

## BELIEVER VERSUS<sup>1</sup> UNBELIEVER : REFLECTIONS ON THE WITTGENSTEINIAN PERSPECTIVE

The paper attempts to analyse and examine Wittgenstein's views on disagreement between a believer and an unbeliever (B and UB henceforth) on the basis of remarks found in *Lectures on Religious Belief and Culture And Value*.<sup>2</sup> It is proposed that use of 'believer' and 'unbeliever' is dependent upon the context. Believing in God or the Last Judgement consists not merely in having certain feelings and attitudes but also believing in the reality of God and the Last Judgement and interpreting life and the world in the light of these beliefs. Thus, disagreement between B and UB is not merely a matter of regulating or not regulating one's life by certain pictures but also of having different explanations/interpretations of life and the world. Some explanations of Wittgenstein's view that UB does not contradict B are discussed and it is argued that none of them rule out the possibility that UB may contradict B. In the end, it is suggested that Wittgenstein's discussion centres around the unshakeable character of religious belief. We find, however, that religious beliefs are not unshakable, believers themselves recognise sometimes that their empirical, scientific beliefs do not fit in with their religious beliefs. This recognition can weaken or destroy believer's faith. Religious traditions also recognise this tension and try to cope with it through modifications and reinterpretations of religious doctrines.

### I

In *Lectures* Wittgenstein says, "Suppose that some one believed in the Last Judgement, and I don't, does this mean that I believe the opposite to him, just that there won't be such a thing? I would say: "not at all, or not always".<sup>3</sup> (LC, p.53)

In the following lines it is said that one who believes that after death the body would rot does not contradict one who believes that particles would join and there would be resurrection of a person. Similarly, one who thinks of an illness as retribution is not contradicted by a person who does not think so. Thus, according to Wittgenstein, it can not be said that UB "contradicts" or "believes the opposite" to the believer.

What does being a believer consist in? Wittgenstein emphasizes the following :

(1) B has an unshakeable belief. What he believes is not to be taken as a scientific hypothesis, or something which may or may not be true.

(2) His firm belief does not rest on evidence, rather B may defy all empirical evidence and hold on to his belief.<sup>3</sup>

Wittgenstein seems to suggest that a religious belief does not require any evidence. "The point is that if there were evidence, this would in fact destroy the whole business". (LC, p.56) At other places he talks of B believing in the Last Judgement on the basis of a dream. It is not clear from *Lectures* whether in his view a religious belief requires no evidence or whether he wants to point out that what Believers regard as evidence may appear quite inconclusive, even ridiculous, to others. He, however, does rule out that a religious belief can be supported by historical or empirical evidence. A forecast about a Judgement day based on sound, empirical evidence is not a religious belief.<sup>4</sup> However, in *Culture and Value* we find that he dismisses the question of evidence and justification altogether. The unshakeableness of a religious belief is reflected in its regulative function in B's life.

(3) A religious belief "uses a picture." This has three aspects<sup>5</sup>

(a) B draws certain consequences from the picture.

(b) The picture affects and moves him deeply and

(c) It regulates his entire thinking and attitude to life.

Thus, one who believes in the Last Judgement or life after death approaches the events in life quite differently from the one who does not believe so. B commits himself to lots of things on the basis of his belief and is prepared to risk a great deal on its account.

The difference between B and UB, thus, revolves around use of certain pictures. B uses certain pictures while UB is not affected by them; these have no role in his thinking and attitude to life. In Wittgenstein's words B and UB are on entirely different planes. The latter thinks differently, he says different things to himself. He has different pictures. This is different from what is normally called "believing the opposite". UB does not have the thoughts that B has or anything that hangs together with them. But we can't say he contradicts B. (LC,p.55)

It becomes clearer from remarks in *Culture And Value*, that Wittgenstein wants to emphasize the affective, commissive side of believing; for him what is important about a *religious belief* is not the form it takes, not the words that express it but the difference it makes to person's life. He views B's faith not as cold rationalistic assent to certain beliefs based on supporting evidence/ reasons but as something emanating from passionate aspect of B which results in changing his whole attitude to life. He remarks in 1946 "I believe that one of the things Christianity says is that sound doctrines are all useless. That you have to change your life (or the direction of your life). .... The point is that a sound doctrine need not take hold of you; .... But here you need something to move you and turn you in a new direction. Once you have been turned around, you must stay turned round". (CV,p.53e)

Again in 1947 he says, "It strikes me that a religious belief could only be something like a passionate commitment to a system of reference. Hence, although it's belief, it's really a way of living or a way of assessing life. It's passionately seizing hold of this interpretation." (CV, p.64e)

## II

Before proceeding any further with the analysis of disagreement between B and UB, let us clarify the meaning of 'believer' and 'unbeliever'. In LC, UB is generally used for an atheist and B for a practicing Christian. The meanings of 'believer' and 'unbeliever', however, are wider. One way to define 'B' would be to say it means 'one who believes in God'. In this sense all theists, whatever be the differences among their conceptions of God, would be B and all atheists UB. This, however, would not be satisfactory. Is a practicing Buddhist

or Jain, who does not believe in a personal God, a B or UB? Is a pantheist like Spinoza a B or UB? In Wittgenstein's discussion of believers, the important aspects relate to the affective commissive force of religious beliefs and their regulatory function in believers' lives. On this criterion a Buddhist or a Jain is B provided his beliefs fall into the category of religious beliefs.

A more promising way to explain B and UB would be to relate them to participation in a religious tradition. One who accepts the central doctrines of a religious tradition and participates in its activities related to rituals and worship may be called a B. The meaning of B and UB would be then dependent upon the context of its use. Depending upon the context, a believer may be a Christian, a Jew, a Hindu etc. Conversely, anyone who does not believe in the same things as the believer in question would be UB in that context. It is clear, thus, that UB need not always be an atheist but also a follower of a different religious tradition. *vis-a-vis* a Christian, not only an atheist but a practicing Jew, Muslim or a Hindu would be UB, though in other contexts a Jew may be B. This is in agreement with Wittgenstein's analysis of religious belief, since being a B consists in using pictures involved in certain religious beliefs. Therefore, anyone who does not use the pictures in question would be UB. (It is a further matter that UB does not have any religious beliefs where he is an atheist or he uses pictures involved in other different religious beliefs where he is a follower of a different religious tradition.)

The distinction between B and UB can operate at an even deeper level, i.e., with respect to certain specific beliefs of a religious tradition. One may be a believer in the sense of generally accepting the tradition but may reject certain doctrinal beliefs. How do we characterise such people, as B or UB? In other words, how do we look upon disagreements between followers of different sects or streams within the same religious tradition? Generally speaking, these are characterized as disagreements among believers but those who do not accept certain religious beliefs can also be characterized as unbelievers since pictures involved in these beliefs do not play any role in these persons' lives.

From the above discussion it becomes clear that disagreement between B and UB has various dimensions. Wittgenstein only

considers disagreement between a Christian and an atheist and says that UB does not contradict B. However, the same analysis would hold in cases where UB is a follower of a different religious tradition or of a different sect/stream of the believer's tradition. In all such cases the pictures involved in certain religious beliefs play no role in the thinking and lives of certain people.

Can we say in all such cases that UB does not contradict B? Let us consider some examples of disagreements between B and UB.

1. B regards his illness as a case of retribution. UB (an atheist) thinks that the illness is due to empirical causes (eg, a virus) and the thought of retribution does not even occur to him. (Wittgenstein's example)
2. Suppose in the feast on Mid-summer Common, a lot of people stand in a ring. Each person holds the hands of the person next to him on either side. Now each person says he saw his dead relative on the other side of the ring. He is aware that each person is holding the hand of another living person yet insists that he saw his dead relatives on the other side.<sup>6</sup> UB has no such thoughts and thinks that one sees only living person on the other side of ring. (Wittgenstein's example)
3. B believes in resurrection. UB (an atheist) does not believe in life after death. Another UB (a Hindu) believes in life after death but in rebirth and not resurrection.
4. B (a Christian) believes Jesus to be the Messiah, UB (a Jew) does not think so.
5. B (a Muslim) regards Muhammed to be the last prophet, UB (a Christian or Bohra Muslim) does not think so.
6. B believes that God creates and sustains the world, UB (a monist) thinks that there is no ontological distinction between God and the world.

In examples 3, 4, 5 and 6, it appears that UB contradicts B. In examples 1 and 2 the thought of retribution and of seeing one's dead relatives does not play any role in the thinking of UB. UB may simply shrug his shoulders at B's talk or may deny what B says. Wittgenstein would say that UB does not contradict B, it is simply the case that

pictures that affect B deeply and regulate his thinking and life have no role in UB's thinking and life. *Prima-facie* it appears that UB sometimes denies what B believes to be the case and thus contradicts the latter. How are we then to understand the statement that UB does not and can not contradict B? Let us discuss some interpretations of religious belief on which this view can be upheld and examine them.

### III

1. A religious belief only expresses feelings, attitudes and commitments of a believer and does not involve asserting or denying anything. Any non-cognitivist analysis would therefore rule out that UB can contradict B.<sup>7</sup> Wittgenstein's emphasis on affective, commissive aspect of religious belief gives the impression that he is providing such an analysis. At the same time we find that in LC he is doubtful that belief in life after death can be analysed purely as expressing an attitude. (LC, p.71) In CV he mentions B's acceptance of somethings as true (CV, p.32e). We have also seen that a religious belief, according to Wittgenstein, makes B explain/interpret the events in life in a certain way (eg. illness as retribution). Thus, pictures involved in religious beliefs are also explanatory. This would involve beliefs that God, that God judges men etc. If so, a religious belief is not merely an expression of an attitude or feeling but also a belief that asserts (or presupposes) certain things to be the case. Perhaps what Wittgenstein wants to emphasize is that B does not merely have a belief about God and the Last Judgement but pictures involved in these are constantly in the foreground of B's thinking and determine how he sees events in life and how he leads his life. The content of the belief or the words in which it is expressed are not important, what is important is whether the belief affects and regulates his life or not.

Believers certainly talk of God as independently real and use 'truth' in the context of talk about God, and his relationship to the world and human persons. Any purely non-cognitivist analysis of religious belief, therefore, is prescriptive rather than descriptive. It would be more helpful to explore the possibility whether even after admitting that religious belief is a belief 'that', it can still be said that UB does not contradict B. Wittgenstein says that in some cases different ways of thinking need not be expressed by one person saying one thing, another person saying another. The expression of belief may play an absolutely

minor role. (LC, p.55) This would suggest that Wittgenstein wants to highlight the difference in the ways of living of B and UB. What is significant in controversies regarding religious matters is not that UB denies what B believes but that they look at events in life differently and their lives are regulated by different pictures. This would be quite correct if it means that such controversies involve much more than mere opposition of beliefs 'that' but this does not show that opposition of such beliefs does not and can not figure in such contexts.<sup>8</sup> A belief 'that' can be regulative, for example, the belief that fire burns or that one's colleague has homicidal tendencies. In the believer's way of life his beliefs, feelings, attitudes and commitment to lead one's life in certain ways are all inextricably linked. The fact that believers interpret life and the world in terms of God's love, the Last Judgement etc. itself shows that their way of life has ontological commitments / presuppositions. A person who believes in judgement by a personal God would behave and act differently from one who believes in the doctrine of *karma* or one who regards God as a detached creator. What follows is that what it means to believe in the Last Judgement can be understood not merely by reflecting on the words that occur in its expression rather how B feels, what his attitudes are and how he behaves and acts have also to be taken into account. But this does not rule out the possibility that in controversies regarding religious matters there can not be opposition of beliefs 'that'.

2. B and UB use words differently. Thus, when UB denies the Last Judgement he means something different from what B means by it. Wittgenstein mentions how 'eye' is used differently when B talks of 'God's eyes. Similarly, 'Last' in 'the Last Judgement' is not being used in the sense of temporal end. He also shows how 'exist' is being used differently by B. If B and UB are using words in different senses then even if UB denies that there is Last Judgement he does not contradict B. This line of reasoning, however, can be stretched only up to a point. While B's use of 'exist', 'eye' 'last' 'judgement' etc. is different from their use in ordinary discourse, it is not completely divorced from the latter. The ordinary use of these words is also part of B's conceptual framework and he employs them in non-theological contexts. In many cases use of words in theological contexts is parasitical upon use in non-theological contexts. So, the use by B is analogical rather than in a totally different sense, and it must conform to the ordinary use to some extent.<sup>9</sup> Thus, unless it is ruled out that UB can understand the sense in which

B is using words, it remains possible that UB may deny what B says, using words in exactly the same sense as B. In some examples discussed earlier, B and UB seem to be using words in the same sense. Wittgenstein admits that UB can understand the words that B uses (LC, pp.55, 71). Yet, he declares that UB can't contradict B. One reason for this could be that UB misunderstands and misrepresents B's belief. Eg., when UB denies the Last Judgement he might be viewing it as an event taking place at some point in future. But this is not how B views the Last judgement. (LC, p.55) It is, however, possible that UB may be using 'Last' and 'judgement's in the same sense as B does. Wittgenstein says that UB can't contradict B because he has not got the thoughts that B has and what hangs together with these thoughts. Granting that the ideas that are always at the centre of B's thinking play no role in UB's thinking, this may be based on UB's rejection of those ideas. UB, for example, might have been a B earlier or might believe other things that imply denial of what B believes.

3. UB refuses to participate in B's form of life, therefore he can not deny what B says.<sup>10</sup> We have already granted that disagreement between B and UB is not merely a case of opposition of beliefs but involves much more. But now it is being ruled out that there can be such opposition of beliefs between B and UB. This view could be based on the following considerations.

a) UB does not deny what B asserts; rather he denies the presuppositions of what B asserts. (This may be countered as, for example, in the Russellian analysis of definite descriptions) There would be contradiction if, for example, B says "God is Love", and the other says, "God is not Love". But here both statements presuppose that there is God. When UB says, "But there is no God", this does not contradict B's statement; it only rejects the presupposition of what B says and, strictly speaking, this is not contradiction. This line of reasoning, however, is not very fruitful because it is evident that B and UB disagree regarding the reality of God and the Last Judgement. This opposition may not be contradiction in the strict sense but it is a fundamental difference all the same. Secondly, as is evident from the examples discussed earlier, (section II) B and UB are sometimes in agreement about the presuppositions and yet disagree. One who believes in resurrection and one who believes in rebirth both accept life after death and yet disagree about what the nature of this life is. A Jew and a Christian agree about the



person they are talking about, namely Jesus, and yet do not agree about certain things being the case.

b) One who does not participate in B's form of life can not understand the words occurring in B's statement.<sup>11</sup> If understanding 'God's Love' is identified with having certain feelings, attitudes and commitments, UB can not be said to understand what B says. Since B's uses of words are not totally divorced from uses of these in other non-religious contexts and since B shares with UB uses of linguistic expression and practices in these non-religious contexts, it is not clear why UB can not understand what B says. If one understands what 'love' means generally and understands how its use in religious contexts is similar to and different from its use in non-religious contexts, one can understand what ascription of love to God means reasonably well. That people sometimes have partial or total loss of faith also shows that it is possible to understand religious doctrines and not be affected by them. It is one thing to say that what is involved in believing in God's love can not be fully appreciated without taking into account B's feelings, attitudes etc. and quite another to say that one can not understand what B says without being a participant.

It is also not clear that B and UB do not share forms of life. They share many activities and also share understanding of things and events in non-religious contexts. If UB is an atheist he does not participate in the religious way of life. But if UB is a follower of a religious tradition different from that of B, he is participating in a religious way of life, albeit one with different concepts and ontological commitments. Wittgenstein has not defined the concept of 'form of life' clearly nor has he given many examples. Generally speaking, a form of life involves a common way of conceptualising experiences along with accompanying shared patterns of action and behaviour among members of community.<sup>12</sup> It is not clear whether religion can be called a form of life<sup>13</sup> and if so, whether different religious traditions constitute one form of life or several different ones.

4. B and UB have different conceptual schemes. The concept of truth is relative to conceptual schemes. Each conceptual scheme has its own criteria of meaning and truth and those determine what is meaningful and true within that scheme. Conceptual relativists deny that there is a concept of 'Truth' which is applicable to sentences

belonging to different conceptual schemes. If there were one set of facts to which truths are supposed to correspond, then two incompatible sentences about what is the case can not both be true at the same time. Conceptual relativists deny that there is one set of 'facts' about the world. We do not have access to neutral facts. Facts are not read off the world, rather facts are what they are because of how we read them. How we read them depends upon the conceptual scheme we are working with.<sup>14</sup> There can be more than one adequate account of how things are in the world. Thus, UB and B have different notions of objects and existence, their criteria of truth are different and therefore one does not contradict the other.

Whether there can be alternative conceptual schemes is a matter of controversy.<sup>15</sup> However, granting that there may be different conceptual schemes, this difference can have various dimensions. They may or may not have different criteria of truth, they may have totally different concepts or one scheme may include various concepts of another and have additional concepts of its own. Thus, two different conceptual schemes need not be totally distinct from each other; they may have overlapping similarities and degrees of differences among them.

Two different conceptual schemes may or may not be incompatible. A geologist's and physicist's schemes are not incompatible with each other provided they use the same language. But those of an astronomer and an astrologer are incompatible. If two conceptual schemes share a concept and yet differ about certain things being the case, truths of one would contradict those of another. Or two conceptual schemes may have different concepts of object itself and one may accept universals as real objects while the other does not. Depending upon the differences between conceptual schemes, in some cases two or more conceptual schemes may fit in with each other to give a picture of what there is, in others they may not. It is incorrect to suppose that if there is more than one conceptual scheme, each would constitute a self-sufficient system such that it neither touches nor conflicts with another on any point.

Similarly, two conceptual schemes may not have different concepts of truth and reality. Where factual discourse is concerned, we have to keep it in mind that what is true is determined by the scheme in question but it is also determined by what there is. To say that how

reality is apprehended is determined by one's conceptual scheme and that there can be more than one way of understanding reality need not allow that any thing goes in the name of describing what there is. We find, thus, that even if it is granted that B and UB have different conceptual schemes, the possibility of a statement by UB contradicting that of B can not be ruled out. Whether UB is an atheist, or a follower of a different religious tradition, if the conceptual schemes with which they are operating share a concept but differ regarding certain things being the case and both have the same criteria of truth, there would be opposition of beliefs. In certain disputes involving beliefs of Jews, Christians and Muslims this appears to be the case. This does not mean that in every case of difference in belief between B and UB there would be contradiction; only that in some cases there can be. It is also far from obvious that a religious person's concept of truth must be totally different and divorced from an irreligious person's concept of truth or from the concept of truth of a follower of a different religious tradition. In non-theological contexts, religious people and irreligious people operate with the same concept of truth. In theological contexts, believers speak of reality of supra natural beings and appeal to religious experiences and authority of revelation etc. But even then, point, of contact with the concept of truth in non-theological contexts of factual discourse remain. As for different religious traditions, quite often they do not have different concepts of truth and reality; rather they take different things as true and real. In some cases, however, the concept of truth and reality may be different as, for example, *Advaita Vedānta's* concept of ultimate reality.

A believer's conceptual scheme is not a self sufficient scheme covering all the aspects of his life; rather he shares with an atheist many concepts, explanations and practices as far as ordinary day to day life is concerned. He accepts the explanations and understandings of things and events that an atheist accepts but imposes upon them further meanings. His religious interpretations/explanations, therefore, are not at the same level as those accepted by the atheist; they are not substituted for the latter but added to them. B's conceptual scheme, therefore, includes the concepts of an irreligious person and also has additional concepts. If B's interpretation constituted an alternative to the atheist's interpretation of life and the world or if the two were interpreting different things, it could be plausible to think that the two can not conflict in any way. But that is not the case. B is operating with

both interpretations of life and the world, there is constant interplay of these two ways of looking at life and sometimes there is tension between them. That believers are faced with such tensions is evident from the fact that sometimes they find it difficult to combine their religious faith with their secular beliefs. This may lead to loss of faith. It is not as if once having accepted a religious tradition, one always remains a believer. The loss of faith may occur because pictures involved in one's religious beliefs are not found to be aesthetically or morally appealing but it may also occur because the believer is unable to combine his faith with his secular beliefs.

Wittgenstein declares that a person's acceptance of religious belief has its roots in his passions, not in intellect or reason. One does not come to religious belief after a process of reasoning; rather he submits to the religious authority (of the book or the prophet) which dictates him to believe certain things, however strange or unsound they may appear (CV, pp. 29 e & 32 e) and to believe them through thick and thin. The believer passionately and lovingly takes hold of the religious interpretation and this is behind the certainty characterising his acceptance of it as true (CV p. 32 e). Having once accepted, he would cling to his beliefs overlooking the demands of reason. Perhaps, this is really the sense behind the statement that UB does not contradict B. Whatever UB may say, whatever counter arguments he may offer, however sound his arguments may appear in the light of observations, a believer would not give up his faith. Nothing can, thus, make him deny what he believes. We, however, find that this is not corroborated by facts. Facts of life, scientific and empirical evidence do put a strain on B's faith; they sometimes weaken it, sometimes lead to modifications and sometimes even to loss of faith.

Wittgenstein's discussion of religion views it as a static phenomenon. Once the message has been given and accepted by believers lovingly, that is the end of the matter. This picture does justice neither to Christianity nor to other religious traditions. We find that religious doctrines go through modifications and reinterpretations and quite often these exercises result from a perception that existing empirical beliefs do not fit in with them. In believers' lives there is continuous interplay of religious and empirical and scientific beliefs and sometimes the two appear to conflict. The reactions of believers to such conflicts vary. Some are able to reconcile quite a lot of apparently

conflicting observations with their faith, some are not. How strongly a believer clings to his faith would depend upon how deep his passionate commitment to it is. Wittgenstein says "Life can educate one to a belief in God" (CV, p. 86e) we find, however, that life can also bring one to unbelief.

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### NOTES AND REFERENCES

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1. 'Versus' is used only to indicate the disagreement between a believer and an unbeliever, leaving it open what the nature of this disagreement is.
2. Notes taken by a group of students from Wittgenstein's lectures given at Cambridge in 1938 have been compiled and edited by Cyril Barrett in *Wittgenstein; Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief*, Basil Blackwell, 1966. Though Wittgenstein never saw the notes written by these students, yet they can be taken as a fairly accurate account of his views at that time. The lectures throw light on topics that have not been discussed in detail elsewhere. *Culture And Value*, ed. G.H.von Wright, tr. Peter Winch, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1980. We will henceforth refer to lectures as LC and Culture And Value as CV.
3. Wittgenstein mentions that even when believers cite historical evidence in favour of their beliefs, they do not subject it to the kind of doubts to which such evidence is generally subjected.
4. Wittgenstein might be wanting to rule out the possibility that a belief based on empirical evidence could have affective, commissive force. Or, he might be wanting to point out that even if there is such a belief it would not be unshakable, since empirical evidence can only establish probability.
5. See Hudson, W.D., *Wittgenstein and Religious Belief*, Macmillan, London and Basingstoke, 1975, pp.165-6

6. This would be a case of a belief which defies contrary empirical evidence if 'See' is being used in its ordinary sense or a sense somewhat similar to it.
7. Non-cognitivist analyses of religious language view it as expressing emotions, attitudes, or commitment to moral principles (Braithwaite), or bliks (Hare). Philosophers like Ruth Rhees and D.Z. Phillips, who draw inspiration from Wittgenstein, also think that sentences like 'God exists', 'God is love' are not in the indicative mood. For Rhees 'God exists' is a confession of faith. (*Without Answers*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1969, pp. 131-2) Phillips insists that a question about God's existence is not one about something being the case. (*Religion Without Explanation*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1976, p.168) Similarly, 'God is love' is a grammatical remark about what can and what can not be said about God. (*Faith After Foundationalism*, Routledge, London, New York, 1988, p.146) Phillips, however, admits that believers think of God as independently real and that it can not be said that theological statements do not have to do with objective reality or truth claims (*Ibid*, p.203)
8. For distinction between belief 'that' and belief 'in' and their interconnections, see Price H.H., "Belief 'in' and Belief 'that'" in, *The Philosophy of Religion*, ed. B. Mitchell, O.U.P. 1971
9. Talking about someone using 'death' in a different sense, Wittgenstein observes that unless his idea of death is related to our ordinary idea of death, there is no reason why it should be called 'death'. "If what he calls his 'idea of death' is to become relevant, it must become part of our game." (L.C., p.69) This would imply that uses of words in religious contexts have to be related to and conform to the rules of their usage in ordinary contexts to some extent at least.
10. Hudson, *op. cit*, p. 193
11. Philosophers like N. Malcolm, R. Rhees and D.Z. Phillips, think that understanding uses of language in religious contexts is open only to those who participate in the religious way of life. Phillips, however, has rejected the view that UB can not understand B. (Phillips, D.Z., *Belief, Change and Forms of Life*, Macmillan, London & Basingstoke, 1986, pp.11-12)
12. Hacker, P.M.S., *Insight and Illusion*, O.U.P., London, New York, 1975, p.220. Also Finch, H.L., *Wittgenstein: The Later Philosophy*, Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1977, p.90. J.F.M. Hunter offers five different interpretations of the concept of 'form of life' (" 'Forms of Life' in Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*" in *Essays on Wittgenstein*, ed. E.D. Klemke, Univ. of Illinois Press, Urbana, Chicago, London, 1971, pp. 275-9)

13. It is debated whether 'form of life' refers to something as large as religion or something smaller like hope. See Patrick Sherry, "Is Religion a Form of Life?" *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 1972.
14. Peter Winch says, "Reality is not what gives language sense, what is real and what is unreal shows itself in the sense that language has. Further, both the distinction between real and the unreal and the concept of agreement with reality themselves belong to our language." "Understanding A Primitive Society," in *Religion And Understanding*, ed. D.Z. Phillips, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1967 p.13. Similarly H.Putnam observes, ".... the logical primitives themselves, and in particular the notions of object and existence, have a multitude of different uses rather than one absolute meaning". *The Many Faces of Realism*, Open Court, La Salle, Illinois, 1987, p.19, Phillips and others talk of each area of discourse having its own logic.
15. Davidson D., "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme" in *Inquiries Into Truth And Interpretation*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984. See also Rorty R., "The World Well Lost", *The Journal of Philosophy*, 69, 1972, & Rescher, N., "Conceptual Schemes" in *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. 5, ed. Peter French, Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1980.

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