

## WHAT IS IT TO BE A HUMAN SOUL?

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This essay is an exploration into the concept of soul in the light of R.C.Gandhi's<sup>1</sup> analysis of it in the framework of human communication. The concept of a human soul has been of immense interest in contemporary philosophy precisely because there has been an effort to understand the human beings in terms of the concept of soul<sup>2</sup>. Taking the clue from Wittgenstein, Gandhi has defined human beings in terms of the concept of a human soul so that, according to him, to be a human being is to be a communicative soul. Thus the concept of soul has been detheologized and made a part of the humanistic discourse of the contemporary times.

In this paper my aim is twofold: first, to expose the limitations of the concept of a communicative soul, and second, to draw a sharp boundary between the humanistic and the metaphysical conceptions of the soul. I am inclined to believe that the merely humanistic conception of the soul is in need of a metaphysical background that can provide a sharp edge to the notion of the soul.

### *The Concept of Soul and The Communicative Discourse*

The arguments provided by Gandhi for a communicative account of the concept of soul hinge on the fact that human beings are necessarily engaged in the communication effort of which to address others and to be addressed by others is a significant, nay, the constitutive, part. Communication demands the recognition of the fact that the communicator addresses the other who is either an individual or a group of individuals belonging to the same human community. Thus communication involves the act of addressing, either actual or imaginary, the result of which is the mutual sharing of information and the reciprocity of understanding. Given this communicative framework, Gandhi finds it convenient

being regarded quite simply as myself, and not merely, or at all, as a creature of a particular sort<sup>5</sup>.

This is to assert that the self need not be, perhaps must not be, presupposed to be belonging to any category of being such as the humans. The self is a more primitive category than that of the human beings. Hence the requirement that the self is the logically basic category of being that is involved in communication. It is here, however, that one encounters the notion of soul as of immense importance because of the fact that the self is just a bare particular which can be non-referentially and non-predicatively picked out. Gandhi writes:

The notion of a soul gets its foothold in our life because, in an act of addressing-in an act of establishing communicative contact with another-we have to imagine that our addressee is a unique but bare particular, we have to identify him non-referentially, non-predicatively<sup>6</sup>.

That is to say that the self involved in the address is to be just the person or soul that has no predicative existence and that it loses its predicative identity for the bare logical self-identity.

Gandhi seems to think that the self itself is the soul that requires no identity other than the logical identity of being oneself. This requirement of self-identity is unique in the sense that for this no property-identification is needed. The idea of property is kept in abeyance because the self as a soul is in need of none of them. It is an attributeless bare soul that is addressed in the act of communication. The soul is picked out just as a matter of being addressed. Here is what Gandhi says on this:

Only in an actual act of being addressed do I fully suffer the experience of being uniquely picked out, called forth, of being regarded quite simply as myself, of being thought of non-referentially, non-predicatively, etc., i.e. of being regarded as a soul<sup>7</sup>.

What is being suggested here is that the self or the soul is introduced without being predicated of properties and also without being named or referred to. Such a nameless and propertyless entity is the soul that acts as the addressee or the addresser.

### *Why is The Soul Attributeless?*

The immediate reason as to why the soul has to be attributeless is revealed in Gandhi's argument that a soul that is predicated of attributes is likely to lose its self-identity as a unique particular. The unique particular that the soul is makes it necessary that it shares no attributes with anything else, not even with another particular of the same species. The species-identity which a particular may claim to have is not the self-identity called for in communication. Gandhi is claiming two ways of approaching the notion of soul: one is the way of withholding the attributes to the soul and the second is the way of picking out the soul as a unique entity that has no comparison with anything else. These two ways are the attributeless mode of capturing the soul and of identifying it without relating it to the rest of the world. Gandhi says:

The notion of oneself, you, and him are notions that capture the attributeless mode in which we must, at any level of depth, think of ourselves and one another<sup>8</sup>.

The attributeless mode of capturing the soul is such that it imposes on us to view the soul in itself rather than under some category. There is nothing that the self or the soul can be under and so there is no way of viewing it as belonging to some higher category. The self belongs to nothing because it is the very basis of all thought. It is the ground of all thinking including all self-identifying thought. This is the reason why the soul is non-predicatively understood. Nonetheless the soul has to be thought as myself or as yourself. I am myself in all acts of thought and communication. In my first-person thought I cannot be missed because it is logically the basis of all my self-regarding thoughts. So :

In so far as I think- and in so far as thinking is imaginative communication I cannot fail to see myself as being regarded as a soul ( as myself, a unique being, and not a certain sort of creature)<sup>9</sup>.

This sort of self-thinking precludes the fact that I can be anything other than myself or the soul. I cannot, for example, be identified as a human being, an Indian and a male for the purpose of self-thinking. The latter way of predicative thinking clashes with the attributeless mode of thinking of the self.

It cannot be denied that the self or the soul must logically remain attributeless insofar as it is playing the role of the ground of all thought. Self as the logical ground remains, the limit of all thought and language. In that sense Gandhi is right in telling us that the self is bereft of all predicates and that it is the unconditioned presupposition of all thought. This line of thinking is likely to preclude the fact that the soul can be thought of as a spiritual substance in the Cartesian sense. The reason is: it cannot be identified with any substance because thereby we will be bringing in attributes through the backdoor. A spiritual substance will have the attribute of thought as its essence. This is what Gandhi is challenging while calling for an attributeless mode of thinking of the self. The idea of substance brings in all the predicative ways of describing the self thus jeopardizing the non-attributive mode of thinking.

If the soul is not taken as a Cartesian substance, it cannot be taken as a material substance either. For the same reason of course. We cannot deny attributes to the soul as a material substance. Thus the notion of the soul is apparently freed of all substantiality as the soul is more primitive and basic than a substance. The soul is thus assimilated more into a logical presupposition than into a reality that can be captured in language. Gandhi, however, has little realized that his idea of a bare particular still has the proneness towards a substance, itself being picked out, though non-predicatively. There is a lurking paradox underlying the idea that the self is a particular, without being a particular of any kind.

### ***Paradox of Self-Reference***

Now the question is: can one think of oneself as a particular soul without at the same time not committing the paradox of self-reference? That is, can one be conscious of oneself as a unique particular without being aware that there are certain attributes which the particular would necessarily have? The paradox is this: the self in thinking of itself as a soul is already referring to itself as a particular, as belonging to a certain kind and as having some properties. The kind of particular it is known from the fact that it shares certain properties such as being self-conscious, self-identical with any other soul. All souls alike share the same property of being a unique particular. Thus there is little that can save the

particularity of the soul at the cost of its universality.

It is necessary to emphasise against Gandhi that the so called attributeless mode of thinking of the self is a myth since in every act of self-thinking one is aware of the fact that one is a unique particular and that it has the attribute of not having any attribute at all. To think of the self is already to think in an attributive mode because one cannot get away from the fact that one is describing oneself as a soul, or a person who is being addressed. Since the basic frame of reference for the self is the communicative act, it cannot be denied that the self is already taken as the addressee or the addresser. Thus the fact that the self is a human being who communicates cannot be denied. The self is posited as one who is cared for and "minimally valued"<sup>10</sup>. Thus there is already a descriptive mode of thinking about the self. Gandhi's strategy to isolate the self as an attributeless particular fails for the obvious reason that there is no way we can escape predication while talking about the self.

The problem now is that Gandhi is willy-nilly drawn into the descriptive mode of talk of the self and is thus committed to the fact that the self is a soul rather than a body, or that the self is a communicative agent rather than a passive spectator. Thus there is already a descriptive view of the self and the discourse of communication has already introduced the self as a conscious communicative soul. This view of self cannot at the same time accommodate the fact that the self is a bare particular and that it does not belong to a class of creatures. If it is a bare particular, it cannot even be called a soul, let alone a communicative agent. There is thus no reason to believe that the idea of soul is metaphysically innocent such that the soul is just a bare propertyless particular. Had it been attributeless, it would have been beyond the language of descriptive predicates. In that case it would have been indescribable and ineffable to say the least. But for Gandhi, the soul is not ineffable at all. In fact it is the communicative soul engaged in the act of communicating with others.

The argument that the soul is not a substance and that it is not even an embodied self does not carry conviction because soul being a bare particular already makes room for its characterization as some thing, or some unique entity. In that case, it is a substance in the minimal sense of the term. The soul

automatically qualifies to be a spiritual substance in this sense. As to its embodiment, Gandhi cannot deny that the communicative soul is an embodied self because admittedly no communication is possible among the disembodied spirits or dead persons<sup>11</sup>. The fact that souls are communicative agents shows that they have bodies and that they are endowed with linguistic faculties. Language is at one level a physical phenomenon and so the language-using being must have a physical location. From this point of view, the soul must have the physical properties which are necessary for being a communicative agent. Thus Gandhi has to admit that the soul has not only the spiritual property of being conscious but also the physical property of having a linguistic faculty.

Gandhi's argument that the soul has nothing to do with a class of biological creatures or that it is not a creature of any kind does sound hollow because in an important sense it brings in the idea of a human being. The idea of soul as a communicative agent brings in the idea of a human being in the sense that only human beings can be communicative in the defined sense of the term. Gandhi has taken the concept of human being as a basic category in the sense that the self or soul is that of a human being and that the communication itself is a human phenomenon. Thus Gandhi's concept of a soul cannot pretend to be non-related to the human species. The soul is supposed to be a human being engaged in the act of communication. In this sense Gandhi's idea of soul is strongly anthropocentric.

### *Is The "I" Non-Referring?*

Gandhi takes it for granted that the concept of "I" is unlike a proper name and that it does not stand for a person as a proper name does. This idea is originally Wittgenstein's<sup>12</sup>. Wittgenstein is emphatic that the logic of the expression "I" is very different from that of the other expressions like "L.W.", "R.G.", etc. which are abbreviated proper names. The latter are meant for picking out a person from among other persons. They are referential in an overt sense. But not so is the "I". It does not pick out a person, nor does it name somebody. It is a reflexive pronoun indicating the fact that the speaker is referring to himself or herself. Thus the "I" has a peculiar logic or grammar of its own which suggests that the first-person singular judgements are not descriptive statements of any kind in that no soul or person is being described as having such and such

properties. Wittgenstein is well aware of the fact that the "I" like the "self" does not stand for any entity<sup>13</sup>, let alone a spiritual entity. The idea that the "I" stands for peculiar spiritual entity is grammatically misleading in the sense that the "I" is not a naming expression at all.

But the fact that the "I" is not a naming expression does not deny the fact that it has an obvious connection with the speaker, that is, that it has a logical role to play in referring to the speaker in the first-person. It is no doubt true that it does not pick out a person for that matter from among other persons. But it does not mean that it has no identificatory role at all. The I is the self that speaks, thinks and communicates. In that sense it is true to say that the word "I" is not an empty term: it speaks of the self that speaks. Wittgenstein is anxious to avoid the Cartesian implication that the "I" stands for the soul or the spiritual entity standing alongside the body. He is interested in the grammar of the reflexive pronouns such as "I", "you", "me", etc., since he believes that these expressions have often misled the philosophers. The correct grammar of such expressions does suggest that there is no reason to believe that any spiritual entity is the referent of these expressions.

Wittgenstein, however, takes the self as the logical limit of all thought and use of language. The idea of the self as the limit is carried forward from *Tractatus* where it is asserted that the self does not belong to the world and that it is the limit of the world<sup>14</sup>. This idea of the self as the limit implies that the self is not a thing, that is, not even a human being: it does not stand for a biological entity, nor does it stand for a spiritual entity either. In a sense it is the transcendental presupposition of our thought and language. In that way the self keeps away from the world. For that reason, the *Tractatus* called it the metaphysical subject<sup>15</sup> without calling it a Cartesian soul. Wittgenstein in a similar vein characterizes the self as a transcendental limit of the world in the following passage in the *Philosophical Investigations*:

Think of a picture of a landscape, an imaginary landscape with a house in it. -Someone asks " Whose house is it?" - The answer, by the way, might be "It belongs to the farmer who is sitting on the bench in front of it". But then he cannot for example enter his house (section 398).

Here the analogy of the farmer who cannot enter his house is apt. It suggests that the house has an owner who is not part of the house. The self likewise does not belong to the world, though the world presupposes the self as its metaphysical owner. That is to say, the self is the limit of the world in the sense that it stands as its metaphysical-transcendental- presupposition.

Now the question is: How does the self as the limit help solve the problem of the identity of the owner ? This limit self has no other identity than the fact that it is a bare presupposition and that it is a bare metaphysical presence. This idea of self has found favour with Wittgenstein because of the fact he denies that we can ever speak of the self as such. We have to remain silent about the very presupposition of our thought and language. That is why he is conscious of the fact that there is no language that can express what language itself logically presupposes. So there is no talk of self-identity or the identity of the self as the owner of the world. All such talk is metaphysically idle.

In view of this it looks metaphysically suspicious that Gandhi should call the self a soul which is a bare particular. Gandhi has reversed completely the Wittgensteinian concept of self by bringing it back into the world though as a unique particular entity. Whereas Wittgenstein makes the self a transcendental presupposition, Gandhi has made it an embodied soul in the world engaged in communion. This not only denies the transcendental nature of the self but also makes it vulnerable to the vagaries of the anthropological pinning down of it in the world. Gandhi's at best is the anthropological soul that self-consciously make communicative gestures to the other souls in the world.

Gandhi's concept of "I" is not really non-referring because it in fact refers to the soul that has no specific first-order predicates. It is neither material nor immaterial. Yet it has second-order predicates such as being self-conscious and self-identical. Therefore it is a full-fledged referring term in the second-order language and as such has the metaphysical character of being represented in language. Because of this the soul in this sense cannot be free of predication at all. Only a transcendental self could be free of predication as conceived by Wittgenstein, for example.



### *The Limits of Anthropocentrism*

Gandhi's concept of soul suffers from the fact that it is anthropocentric and so is bogged down in the limitations of the humanistic conception of the soul. For Gandhi, the soul is a communicative agent and therefore is available only in a communicative framework. Thus there is no way we can transcend the limits of the communicative framework. Gandhi, true to his basic framework, suggests that the soul be conceived as the addressee in communication. Neither God nor the non-human species could claim to have the human soul.

But this itself is an admission of the fact that the human soul is a limited being and that it is bound to the spatio-temporal world like any other entity. It becomes at best like the Strawsonian persons<sup>16</sup> who are capable of thought and language. Like these persons they share a common world and a common language and thus are engaged in interpersonal communication. But that does not absolve them of the limitation of being in the world. These persons or the souls are necessarily human in the sense that they are bound to live in the human space and are thus imprisoned in the communicative network. There is a face-to-face encounter of the souls so far as they are in the space-time world and are constrained by the fact that they speak a language for the purpose of communicating with one another. In this sense the idea of a communicative soul is necessarily limited.

Let us see now why such a view of self can never be the one philosophers can aim at. Philosophy cannot be satisfied with the fact that the self is a human being or that it is at best the mental being in the sense psychology talks about it. The "I" of the psychologist does not fulfil the demands of logic because it at best refers to the mind's "I"<sup>17</sup> that is nothing but a mental construction. The self as the mind's "I" reminds us of the Cartesian invisible soul or such like entity. But this itself does not fulfil the philosophical demand because it only presents a partial view of the self. The self as such need not be identified with a substance of any kind, since it is presupposed by any such characterization. Thus the notion of self has to be transcendental in the sense of being taken as a logical presupposition of the world.

There are two ways in which the anthropocentric view of self fails. First

of all, it does not recognize the fact that the self is not a human soul since the human soul still needs the self as its presupposition. The human soul must belong to the self which is its transcendental presupposition. Secondly, the human soul is necessarily embodied and has the capacity for communication. If it is a necessary fact that it is embodied, it cannot escape the fact that it is one of the entities in the world on a par with other material bodies. Therefore it cannot escape the fate of being contingent in the world. Thus the self as the human soul is a self-negation of the idea of self itself as it does not capture the transcendental use of the idea.

Gandhi's notion of soul thus falls short of the transcendental account of the self as it brings in contingent features of the human soul into the picture. The human soul as the communicative agent is only a contingent phenomenon and so there is no way it can stand for what the notion of self stands for.

### ***Possibility of Self-Knowledge***

The idea of self-knowledge which is itself a difficult but intelligible concept makes it obligatory on us to provide for the ways of knowing oneself since it is undisputed that we have knowledge of ourselves. It will be illogical to deny that we know ourselves, that is, that we are aware that we have such and such mental states. At no stage of our mental life we are denied of access to ourselves which has no connection with what we do and think otherwise. Some philosophers following Descartes believe that there could be a special intuitive access to the self, that is, a privileged access<sup>18</sup> to the self.

Gandhi has rejected the idea of knowing the self in a privileged way: he in fact rejects the very idea that the self can be observed or intuited in a peculiar way. The philosophers who hold the view that the self could be observed believe that the self is an entity that can be seen in a mysterious way, that is, could be revealed in introspection. This observational view of self is the result of the confusion created by our ordinary language which takes the self as some sort of an object to be known. To know the self is not to know a special mysterious entity. Gandhi writes;

It is a profound illusion that in thinking one literally talks to oneself,

addresses oneself. And it is illusion which is responsible for the further illusion that in self-consciousness one finds oneself regarding oneself as a soul. But I cannot address myself. In order to do so I would have to invite myself to invite myself to...invite myself to attend to myself. And all this is impossible and absurd<sup>19</sup>.

The illusion persists because it is believed that the self is given directly in self-consciousness. The self is supposed to be an object: the soul is that object which is intimately given to me. If this way of talking to the self and addressing it is permitted, then there must be a privileged way of knowing oneself. But the fact remains that the self is not given in self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is not a process of revealing the self in a mysterious way.

It is now well known that there is no special epistemological problem regarding self knowledge<sup>20</sup> because there is little that one gains in knowing the self as a matter of information. There is no information that we do not have ourselves, so there is nothing to discover about the self. All that remains is the higher order sense of understanding the self as one logically self-identical and self-conscious. But this is only a logical way of understanding the self as the limit of our thought. So in self-knowledge there is no way of knowing the self as so-and-so and such-and-such<sup>21</sup>. The self is the logical and, in a sense the metaphysical, reality which cannot be described in any form.

It is this idea that lies at the heart of the new move to make the self the logical desideratum of self-knowledge. Gandhi advocates the view that there is no ontological fact involved in the exercise of self-knowledge. The reason is that if the self is ontologically situated, then there will be the possibility of knowing the self as such-and-such, thus predicatively and descriptively. This seems impossible because it will lead to infinite regress as each description of the self will presuppose another description and so on. But, as already shown, Gandhi has made an ontological move towards locating the self as the human soul. The human soul is a metaphysical entity and thus is amenable to description. Thus Gandhi has made the logical defence of self doubly deceptive, first, by concealing the fact that there is a metaphysical reality underlying it as the soul and secondly, by concealing the fact that a description of the soul is possible.

It is no doubt true that the soul is not the right ontological equivalent of the self and that the grammatical identification of the self and the 'I' does not entail that the self has to be a communicative human being. Both these steps taken by Gandhi are retrograde: first, because the soul is not the entity that the self wants to become; secondly, because the self is not logically a communicative agent. The self is an ontological or metaphysical reality not by taking refuse in the concept of the soul. Self is autonomous in the sense that no particular identification of it is adequate or even necessary. It is the transcendental reality for that matter. Besides, under no circumstances, can self be a human soul which can be in effective communication with others. The self is ontologically more primitive than the human soul.

***The Audience Stance Vs. The Advaitic Stance***

There is an underlying audience stance that constrains Gandhi's notion of self so much so that there is no escape from it for a wider view of the self. Gandhi hints at the audience stance in the following passage:

In thinking the thought 'I' I perform an act of imaginatively adopting an audience-stance.. When I am addressed by somebody, a speaker, I am uniquely picked out, I am non-referentially identified, I am called forth<sup>22</sup>.

This way of the self being taken as the addressee makes the audience stance clear in the sense that in every act of self-consciousness I am the audience of somebody's calling and so I am the object of somebody's address. This makes me a special category of being and allows me the privilege of being the soul that responds to that calling.

But the audience stance chains the self to the moorings of the human world and thereby makes it historical and anthropological in character. This stance puts the self right in the midst of history in the sense that it is the temporal self that merges itself with the human soul. The human soul has a history of its own and it treads the path of time in its evolutionary trajectory. This is the fate of the soul as a phenomenal being in time. It becomes the temporally isolated soul that establishes communication with the rest of the souls in similar temporal isolation. Thus there is a communication space of the temporally isolated souls in the world.

The soul in such temporal isolation loses its cosmic stance and becomes the focus of a local world of communication. It becomes the centre of the linguistic world of other-communicating beings. But the soul loses its cosmic significance in the sense that it has no knowledge of its sharing the same nature with the other souls. Its cosmic significance is realized when there is the Advaitic understanding of the oneness of all souls. The Advaita tradition does emphasize the fact that the self is the cosmic, ahistorical reality that accounts for the diversity of the temporal human souls<sup>23</sup>. The temporal souls are the limited souls engaged in time and language. They are the local centres of communicative collectivity but are thereby limited in their non-local significance. It is the non-local significance that matters for a transcendental view of self.

Wittgenstein did realize the importance of the cosmic significance of the self by detaching it from the world, including the historical communicative world. The latter is a burden for the unencumbered self that posits itself ahistorically outside time and history. The self is metaphysically unencumbered by the world according to Wittgenstein. He says:

What has history to do with me? Mine is the first and only world  
(*NB*,p.82).

That is to say, the I has no history of its own; it has no temporal location and so there is no specific relation with the world. For it there is only world and that is "my world", Wittgenstein adds:

It is true: Man is the microcosm.  
I am my world (*NB*,p.84).

Thus there is the realization that the world ultimately is 'my world' which is non-different from 'me'. This seems to be the culminating Advaitic realization that there is nothing other than the cosmic self. The world itself as the not-self is non-different from the self. In that sense the historical and the communicative world ceases to be real. There is the cosmic reality of the self that manifests itself in its purity as the non-dual reality.

The Advaitic stance opposes the anthropomorphic tendency of the audience stance proposed by Gandhi. The latter keeps the soul tied down to the

limited space of interpersonal communication and the resulting minimization of the cosmic significance of the soul. The human soul is the human being as engaged in communication. Therefore there is no more value to the soul except that accorded to it in the communicative space. It is because of this that the soul loses its autonomy and thus loses itself in the crowd of multiple communicative agents. The soul is lost in the cacophony of communicative noise from which it has no escape.

The Advaitic standpoint, on the contrary, liberates the self from the serfdom to the contingent chain of communication and makes it stand as the autonomous background of all communication. Self as the cosmic background of thought and language is the limit of communication rather than a participant in it. The self is the witness (*sākṣin*) of the interpersonal communication and not the communicative agent. Thus the self as the cosmic reality is distinguished from the human souls which are contingent beings located in the human world. The Advaitic stance thus cuts at the root of the historical and the communicative being of the human soul. It rejects the very duality of the self and the world and also of the self and the other. It allows communication to disappear into silence. Language ceases to be operative at the level of the cosmic self, not because language is inessential, but because the self needs no communication with the non-existent other.

The "I" of the Advaitic stance is the ahistorical other-negative self that sweeps away the reality of time and of the historical other. It brings down the entire reality to itself and thus cancels the supremacy of the other. The world lapses into the self leaving behind the other. Thus the idea of the world embedded in the communicative language becomes a non-reality in the Advaitic standpoint. Thus we have a transcendental perspective which makes a short shrift of the communicative notion of the human soul.

### ***Concluding Remarks***

The notion of self as the human soul does not survive the scrutiny of logic because it makes the self an illusion by keeping it in the realm of the contingent world. Gandhi's attempt to locate it in the human world of communication fails to take account of the fact that the human soul excludes the

souls of animals and other species and denies the cosmic metaphysical significance of the self. The self is reduced to a particular spatio-temporal being called the human soul.

Gandhi's notion of soul as examined above falls short of the transcendental dimension which has been part of the notion of the self both in the Western and Indian traditions. It has been limited to the local region of interpersonal communication in its bid to realize the importance of the human being. The cosmic notion of self is a far cry from what is presented under the category of the human soul<sup>24</sup>.

#### NOTES

1. R.C. Gandhi, *The Availability of Religious Ideas* ( Macmillan, Delhi 1976), Chapter 2. ( To be abbreviated hereafter as ARI).
2. See Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1953), Part II, iv.
3. *ARI*, p. 28.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 28-29.
5. *Ibid.*, p.29.
6. *Ibid.*,pp.29-30.
7. *Ibid.*, p.29.
8. *Ibid.*, p.32.
9. *Ibid.*, pp.32-33.
10. *Ibid.*,p.37.
11. *Cf.Ibid.*,pp.38-41.
12. Cf, Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, sections, 404,410.
13. *Ibid.*, section,410.

14. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. D.F.Pears and B.F. McGuinness (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1961), 5.632.
15. *Ibid.*, 5.633.
16. See P.F.Strawson, *Individuals* (Methuen, London, 1959) Chapter III. See also A.Quinton, "The Soul", *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol.59. No.15 (1962), pp.393-400.
17. See Owen Flanagan, *Consciousness Reconsidered* (MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1992), Chapters 9 and 10.
18. See Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (Penguin Books, 1963; originally published by Hutchinson, 1949).
19. *ARI*, p.33.
20. Cf. Akeel Bilgrami, "Self-Knowledge and Resentment" in *The Philosophy of P.F.Strawson*, ed. P.K.Sen and R.R.Verma (ICPR, New Delhi, 1995), pp.213-233.
21. *ARI*, p.23.
22. *Ibid.*, p.25.
23. See Kathopanishad, II, 20-25. See also Sri, Aurobindo, *The Life Divine*, Book One (Sri Aurobindo Ashram, Pondicherry, 1973), Chapter XVII, pp. 150-58.
24. This paper was presented and discussed in an ICPR Seminar entitled "Addressing the Soul" held at Bangalore in December, 1998. I am thankful to all those who participated in the discussion.



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