

PHILOSOPHY - THEORY OR THERAPY?

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When most people ought to engage in philosophical investigation they act like someone who is looking for an object in a drawer very seriously. He throws papers out of the drawer - what he is looking for may be among them - leafs through the others hastily and sloppily. Throws some back into the drawer, mixes them up with the others, and so on. Then one can only tell him: Stop, If you look in that way, I can't help you look. First you have to start to examine one thing after another methodically, and in peace and quiet; then I am willing to look with you and to direct myself with you as model in the method.

Ludwig Wittgenstein, "Philosophy "

Since the time Wittgenstein's remark in *PI* 255, namely, " The Philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness " has been noticed, many have concluded that Wittgenstein conceived of Philosophy as a therapy. They support their hypothesis by showing that Wittgenstein uses such expressions as "Philosophical disease" (*PI* 593), and by quoting *PI* 133 which says: "There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods like different therapies." Can philosophy be a therapy ? ; or is to be categorised as a discipline which deals with practical problems of life and offers their solutions ? Or else is philosophy to be treated as a pure and simply theoretical discipline whose primary function is to deal with the abstract and abstruse problems which have no practical

ramifications either for the life of an individual or for the 'lived life' of the society? The logical prerequisite for answering these question is dependent upon a final or settled meaning of the term 'philosophy'. Even for Wittgenstein the term 'philosophy' did not have a wholly unproblematic sense. Time and again he returns to the question of the relationship between what he was doing and what has traditionally been called 'Philosophy'. To begin with I shall attempt an answer to the questions. What is Philosophy, or better still, what does one mean by philosophical activity?

Though philosophy is regarded as the prerogative of man which distinguishes him from other animals, and inspite of the fact what philosophy is a universally recognised academic discipline almost as old as human race, whose sources are considered by some¹ to be "pre-verbal and often pre-cultural" there is no agreement on its nature. The *first* difficulty in attempting a definition of philosophy is that the word 'philosophy' is used in a variety of senses. Some use it simply to connote their views on or about anything, as well as for collecting, or rather ostentatiously parading them. In this usage of 'Philosophy' we are all in a sense philosophers whether we know it or not, because "there is none so poor as not to have a philosophy of his own; as well as there is none so rich as to be able to do without one".² Some use it in the sense in which there can be philosophies, for example, philosophy of life, philosophy of a class, philosophy of stamp-collecting, philosophy of education etc. In a nutshell in this usage of the word 'philosophy' it is used with any activity ranging from the most flippant to the most serious. This usage presupposes that philosophy is fed by a meta-interest, that is, it comes after something has been asserted, believed and studied. According to Wittgenstein "one might also give the name 'philosophy' to what is possible *before* all new discoveries and inventions". (*PI* 126) He upholds the view: "Philosophy is not laid down in sentences but in a language"³ implying thereby that philosophy is a form of life because language represents a form of life. The term 'philosophy' is also used by some to denote the highly demanding business of rendering the contents of a subject into highly complex and difficult concepts rather than into vernacular language of every day life. In contrast to these work-

a-day usages, the term philosophy is also used in a technical sense. In its technical sense it refers to the preachings, teachings and ideas contained in the writings of Plato, Aristotle, St. Aquinas, Descartes, Hume, Russell, Wittgenstein *et al*, as well as the academic traditions which we describe as Idealism, Realism, Materialism, Scholasticism, Logical Positivism, Analysis etc. In this sense philosophical interest is extraordinary and out of the way. It connotes the body of conceptualised, coherent and articulated thoughts.

The *second* difficulty in defining 'philosophy' is that with the passage of time it has undergone a radical change in its scope. There has been a progressive narrowing of its tether. Astronomy, Physics, Zoology, etc. which in the Greek notion of 'philosophy' were subjects belonging to it, are no longer considered to be branches of philosophy. As a result the usage of the label 'philosophy' has narrowed down over a period of time. The Greeks when they used the term philosophy for the love of wisdom, by their usage of this notion, meant knowledge - knowledge of all matters ranging from the most abstruse to the most practical. In their sense, therefore, all branches of study were within the scope of philosophy. In the Seventeenth century the word 'new philosophy' was coined and it referred to the works of Galileo and Newton. All scientific researchers were called philosophers. It is because of this usage of the term philosophy that the official titles of some of the chairs of physics in some of the universities, especially the older universities, are still titled 'Professor of Natural or Experimental Philosophy'. Likewise it was only till very recently that the Departments of Psychology did not have separate and independent existence. Hitherto psychologists were brigaded into Departments of Philosophy.

Though Popper calls specialization a moral sin, yet specialization is inevitable. The moment a subject of study reaches a certain level of specialization it calls itself an autonomous scientific discipline and claims that it either has no relation to philosophy, or that at the most this relationship is tangential. In general one can say that the moment the scope of a branch of knowledge becomes definitely settled or settelable it goes outside the

domain of philosophy. Sartre puts it somewhat elliptically when he says "no science can take philosophy's place because science applies to some already delimited subject matter, philosophy is a process of 'totalization'".⁴ And Russell puts it thus: "... the only difference between science and philosophy is that science is what you more or less know, and philosophy is what you do not know. Philosophy is that part of science which at present people choose to have opinions about, but which they have no knowledge about. Therefore, every advance in knowledge robs philosophy of some problems which formerly it had."⁵ According to him the moment a problem becomes soluble it "ceases to belong to philosophy and starts belonging to science and becomes to a large class of philosophical minds uninteresting."⁶ He re-emphasises this distinction when he says: "those questions which are already capable of definite answers are placed in science, while those only to which at present, no definite answers can be given, remain, and form the residue which is called philosophy."⁷

The *third* difficulty in defining philosophy is that "there are many ways of philosophising, and philosophers may differ regarding what they consider to be the best way. But if "any kind of religious, mystical, practical, psychological, political, or social 'talk' is considered philosophy, philosophy becomes amorphous, soft and loose. On the other hand if logic (mathematical, philosophical, deontic, multivalued and modal), or analysis (whether it be of 'systematically misleading expressions', 'referring', 'three ways of spilling ink', 'making something happen' etc.) or of the structure of Dasein as 'already-being-in-the-world-in-advance-of-itself, or Being-concerned-with-being-in-the-world, or the discussions of 'the-for-itself' or the pure nihilation of the 'in-itself') is considered the only right prototype of philosophy, philosophy becomes restricted, technical, hard and rigorous".⁸ But 'philosophy' is not always used in this technical, restricted, hard and rigorous sense. For example, "to me", says Sartre "philosophy is everything. It is the way one lives. One lives as a philosopher. I live as a philosopher, that does not mean that I live as a good philosopher, but that my perceptions are philosophical perceptions, even when I look at that lamp, or when I look at you. Consequently, it is a way of living and I think it

should be taught as soon as possible in simple language".⁹ According to him philosophy is not something which is "to be written by itself, for its own sake", but is something which fulfills the need for the interaction of the philosopher's experience, more specifically what he calls "my inner experience".¹⁰ Wittgenstein who in *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus* upheld that the task of philosophy was 'the logical clarification of thoughts', surprisingly also has a similar conception of philosophy when he says: "working in philosophy- like working in architecture in many respects - is really more a working on oneself. On one's interpretations. On one's way of seeing things. (And what one expects of them)" (CV p.16) In short one can say it is a reflection of one's own form of life. Mohanty means the same when he says: "Philosophy consists of reflection on man's experience in relation to himself, to others and the world."¹¹

Reflecting upon the activity of doing philosophy Wittgenstein says: "When you are philosophising you have to descend into primeval chaos and feel at home there" (CV, p.65), and regards the activity of philosophising to consist in: "rejecting false arguments", whose aim is to free people from the philosophical confusions in which they are deeply embedded. And to free them from these presupposes pulling them out of the immensely manifold connections they are caught up in."¹² It does so by erecting "a wall at the point where language stops anyway."¹³ Because in his view though "philosophical problems are not empirical problems" (PI 109), yet they "can be compared to locks on safe, which can be opened by dialling a certain word or number, so that no force can open the door until just this word has been hit upon, and once it is hit upon any child can open it."¹⁴ So that philosophy in his opinion "is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language." (PI 109)

Whereas Karl Jaspers regards philosophising to be "the act which makes an individual a total human being", Heidegger considers "astonished, meditative preoccupation with the problem of existence perceived in its magnitude: its possible impossibility" to be the best way of philosophising. Schopenhauer too upheld the view that philosophising begins "as an interruption, a hold up which puts all in question". He regards philoso-

phising to be the "supreme spontaniety and normality". Karl Jaspers too traces the origins of philosophising to "the experience of insufficiency in communication," and according to Murty "philosophising is taking into account the totality of experience and survey it as a whole so that thought may not be initiated by abstraction and partial over-emphasis and hence lack of balance".¹⁵ Kalidas Bhattacharya regards philosophising to be a 'creative thought' and considers it to be "a serious struggle with the problem of life and existence, as distinct from formalistic classification".¹⁶ These diverse and conflicting ways of philosophising add to the difficulty in giving a precise definition of philosophy.

The *fourth* and the most crucial difficulty in attempting a definition of philosophy is that one's definition of philosophy has its foundations in his philosophical position. Or one may say that in giving a definition of philosophy one *ipsofacto* takes a philosophical position. But the philosophical position one takes and the philosophical ideas one upholds "are actually sensitive to individual temperament, and to wishes. Where the evidence and the arguments are too meagre to determine the results, the slack tends to be taken up by other factors. The personal flavour and motivation of each great philosopher's version of reality is unmistakable, and the same is true of many lesser efforts."¹⁷ Moreover, as Gerald Edelman says: "There is no partial philosophy; it is complete with each philosopher. Like a child exploding into a grasp of language, the philosopher must not simply describe an environment but construct a whole world. Each time a philosophical construction is attempted, there is a world view behind it, and a personal one at that." Each of these philosophical constructions is entitled an 'ism'. Each of these 'isms' is "likely to spell the rejection of the last, as each philosopher constructs a unique point of view. Philosophy is a graveyard of 'isms' ".¹⁸ That is why no philosophical position has been accepted as final and absolutely correct position. As Waismann put it: "No philosophical argument ends with a Q.E.D. However forceful, it never forces. There is no bullying in philosophy neither with the stick of logic nor with the stick of language."¹⁹ Nor can testimony - whether verbal or scriptural, or authority - whether of '*sruti or*

smrti or that of an *apta-purusa* be regarded as the criteria for settling philosophical disputes once and for all, or for drawing conclusion. So there is no definite way of arriving at final conclusions in philosophy. Or as Kant said, philosophy "is a battle-field of endless controversies". Since no philosophical position can be said to be final, no definition of philosophy can be final and absolute. The difficulty is compounded by the fact that "Philosophy cannot take refuge in reduced ambitions. It is after eternal and non-local truth, even though we know that is not what we are going to get."²⁰

The *fifth* difficulty in defining 'philosophy' stems from the fact that there is no agreement among philosophers about its placement among the other branches of knowledge. Whereas Wittgstein upholds that "Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences. (The word 'philosophy' must mean something whose place is above or below the natural sciences, not beside them.) (TLP 4.111), Russell in *The Problems of Philosophy* maintains that "Philosophical knowledge ... does not differ essentially from scientific knowledge; there is no special source of wisdom which is open to philosophy but not to science, and the results obtained by philosophy are not radically different from those obtained by science."

But from the above it does not follow that the term philosophy can be used in any manner one likes. One cannot mean by it anything and everything. One cannot say like Humpty Dumpty said to Alice "When I use a word it means just what I choose it to mean". Nor does the controversy about the use of the term 'philosophy; imply that we have had enough of it and cannot make any progress in the matter, i.e., the conclusion which Humpty Dumpty reached when Alice asked him to explain his meaning. Humpty Dumpty had replied "Now you talk like a reasonable child I meant ... that we have had enough of the subject, and it would be just as well if you'd mention what you mean to do next, as I suppose you don't mean to stop here all the rest of your life."

Following Humpty Dumpty's advice and keeping in mind the fact that 'philosophy; in its history has never been given a meaning precise

enough for it to be used unequivocally a meaning on which most people living at a given time would agree, and also using Wittgenstein's maxim that meaning of a word lies in its use and the dictum that instead of drawing clear-cut, razor sharp boundaries around a concept, we shall look for family resemblances that a word has in its variety of usages, as our heuristic principle, let us make a survey of how the term philosophy has been used. Based on this survey we may arrive at a broad definition of the term philosophy.

To begin with let us differentiate between philosophy and ideology. The distinction between the two has been best put by Sartre in the following words:

Ideology is not constituted, mediated and reflected philosophy. It is an *ensemble* of ideas which underlies alienated acts and reflects them, which is never completely expressed and articulated, but which appears in the ideas of a given historical time or society. Ideologies represent powers and are active. Philosophies are formed in opposition to ideologies, although they reflect them to a certain extent while at the same time criticising them and going beyond them.²¹

After this clear distinction between ideology and philosophy let us first see what a philosopher actually does. In the words of Murty "A philosopher may surely discuss, dissect and evaluate all ideas, poetical, scientific, religious, legal, political, social and educational; for among other things, philosophy is the critique of ideologies and also the rational examination and evaluation of the foundations of belief and faith".²² Based on the type of activities a philosopher engages himself in we have two types of philosophies. One: Speculative philosophy. Two: Critical philosophy. Speculative philosophy is described by A.N.Whitehead as "the endeavour to form a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which any element of our experience can be interpreted".²³ Critical philosophy, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with the meanings of concepts and evaluation of beliefs. It aims at conceptual clarification. It takes its prime business to be the investigation of thought in the shape of

an analysis of it in its linguistically explicit form. The analysis is carried out on the principles of deduction and inference specified by formal logic.

Irrespective of whether we talk about speculative or critical philosophy one thing is clear and that is: an activity can be called "philosophy" if and only if it has something to do with knowledge, if it is in some sense a theory of knowledge or a method of getting knowledge or at least hints in the direction in which some supremely important kind of knowledge might be found.²⁴ According to Rorty "Philosophy ... understands the foundations of knowledge and it finds these foundations in a study of man-as-knower of the "mental processes" or the "activity of representation".²⁵ Philosophical questions are certainly not of the kind which Wittgenstein holds them to be when he says:

"Philosophers often behave like little children who scribble some marks on a piece of paper at random and then ask the grown ups "what is that?" - It happened like this: the grown ups had drawn pictures for the child several times and said: "this is a man", "this is a house", etc. And the child makes some marks too and asks: "what is this then"? (CV p.17)

This could be nothing but a parody of philosophical questions, for philosophical questions are not childish but foundational to all knowledge, and to the life of man. They are the most serious and fundamental of all the questions that can be asked. Philosophical problems have their origin in "an awareness of disorder in our concepts" and "always" are of the form: "I simply don't know my way about". (PI 123) Philosophical problems "have the character of depth. They are deep disquietudes; their roots are as deep as the form of our language and their significance is as great as the importance of language." (PI 111). Hence philosophical questions are "foundational in respect to the rest of the culture because culture is the assemblage of claims of knowledge, and philosophy adjudicates such claims..."²⁶

Philosophical questions being fundamental, arise out of assumptions, practices, speculations and discussions which are not themselves philosophi-

cal. But in order to be philosophical the questions arising have got to be about basic meanings, about logical presuppositions, implications and incompatibilities. It is because of the fundamental nature of these questions that philosophy distinguishes itself from science which is an interpretation of observable data; distinguish itself from theology which claims to possess certain facts which by their very nature are never directly verifiable, and differ from poetry and rhetoric which express a certain attitude and whose main purpose is to evoke emotions in other persons. Philosophy "has no proper subject matter of its own. Instead it scrutinizes other areas of knowledge for clarity and consistency."²⁷ The questions which philosophy asks and the answers that it gives are reducible to simple propositions which are capable of being true or false. By their very nature they can be either contradicted or accepted as such. Arguments may be advanced in favour or against them.

A student of philosophy "refuses to be satisfied by the conventional presupposition that every sensible person knows the answer. As soon as you rest satisfied with primitive ideas and with primitive propositions, you have ceased to be a philosopher."²⁸ So philosophy develops an attitude of mind not to accept anything which is given in one's experience on its face value without thorough examination. It also develops a habit of the mind not to accept any answer as the final answer. Infact, while doing philosophy one develops a faculty which starts comparing the solution offered by anyone to a philosophical problem "with a gift in a fairy tale: in the magic castle it appears enchanted and if you look it outside in daylight, it is nothing but an ordinary bit of iron (or something of the kind)" (CV, p.11). That is why there is no answer in philosophy which is left unquestioned. It is because philosophical problems have no final solutions as these solutions, if at all one may call them solutions, are by their very nature interlinked and reflect the 'lived life'. That is why Wittgenstein concludes "If there were a 'solution' of philosophical problems then we would only have to call to mind that at one time they had not been solved (and then too one had to be able to live and think)."²⁹ We do feel dissatisfied with the old solutions and old models of explanation but we do not change them, we

only sublimate them. From this Russell concluded in *Our Knowledge of the External World*: "Philosophy from the earliest times, has made greater claims, and achieved fewer results than any other branch of learning."³⁰ This conclusion has led many to say that there has been no progress in philosophy since the time of Plato. To this Wittgenstein has given a befitting reply. He puts it thus:

"Philosophy hasn't made any progress? - If somebody scratches the spot where he has an itch, do we have to see some progress? Isn't it genuine scratching otherwise, or genuine itch? And can't these reactions to an irritation continue in the same way for a long time before a cure for itching is discovered? (CV, 86-87)

Whereas Russell traced the reasons for this stagnation in Philosophy to the method adopted by it. He claims in *Mysticism and Logic*³¹ that if philosophy is to advance as science does, it needs to be more closely connected with science, not so much in results but in methods. According to Wittgenstein the reason for philosophy's not making a progress is to be found in the nature of language itself. He says:

"People say again and again that philosophy doesn't really progress, that we are still occupied with the same philosophical problem as were the Greeks. But the people who say this don't understand why it has to be so. It is because our language has remained the same and keeps seducing us into asking the same questions". (CV, p.15)

A philosopher, thus, keeps answering the same questions in the light of his experiences, *his* life situations, and in the idiom relevant to *his* times. He continues to analyse and evaluate the beliefs which are ordinarily assumed to be true and keeps pressing persistently beyond ordinary thought in order to synthesize all knowledge acquired over the years of human history into one consistent picture of the universe. Philosophy, therefore, is a continuing activity and the philosopher continues to provide contemporary answers to the perennial questions faced by human mind. He places the problem in *his* contemporary situation and builds a theory or a system consisting of a group of concepts organised to form a consist-

ent whole. While doing so he is free to relate to, or refer to any other philosophy irrespective of the time or place of the latter. He aims at a theory "which gives unity and system to the body of the sciences and the kind which results from a critical examination of the grounds of our convictions, prejudices and beliefs."³² He primarily builds a theory of representation or reality. These theories may be classified into (i) those which represent reality well, (ii) those which represent it less well and (iii) those which despite their pretence to represent reality do not represent it at all. If philosophising results in a theory of the first kind, it exemplifies a good philosophy and becomes at least for the time being universally acceptable; if it results in a theory of the second type it illustrates a kind of philosophy which needs more polishing in order to become universally acceptable; and if it results in a theory of the third type then it is universally rejected. So, as Quine put it: "Philosophy ... as an effort to get clearer on things, is not to be distinguished in essential points of purpose and method from good and bad sciences."³³ And he considers the "tolerance of wrong headed philosophy (to be) as unreasonable as tolerance of astrology would be on the part of astrophysicists and as unethical as tolerance of uniterianism on the part of the hell-fire fundamentalist."³⁴

However in philosophical thinking one thing is certain and that is, philosophising has to proceed on the basis of experience and rigorous consistent thinking with full freedom to appreciate ideas acceptable to the thinker irrespective of their origin. As a result any philosophical theory is an outcome of rational thinking and though it transcends the barriers of space and time yet it "comprehends *local* differences, it lives in and through such differences."³⁵ That is why there cannot be a universal philosophy, a philosophy for all time to come. It is because "Even those who regard philosophy as real and important know that they are at a particular and, we may hope, early stage of its development, limited by their own primitive intellectual capacities, and relying on the partial insights of a few great figures from the past. As we judge their results to be mistaken in fundamental ways, so we must assume that even the best efforts of our own time will come to seem blind eventually."³⁶ Sartre who said "I consider Marx-

ism, the one philosophy of our time which we cannot go beyond..."³⁷ has been proven to be wrong by the post-Marx and post-Marxian developments in social theory as well as praxis.

Through the enterprise of theory-building a philosopher clears the cob-webs of understanding, throws out from the cupboard those skeletons which have got rotten over a period of time and which confine a man to the narrow limits of common sense and traditional beliefs. He does not show preference for any particular ideas, nor does he dislike any ideas. As Wittgenstein puts (*Zettle* 435) "The philosopher is not a citizen of any community of ideas. That is what makes him into a philosopher." But this does not mean that engagement in philosophical activity leads one to renunciation. On the contrary it "requires a resignation, but one of feeling and not of intellect. And may be that is what makes it so difficult for many."³⁸ The activity of philosophy thus makes an individual less selfish and less dogmatic, makes him more rational, open-minded and objective. Thereby it contributes to the society by resolving its problem in an objective, scientific way. "The use of philosophy" says A.N. Whitehead "is to maintain an active novelty of fundamental ideas illuminating the social system. It reverses the slow descent of accepted thoughts towards the inactive common place".³⁹ And according to Wittgenstein "Philosophical clarity will have the same effect on the growth of (any subject) as the sunlight has on the growth of potato shoots. (In the dark cellar they grow yards longer)" (*PG.* 381). According to Hilary Putnam the function of philosophical reflection is not to make flashing claims to "deconstruct" truth itself or the world itself, but its true role is to "unsettle our prejudices and our pet convictions and our blind spots."⁴⁰ While Wittgenstein upholds that all that philosophical reflection "can do is to destroy idols. And that means not creating a new one for instance as an 'absence of an idol'."⁴¹ It does so by in 'no way' interfering with the actual world, but by merely describing it. It "simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything... since everything lies open to view, there is nothing to explain either. For what might not lie open to view is of no interest to us".⁴² By philosophical reflection 'problems are solved (difficulties elimi-

nated) not a *single* problem." (*PI* 133)

A philosophy which is purely theoretical, and does not solve any problem, or has absolutely no practical implication either for our intellectual life, or for our wordly life can at best be called reductive and niggling. This kind of philosophy perishes sooner than one can imagine and has no takers, but only undertakers. No one takes such a philosophy seriously. Ramsey too upholds the view that "Philosophy must be of some use and we must take it seriously. Or else it is a disposition we have to check."⁴³ In contrast, history of philosophy reveals that philosophies which have practical implications, which are productive and comprehensive have an everlasting value. They are pursued by many over the ages. But by practical utility one does not have to think that philosophy aims at producing or making things or developing improved techniques for providing material goods. But if one like Shakespere's Romeo believed and said:

" ... Hang up philosophy!
Unless philosophy can make a Juliet,
Displant a town, reverse a prince's doom,
It helps not, it prevails not: talk no more"

(*Romeo & Juliet*, III (iii))

then philosophy by itself will not be able to help, it will offer no cure, it will not be a, therapy. But then Romeo's demand for the making of a Juliet etc. was a cry of despair and it can be easily presumed that he did not mean it seriously.

If one like Marx attempts to condemn philosophy by saying; "Philosophers have variously interpreted the world; the point, however, is to change it", one has to remind him and his followers that even in saying so he was propounding a philosophy - a philosophy which brought a revolution in this world; a philosophy which claimed to provide a remedy to the exploited, suffering millions in the world. A philosophy which provided relief - what a relief it was time has revealed.

But that is where the charm of doing philosophy lies. According to

Russell it "consists in speculative freedom, in the fact that you can play with hypotheses. You may think out this or that which may be true, which is very valuable exercise until you discover what is true; but when you discover what is true the whole fruitful play of fancy in that region is curtailed, and you will abandon that region and pass on".⁴⁴ A philosopher therefore is an adventurous person who "likes to dwell in the region where there are still uncertainties".⁴⁵ He may be studying the problem not for the sake of any definite answers, for he recognises the fact that no definite answers are possible, he studies them 'for the sake of questions themselves; because these questions enlarge our conception of what is possible, enrich our intellectual imagination and diminish the dogmatic assurance which closes the mind against speculation: but above all because through the greatness of the universe which philosophy contemplates, the mind also is rendered great and becomes capable of that union with the universe which constitutes its highest good."⁴⁶

A philosopher may not be at the helm of affairs, but certainly he is not a person who is searching for a black cat in a dark room which is not there. He is not oblivious to the problem of day-to-day life. As R.G. Collingwood said about a philosopher: "If he is not a pilot, neither is he a mere spectator watching the ship from his study window. He is one of the crew."⁴⁷ Nor is philosophy as Russell said in *My Philosophical Development* "at best a slight help to lexicographers, and at worst an idle tea-table amusement". On the contrary "The results of philosophy are the uncovering of one or another piece of plain nonsense and of bumps that the understanding has got by running its head up against the limits of language. These bumps make us see the value of the discovery." (PI 119) The business of philosophy is to show that our ordinary beliefs are in some important sense dubious and the role of philosophy is either to give some support for our ordinary day to day views or to reject them if we can find no support for them. In *Modes of Thought* Whitehead pointed out that philosophy is an attempt to make manifest the fundamental evidence as to the nature of things. The role of a philosopher according to Sartre "is to show a method whereby the world can be conceived starting at the ontological

level."⁴⁸ "The business of philosophy" according to Wittgenstein is "to make it possible for us to get a clear view of.. The state of affairs *before* the contradiction is resolved." (PI 125) We get the clear view of the philosophical problems not by adding some new information to our already existent repertoire of knowledge "but by arranging what we have always known." (PI 109) In short it provides a justification for what we do, or do not do, and shows "that we are not fools for doing what we want to do."⁴⁹ In doing that it serves both as a theory and a therapy, because "without philosophy, thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct; its task is to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries". (TLP 4.112).

NOTES

1. For example, Thomas Nagel, *The View from Nowhere*, Oxford University Press, New York, Oxford, 1986, P.11.
2. Randhir Singh, *Reason, Revolution and Political Theory*, Peoples Publishing House, Delhi, 1966, p.XII.
3. "Philosophy", *Philosophical Occasions 1912-1951* ed. James C. Klegge and Alfred Nordmann, Hackett Publishing Company, 1993, p. 189.
4. Quoted in R.D. Cumming, "To understand a Man", *The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre*, ed. P.A. Schilpp, La Salle, Open Court, 1981, p.56.
5. "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", *Logic and Knowledge Essays 1901-1950*, ed: R.C.Marsh, George Allen and Unwin, p.281.
6. *Ibid.*
7. *The Problems of Philosophy*, reprinted in *Encounter*, ed. Ramana Carrier etal., Scott, Foresman and Co., 1970 p. 621.
8. K. Satchidananda Murty, *Philosophy in India*, Motilal Banarsidas, Delhi, 1985, p.177.
9. "Interview with Jean Paul Sartre", *The Philosophy of Jean Paul Sartre*, *Op.cit.*, p.51.

10. *Ibid.*, p.6.
11. *Essays in Indian Philosophy: Traditional and Modern* by J.N.Mohanty, ed. P.Billimoria, Oxford University Press, 1993, p.2.
12. "Philosophy", *op.cit.*, p.185.
13. *Ibid.*, p.187.
14. *Ibid.*, p.175.
15. *Evolution of Philosophy in India*, Waltiar, 1952, p.38.
16. *Philosophy, Logic and Language*, Bombay, 1965, p.IX.
17. Thomas Nagel, *op.cit.*, p.10.
18. *Bright Air, Brilliant Fire*, Penguin Books, 1992, p.158.
19. "How I see Philosophy", *Contemporary British Philosophy*, ed. H.D. Lewis, Allen and Unwin, 1956, p. 480.
20. Thomas Nagel, *op.cit.*, p.10.
21. *The Philosophy of Jean Paul Sartre*, *op.cit.*,p.20.
22. *Philosophy in India*, *op.cit.*, p.178.
23. *Adventures of Ideas*, Mcmillan, 1933, p.285.
24. Cf. Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and The Mirror of Nature*, Basil Blackwell, 1980, p.357.
25. *Ibid.*, p.3.
26. *Ibid.*, p.3.
27. Gerald Edelman, *op.cit.*, p.158.
28. A.N. Whitehead, Epilogue to *Modes of Thought*, reprinted in *Encounter op.cit.*, p.602.
29. "Philosophy", *op.cit.*, p.181.
30. Allen and Unwin, 1914, p.14.

31. W.W. Norton, 1929, p.14
32. B.Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy*, *op.cit.*, pp.621-22.
33. *Word and Object*, Harvard University Press, p.3.
34. *Quiddities*, Harvard University Press, 1987, p.209.
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