

## THE MAJORITY RULE FALLACY

The majority rule principle has come to form the basis of democracy and parliamentary procedure. It appears to be as fundamental to our society as number is to mathematics, or the engine is to an automobile. It is thought that without the majority rule, we just could not move. We "fight for democracy" and as people and government we wish to spread it throughout the world. Even humanists, who are the furthest removed from holding dogmatic, uncritical values, state in *A Secular Humanist Declaration* (1980):

We are committed to extending.... democracy throughout the world....  
(p. 24)

We are impressed with the majority rule. We are impressed with democracy. We are impressed with parliamentary procedure. And so, as one would wage war, we set out to "wage" democracy. This view was also recently expressed by Petra Kelly (1983):

There remains nothing left for all of us to do, than to wage more democracy. (Es bleibt uns allen nichts anderes übrig, als mehr Demokratie zu wagen.) p. 14

("Wage" here means also risk, dare or venture.)

We think that democracy and the majority rule alone will save us and other societies as well. They are weapons with which to defend ourselves. Thomas Jefferson (1968) wrote :

The only weapons by which the minority can defend themselves against.... those in power are the forms and rules of proceeding.... by a strict adherence to which the weaker party can only be protected from those irregularities and abuses which these forms were intended to check and which the wantonness of power is but too often apt to suggest to large and successful majorities.

Although a majority has seemed to favor democracy and the majority rule, a minority has recently leveled strong criticism of them.

The majority principle is a broken reed. (Barry 1979, p. 172)

[There] is nothing to the view, then, that what the majority rules is right. (Rawls 1971, p. 365)

Majority rule is fatally flawed by an internal inconsistency which ought to disqualify it from consideration in any political community whatsoever. (Wolff 1970, pp. 58-59)

Majorities may commit acts of tyranny. (Fishkin 1979, p. 5)

Nobody but a moral imbecile would really be prepared to deliver himself over body and soul to the majority principle. (Barry 1979, p. 171)

In the area of parliamentary procedure the majority rule is so universally taken for granted that there exists practically no critical literature on the subject. In one rare article, however, John Heinberg (1968) wrote :

Majority decisions are often erroneous or partisan. (p. 99)

The majority.... has no inherent ethical validity. (p. 100)

It is argued that the majority rule (henceforth : MR) guarantees neither truth nor fairness. Extensive criticisms of the MR have not been presented, and seldom brought "under one roof." This will be done here. Without awareness and a clear picture of these criticisms we will continue to exercise "tyranny" disguised as democracy, parliamentary procedure, or majority rule.

1. *MR is a mechanical, mathematical, procedure.* It is expedience. It is held that decisions must be made quickly, and that MR is better than fighting. "Das muß biegen oder brechen," refers to the view that a decision must be reached at all costs. "Die Tugend besteht in Handeln," (Virtue lies in action) makes a similar point.

"Decision", by itself, refers to a cutting, ending or the bringing of a matter to a close. It is not necessarily a rational or reasonable process. It is merely a way of ending a controversy. "Die Entscheidung" (decision) literally refers to a separation or departing; and "beschließen" (to decide), "Der Entschluß" (decision), and "zum Schluß Kommen" (conclude) suggest merely the closing or finishing of a matter.

As a mechanical, mathematical procedure, MR and decision-making alone do not guarantee truth, fairness, success or satisfaction of wants. They may be bad decisions. The justification of a decision must be determined outside of MR and not by the MR decision itself. Increasingly, articles on the "voter paradoxes" show even mathematical problems with the fairness of MR. (Blair & Pollack 1983) (Kelly 1978) (Brams & Fishburn 1983) Decisions alone are not self-justificatory. The cartoonist, Abner Dean, rendered this point as follows. A picture showed someone shooting arrows indiscriminately in all directions. The caption read, "Anyone can make a decision".

Having to decide may presuppose a necessity which does not exist. It may be a "hasty decision" and so an informal logical fallacy. In this sense, MR does not end conflict, but keeps it going. MR spurs action, but it may be blind action.

J. S. Schumpeter (1950) wrote :

Democracy is.... incapable of being an end in itself. (pp. 240-242)

John Wilson (1979) wrote :

To take "society" or a "consensus" as authoritative-is just another way of trying to shrug off the burden of reason and find safety in some fixed and easily identifiable set of rules. (p. 33)

2. *Fifty-one percent rule.* There may be only a bare majority. Supreme Court cases are frequently 5-4 decisions. This makes for a weak decision. It may be compared to receiving a score of only 51% on an examination or being only half awake, half-pregnant or half-guilty. We do not want drugs put on the market which are only fifty-one percent safe. If only fifty-one percent vote for something we may take it as a sign that it is a questionable decision. The same would apply to any figure less than unanimity.

A correction is to require a three-fourths vote or unanimity or to alter the course of action to reflect the weakness of the vote.

The fifty-one percent rule is again a mechanical rule which cannot guarantee truth or fairness.

3. *Avoidance of possible unanimity.* Where a possible unanimous decision could be reached, a mere majority decision is instead accepted.

The jury system has adopted the unanimity rule and the critical literature and experience with the system may be examined. In interpersonal relationships we often require unanimous approval. And even a political party has adopted the rule (Die Grünen, West Germany).

Unlike MR, the unanimity rule tends to force full discussion of all views and provide the utmost recognition of every individual view. The following writers have expressed this criticism :

Majority rule, with the single exception of rule by a unanimous majority, cannot be justified. (G. Allen 1977, p. 57)

I suggested that we might adopt the principle not of satisfying the preference of the majority, but safeguarding the interests of everyone.... The majority principle cannot be regarded as sacrosanct.... (B. Barry 1979, p. 172)

But even the unanimity rule would have to be qualified to avoid failure. It also is a mechanical rule. For example, all of a group of children could to a disastrous decision.

4. *Votes are quantitative not qualitative.* Each vote counts mechanically as much as any other vote, thus ignoring the qualitative intensity of each vote. The victorious majority may be indifferent on an issue the minority feel strongly about.

The intensity of the minority may outweigh the numbers of the majority so as to make it tyrannous to overrule the former. (Fishkin 1979, p.16)

In themselves, votes are not qualitative, as they are crude, all-or-nothing systems which do not admit of degrees. Preference voting or point assignment is a partial correction.

5. *MR commits the appeal-to-majority fallacy.* Merely because most people vote for something does not make it true. Truth comes rather from sound arguments and evidence. As a method of determining the truth, the most effective and best course of action, MR may be irrelevant. We cannot vote-in truth. Whatever deviates from good evidence and argument is a fallacy. MR appears to qualify as a "fallacy of majority rule."

It is relevant that one version of the appeal-to-majority fallacy is appeal to the emotions, rather than appeal to the understanding.

6. *The majority may show no concern or sensitivity to the minority.* Nothing in the MR, as such, requires one to take any notice of minority views. The MR may even be called the "theory of the oppression of minorities." MR would need extensive qualification to overcome this problem. But to give such qualification would be to undermine MR as itself a procedure to guarantee fairness or effectiveness.

To have a vote in the minority is, in effect, to have no say at all. It is a form of disenfranchisement. The minority views and interests can be entirely disregarded.

What matters is not to satisfy the preferences of the majority but to respect the interests of all. (Barry 1979, p. 170)

Nor can it be argued that there will be fairness over time, that we may lose one vote but win the next. If an interest group combines with a smaller group it may render the latter as a permanent minority and even exercise tyranny over it. Madison (1974) expressed this concern :

If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure. (p. 13)

However, even if the outcome differed in each decision, that in itself would not guarantee or even suggest fairness. Some decisions are clearly more significant than others. It is a myth to think that over time the equality of votes and issues will equal out.

7. *Disregard for alternatives.* The majority may impose deprivations on the minority although more considerate alternatives are readily available.

It is tyrannous for a government to impose severe deprivations when an alternative policy would impose no severe deprivations on anyone. (Fishkin 1979, p. 16)

For a voter to have to choose between alternatives none of which are acceptable is to render MR a fallacy of irrelevance. Many voters

then vote merely for the "lesser evil." Machinery could be instituted to allow the vote "neither" as an option, especially in a presidential election.

8. *Inappropriate representation.*

a. Not all those able to vote, do vote. Absentee ballots would increase the number voting. In the United States just over fifty percent of those able, vote. The result is inadequate representation.

b. Not all or not all affected are represented, whereas many not affected are represented. The issue may concern or affect the minority directly, but not the majority. Women and majority of older men may vote to have all men between the ages of 18 and 21 be drafted to fight a war.

c. Not all those qualified to vote can vote. Job, weather, or other circumstances prevent them from voting. Often, meetings are held where only those present are allowed to vote. Partial correctives of inappropriate representation are to ensure (1) that those mainly affected have a vote and perhaps the final or only vote, (2) that on relevant issues the vote cross nationalistic lines even extending to world citizenship, (3) that businesses and other organizations move toward participatory establishments, (4) decentralization, (5) direct rather than representative democracy, (6) truly representative leadership.

9. *MR is too indirect and representative.* It becomes more symbolic than real. Here the complex machinery of politics, "Realpolitik," and practical politics becomes of more concern than MR or democratic principles. There is substituted a limited pragmatism as the phrase "What the traffic will bear", suggests.

Thus, besides theoretical problems there are practical problems with MR. An individual votes for a representative B, who in turn is represented by another representative C, in general or in committee, and a regress of abstract representation develops reducing to absurdity any individual vote.

There are seemingly limitless ways in which one's vote becomes eroded. MR decisions are often determined in advance of the meeting.

or by collusion, biases, lobbies, "trade-offs", rather than by the facts and arguments at issue or by one's view. If a vote is held on the merits of a particular proposal the outcome of the vote may have nothing to do with the merits of the proposal. We may reject in MR the myth of "equal representation." It is a faulty-assumption fallacy.

10. *MR and utilitarianism.* A defense may be given that MR produces the greatest good for the greatest number. It has been shown that MR is value free. It may produce harm or good but guarantees neither. The utilitarian principle cannot be used as a defense because "good" is a vague, open-context term and because the formula cannot be carried out consistently. Given that a good is distribution of food to five hundred people. According to the formula we could give a tiny portion to all, or a larger portion to a few. If we stress quality we give to an elite few people. If we stress quantity we give less good to more people. Five units of good times one hundred people or one hundred units of good times five people still results in the same total distribution of units.  $5 \times 100 = 100 \times 5$ .

We can accordingly decide to keep all the food for ourselves, or for one hungry person with the reasoning that the utmost quality has been achieved. Perhaps utilitarians should only distribute to other utilitarians to maximize the greatest good. The utilitarian formula thus allows distribution any way whatsoever. It is unworkable and cannot, without severely restricted qualification, be used to attempt to support MR.

11. *MR requires limitations.* MR is often used to apply to basic civil and human rights which ought not to be subject to it. It should only be used within well-prescribed limitations, rules, laws, and procedures.

The majority rule.... is contingent on the presence of a number of highly restrictive conditions. (Barry 1979, p. 172)

Free speech; honest, open inquiry; enhancement of each individual, health, safety, protection of human lives, etc. should in general not be negotiables, and so not subject to or undermined by MR. The United States still regards all of these including loss of life in battle as negotiables in spite of the Bill of Rights and Constitution.

No minority can be, or should be, expected to acquiesce in the majority's trampling on its vital interests. (Barry 1979, p. 171)

There are ultimate ideals and interests which the most ardent democrat will put above democracy.... (J. S. Schumpeter 1950, pp. 240, 242)

A correction is to set severe limits, for instance by adopting by-laws on what is admissible. *Robert's Rules of Order* (1967) on parliamentary procedure states :

Motions must not be in violation of local and Federal laws, the organization's constitution and by-laws, or standing rules. (p. 132)

MR is also often used on matters requiring only individual decision rather than the relevant collective decisions. Authority and decision should, in general, rest with the individual unless it can be clearly established that a cooperative decision is needed, or that there should be authority over the individual. Otherwise MR may constitute unnecessary interference as well as a violation of civil rights.

12. *Irrational voting.* The basis for any vote is totally unspecified. One may vote on the basis of (a) wants or desires, (b) bias, (c) opinions or mere beliefs, (d) value judgments, (e) goals, (f) well-founded knowledge and evidence, (g) mistake, (h) emotion, such as anger or personal attraction, etc. Socrates was found guilty and condemned to death by the close vote of 281 to 220. It was commented of the voters that "He may cast his vote in anger." (*Apology* sect. 23)

The above possibilities invalidate MR decisions. Because we do not know if votes were based on evidence or wants or bias, etc., we cannot know what the decision means. A fallacy of equivocation and category-mistake are produced.

For example, recently it was reported that the majority of West Germans (75%) were found to oppose the deployment of missiles on German territory, (*Manchester Guardian Weekly*, Oct. 9, 1983, 2, 7. See also *Die Zeit*, Oct. 14, 1983, p.3) It would be a fallacy to conclude that the majority (a) did not want them there, or (b) believed on good evidence that they should not be there, or (c) therefore they should not be there. We do not know why they voted as they did.



Most people may not want to go to dentists, but nevertheless find it wise to do so. To confuse a want-based vote with a truth-based vote is to equivocate. The truth must be determined by evidence, not by wants or majority votes. Whether or not the missiles should be there depends rather on the consequences and arguments. It is a category-mistake to conclude, "Most people voted (wants or good evidence?) for X, therefore it is the best decision." Yet most people do conclude that.

A decision may be desired, but be unintelligent, or be intelligent and not desired. A vote based on wants or opinions should not be used to determine factual matters. The degree of safety of nuclear weapons is determined by research and evidence, not majority opinion.

If MR is used only to survey want or becomes an opinion survey, it is valuable, though still not completely. But surveys alone should not determine decision.

To attempt to correct some of the above deficiencies one could instruct the voter, as the judge instructs the jury, and require the voter to defend and give reasons for his or her vote.

At present, voters are appealed to less by education than by persuasion, advertising, appeal to special interests, and by racial, gender, financial and religious biases.

13. *The uninformed vote.* Those voting are often not adequately educated, informed, or involved in objective discussion before voting. Yet, we encourage everyone, regardless of ignorance, to vote. Democracy depends on an educated people. (Kolenda 1984) Democracy and MR among five year old children may be suicide.

Correctives would be to require each citizen to read the relevant arguments and literature before voting; to, at certain meetings, provide arguments and evidence to support one's vote; to subject such arguments to inspection before the vote and subject it to further appeal and accountability after the vote. In the courtroom and other examination situations in everyday life such criteria are normal and to be expected. Presently, voting can and does even violate the most basic civil rights, and its basis is a scandal of the intellect.

If the above is unrealistic, still some procedures would be needed to save the credibility of MR and to ensure that the vote will be well-informed and rational.

14. *"Rule" is ambiguous.* In majority rule, it is not clear what "rule" means. It may mean principle, but it may also mean "decides", "prevails", "dominates", "predominates", "wins." Does it mean that the majority can use violence to force the minority to comply? MR is a form of the *ad baculum* fallacy, that is, use or threat of force. It is not specified how the MR will "rule." Is the decision to be merely a recommendation, or perhaps not enforced at all?

It would not be rational to, in advance, commit oneself to accept any majority decision on any subject by *any* means of enforcement.

If we are to vote on whether or not we should go on a picnic we may take a vote. If six wish to go and five do not want to go, is it acceptable to force all to go?

15. *Improper question.* The vote is only as valid and useful as the clarity and intelligibility of the question. It makes a great difference if one is asked if they want missiles deployed, or if they have clear evidence and sound arguments that support their deployment. It makes a difference if we are asked if we want to go on vacation and, if we are able to go on vacation now.

The question voted on must be properly and clearly formulated. It must be adequate to include all viable possibilities and alternatives. MR does not provide the restrictions and procedures to ensure the needed clarity of the question.

16. *"General Will" or "Good of All" myths.* One may attempt to justify MR by appeal to the notion of a higher "general will" of the state. It is a fiction. To speak of adhering to MR for the "good of the majority" has already been eroded. This is the fallacy of *argumentum ad superstitionem*.

17. *MR based on trust.* Defense of MR by the argument that people should be trusted not to misuse it, fail. The above indicates constant abuse and misuse in theory as well as practice. If trust were

acceptable MR would not be needed in the first place.

**18. *Self-applicability of MR.*** It may be question-begging to allow MR to decide on questions of MR, democracy, or majority versus minority. We cannot without possible contradiction ask for a majority decision on MR itself or its limitations.

Any use of the majority principle in order to establish boundaries must involve begging the question.... [or] where people are disagreeing about the "body" they want to be members of. (B. Barry 1969, pp. 168-169)

MR may, for example, be used to dispense with MR.

**19. *Inconsistent application of MR.*** In many decision-making situations MR is either not preferred or not used. MR is often not used in the following places.

a. The operation of business and industry is often not participatory. Some meetings, union votes and stockholders meetings use MR. A government may be democratic, but one's immediate job and living situation may be a dictatorship.

b. Situations requiring expert knowledge : medicine, science, therapy, education, law, etc. Here those most knowledgeable are relied on, whereas in MR those least knowledgeable are relied on.

c. Interpersonal decisions between family members, friends or two people. In such situations, in place of a vote there is discussion and concern for one another, and use of MR would be thought to be dehumanizing. Where only two or three people are involved MR would be unworkable.

d. Religious groups, eg., Catholic, Islamic, etc. do not believe in the democratic process.

e. In the military.

f. In application to non-negotiable issues.

g. It is not applicable to every issue whatsoever. Its scope is limited, often vaguely, to apply only to certain issues.

h. MR can be used to decide on becoming a dictatorship.

i. Where a power hierarchy is established .

The issue raised is that of choice. We do not allow MR where we wish to dominate or indoctrinate. But the alternative is to be dictatorial. Neither option may be appropriate. One should be free to choose whether or not to belong to a religion or celebrate Christmas. Neither parental force nor MR should be appropriate. Children should not be indoctrinated either at home or at school.

Young minds should not be indoctrinated in a faith before they are mature enough to evaluate the merits for themselves. (Kurtz 1980)

20. *MR is the best method when all else fails.* It is argued that MR may have some minor limitations, but when all else fails, it is better than war. But the objections to MR have been seen to be major, not minor. If all else fails the situation is a failure, and that failure should be attended to, not ignored. If there is a failure then MR itself will be manipulated and guaranteed not to succeed. "Either MR or war" is an either-or fallacy. It may be better to, at that point, just draw straws.

More appropriate would be an evaluation of the causes for the lack of ability to agree. What caused the breakdown of communication, or lack of ability to be fair? Was it lack of education or information? Disagreement is a useful tool to force deeper analyses into the argument, not a point at which to ignore or end the issue. Increase of pre-trial settlements involve attempts at negotiation. Neutral outside arbitrators often are called in to settle disputes. In some cases, therapy and educational programs may be needed. We may simply use the scientific method of inquiry and employ decision-making theory in place of MR.

In any case, prevention of the conflicts in the first place may be preferable to any other method. If we have the responsibility to wage war or MR, we have the responsibility for preventing the problems from arising in the first place. MR may tend to take the place of establishing a climate of good communication and fairness.

21. *Should MR decisions always be followed? Civil disobedience.* We may agree to be bound by the decisions of the MR as by a social contract. To do so blanketly is to agree to the unknown. The question arises as to whether we should be bound completely or by

every decision of MR or of a democratic government. Is, for example, civil disobedience justifiable? The subject is controversial and the literature on the subject is rapidly increasing.

Agreements to social contracts and MR decisions ought to be made only within a number of highly restrictive conditions. If those conditions are violated our compliance may be withdrawn. A decision need not be followed if it (a) is objectively irrational, (b) is unfair, (c) is not based on correct information, (d) undermines basic civil rights, (e) is inhumane. We may choose not to obey an officer or fight in certain or any wars. It is not "America right or wrong."

Disobedience and civil disobedience may be carried out whenever they are justifiable. One central problem with civil disobedience is use of force. It may be argued that use of force is unacceptable. It is an informal logical fallacy. What is needed instead is to call attention to the arguments and relevant information. If peaceful demonstrations, satire, or even humor call attention to the arguments they are appropriate. (Shibles 1985) MR itself may be seen as a form of force or violence.

In view of the above, no one should be expected to comply in every way with all decisions of the MR. Non-compliance should be performed in such a way as to preserve, as much as possible, the MR system itself.

22. *MR is not a substitute for thinking.* Voting is not thinking. Thinking is largely language-use with all of the fine distinctions of our language. We cannot give that up to a numerical procedure. Similarly, we cannot give up thinking in ordinary language to the mechanical, quantitative model of the syllogism. We seldom, if ever, think in syllogisms.

There is a similar controversy between ordinary language philosophy and symbolic logic. Can ordinary language be reduced to a quantitative, mathematical model?

23. *Additional logical fallacies of MR.*

a. *Composition and division.* MR is a part-whole confusion.

What is true of the part is asserted of the whole. It is a form of synecdoche. MR may in this sense be thought of as a metaphor or fiction. Also, what is true of the whole may be falsely applied to the part. Because one is a member of a group having made a decision, does not mean one voted for, agrees, or even plans to support that decision

b. *Argument from consequences.* Does the end of having to arrive at a decision justify the means? It is only assumed that it does. MR may produce neither truth nor fairness. This compares with "hasty generalization" under point # 1.

c. *Contextual fallacy.* Committing oneself in advance to MR decisions regardless of substance, time, manner, and circumstance of whatever decision will be produced.

d. *Either-or fallacy.* The denial of gradations or alternative solutions. We vote either yes or no, and what is voted on may also lack gradation or alternatives. Often candidates run unopposed, thus allowing no choice. For an analysis of "approval voting" (vote for each approved candidate), Borda's preferential system, Condorcet, etc. see Brams & Fishburn 1982: "Every practical voting system suffers certain deficiencies." (p. xii)

e. *Appeal to emotions* Voter propaganda and advertisement may be cited as applications of MR in practice.

f. *Argument from the familiar or well-known.* Because MR is common, we tend to think that there is nothing wrong with it.

g. *Argumentum ad fidem.* Arrangement from faith is a fallacy. To be told merely to have faith in MR, or democracy, is unacceptable.

h. *Genetic fallacy.* He must be a good mayor, because he was elected by a majority. This does not follow.

i. *ad hominem.* The individual may be "brow beaten" or forced to go along with the majority decision.

j. *ad ignorantiam.* The truth of a statement or the best course of action may be irrelevant to what the majority believe. Voting is often

based on ignorance.

k. *ignoratio elenchi*. This is proving an irrelevant conclusion. Sidgwick phrases this : "The journey has been safely performed, only we got the wrong train." MR decisions may sometimes succeed, but it does not mean that they did so because of the MR machinery.

l. *reductio ad absurdum*. By MR we may produce tyranny as indicated earlier. Another example of the fallacy is : Because most people believe in war, therefore war is good.

m. *Statistical and probability fallacies*. (cf. "voter paradox" controversy.) (Arrow 1963) (Brams & Fishburn 1983)

n. *tu quoque fallacy*. "You also" fallacy. Because most want or think that way as well.

o. *ad verecundiam*. Appeal to authority. MR is appeal to the authority of the majority.

p. *Fallacy of oversimplification*. The fallacy of assuming that MR in itself, or unqualified, guarantees truth or fairness.

q. *Dehumanization fallacy*. The fallacy of quantification into votes, treats humans as if they were inanimate,

It may be concluded that both in theory and practice MR is based on a number of fallacies, guarantees neither intelligent decisions, fairness, or truth. It tends to take the place of rational discussion, inquiry, communication and concern for others. However, by careful qualification, conditions, and restrictions it can be made to work in certain situations. In any case, an educated voter is an absolute necessity. The absence to such conditions has been more noticeable than their presence.

**A Case Example.** Die Grunen party in West Germany recently, by a few votes, became the first new party in the West German Bundestag in thirty years. They do not provide an extensive critical analysis of MR, but do propose alternatives to traditional democratic practices and the MR, which may in practice correct some of the abuses mentioned above. Several such proposals involve :

a. decentralization of government, industry, social units, cities, decision making, etc., in order to allow more people to share in decisions which affect their lives.

b. participatory decisions in the various institutions.

c. an attempt to educate and bring reasoned arguments to the people thereby enabling them to be informed voters.

d. a general attempt to establish direct democracy.

e. a concern for all minorities. For example, they were the only party in the Bundestag to oppose a 4% raise for MP members. They said it was not acceptable during 9% unemployment. (*N.Y. Times*, Oct. 14, 1983, p. 36)

f. a concern to extend the minority and majority to include all people everywhere in the decision-making process. The concept of "world citizen" is implied.

g. an attempt to place humane behavior, a healthful environment and human rights, as opposed to war, killing, and exploitation of the environment, as issues which are not-negotiable and outside the realm of MR. (Kelly 1983, pp. 22, 26, 27) At present, such issues as killing and war are not only negotiable, they are common political, economic and legal practices.

h. a rotation system whereby members of the Bundestag share each term of office.

i. reference to their party in the form of oxymoron, as the "anti-party party." ("Antiparteinpartei", *Ibid*, pp. 21, 26) Petra Kelly claims to be an anti-leader leader.

As the above example indicates, it is not recommended that the MR be abandoned. What is suggested is that the necessary qualifications and limitations be provided and the rhetoric of the MR be revised to reflect argument rather than pressures. MR decisions can only be regarded as valid within and as qualified by such parameters. Only when



we see what is defeasible with MR can we proceed to make it an effective and viable method.

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### Notes

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