

L. J. COHEN'S METAPHILOSOPHICAL RELATIVISM

1. *Revisionism in Analytical Philosophy*

How analytical is analytical philosophy? It is not easy to find an answer, because critics waver between perfect denouement and absolute practice. There are 'sceptics' who disbelieve that the 'prophylactic' account of analytical philosophy can save us from falling a prey to conceptual confusions, because analytical philosophy itself is a product of conceptual confusions. This is a theme that dominates much of the critique of clarity (critique of the distinction between sense and nonsense) advanced by Baker and Hacker.¹ The epithets of abuse these authors heap on the evolution of the ideas that are currently reigning supreme, will only make professional philosophers blush. They hold, for example, that analytical philosophy is 'a pipedream bred of confusion'; for them, analytical philosophy represents 'a barren mythology of twentieth century culture' (preface, x); again, 'what appears to be a sunrise is merely a false dawn'; 'it leads to wastelands of intellect' (p. 13); 'it is a sterile thunder without rain' (*Ibid.*). Is analytic philosophy, as it is practiced today, then, such a will-O'-the-wisp? Or are there grounds to take it to be a 'metaphilosophy *par excellence*? Cohen answers it by taking analytical philosophy to be analytical because it has a distinct trait of independence from other varieties of non-metaphilosophical accounts of philosophy, and tries to defend with a strong and sustained argumentation so as to vindicate it by vindicating 'rationality' itself.² For Cohen,

Received : 24-4-90

therefore, the linguistic thesis of clarity has the widest possible implications in that it can occupy a very honourable place among disciplines like jurisprudence, law, economics, and art; and hence, its 'socio-political', implications are to be understood on a wider canvas of 'reasoning' and 'rationality'. From this, Cohen develops what may be called a 'dialogical' conception of analytical philosophy, taking the 'dialogue of reason' as synonymous with the 'dialogue of analytical philosophy' itself. Says Cohen, "... The history of analytical philosophy is the history of dialogue itself". For Cohen, once this is recognised to be the unifying theme of the history of analytical philosophy, then the 'direction of its socio-economic political influence is apparent' (61). Understood in this way, analytical philosophy has immense prospects of becoming a species of *Kulturphilosophie* and as such, it will be a 'strong ally for any society' (192) which wants to promote a 'tolerant and democratic culture' (191). Analytical philosophy, says, Cohen, is "a cultural movement, that makes for tolerance, universal suffrage, ethical pluralism, non-violent resolution of disputes, and freedom of intellectual enterprise, and is in turn, promoted by them. Doctrinaire tyrannies certainly have good reason to ban it" (p 62). Cohen's revisionism is not based on any historical interpretation, but as he tells us, it is born out of a metaphilosophical reflection. As I unfold the story below, the major shortcoming of Cohen's vision of 'metaphilosophical revisionism' is that it lacks the historical-hermeneutical side of it, the importance of which is independently acknowledged by writer like Gordon Baker.⁸ Hence, I believe the question how 'analytical' must be substituted with how 'historical' is analytical philosophy (see Section 5 below).

2. *Cohen's Metaphilosophical Argument*

Earlier, Rorty has given recognition to the metaphilosophical trait of linguistic turn, but failed to grasp its wider implications.

But Cohen goes further than this in weaving a perspective around it. By putting it to test, he brings it to the 'court of enquiry', and raises a searching question about its globalist character, so as to make it possible to assert that jurisprudence itself can be brought within its fold. For Cohen, its inner contradictions, inconsistencies, paradoxes can be turned to its advantage by placing emphasis on its 'pluralistic character of metaphilosophy'. What follows from it is the contrast between two accounts of consensus: that is, consensus is an object-level elitist trait as far as the non-metaphilosophical accounts are concerned, but it is an attainable trait as far as metaphilosophical accounts are concerned. Incidentally, Cohen regards "Cogent philosophical arguments are only *ad hominem* at certain points". This explains why analytical philosophers need not bother about agreement, because their lack of consensus itself is quite compatible with the rationality of dialogue. Thus, Cohen makes it a positive virtue of analytical philosophy when it lacks a 'logic' or rules of paradigmatic reasoning. In this context, Cohen may be understood to formulate a metaphilosophical argument for demonstrating the very possibility of analytical philosophy, by assuming the dialogue of reason as providing its necessary transcendental premise. Read backwards, the argument becomes: analytical philosophy provides the conditions of the possibility for human rationality itself. I suppose that either reading is agreeable to him, but it is the former version that is faithful to Cohen's original account; thus analytical philosophy determines the boundaries of reason itself, or more precisely, the limits of analytical philosophy is the limit of reason itself. It appears as though, any disproof of the possibility of analytical philosophy will amount to a disproof of reason itself. Cohen wants to rule out the conceptual possibility of such a proof, even in the face of experimental proof concerning human irrationality itself.

In recent years, Cohen is mounting a vigorous campaign against the experimental proof of 'irrationality'.⁴ Thus, Cohen vehemently denies that philosophical analysis is nothing but a species of computational analysis or its converse, namely that computational analysis (artificial intelligence) is nothing but a sophisticated type of philosophical analysis. It is, therefore, necessary to extend this argument so as to vitiate the argument which stands in favour of psychological language of thought. This is precisely the direction which Cohen takes. From this he develops what may be called an inductivist account of analytical philosophy which is backed up by his work of the last two decades. The key to such an inductivist account is an asymmetry thesis about deduction and induction, which states that: whereas induction can accommodate deduction because of its 'generality' and 'synopticism', deduction cannot so accommodate and therefore the former can provide the terms of integration between them. The question however is, does an inductivist 'option' defend analytical philosophy? It can obviate the charge of sterility, but it cannot silence the cavils of critics. What follows from this is a view of 'metaphilosophical pluralism' that entails neither relativism nor nihilism but a sort of normativism, but without implying a singular 'computationalist account of analytical philosophy'. Cohen derives an advantage from it by separating the inductivist account from the computational, and claims that this gives certain autonomy to the issue about the possibility of analytical philosophy. It is not so much that Cohen denies the psychological reality of reasoning, and in fact agrees with much of it but at the same time, he denies that there is any analogy between philosophical analysis on the one hand and computational analysis on the other.

So, on Cohen's hypothesis even if it is true to hold that all problems of philosophy are *au fond* problems of language

(which, I think, he takes with extreme reservations), it does not follow that mind should be regarded as a computer. With equal vehemence, Cohen expresses himself against the recent analysis of language of thought, particularly the hypothesis proposed by Fodor. Both of the above oppositions do not as yet prove that Cohen is a sceptic about founding the philosophy of language on the philosophy of mind. Cohen's account rather prefers to found it on certain type of philosophy of reasoning, which makes adequate proviso for a non-linguistic variety of linguistic philosophy and non-verbal medium of thinking. Cohen seems to be a cartesian of a sort in his account of reasoning. *A fortiori*, Cohen is a telementalistic, but not of the Boolean type, which gave importance to the isomorphism between the structure of human thought and structure of human language, nor of the Fregean type which gave exclusive importance to the structure of language, but a classicist in the sense that he gives importance to the structures of thought or reasoning.⁵ Accordingly, neither language, nor mind provides the necessary paradigm of analysis, but the paradigm that is to be favoured is rationality, which is neither linguistic nor computational in its core, but of the pragmaticist in type, in that its substantive issues lie in the socio-political realm. Using the above stance, Cohen tries to justify the inclusion of what he calls 'semantic descent' along with 'semantic ascent' to account for techniques of analytical philosophy.

Cohen is sure to disagree with the Dummettian interpretation of philosophy of language which stresses the foundational interests of philosophy of language by advancing what is called the 'central-peripheral' picture.⁶ Against this positive outlook, Cohen's account is negative in that it deviates from this by calling attention to its contribution towards 'substantive' philosophical analysis. What Cohen calls 'substantive' here, is

inconsistent with the above semantic descent. To the extent it engages in substantive questions, it makes a semantic descent. Thus, Cohen disposes of the telementational view adopted by Dummett by arguing that analytical philosophy does not stand in need of 'psychological' arguments for its support. The two arguments that he inveighs against here are : one, thinking cannot go on in a non-verbal medium; second, experiments to prove that we are liable to fallacies in logical arguments. But to what extent Cohen is determined to concern himself with the intentional demension of thought remains enigmatic till the end.

3. Semantic Ascent and Semantic Descent

In Cohen's revisionary outlook, one asymmetry between 'semantic ascent' and 'semantic descent' leads him to the other asymmetry between 'deductive' and 'inductive' modes of reasoning, and the strategy can be extended to cover 'meaning' and 'reference' or even 'realism' where it apparently works and 'anti-realism', where it does not work. If it were to work, then Cohen's inductivism must entail anti-realism. But since this term does not evoke much sympathy with him, the above consequence is suspect. As Cohen makes out, the most important trait of his outlook is the distinction between semantic ascent and semantic descent. Characterised as techniques of analysis, they undoubtedly wear a Russellian garb in that they roughly correspond to Russell's account of 'definition' and 'analysis' given in his lectures on Logical Atomism, wherein the former is understood to be concerned with meaning of words (or transformation of sentences) and the latter is roughly equivalent to the relation between language and extra-linguistic reality. That Russell's concept of analysis, thus, corresponds to definition of logical expressions has been very often overlooked. Looking at this way one can perceive the major shift from 'talk about objects' to 'talk about talk' found in Carnap and Quine in various degrees

moving it in one direction, but how one should locate it within his account of naturalised epistemology is enigmatic, to say the least of it. In brief, the tangle between semantics and epistemology is no longer clear. For Cohen, the thread that spins semantics with epistemology lies in what he calls semantic descent. Complimentary methods as they are, still they are attributable to Quine.

From Cohen's point of view, such a complementarity is to be emphasised for at least two reasons: one is that it reinforces the disanalogy between philosophical analysis and computational analysis; and secondly, it could be used to bring about the identity between 'talk about talk' and 'reasons about reason'. Thus, what the metaphilosophical account aims at is that it provides the norms about norms. The emergent view of analytical philosophy is that, even though there is no one precise method or norm in Cohen's sense, it gives us the norms about norms. Thus, on Cohen's view, neither deduction nor induction provides the ultimate norms of reasoning, but a metaphilosophical way of looking at the basis about their norms has the prospect of illuminating the above two techniques. No doubt the standard method of reasonings as reflected in deductive and inductive methods are not acceptable without major changes, which were fostered by the revolution in logic of mathematics as science. But the methods to standardise them cannot be said to be available within the purview of analytical philosophy, but the consequent problems that they generate go to make up the contours of analytical philosophy. Thus, Cohen is right in holding that it is these problems that go to make analytical philosophy as it is, and not the method which creates the problems. For Cohen, nihilism constitutes only the appearance of analytical movement, but its reality is different in that it contributes towards the study of norms about norms. It is not totally impertinent, therefore,

to characterise analytical philosophy as providing a normative epistemology.

Cohen's metaphilosophy, in a sense, can be equated with a (normative) epistemology of logic. But to what extent, the focus on 'reasoning' can provide an option for defence is not yet clear. As an important trait of analytical philosophy, normative epistemology is quite opposed to 'naturalised' epistemology because it succeeds where naturalised epistemology fails. Though this may seem to be consistent with one interpretation of the aforesaid 'substantivity' of analytical philosophy, it is emphasised at the expense of foundational interests; and Cohen's thesis of complementarity thus errs in making manifest one at the expense of the other. Thus, the normativism of analytical epistemology seems to overlook normativism in semantics, because both take us in divergent directions. One cannot hope to tackle normativism in other areas unless one knows how to tackle normativism in semantics. To reiterate this is to orient ourselves firmly in the foundational outlook. Thus, metaphilosophy is closely linked to foundationalism. But Cohen's outlook is metaphilosophical but without foundationalism.

Normative epistemology has two sources according to Cohen's account: one is seen in the globalist preoccupations of deductivist logic, and second is the localist concerns of inductivist logic. A synthesis of both gives the normative character of analytical philosophy. This is a direct derivation from the premise that deduction is a limiting case of induction, or what in the words of Cohen, inferrability is a limiting case of (inductive) probability, or put it conversely, it amounts to holding that induction is a degenerative form of deduction and *vice versa*. Stated thus, one does not know the primacy of one rather than the other. On Cohen's understanding, there are enough justifications for making inductive probability to be triggered off on a singular case of

intuition. Thus, induction can be given primacy because it is all-pervasive, and it can very well subsume deduction as well. From Cohen's point of view one can be a fallibilist inductivist rather than perfected deductivist. Stated thus, Cohen's dictum stands in support of the above asymmetry thesis. Again the normative character comes through when one considers its relevance to epistemology. Thus, while semantic ascent concentrates on what one means by calling an argument as 'inductively valid', semantic descent suggests what is rational about it within the sphere of epistemology. From the point of view of philosophy of language, while semantic ascent can be considered to be an inquiry into the structure of meanings, semantic descent is an inquiry into what the terms stand for, or simply refer. This is best illustrated in the writings of Russell down to Quine. While Russell was broadly analytic, but stood on empirical grounds; so also Quine whose brainchild semantic ascent is, is still able to concede that "there are no purely linguistic questions at all" (26). It follows therefore, analytic philosophy cannot merely stop at constructing a theory of meaning for natural language, but its *rationale* consists in creating "new solutions for new problems" (30). It is here that Cohen puts forward a suggestion saying that one way in which its basis could be broadened is by introducing 'analogy' which is classically considered to be a species of induction. The advantage that accrues to analytical philosophy, Cohen hastens to add, is that it facilitates an inquiry into the structure of metaphor. Metaphor, in Cohen's sense, therefore is a species of analogy. This lends a new direction to analytical philosophy according to Cohen, which is otherwise sterile. Even analytic verificationism need not be thrown away as useless but it could be fruitfully married to religionism. His objections to naturalised epistemology become almost obvious: naturalised epistemology cannot differentiate between one's own norms and other-norms, by telling us how different people stand in relation to judgements.

Secondly, the cementing relation between facts and language cannot easily be dismissed; and thirdly, beliefs can only be fixed in accordance with norms. Though the first sustains Cohen's pluralistic outlook, its resolution is nowhere in sight; the second has not been successfully explained by realists. By virtue of the point about the first, the last hypothesis wears a dubious character, and Cohen's solution about normativism is nothing but a surrogate relativism, projected on the metaphilosophical screen. Cohen thinks that his project can steer clear of any charge of relativism by changing the relativistic conclusion into one about norms. The resultant anti-relativism does not merely aim at norms but a norm about norms, which recognises that not having any norms is also a norm. So, one is justified in calling Cohen's account of normativism as meta-philosophical relativism.

An essential aspect of Cohen's metaphilosophical relativism is his cure for sterility, which lies counter-productivity, or what may be called the set of rancorous opposites. Cohen is not aware that it leads towards a particular version of, the *aufgehobonist* thesis which mediates between 'dialogical' rather than dialectical opposites.⁷ His asymmetry thesis, to be discussed below, is just an echo of this. Cohen is an *aufgehobonist* without an *aufgehoben* outlook, that is, one who prefers the 'localist' rather than the 'globalist' character of analytical philosophy. Consider the following simple argument; if we assume that all problems of philosophy are problems of language, then the problem of induction is also a problem about language. Hence, it is the concern with language that must illuminate the problem, and not *vice versa*. But Cohen cannot accept this in view of his localist commitments. But if Cohen's portrayal of induction as the core of analytic philosophy is true, then it not only withdraws the pluralistic character it assumes at the beginning, but also completely distorts the *aufgehobonist* character of his outlook.

5. The Strategy of 'deductive' and 'inductive' reasoning

Cohen's strategy is very clear : that is, by grouping deduction and theory of meaning with semantic ascent on the one hand, and theory of reference and induction with semantic descent on the other, he attempts to contrast philosophical analysis and computational analysis. Apart from the fecundity of this contrast, Cohen's attempt to map the development of the ideas over the past eight years runs a serious risk because it is too simplistic. Besides Cohen's reasons for making them fundamental is not too convincing unless he also explains how one is more fundamental than the other, while at the same time taking into consideration the reason why they are to be regarded as fundamental. For illustration, one can describe the same phenomena with which Cohen is concerned by adopting the following strategy; while agreeing that both deduction and induction play certain roles, one may centralise them by studying their respective roles in explaining the broad contours of the theory of meaning. One can even go to the extent of categorising the role of deduction and induction in terms of the following stages. In the earlier stage, there was a consistent attempt to bring the theory of meaning under the paradigm of deduction as reflected in the Tarski-Davidson paradigm, in which case deduction is more primary; at the later stage, an attempt was made to bring meaning under some inductive model or the other (a standard model like the one advanced as deductive-nomological) which also has the early positivist moorings; or consider again, a more advanced stage of the physicalistic Field, or the anti-realistic Kripke, or a still more advanced level in which it is identified with what has come to be christened as the 'epistemology of understanding'. Further developments in the post-fifties can be located at least in two major areas, namely, philosophy of language and philosophy of linguistics (Chomsky, Katz, and Vandler, each of which is unique in certain respects), where semantics still rules and

comes in the form of epistemology of competence (the Chomskyan component reflected in Davidson, and Dummett, and more recently in 'information--processing' approach to the phenomenon of psychological explanation (as reflected in Peacocke and Martin Davies etc.), and the stage at which it is called the 'epistemology of performance' (or understanding as reflected in McDowell, Baker, Hacker etc.). Though this is not purported to cover the entire gamut of developments, it certainly introduces certain order into our thinking. Cohen has not considered in detail any of them, though his references to work on philosophical psychology and philosophy of law are not scanty.

It does not mean that Cohen's approach is without any principle of order. On the contrary, for Cohen the basic character of 'categorical' and the 'hypothetical' modes of reasonings is best appreciated when deduction as well as induction, take on each one of the above modes, and possibly intermix with each other. Given his emphasis on 'intuition' (a single membered one at that which works paradigmatically at times where the jurisprudential metaphor is apt), it unfolds the whole story of analytical philosophy from a base which hardly requires the above stages, but which undoubtedly bears the stamp of overlapping progression of ideas. Cohen's list of thinkers and the doctrines corresponding to them is little longer than necessary, if only to reinforce the above insight. It is not very difficult to realise that the particular order Cohen adopts is based on his earlier work on induction, and is, thus, open to the charge that it is biased to one dimension of analytical thinking.⁸ Cohen cites in support of his intermixing thesis the deductivist Hobbes' derivation of the sovereignty of state, the inductivist Hume's challenge to produce a simple idea without a copy of the corresponding impression, and the deductivist Hume's challenge to causal nexus, deductivist Quine's 'Plain truism' about 'inductive starting point',

inductivist Quine's scepticism about meaning, and inductivist Wittgenstein's case for 'assembling reminders' and Strawson's worry about how impoverished our social life would be if determinism is theoretically true (141) etc; but in all these his vision is narrowed down to a mixing of both deduction and induction in each.

Even scepticism and non-scepticism can take on deductive (Unger) and inductive (classical) forms. Cohen cites Chisholm's work as embodying deductivist's approach to epistemology; again, he cites both the deductivist Spinozist Reformatory Movement, and Bentham's 'reformatory' utilitarianism for showing how deductivism can influence worldly events, before concluding with a remark on the 'synoptic' character of inductivism. Cohen also tries to identify 'realism' and 'anti-realism' with the deductivist and inductivist modes of thinking. No light, however, is shed on this, because the route by which he arrives at this identity is not defensible. In fact, he nearly comes to withdraw the identity of a deductivist analytic philosophy with realism, and inductivist analytic philosophy with anti-realism and again backward to the problematic concerns of meaning and reference respectively. Thus, his efforts to found an inductivist analytical philosophy is doomed to failure at the start, for the very reason it has a deductivist opponent. Cohen's efforts to disentangle the analytical web of reasoning yield no success. His preference for an inductivist version of analytical philosophy is rooted in his understanding of induction as having 'greater generality' and 'synoptic' character. So, towards the *finale* Cohen's attack on the psychological (computational) account of analytical philosophy has its roots in his front against deductivism. A strong reason for Cohen's rejection of its basis is due to the fact that any acceptance of the formalist assumption cannot

do justice to the semantic richness of natural language, a reason which spills over to his critique of Chomsky's account of grammar. In a way, his current opposition to a computational analysis is just an outgrowth of the above critique. But Cohen's account does not make explicit this parallelism anywhere. The unifying theme in all this is that one cannot seriously believe that whatever that has been standardised by the formalist outlook is all that is in language. Such an endeavour, according to Cohen, overlooks the primary function of language, where the formalist account of logical connectives means more than what they stand for a formalist and hence they cannot sustain a psychological argument for reasoning. Cohen illustrates this with a particular case for the conversion of conditionals, where a logical rule cannot tell us how the conversion of $p \supset q$ to $q \supset p$ is justifiable.

6. *Cohen's 'Solution' of Induction*

The strength of Cohen's inductivist analytical philosophy turns on the account of induction which he gives. Cohen's solution consists of the following steps :

Step 1 : What semantic ascent teaches is that the distinction between 'ampliative' (counterfactualisable) and non-ampliative (non-counterfactualisable) is a conceptual equipment;

Step 2 : The technique of semantic descent teaches us that its nomological character depends on the degree of factual assertions which stand as evidence for such generalisations. (incidentally, even one single case can give rise to a law-like generalisation);

Step 3 : The degree of support a set of evidential assertions which support an inductive generalisations represents degree of 'legisimilitude' (nearness to law);

Step 4 : Thus, whereas counterfactualisable generalisation has a high degree of certifiable evidence, the noncounterfactualisable has 'zero' degree legisimilitude;

Step 5 : One can increase the degree of legisimilitude, by either adopting a homogeneous class of events, or by varying the selected samples, or by simply adding a *ceteris paribus* clause;

Step 6 : Thus, it becomes obvious that one may alter the nature of the conclusion by suitably changing the former class;

and

Step 7 : Following (6) one may even go the extent of interpreting inductive fallacies not as involving incorrect scientific or inductive probabilities but as involving an altered class of evidence. The crucial step here, therefore, is (6).

What the above argument establishes is that the well known paradoxes of induction, given as the fallacy of the converse, the 'base-rate' fallacy, the gambler's fallacy, the sample-size fallacy, or the conjunction fallacy are not really fallacies, but they could be interpreted in a positive way; *a fortiori*, no empirical evidence can show that analytical philosophers reason irrationally. What Cohen offers here is nothing but a pragmatic test for the possibility of analytical philosophy. The proof about the empirical possibility of illogical reasoning, therefore, poses no threat to analytical philosophy. Hence, every analytical intuition of every analytical philosopher is not incorrect, just as every reasoning is sanctioned by analytic philosophy and every intuition is valid, even if it is not true of false. The first nullifies the conceptual possibility of 'disproof' of analytical philosophy. The second accounts for its popularity. While its pedagogical

implications are much less clear, its implications for cross-cultural studies is far too wide to discuss within the brief compass.

Department of Philosophy
Calicut University
Calicut
KERALA - 673 635

A. KANTHAMANI

NOTES

1. That analytical philosophy's claim to do a 'critique of language' is neither a critique, nor is it one about clarity, has been almost 'paraded' in Baker's and Hacker's *researche* account of *Language, Sense, and Nonsense* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984). Such an account throws a direct challenge to what it calls the a-historical clarification that has become paradigmatic in Frege research. In their exploding account, history is turned into archeology. In sharp contrast to L. J. Cohen's 'revisionism' of analytical philosophy (see f. n. 2 below), their historical outlook feeds on negative conclusions; however, Gordon Baker refuses to fully endorse this standpoint (see below f. n. 3). An interesting offshoot of the above, somewhat contrary, outlook pervades Stuart Shanker's account where the 'prophylactic clause' of analytical philosophy is overstressed. See his *researche* account in his *Wittgenstein and the Turning Point in the Philosophy of Mathematics* (London: Croom Helm, 1986) which, until now, has failed to evoke any response which it deserves.
2. The *locus classicus* here is L. J. Cohen's *The Dialogue of Reason: Analysis of Analytical Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) (page references in the brackets are to this book).
3. At present there are three ways of doing the history of analytical philosophy: the Dummettian way which scoops out its underlying presuppositions with a view to make analytical philosophy a systematic enterprise (cf, "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic or ought it to be?" in *Truth and other Enigmas* (London: Duckworth, 1978) abetted by certain interpretations of Frege research; the Bakerian way which attempts to make "philosophical understanding as essentially historical"; even while making "historical investigation as an integral part

of philosophical understanding", it makes overtures towards a 'hermeneutical' interpretation of its history" (Preface, p. xv.) and its antecedent namely, the Hacker-Baker's way which the note (f. n. 1) mentions (see above). Baker's divergence surfaces in his *Frege, Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988).

4. Cohen's current opposition has its origin in his earlier article like "Can Human Irrationality be Experimentally Demonstrated?" in *Behavioural and Brain Sciences*, 4, (1981), pp. 317-370, as well as in his "Are people Programmed to commit Fallacies?" etc in the *Journal of the Theory of Social Behaviour*, 12 (1982), pp. 254-274. See also other references under f. n. 14 on p. 158-9 in Cohen's book.
5. The locution 'telementalational' represents the preclassical (i. e. the Boolean) approach to logic and, I think, still holds a certain promise in the current context. (see f. n. 1.).
6. A major feature of Dumettian way of doing interpretative history is the distinction that is drawn between the 'central' (philosophy of language) and the 'peripheral' (epistemology etc.,). The above picture evokes a strong reaction in Stuart Shanker. See for example, his introductory article, "Approaching the Investigations" in *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Critical Assessments*, Vol. II (London: Croom Helm, 1986).
7. In my view, all the three 'prophylactic', the 'dialectical' and the 'dialogical' epithets can be subsumed under the same 'aufgehobonist' outlook, and hence they all share similar questionable grounds. Some of the objections to the 'dialectic' are stated in my "Rorty's Metaphilosophical Argument" in *Indian Philosophical Quarterly* (1989); the objections to the others are stated in my "The Idea of Semiotical Transformation in Philosophy and the Argument from Linguistics" (Ms.) and argued from a hermeneutical angle.
8. Cohen's earliest work on induction is found in his *Implications of Induction* (London: Methuen, 1970) followed by another book on *The Probable and the Provable* (Oxford: OUP, 1977) and see also a large number of articles on induction and probability right upto the present.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF KALIDAS BHATTACHARYYA

Proceedings of a seminar organised by the Department of Philosophy, Rajasthan University, the book contains a critical appraisal of various aspects of the late **Kalidas Bhattacharyya's** philosophical thought, and includes his own final formulation of his philosophical position.

Edited by **Daya Krishna, A. M. Ghose and P. K. Srivastava**

The book includes contributions from **K. L. Sharma** (A Step Beyond K. C. Bhattacharyya), **Daya Krishna** (Kalidas Bhattacharyya and the Logic of Alternation), **S. K. Chattopadhyaya** (Professor Bhattacharyya's "Alternative Standpoints" of Philosophy), **K. Bagchi** (Subjective and Objective Attitudes as Alternatives: A study of Professor Kalidas Bhattacharyya's View of Knowledge-Object Unity), **N. K. Sharma** (Kalidas Bhattacharyya's Philosophy: Alternative Absolutes), **R. S. Bhatnagar** (Philosophy and Meta-Philosophy: Study of a Fundamental Dichotomy in Kalidas Bhattacharyya's Thought), **Mrs. Yogesh Gupta** (Pre-suppositions of Science and Philosophy: A Critical Study) **Mrinal Kanti Bhadra** (Kalidas Bhattacharyya's View of Freedom and Existentialist Thought), **Rajendra Prasad** (Freedom and Existential Thought), **Rajendra Prasad Pandey** (Kalidas Bhattacharyya on the Indian Concept of Man), **K. J. Shah** (Religion—Sophisticated and Unsophisticated), **J. N. Mohanty** (Kalidas Bhattacharyya as a Metaphysician).

1/8 Demy, Pages 239. Price Rs. 60/-

Contact : The Editor,
Indian Philosophical Quarterly,
Department of Philosophy,
Poona University, PUNE 411 007.