion, none of our present true justified beliefs would count as knowledge. In any case, as Shope rightly remarks, "It is not clear from Dreher's own remarks how to formulate a general requirement for a true proposition e to describe good evidence for another proposition h in order to be able to deal with Gettier-type counter-examples.¹⁰ Yet another defect that is often pointed out with this analysis is that the variants on the Gettier theme can be written in which, though there is falsehood, there is no inference.

The more fruitful method, therefore, is to acknowledge the defect and repair the conditional by removing reference to inference and by tightening up the relation between the false-beliefs and true justified ones which are not to count as knowledge. Thus we could simply require an absence of relevant falsehood.

(ii) *Epistemic Explanation*

Shope assumes that our analysis of knowledge can avoid Gettier style counter-examples once we recognize that in such examples falsehood plays a certain role in relation to one's actual justification. An epistemic explanation, according to Shope, is a set of propositions explaining why some proposition is justified. When one is concerned with justified factual knowledge, one's belief or acceptance must be justified through its connection with a sequence of such explanations not involving falsehoods at those places. This he calls, 'Justification-explaining-chain (JEC).¹¹ With this notion of JEC, Shope suggests the following alteration in the standard analysis: 'S's believing p is justified in relation to epistemic goals through its connection with a justification-explaining-chain (JEC) related to the proposition p .¹² Commenting on this, Moser observes: "The basic idea of Shope's diagnosis... is that by constructing such a JEC for a Gettier style counter-example we can expose the false propositions and thereby account for the lack of genuine propositional knowledge".¹³

Shope's solution to the Gettier problem exhibits a leaning towards naturalized epistemology. It seems that Shope is quite unwilling to give up the traditional epistemic conceptions. As a result of this, he is not successful. The use of a JEC does not guarantee that a knowledge-precluding falsehood

will emerge in such Gettier-style counter-examples.

(iii) *Truth-resistant Evidence*

The truth-resistant evidence requirement is very similar to the epistemic explanation thesis. This theory assumes that the kind of evidence essential to propositional knowledge admits of an epistemic explanation that is not contravened by the addition of any further true propositions. Paul K. Moser, the major proponent of this thesis gives the following requirement to undercut the Gettier-type counter-examples: For S to have knowledge that p on evidence e , there must be an epistemic explanation of p that explains, solely by means of true propositions why S is justified in believing that p or e even if any other true proposition is conjoined with e .¹⁴

An epistemic explanation appropriate to knowledge is resistant to any truth even those that are not part of knower's actual evidence. The kind of evidence knowledge requires is truth-resistant in the sense that its justificatory value is not contravened by the addition of any true proposition, including true propositions of which the believer is unaware. Moser explicates the notion of truth-resistant evidence as follows: 'S' s justifying evidence e for p is truth-resistant *iff*, for every true proposition t that, when conjoined with e and t restores the justification of p for S in a way that S is actually justified in believing that p .¹⁵

With this condition of evidential truth-resistance added as the fourth condition, Moser offers the following analysis of knowledge: S knows that p *iff* (i) p is true, (ii) S has justifying evidence e for p , (iii) S believes or asserts p on the basis of e , (iv) S has justifying evidence e for p that is truth resistant in the sense, for every true proposition t that when conjoined with e contravenes S's justification for p on e , there is a true proposition t that when conjoined with e and t restores the justification of p for S in a way that S is actually justified in believing that p .¹⁶

Though there are a few advantages in this type of analysis, it shares a few defects in common with other conservative analyses. First, among the many counter-examples weaved against conservative reformulations, atleast a few would counter this theory also. The thesis in fact is a form of defeasibility analysis expressed in simpler terms.

(iv) *Defeasibility Analysis*

Some like Chisholm, Steven Levy, Pappas and Swain have proposed defeasibility analysis. Chisholm, for example, in his paper, 'The Ethics of Requirement', suggests that an analogous explication can be given for the epistemic notion of defeasible *iff*... there is a body of evidence *e* such that *e* is true and *e* justifies *h*, and this justification may be over-ridden.¹⁷ There is justification for *h* which has been over ridden *iff* 'there is a body of evidence *e* and a body of evidence *e* such that: (i) *e* is true and *e* justifies *h* and (ii) *e* is true and the conjunction of *e* and *e* does not justify *h*. Therefore, a justification for *h* is indefeasible if there is a body of evidence *e* such that *e* is true and *e* justifies *h* and this justification cannot be over-ridden. Similarly, Steven Levy speaks of a similar defeasibility condition to that of Chisholm. According to him, a defeasibility condition in an analysis of knowledge is 'a requirement to the effect that for S to know that *p* there must be no other evidence against *p* strong enough to undermine S's belief that *p*, should this evidence come to S's attention.¹⁸ Pappas and Swain had the same idea in their mind when they suggested the following requirements: 'In order for a proposition *h* to be indefeasibly justified the evidence *e* must be sufficiently complete that no further additions to *e* would result in a loss of justification and hence a loss of knowledge.'¹⁹ This way of characterizing defeasibility allows that justification may be undermined by evidence, which is relevant to *p*, even though it is not evidence against *p* as in the Tom Grabit example.

Swain counters these theses forcefully. To say that justification for *h* cannot be over ridden, he observes, is just to say that there cannot be any body of evidence *e* such that *e* in conjunction with the justifying body of evidence *e* fails to justify *h*. but how are we to understand the requirement that there cannot be any body of evidence *e*'? If it is to be taken as a logical impossibility, it is too strong for, if *h* is a contingent proposition, then it is logically possible that *h* is false and that there is some body of evidence *e* such that the conjunction of *e* fails to justify.²⁰

According to Lehrer, the defeasibility condition has to be weakened by restricting the range of defeating counter-evidence, to those for which the evidence *e* is strongly negative. In a combined article along with Paxon, Lehrer shows how Chisholm's analysis can be amended adopting the Nogot

example.²¹ Lehrer offers the following definition of defeasibility. If p completely justifies S in believing that h then this justification is defeated by q iff (i) q is true (ii) the conjunction of p and q does not completely justify S in believing that h (iii) S is completely justified in believing q to be false, and (iv) if c is a logical consequence of q such that the conjunction of c and p does not completely justify S in believing that h then S is completely justified in believing c to be false.²²

The most attractive feature of defeasibility thesis is that it allows us to indulge in two apparently conflicting intuitions regarding conditions of standard analysis - that one's evidence be inductive and that one has conclusive evidence for knowledge. The new quadripartite analysis will have a coherence that was previously lacking: it provides an explanation in the fourth clause of what was before included by mere stipulation, that knowledge requires truth. But this very advantage has dug its grave. To provide truth connection by requiring that the subject has conclusive evidence is self-negating given the human cognitive limitations and fallibilistic epistemology.

III

Least Conservative Reformulations

Those analyses, in which the existing conditions are totally replaced by some set of new conditions, fall under this category. It is due to the attempts made by the epistemologists to deviate from the traditional path in search of a possible solution to the Gettier problem. The following theories come under this category: (i) Conditional theory, (ii) Conclusive Reasons Analysis, (iii) Causal Theory of Knowledge and (iv) Reliabilistic Theory of Knowledge.

(i) Conditional Theory

This theory owes for its origin mainly to Nozick. He suggests that the reason why we take the justified true beliefs in the Gettier-type counter-examples not to have been known is that S would have believed them even if they had been false. He takes it, therefore, that for S to know that p , we require that S would not have believed that p iff p had been false. The

analysis therefore, is specified thus:

S knows that p , iff

(i) p is true (p)

(ii) S believes that p (Bsp)

(iii) If p were not true S would not believe that p ($\sim p \square \rightarrow \sim Bsp$)²³

There are two ways by which it can be a coincidence that S's belief is true. First, if it were false, S would still believe it, and second, there may be slightly different circumstances in which p remains true but S no longer believes it. To exemplify both these, an example seems required. Suppose S believes that there is a police car in the road outside because he can hear a police siren. There is in fact such a car outside, but the siren he hears is that of the hi-fi of the Kid's in the next room. Here S does not know that there is a police car outside for two reasons: first, S would still have had the belief even if the car had not been silent, even though the car itself remained outside.

In short, this theory makes an attempt to articulate the feeling that for a belief to be knowledge, it must be peculiarly sensitive to the truth of the proposition believed. Nozick contends: "It must track the truth in the sense that if the proposition were in changed circumstances, still true, it would still be believed and if it were not true, it would not".²⁴ Tracking the truth of p is in effect a requirement that the first two clauses of the analysis should be related in a certain way. The theory does seem to have some resources with which it can explain the link between certainty and knowledge. According to this theory, someone who claims to know that p is in effect claiming that if p were not true, he would not believe it. But this claim is precisely one which he would not make if he were not certain that p .

No doubt, this theory has diagnosed it right what has gone wrong with Gettier-type counter-examples and proceeded in the right direction for a solution. But, unfortunately, Nozick provides no means by which we can track the truth and to this extent the theory is unsatisfactory.

(ii) *Conclusive Reasons Analysis*

This theory proceeds from the apparently natural way to respond to

the Gettier problem, namely, that a person can have knowledge on the basis of evidence *e* is sufficiently strong to rule out the possibility of coincidence. In other words, S has knowledge that *h* only if S has conclusive reasons for believing that *h*. It is pointed out that the evidence *e*, a person has for some proposition *h* may support *h* to any degree along a continuum ranging from virtually worthless to conclusive. If a person's evidence is less than conclusive, it always seems possible that the propositions for which the evidence provide support is only coincidentally true. In Gettier cases, the subject has excellent, but not conclusive evidence for *h* and therefore, it seems merely a coincidence that *h* is true. The problem is how this intuitive notion can be elevated from the level of vagueness?

A strong version of "conclusive reasons analysis" is presented by Peter Unger. Unger feels that in Gettier cases there is an element of accident in S's being right about the fact that *h* is true and therefore his evidence cannot be conclusive. For, S could as well have been wrong if it is accidental that he is right. To handle the Gettier type cases, Unger provides the following analysis: 'A person S, has knowledge that *h* iff it is not at all accidental that S is right about its being the case that *h*'.²⁵

Unfortunately, this analysis does not have the required clarity for a solution. When is it correct to say that it is not at all accidental that S is right about its being the case that *h*? Unger repeatedly tells us that his notion of accidentality is not similar to the automobile accidents, but he does not tell us precisely what he intends. It is true that Gettier counter-examples do seem to be accidental. But it is not difficult to complicate the examples, by which it is not at all accidental that S is right about this conclusion, even though he still does not know. Suppose in case I of Gettier, someone has cleverly staged the entire set of circumstances described by Gettier. The employer has been bribed to mislead S, ten coins have been placed purposefully in Smith's pocket, etc. Then it seems, in this revised case, it is not accidental (in the same sense of 'accident') that S is right.²⁶ Hence Unger's notion of non-accidentality is too weak to serve the purpose.

(iii) Causal Theory of Knowing

Among these philosophers who have supported a causal theory of knowing, some add a clause concerning causation as a fourth condition of

knowledge, while others substitute such a clause for the justification condition in a standard analysis. In an early analysis, Goldman suggests. "...A person can be said to have knowledge that *h* only if the fact that *h* is causally concerned in an appropriate way with S's believing that *h*.²⁷ Goldman complicates his proposition by an additional requirement to the effect that S must correctly reconstruct the important links in the relevant causal chains.

Applying his theory to the Gettier counter-examples, Goldman argues that what makes *h* true is the fact that Brown is in Barcelona, but this fact has nothing to do with Smith's believing *h*. That is, there is no causal connection between the fact that Brown is in Barcelona and Smith's believing *h*. If Smith had come to believe *h* by reading a letter from Brown postmarked in Barcelona, then we might say that Smith knew *h*.²⁸ Similarly, if Jones did own a Ford, and his owning the Ford was manifested by his offer of a ride to Smith and thus in turn, resulted in Smith's believing *h* then we would say that Smith knew *h*. Thus, one thing that seems to be missing in these examples is a causal connection between the fact that makes *h* true and Smith's belief of *h*.

In the case of perception, a causal requirement is very obvious.²⁹ Remembering like perception, according to Goldman, must be regarded as a causal process. S remembers *h* at time 't' only if S's believing *h* at an earlier time is a cause of his believing *h* at *t*. Knowledge can be acquired by a combination of perception and memory also. Apart from perception and memory, there is inferential knowledge also. Cases of knowledge based on testimony too can be analysed causally. In a genuine case of knowing, there will be continuous causal chain leading from H to S's believing *h*. In the absence of such a causal connection, though S is warranted, S cannot be said to have knowledge.

Swain attempts to establish that in standard analysis the defeasibility condition can be replaced by conditions that refer to facts about the causal connections obtained between beliefs and states of affairs. The special defeating counter-evidence can be explained in terms of the lack of a causal chain connecting S's belief that *a* with the state of affairs referred to by *p*. Whether a man's justification is defeated or undefeated is in general a function of the characteristics of such causal chains. After a considerable long discussion, Swain gives the following conditional: The causal chain

leading to S's belief that *e* either (1) contains the event or state of affairs referred to by *p*, or (2) contains some other event or state of affairs that is either or logically sufficient for the occurrence of the event referred to by *p*.³⁰

Swain's account of causal theory is, in a sense, an improvement on Goldman's proposal. For, many of Goldman's requirements, for instance, that S must correctly reconstruct the important links in the relevant causal chain is too vague to be serviceable. But even is Swain's analysis, it emerged that we have no guarantee that there is only one way in which belief come to be justified and in particular no real reasons for supposing that any acceptable way must somehow be causal, so that all justified beliefs that *p* must be caused by relevant facts.

(iv) Reliability Theory of Knowledge

Epistemic reliabilism is the widely held view that a true belief becomes knowledge depending on the reliability of the process that causes that belief. Reliability consists in the tendency of a process to produce true beliefs rather than false ones. The source of a given belief is minimally reliable just in case "... it has a (possibly unexercised) propensity to accurately indicate the truth about that sort of belief."³¹ To be reliable a source would have to perform well in a wide variety of conditions; but it need not perform well in all possible conditions. For instance, in cases of visual illusions, vision performs poorly indeed, but overall it is still reliable for, circumstances in which illusions are present are relatively abnormal. It is the fact that vision does and would perform well if relied on in normal circumstances that leads us to judge it reliable. Normal circumstances relative to an individual are those in which people in his community typically find themselves. What constitutes normal conditions, the sort of situations in which members of a community typically are ensconced, will vary from one community to the next. As a consequence, the minimum level of reliability a source must possess fluctuates across a range of communities.

Goldman, the chief proponent of reliabilist theory, criticizes the traditional theories of justification. The traditional theories of justification are faulty, he says, "for ... they confer justification on to a belief without restriction, on why the belief is held, on what causally initiates the belief or

sustains it."³² Here cause is construed broadly to include sustainer as well as initiator of belief. Granted that principles of justified belief must make reference to cause of belief, what kinds of causes confer justifiedness? Here, Goldman reviews those belief forming processes that are intuitively justification conferring such as standard perceptual processes, remembering, good reasoning and introspection etc.

Criticisms were in abundance to Goldman's proposal. First and foremost, the requirement is too demanding. The theory assumes that the truth ratio of a belief forming process is invariant across all normal worlds. Such consistency seems not to preserve reliability. For, we can conceive of a possible world which is consistent with all our general beliefs about the actual world, but which does not feature the reliability of a particular belief forming process that is highly reliable in all normal worlds. Secondly, not all humans share the same general beliefs about the normal world. Normal worlds for certain humans are abnormal for others. Here we need to only mention the animism and idealistic mysticism of various tribal communities.

IV

Can Externalism be a solution to the above problem?

The brief approaches made on the various proposed analyses all point to one thing: the growing necessity to neutralize epistemology. A naturalized epistemology is "...one in which all the terms used in the analysis are ones that describe phenomena of nature, such as causation, for example, or those that can be reduced to such terms."³³ Quine's 'epistemology naturalised' suggests that inquiry into the nature of human knowledge be restricted to accounts of how belief arises and is altered.

Assuming that the required relationship is a causal reliability, the externalist theories are naturalistic. Externalism avoids the problems faced by foundationalism and coheretism because neither one has to posit self-justified beliefs nor assume coherence among the beliefs since the justifications of belief is either attained by some other means or justification itself is not required to convert true belief into knowledge. The externalist theories of justification could never convincingly convey that a belief could be justified externally, for the simple reason that there are inherent

contradictions in it. The term 'justified' consists within itself an internalist conception. The most plausible theory, therefore, is those true beliefs having the appropriate sort of naturalistic external relationships to the facts as a result of such relationship, converted into knowledge without being justified. It is the way true beliefs are connected to the world that makes them knowledge rather than the way in which we might attempt to justify them. What matters for knowledge is how the belief arises, the natural history of belief, not how one might reason on behalf of it. Looked at this way, the justification requirement can be eliminated altogether in favour of the right sort of historical account.

Externalism deals neatly with skepticism, both traditional and modern also. The traditional skeptics doubt the perceptual claim, we might be deceived by an evil demon who supplies us with deceptive sensations which lead us to believe that we see a tree, for instance, when we do not see it at all. The modern skeptics replaces evil demon with a small object, a 'braino' implanted in our brain, which, when operated by a computer provides us with sensory states which are produced by the working of the computer influencing the brain rather than by the external objects one believes to exist. To all these skeptics, externalist gives a simple reply: "... if my beliefs are indeed produced by the demon or by the braino, then they are false and I am ignorant. On the other hand, if the beliefs are true and produced in the appropriate way, then I do know."³⁴ It is so simple an affair for them since the validity of the cognition does not, in any way, depend upon the cognizer.

The intuitive difficulty the majority of epistemologists face is that a person may be highly irrational and irresponsible in accepting a belief, when judged in light of his own subjective conception of the situation and may still turn out to be epistemically justified according to externalist criterion. His belief may in fact be reliable, even though he has no reason for thinking it is reliable. In short, the externalist theories attempt to escape the dilemma by invoking external justifying conditions which need not be at all within the ken of the knowing subject. "But the price of such a view" retorts Lehrer, "is the abandonment of any claim that this subject himself has any reason for accepting the basic belief and thus seemingly also of the claim that he is justified in holding either that belief or the others which depend on it."³⁵ In this way, the externalist view collapses into skepticism.

The appeal of externalist theories is their naturalistic character. They assimilate knowledge to other natural causal relationships between objects. Our attainment of knowledge is just one natural relationship between facts among all the rest. Such a theory, though escapes a number of difficulties encountered by the other theories, they have this defect that they provide accounts of the possession of information rather than attainment of knowledge. Substantiating this criticism, Lehrer noted: "The relationship in question may suffice for the recording of information. But if we are ignorant of the relationship we lack knowledge."³⁶ We need the additional information of the existence of those relationships to convert the specified relationship into knowledge. For knowledge, more than the possession of information is needed. One must have some way of knowing that the information is correct.

It is also criticized that externalist theories, typical of epistemological theories, take some sort of example that best fits for the theory and ignore less felicitous examples. The paradigm examples for externalism are perception and communication. In the case of perception, it is indeed very plausible to contend that what converts perceptual beliefs into knowledge is the way that the belief arises in perceptual experience. S's belief that he sees a tree is converted into knowledge by being caused by his actually seeing a tree. The same is the case with communication. John says Peter that Mr. Smith is the department head and that causes Peter to believe that Mr. Smith is the department head. Here Peter's knowing that Smith is department head depends on whether his informant knows that what he tells him is true. The assumption is that there is a causal chain beginning with his believing it which accounts for his knowing to it. But the realm of knowledge has more to it than perception and testimony. Not all knowing that p can be supposed to be caused by the fact that p. for instance, there are general propositions and theoretical propositions that cannot be given an account of with their theory.

Such a criticism is unwarranted. Goldman insists on logical connections that account for the knowledge of general and theoretical propositions. And after all, descriptive epistemology enlists the major means to knowledge. They are perception, inference, testimony, memory and intuition. Of these, externalism accounts for all.

Regarding the justification condition, those who stick on to the traditional western conception insist that a necessary normative condition of a person knowing that *p* is that it be more reasonable for him to accept that than to accept the denial of *p* on the basis of his information. Here the key notion is 'normative', this takes us to the crux of the whole problem. The term 'justified' is used in the traditional western epistemology in a deontological sense. Just as to be justified in having done something is for that action not to be in violation of any relevant rules, regulations, laws, obligations, duties or counsels, the ones that govern actions of that sort, justification of belief too means to believe something in terms with epistemic rules. On the deontological conception of the epistemic justification of belief that is as close as possible to the standard conception of the justification of action, to be justified in believing that *p* at '*t*' is for one's belief that *p* at '*t*' not to be in violation of any epistemic principles, principles that permit only those beliefs that are sufficiently likely to be true.

Many deontologists, after disavowing any commitment to direct voluntary control of belief, proceed to insist that beliefs are subject to what they term, 'indirect voluntary control'. With respect to almost all normal perceptual, introspective and memory propositions, it is absurd to think that one has any such control to accept, reject or withhold the proposition,. When I look out my window and see rain falling, water dripping of the leaves of trees, ... I no more have immediate control over whether I accept those propositions than I have basic control. I form the belief that rain is falling willy-nilly. There is no way I can inhibit this belief. Of course, there is no denial of the fact that we do have a rather weak degree of 'long range' voluntary control over some of our beliefs. But the deontological notion of justification based on this indirect influence is not the sort of notion we require for the epistemological purposes to which the term justification is put.

The discussion above reveals that the justification condition the traditional western epistemology nourished for so long is nothing but the offspring of their conceiving epistemic notions comparable to ethical notions, a thesis proved unwarranted. Take away such deontological implication from propositional knowledge, it shall be clear that the justification condition vanishes. Ordinary people, for instance, routinely acquire numerous valid

perceptual beliefs. If one of them, a normal non-philosopher, Mr. Jones were asked to provide some justification for thinking that a certain one of his perceptual belief is true, very likely, he would be at a loss about what to use and how to use it. If he sees and recognizes a table under favourable observation conditions, then it is quite plausible that he is justified in believing that he sees a table. But there need not be anything else that he regards as his justification for the belief.

NOTES

1. The dictum "knowledge is justified true belief" was questioned by Edmund L. Gettier. In his three paged article entitled "Is justified true belief knowledge?", he presented two counter-examples

Gettier aims to question, the sufficiency of the tripartite definition of knowledge. He is not confronted with any of the existing three clauses in the definition. He allows that they are individually necessary and argues only that they need supplementing. In order to explain this, he gives two counter-examples.

In Case I of Gettier's, there are two characters, Smith and Jones, who have applied for a certain job. Gettier asks us to suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following conjunctive proposition: (f) Jones is the man who will get the job and, Jones has ten coins in his pocket.

Smith's evidence for (f) might be that he has been told by the man doing the hiring that his rival Jones is going to get the job and Smith has counted ten and only ten coins in Jones's pocket. Call this evidence *e*. Based on this evidence *e*, Smith arrives at the following proposition which is entailed by f: (h) The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.

Note that it is the entailment from f to h that makes Smith accept h. Thus Smith accepts h on the grounds of f for which he has strong evidence. Therefore, Smith is clearly justified in believing that h is true. To everyone's surprise, however, it is Smith who gets the job and as it happens Smith unknowingly has ten coins in his pocket. Therefore, proposition h is true, though proposition f from which Smith inferred h is false. Gettier points out here that the proposition in question namely, h: (i) is true, (ii) Smith believes

that *h* is true, and (iii) Smith is justified in believing that *h* is true for, Gettier observes: "h is true in virtue of the number of coins in Smith's pocket while Smith does not know how many coins are in Smith's pocket and bases his belief in *e*, on a count of the coins in Jones's pocket, whom he falsely believes to be the man who will get the job."

Case II of Gettier appeals to the logical principle of addition, affirming that if *p* is true, then the truth-functional disjunction of *p* and *q* is also true whatever *q* may happen to be: i.e. in a disjunctive statement of *p* and *q*, the proposition would be true *iff* *p* and *q* are not both false. Gettier's Case II is as follows:

Suppose Smith has strong evidence for the following propositions: (f) Jones owns a Ford. Smith's evidence for this might be the conjunctive proposition (e) Jones says he owns a Ford, has showed him certificates to the effect and has always been honest and reliable in the past. This conjunction *e* of propositions is said to make evident for Smith the proposition (f) namely, 'Jones owns a Ford.' Thus, Gettier supposes that Smith is completely justified in believing that Jones owns a Ford on the basis of his beliefs about Jones. Gettier asks us to imagine now that Smith has another friend, Brown, of whose whereabouts he is totally unaware of. Smith selects a place's name at random and constructs the following propositions: (h) Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona.

That is, being something of a logician Smith notice that from, 'Jones owns a Ford', it follows by the principle of addition that 'Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona' is true. This inference does not rest on any assumption about the ordinary meaning of the word 'or'. Using the term as a logician does, the deductions of *h* from *f* is valid, i.e. S may well deduce *h* from *f* even though S has no beliefs one way or the other concerning whether Brown is in Barcelona.

2. R. M. Chisholm, *Theory of Knowledge*, p. 109.
3. *ibid.*, p.110.
4. *ibid.*, p.111.
5. *ibid.*, p.112.
6. *ibid.*

7. J. M. Dreher, "Evidence and Justified Belief", in *Philosophical Studies*, 25 (1974), pp. 435-439.
8. R. K. Shope, *Analysis of Knowing*, p.81.
9. J. H. Dreher, *op. cit.*, p. 437.
10. R. K. Shope, *op. cit.*, p. 82
11. R. K. Shope, "Knowledge and Falsity", In *Philosophical Studies*, 36 (1979), pp. 389-405.
12. R. K. Shope, *Analysis of Knowing*, p. 208.
13. P. K. Moser, *Knowledge and Knowing*, p. 236.
14. *ibid.*, p. 242.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 245.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 247.
17. R. M. Chisholm, "The Ethics of Requirement", in *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 7 (1977), p. 115.
18. S. R. Levy, "Defeasibility Theories of Knowledge", in *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 7 (1977), p. 115.
19. G. S. Pappas and M. Swain, *Essays on Knowledge and Justification* Introduction, p.27.
20. M. Swain, "Epistemic Defeasibility", in *Essays on Knowledge and Justification* Pappas and Swain (Ed.), pp. 163-164.
21. Here S's sole justification for believing that some one in his office does own a Ford is and should be defeated by the true statement that Mr. Nogot does not own a Ford. Why does this true statement defeat S's justification? The answer is that S's justification for believing that someone in his office owns a Ford does depend on his being completely justified in believing it to be false that Mr. Nogot does not own a Ford. A defeating statement must be one, which though true, is such that the subject is completely justified in believing it to be false.
22. K. Lehrer, "The Gettier Problem and the Analysis of Knowledge", in *Justification and Knowledge*, G. S. Pappas (Ed.), p. 66.
23. Jonathan Dancy, *An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology*. p. 38.

24. *ibid.*
25. Unger, "The Analysis of Factual Knowledge" in the *The Journal of Philosophy*, 65 (1968), pp. 157-70
26. Pappas and Swain (Ed.), *Essays on Knowledge and Justification*, Introduction, p. 20.
27. A. I. Goldman, "A Causal Theory of Knowing", in *Essays on Knowledge and Justification*, Pappas and Swain (Ed.), p. 68.
28. *ibid.*
29. Suppose that S sees that there is a wax in front of him. A necessary condition of S's seeing that there is a wax in front of him is that there be a certain kind of causal connection between the presence of the wax and S's believing that a wax is present. A certain causal - process, that which standardly takes place when we say that so and so sees such and such must occur. If that is absent, we would withhold the assertion. Suppose that although a wax is directly in front from S's view. The photograph is interposed between it blocking it from S's view. The photograph, however, is one of a wax and when it is illuminated by light waves from a laser it looks to S exactly like a real wax and S forms the belief that there is wax, for his view of the real wax is blocked so that it has no causal role in the formation of his belief.
30. M. Swain, "Knowledge, Causality and Justification" in *Essays on Knowledge and Justification*, Pappas and Swain (Ed.), p. 83.
31. Carl Ginet, "Contra Reliabilism", in *The Monist* 2, (1985), p. 179.
32. A. I. Goldman, "What is Justified Belief?" in *Justification and Knowledge*, G.S. Pappas (Ed.), p. 23.
33. K. Lehrer, *Theory of Knowledge*, p. 156.
34. *ibid.*, p. 157
35. *ibid.*, p. 162.
36. Bonjour, "Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge" in *Mid-West Studies in Philosophy* 5 (1980), p. 60.

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