WITTGENSTEIN AND THE AVAILABALITY OF A TRANSCENDENTAL CRITIQUE

In this paper I intend to explore the possibility of a transcendental critique in Wittgenstein's philosophy. A transcendental critique, as the history of philosophy has so far evidenced, is the representative of a critical self-awareness, a breaking away from the monotony of unexamined orthodoxy and above all, the spirit of questioning the assumptions and methods of philosophy itself. Philosophy is subjected to self-examination, its scope and limits are redrawn and its methods of enquiry redesigned. The critique is not merely an abnegation of the natural habits of thoughts and so of the well-entrenched modes and methods of understanding, but a self-abnegation calling for intellectual austerity and the resulting self-withdrawl signalling the end of intellectual adventurism and the soft options of reason. This critique can rightly be called transcendental to the extent it examines the possibility of philosophy as a rational activity and suspends the natural attitudes of reason for the sake of a critical attitude regarding the on-going business of theoretical reason.

The unfoldment of a transcendental critique has been the continuing preoccupation of western philosophy right from the days of Kant to those of Hussserl and the hermeneuticists.[1] The search for the transcendental origins of our ideas about the world, that is, our understanding of the world including ourselves has led to the evolution of the dichotomy between science as the discipline of the critical reason. The transcendentaal turn of philosophy marks the end of the hegemony of science and scientific reason. It marks the return of the native reason to itself, the subjectivity and its original home, language. Kant and Husserl identified philosophical progress with the unccovering of the subjectivity, while Wittgenstein and to some extent, the hermeneuticists have identified it with the unfoldment of the grammar of our language which is the original home of our ideas, meanings and experiences. From the transcendental subjectivity to transcendental grammar the road has

been very zigzag and often bristling with the broken hopes of a universal science and a universal grammar. Yet, there has been a road and a continuing link.

I intend to explore the interface between the transcendental subjectivity and the transcendental grammar in Wittgenstein's philosophy so as to suggest that Wittgenstein gave a transcendental turn to philosophy and that in his effort to understand the grammar of language he opened up the transcendental method of enquiry into the possibility of our language, experience and the world.

I. THE LAYOUT OF THE WITTGENSTEINIAN CRITIQUE

For Wittgenstein philosophy is essentially a critique, a critique of language as he rightly called it (*TLP* 4.0031). It studies language not because language is problematic and so needs immediate philosophical solution, but because language solves all *our* problems and a study of language is the philosophic way of solving or dissolving these problems. The philosophical critique does not derive its origin and authenticity from the genuineness of the problems, metaphysical or otherwise, but from the fact that these problems arise despite language and despite our native reason. That is why Wittgenstein talks about the possibility of a reason 'bewitched' by means of language (*PI* § 109) which remains the object of philosophical battle, the critique. The 'bewitched' reason is unnatural, unphilosophical and far removed from the native reason and so needs philosophical treatment, the much needed therapy (*PI* §§ 133, 225). Philosophy is, therefore, a call to the native reason, the native language and the natural history of man (*PI* § 415) because in this lies the complete 'disappearance' of all problems (*PI* § 133).

Philosophy dramatizes the dichotomy between the natural and the speculative reason, and seeks to annul the latter since the latter alone faces the prospect of bewitchment, puzzlement and the torment of self-estrangement. It is the proverbial 'fly in the flybottle' (*PI* § 309) which philosophy shows the way out. Philosophy does not reform the speculative reason but shows it to be unnatural and ultimately abolishes it. The natural reason prevails and we are back with our native language and natural intelligence. The abolition of the speculative reason is the abolition of the artificial, the contrived and the manipulative operations of reason. It is the abolition of the so-called strange-looking deep problems of reason which have been projected as the source of philosophical illumination. In fact, these deep problems are 'deep disquietudes' (*PI* §

111) and are as such deformities of reason rather than signs of its healthy functioning. Wittgenstein puts it with a characteristic poignance :

> The problems arising through a misinterpretation of our forms of language have the character of *depth*. These are deep disquietudes; their roots are as deep in us as the forms of our language and their significance is as great as the importance of our language. - Let us ask ourselves : why do we feel a grammatical joke to be *deep*? (And that is what the depth of philosophy is.) (original italics, *PI* § 111).

Our forms of language are subjected to disquieting misinterpretation and, thus, are given to creating grammatical illusions (*PI* § 110) which can masquerade as the profound products of intellectual enlightenment. Hence, philosophy wants its abolition, its complete disappearance. "The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to, - the one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself in question" (*PI* § 133).

By abolishing the speculative reason along with its hallowed products, does philosophy gets itself abolished? This question haunts the Wittgensteinian critique to great measure. Wittgenstein asks, "where does our investigation get its importance from, since it seems only to destroy everything interesting, that is, all that is great and important? (As it were all the buildings, leaving behind only bits of stone and rubble.)" (*PI* § 118). The answer to this question is that philosophy gets its importance just because it has to destroy the so-called 'great and imporant', and "what we are destroying is nothing but houses of cards and we are clearing up the ground of language on which we stand" (*Ibid*). The return of the natives reason is the return of our natural language and philosophy is the triumph of the natural reason. We are 'back to the rough ground' (*PI* § 107) and thus back to the native home of reason. Philosophy takes a turn towards what is original, natural and native. 'The axis of reference' of our philosophy is rotated (*PI* § 108).

Philosophy, as the return to the native, signals that it must do away with the pretensions of the theoretical reason. The theoretical reason is trapped in the constructions of its own which have no sanction of the native reason, that is, have not been legitimized by the grammar of the natural language. The legitimacy sought for happens to be rooted in the grammar of the native language and therefore must be brought to the fore through philosophical analysis. Philosophy itself does not supply the grounds of legitimacy or proof for any theoretical construction. It only points out that legitimacy or justification lies in grammar. There is no urgency on the part of philosophy itself to offer a theoretical construction, since it has no source of validating or proving a theory. Philosophy is not "a body of doctrine but an activity" (*TLP* 4.112); its task is to clarify, to

elucidate. "Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct : its task is to make them clear and give them sharp boundaries" (*Ibid*). But what philosophy is most concerned about is the legitimacy of the ideas or thoughts which cluster our theoretical constructions. The needed criteria of legitimacy are shrouded in the grammar of our language and therefore what is most urgently required of philosophy is that it be concerned with the grammar of our language.

Thus, in a sense the return to natural reason is the return to the grammar of language. It is the grammar that determines the limits of language and languages use, and, thus, determines what is legitimate in our concept-formation. Philosophy becomes philosophical grammar sincse in raising the question of grammar it resolves itself into a grammatical investigation (*PI* § 90). It undertakes the investigation how grammar can account for the "possibilities of phenomena" (*Ibid*) and how we can in presenting grammar provide a "perspicuous representation" of language, experience and the world. For, as Wittgenstein puts it, "the concept of a perspicuous representation is of fundamental significance for us. It earmarks the account we give, the way we look at things.(*PI* §122).

II. THE TRANSCENDENTAL TURN

If the above layout of the Wittgensteinian critique is any guide, it takes positively a transcendental turn, a turn towards what is original and given in the human discourse. The language of human beings constituting the broad framework of thought, experience and forms of life promises to be the ultimate sheetanchor of the native reason. It is in the network of the linguistic activities, i.e., the language-games that reason seeks its ultimate unfoldment and its multiple activities. Reason becomes the living discourse, the unfolding life-force underlying the language-games. Language-games are the forms of life representing the vitality of the integrating reason, which holistically encompass the motley of linguistic activities, techniques and conventions into the broad life-world. Life and language become one, and so are reason and the life-force. All of them point to one reality, the reality of the unfolding language of the human beings, or, in short, the natural history of the human beings (*PI* § 415, *RFM*, I, 142). "What has to be accepted, the given, is - so one could say - *forms of life*" (*PI*, p. 226, original emphasis).

The transcendental turn is not towards studying natural history or histories as causal phenomena, as the historical-natural events in an anthropological repertoire. An anthropology of the natural histories is

called for if our interest is in documenting their causal ancestry and their historical necessities. It is the goal of a scientific endeavour to dissect a natural history and to bind together the fleeting details into a statistical or otherwise network of scientific laws. This results in a casual explanation of the anthropological phenomena. But philosophy hardly bothers to provide a causal explanation. As Wittgenstein has repeatedly emphasized, philosophical problems are not empirical problems and philosophy must do away with all explanations including the causal ones (*PI* § 109). He writes,

> If the formation of concepts can be explained by facts of nature, should we not be interested, not in grammar, but rather in that in nature which is the basis of grammar? Our interest certainly includes the correspondence between concepts and very general facts of nature. (Such facts as mostly do not strike us because of their generality.) But our interest does not fall back upon these possible causes of the formation of concepts; we are not doing natural science; nor yet natural history - since we can also invent fictitious natural history for our purposes (*PI* p. 230)

Thus, Wittgenstein does away with the scientific explanations of our natural history which includes our language-games and the concept-formations. The interest is not in the causes of the phenomena, but in their reasons, their grammar so to say. That philosophy opts for the descriptions of the grammar of the phenomena is very clear from the following statement :

> Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains or deduces anything. - Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us. One might also give the name "philosophy" to what is possible *before* all new discoveries and inventions (*PI* § 126 original emphasis).

Philosophy puts the grammar before us which itself neither needs explanation or justification. Language which grammar codifies in rules and paradigms needs no further philosophical justification or explanation. Philosophy puts everything as it is (*PI* § 124). It is, as Wittgenstein puts it, "our mistake to look for an explanation where we ought to look at what happens as a 'proto-phenomenon'. That is, where we ought to have said : this language-game is played" (*PI* § 654).

Thus, the transcendental turn amounts to a cancellation of the causal and the scientific mode of explanation. It is the transcendental epoche of the naturalistic attitude, the suspension of our empirical habits of thought, as Husserl[2] would have put it. It marks the end of philosophy

being directly concerned with the facts of nature, i. e., the natural world. It is grammar of the phenomena that becomes transcendentally the subject-matter of philosophical enquiry. Two considerations weigh heavily for grammar being the focus of philosophical investigation. One, grammar is the ultimate source of normativity and necessity involved in our thought and experience, and two, grammar contains the possibilities of phenomena. Grammar as the source of necessity in our thought and experience is the transcendental ground of all language-games, since the latter are the linguistic moves already permitted by the grammatical rules. Rules of grammar define the limits of the possible language-games and so are writ large on the latter. Each language-game is the actualization of rules of grammar. Rules are embedded in the very structure of a language-game, so that the rules and what they permit make one unity of grammatical space. The grammatical space is the space of all linguistic possibilities, the actual as well as the possible language-games. Apart from this fact, grammar contains the possibilities of phenomena (*PI* § 90), the ground of all existence. "Essence is expressed by grammar" (*PI* § 371), as Wittgenstein so aptly puts it. This only suggests that grammar contains the grounds of all possible existence in the world. The essence of the world is as it were reflected in grammar. The following passage is revealing in many ways :

> But the essence of language is a picture of the essence of the world; and philosophy as a custodian of grammar can in fact grasp the essence of the world, only not in the properties of language, but in rules for this language which exclude nonsensical combinations of signs (*PR*, p. 85).

This explains how the essences deposited in grammar show the essence of the world such that the world is already reflected *a priori* in grammar. More revealingly, as Wittgenstein puts it, "grammar tells what kind of object anything is" (*PI* § 373).

The transcendental nature of the critique, thus, stands clear with grammar as the concern of the enquiry. Grammar as the realm of the possibilities of the phenomena and the realm of the necessity of rules in the ultimate transcendental subject-matter of philosophy. Kant would have gladly welcomed this if the following passage from his *Critique* is any guide :

> I entitle *transcendental* all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with the modes of our knowledge insofar as this mode of knowledge is to be possible *a priori*. A system of such concepts might be entitled transcendental philosophy (italics original). [3]

Whatever the precise definition of a transcendental method, it remains an

accepted truth that it is not simply a study of the *a priori* possibilities of knowledge alone, but also the study of the *a priori* grammatical correlate of knowledge, that is, the rules of concept-formation which explain the possibilities of knowledge.In a changed context, Wittgenstein would like philosophy to be concerned with grammar and its *a priori* rules to lay bare the precise contours of the realm of experience and above all the world of natural facts. The traces of Kantianism[4] and broadly of the transcendental thrust[5] are loud and clear.

Wittgenstein's transcendental philosophy is, however, not without the moments of its conflict with the opposite pull of naturalization of philosophy or, to be precise, the anthropologizing[6] of our methods of enquiry. This conflict arises from Wittgenstein's admitted concession to the descriptive account of our natural histories, the customs and practices of people, societies and cultural groups. The interest in natural history is not an interest in anthropology, however. It is only from within a philosophical standpoint that the study of nattural history becomes important. That philosophical standpoint is grammatical and in a sense trans-empirical and trans-anthropological.[7]

III. THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF RULES

If we still search for an exact characterization of Wittgenstein's philosophical grammar, we can very well call it the phenomenology of rules, since Wittgenstein called philosophy a description of the rules of grammar. However, what marks this approach to phenomenology as diferrent from phenomenology proper is its non-recognition of any pure realm of experience, that is, the realm of the given as the locus of meaning and essence. The realm of experience which is the transcendental subjectivity of pure phenomenology[8] is resolved into the realm of grammar and, thus, a further transcendental epoche is made to cancel the diferrence between experience and grammar. The methodological duality between experience and grammar is denied in the ultimate transcendental plane for the reason that ssuch a distinction is extra-grammatical and so empirical in nature. Empirically we do make a distinction between what language is about and the rules of description of what it is about. The objects described in language are empirically distinguished from the rules of description of such objects. But not so transcendentally, since what is termed the object is part of the method of representation, i. e. , the rules of description (*PI* § 400, 401). As Wittgenstein puts it,

> What looks as if it had to exist is part of the language. It is a paradigm in our language-game; something with which comparison is made. And this may be an observation; but it is nontheless an observation concerning our language-game - our method of representation (*PI* § 50).

This move to characterize the so-called facts of experience as internally grammatical and thus to reduce ontology to grammar has the result of cancelling phenomenology of experience as an independent discipline. Phenomenology is ultimately the phenomenology of rules, the methods of description and the paradigms of concept formation (*PR*, pp. 51-53).

The rules of grammar which language embodies and which constitute the linguistic moves are not given to our transcendental consciousness and are not therefore eidetically derived from an absolute pure experience. The rules are there unfolded in language and constitute our experience itself. That is to say, the rules are the internal constituting conditions of language-games and our experience as such. Experience is dependent on the language-games and so on the constituting rules themselves. Wittgenstein thus does not admit experience as pre-grammatical and so as constitutive of grammar. The phenomenological attempt to situate grammar[9] in the domain of intentional experience, i. e., the eidetic acts of transcendental subjectivity falls short of recognizing grammar as the ultimate source of the essences and the *a priori* rules of constitution. Husserl accepts the constitutive essences of grammar[10] but does not admit that these essences are subjective phenomena and are to be discovered through transcendental epoche.

Thus, though Husserl and Wittgenstein agree on philosophy as a description of the essences of language and experience, Husserl's attempt is to derive the essences from a self-evidently given transcendental domain of consciousness. For Wittgenstein, however, the essencess, the rules, are there *sui generis* and do need no derivation or explanation, transcendental or otherwise. Just as language is spontaneous so are the rules, and beyond the rules there is no eternal domain of consciousness which gives them their constitutive character. All our explanation, acccording to Wittgenstein, stops at the rules of grammar and everything else including our experience of the world is derived from them. Of course, the rules are not themselves unconscious bits of sediments of our experience but they are not products of consciousness either. What we call consciousness is a matter of application of rules, the rule-following and their non-applicability beyond the domain of agreed meaning and definition.

Wittgenstein's attempt to make grammar and the rules

autonomous[11] can be seen as the philosophical move to block the possibility of a causal and also a mentalistic account of grammar. Grammar has no mental or physical origin; it is the universal domain of possibility - the possibility of language and the world. It stands for the grammatical space, the unique realm of rules, paradigms and the methods of description. The grammatical space itself is not accountable to any reality beyond itself since realitly, the world is accountable to grammar and is constituted by it. Hence rules are arbitrary, according to Wittgenstein. He writes,

> The rules of grammar may be called "arbitrary" if that is to mean that the *aim* of the grammar is nothing but that of the language.
>
> If someone says, "If our language had not this grammar, it could not express these facts" - it should be asked what "could" means here (*PI* § 497).

The temptation to explain grammar as constituting facts or to justify it by what could or could not be without grammar seems to be ungrounded, since grammar cannot be justified in this way and it goes against the fact that the rules are arbitrary (Z § 331). The fact of being arbitrary is a transcendental fact, a fact of grammatical necessity and so concerning the very possibility of a certain kind of languages-game and the concept-formation. We cannot conceive of a certain kind of fact, if we do not have a certain language-game, and a certain set of rules of concept-formation (Z § § 350, 352). That is, however, not an explanation but a description of a grammatical truth. In this we have reached the limit of all explanation. Hence that is ultimate for us.

IV SUBJECTIVITY, RELATIVISM AND THE TRANSCENDENTAL 'WE'

The limits of our explanations are the limits of our concept-formation. These are the limits laid in our grammar, since grammar determines what can be counted as possible experience. However, "the limits of empiricism are not assumptions unguaranteed, or intuitively known to be correct : they are the ways in which we make comparisons and in which we act" (*RFM,* VII 21). That is to say that grammar as embodying all our possible acts, that is the language-games takes care of all that matters as significant in our thought and experience. Therefore a phenomenology of experience is considered redundant in view of the availability of a philosophical grammar.

Nevertheless, the possibility of a phenomenology of rules does not logically preclude the possibility of a transcendental subjectivity,

however diluted its role may be in the account of grammar and its rules. This has been made clear by Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus* (5.6; 5.62, 5.64) while considering the philosophical availability of a transcendental 'I', the metaphysical subject as the limit of the world. The fact that 'the world is my world' brings in the metaphysical self or the subject but not without a transcendental overtone, since an empirical or, for that matter, a psychological self is considered unimportant from the philosophical point of view. "There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas" (5.631), asserts Wittgenstein reminding us of the non-availibility of a thinking self that empirically can legislate over the world. The only self that is available "does not belong to the world" (5.632) and is rather a limit of it, leaving the world alone untouched by the transcendental self. The transcendental 'I' is no extra-world centre from which the world can be viewed except *sub specie aeternitatis*. But that is not a view-point which can be said. It can onlly be shown. Nevertheless, the limit-self is still significant, since the possibility of the world is shown by this self, and that accounts also for the possibility of language. The visual room, to refer to Wittgenstein's analogy, cannot be significantly considered if there is no owner, but the owner "cannot be found in it, and there is no outside" (*PI* § 398). The owner of the visual room is like the farmer of the imaginary landscape who, though owns the house, cannot enter it (*Ibid*). This only shows the transcendentality of the self or the subject which can be viewed as the supposed owner of thoughts, experience and language. There is language and there are thoughts and experience but there is no owner of them in the empirical sense of the term.

That the transcendental subject is a transcendental need[12] for understanding langluage and experience has been recognized by the Wittgensteinian protagonists. This is more so as a matter of methodological requirement, since without a transcendental "we"[13], as Williams puts it, we cannot explain how language is possible as a totalitly of linguistic activities. The transcendental 'we' is the transcendental bedrock of the language being *our* language and the world being *our* world. This reiterates a continuation of the transcendental move in Wittgenstein's early philosophy in bringing philosophy closer to a transcendental idealism.[14] However, it should be clear that Wittgenstein is no protagonist of either idealism or solipsism or realism in the available sense of the term since these are one-sided ways of construing grammatical facts. So far as grammar is concerned it is neutral to these constructions. For example, the grammatical fact that the limits of our language are the limits of our world

can be subjected to both solipsistic and realistic construations. In that sense the world is what it is, whether we call it *our* world or simply *the* world. As Wittgenstein puts it, "Solipsism, when its implications are followed out strictly, coincides with pure realism.The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it" (*TLP* 5.64).This reaffirms the need of keeping grammar free of metaphysical constructions and of stating it rather than interpreting it.

Nevertheless the transcendental standpoint which grammar subserves cannot be jettisoned as a purely metaphysical construction. It is the fact of grammar that brings in the necessity of a transcendental 'we', the veritable analogue of a transcendental subjectivitly of Husserl and the transcendental unity of consciousness of Kant. But Wittgenstein steers clear of the Kant-Husserlian subjectivity and opts for a transcendental standpoint without a transcendental subjectivity of the idealist type, since the latter is only a grammatical need and not a metaphysical requirements. The question of the transcendental 'we' is the question of making our grammar intelligible as the domain of the rules of language use and the associated forms of life. The empirical availability of forms of life which make the bulk of our natural history does underline the need of a transcendental horizon in which our empirical life-world gets significance. Without this horizon, our forms of life gets dissolved into the contingent accidents of natural history.

Wittgenstein is not advocating, as it is claimed in some quarters, a relativization of our forms of life, our language and grammar including logic and mathematics. The general tendencly of this type of interpretation is to resconstruct the multiple natural histories i. e., the forms of life which are empirically available into genuine alternative histories so as to show that language and grammar are bound up with communities and cultures, and that the rules of grammar are the products of cultural and social agreement. This necessarily results in a kind of relativism with the attendant conventionalist overtone. Wittgenstein is considered a relativist, conventionalist [15] and an advocate of the communitarian[16] view of language and rules. Wiitgenstein, however, has considered the so-called alternative forms of life as model forms of life which *could* be thought or conceived so that we remind ourselves of the uniqueness of *our* forms of life. The following two remarks from *Zettel* suggest what forms of life other than ours could mean :

> I want to say : an education quite different from ours might also be the foundation for quite different concepts (Z, 387).

> For here life would run on differently - what interests us would not
> interest them. Here different concepts would no longer be unimaginable.
> In fact, this is the only way in which *essentially* different concepts are
> imaginable (Z, 388, original emphasis).

This shows how forms of life and conceptual schemes altogether
inaccessible to us could be imagined. What interests Wittgenstein in this
thought experiment is not so much their reality as their conceivability,
since, according to him, we cannot *say* that ours is the only form of life,
nor can we actually compare the different world-pictures (*OC*, § § 94, 95)
as a matter of evaluating what is right or wrong in other world-pictures. All
that we could talk about is the logical possibility of different forms of
acting, thinking and reacting to situations. There is no reason why a group
of people acting very differently could not be considered at all (*OC*
§ §609,612). But that does not throw any light on whether they are actually
available and even if they are so, whether they actually amount to being
alternatives to our world-picture. First of all, even if they are empirically
available, they may not be alternatives to ours and so may be accessible to
us. Secondly, if they are inaccessible to us, we may not be able to
understand them and so they must be considered non-significant for us.[17]
Thus the so-called forms of life do not pose a threat to ours, and do not take
away the uniqueness of our forms of life. As Williams rightly points out,
"the imagined alternatives are not alternatives *to us*; they are alternatives
for us, markers of how far we might go and still remain within our world
- a world leaving which would not mean that we saw something different,
but that we ceased to see" (italics his). The forms of life we have and the
concepts that we share remain an absolute fact for us and they determine
what we can think and experience at all. They determine the very nature
of our thinking and experiencing, that is, precisely what we are. That our
forms of life are absolutely what they are and could not be otherwise is a
transcendental fact, and cannot be further justified. It is the bedrock of our
justification. As Wittgenstein puts it,"if I have exhausted the justifications
I have reached the bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined
to say : "This is simply what I do" (*PI* § 217). Thus what seems ordinarily
as our forms of life do point to the transcendental dimension which
conceals the availability of the socio-cultural relativism threatening to
engulf our language and grammar.

The transcendental critique thus serves the interest of language
and grammar by insulating it against the claims of socio-anthropological
explanation and the dominant pressures of usual modes of thinking. The
critique is a safeguard against philosophy being dissolved into a science

of nature and natural language. Though the dominant concern of philosophy is the natural language, it is not interested in the explanation of natural language as such but in the transcendental horizon which makes natural language what it is. This is not another kind of explanation but a kind of "showing" of what it means to be a language and a form of life. If the transcendental critique is a kind of describing what grammar is and what it means to be bound by grammar, then it is a kind of plainspeaking and a kind of "assembbling reminders" (*PI* § 127) for the purpose of warding off possible misunderstandings. The availability of the critique is a standing testimony of the fact that we are in the constant need of plainspeaking and of plain seeing. The critique is just an eye-opener.[19]

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NOTES

1. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (Crossroad, New York, 1975) part II and III.
2. Cf. Edmund Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, trans. by J.N. Findlay (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1970) Vol. 2 862-63.
3. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. by N. K. Smith (Macmillan St Martin's Press, London, 1920), p. 29.
4. See Jaakko Hintikka, "Wittgenstein's Semantical Kantianism", in *Ethics, Foundations, Problems and Applications* (proceedings of the 5th International Wittgenstein Symposium. 25th to 31st August, 1980, Kirchberg/Wechsel, Austria) eds. Edgar Morscher and Rudolf Stranzinger (Holder - Picher - Tempsky, Vienna, 1981) pp. 375-90.
5. See Jonathan Loar, "Transcendental Anthropology" in *Subject, Thought and Context*, eds. P. Pettit and J. McDowell (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986), pp. 267-98.
6. Cf. *Ibid*, pp. 270-72
7. *Ibid*.
8. See Maurice Natanson, *Edmund Husserl, Philosopher of Infinite Tasks* (North Western University Press, Evanston 1973), pp. 42-146. See also J. N. Mohanty, *The Possibility of Transcendental Philosophy* (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1985) pp. 191-246.
9. Cf. Husserl, *Logical Investigations* Vol. 2, pp. 522-29.

10. See Merril B. Hintikka and Jaakko Hintikka, *Investigating Wittgenstein* (Blackwell, Oxford, 1986) Chapter 6.

11. See G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker, *Wittgenstein : Rules, Grammar and Necessity* (Blackwell, Oxford, 1985), pp. 34-64.

12. See Bernard Williams, "Wittgenstein and Idealism" in *Understanding Wittgenstein* (Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures Vol. 7, 1972/73) (Macmillan, London, 1974), pp. 76-95.

13. Cf. *Ibid*, p. 79.

14. *Ibid*, pp. 92-95.

15. Cf. Michael Dummett, "Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics", in *Wittgenstein : Philosophical Investigations*, ed. George Pitcher (Macmillan, London 1966), pp. 425-26.

16. See Saul Kripke, *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language* (Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 1982) pp. 54-113.

17. See Barry Stroud, "Wittgenstein and Logical Necessity", in *Wittgenstein : Philosophical Investigations*, ed. George Pitcher, pp. 477-96.

18. Williams, *"Wittgenstein and Idealism"*, pp. 91-2.

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