

### IDENTICALNESS

Where something is stipulated as possessing identicalness, its identity predicates will serve to afford it a means to unity and at the same time defend it against contradiction. Where  $X$  and  $Y$  designate the same object in *phi* and  $X$  has the property  $F$ , then  $Y$  must have the same property and one which is substitutable in identity predication. The variants  $X$  and  $Y$  will, if the entity in question is assumed to be one and the same thing, have the property of identicalness in some respect, that is, at least symbolically and in name.  $F$  is therefore the close or weakly ordered property in common of necessarily having the indeterminate property  $G$  of identicalness, which is the property of being identical with a certain object in some or in all positive respects  $H$  coterminous with time to a measurable duration and in some degree of freedom.  $F$  is a universal property by virtue of which  $G$  as an 'inexact predicate' has been assigned the interim property of identicalness in some or all respects  $H$ .  $F$  and  $G$ , since they both retain their identicalness with respect to the object in question, share this identicalness in common and are limited to it such that  $F$  and  $G$  will be interchangeable properties expressed in class membership and in terms which are mutually substitutable.  $F$  and  $G$  are class properties which share in common in some or all respects the property of identicalness with the symbolized object which possesses this property.  $F$  and  $G$  are logically and semantically equivalent insofar as they share identicalness. The object possesses an all-inclusive, common and

actually shared identicalness in existence and hence also a causal identity in time duration and sequence rather than only a semantical or purely logical identity.

The interchange of identities in class membership depicting identicalness in existence in some or all respects along with other determinate possibilities is asserted in order to establish the essential identicalness of any entity with which we are concerned.

The problem is to achieve a positive identity formula that will hold universally and in all actual as in all possible contingencies; it will give a complete description of the way in which one world might be given repeatedly in what may be called a 'maximal proposition'. There is no prejudice in favour of the actually existing. We have  $x$  and  $y$  as individual variables identical in  $\phi$  and we want first to bestow upon them the property of a freely elected identicalness in some essential respect to hold under the unique conditionality of possessing a certain measurable duration in time. The property  $F$  is a class of properties in  $\Delta \phi$ , the constant of the set of all properties. The property  $F$  is any essentially stipulated property of identicalness in kind, i. e., a 'near' property, and retains its ordered identicalness through substitution of like properties in kind which are alike in the sense that they are the same only in their identicalness in principle, but not the same absolutely. In other words the property  $F$  bestows class homonymity or equivocity, which allows individuality as to reference in a truth-bearing object while retaining a common meaning in class membership. Sameness of identity eventually resolves itself into the fact that substitution either may be made or it need not be made.

To have identical properties means that the entity or entities under consideration will possess an essentially stipulated property  $F$  of having the freely elected and indeterminate property of

identicalness  $G$  in some essential respect  $H$  in common and shared with something else and substitutable. Substitution will be in terms of class membership, i. e., in terms of some change of class membership of  $F$ , which will be a substitution of terms in kind. This amounts to a substitution of non-irreplaceable terms coterminous with each densely ordered time contingency.

It may be observed that an entity is not identical even with itself without risk of duplication of terms, that is, without embarrassment of the possibility of substitution of identifying terms in synonymy. There is, however, an allowable differentiation or 'time' sameness in dissolution in identifying paronymy cognate terms short of their full definitive meaning. To keep the entity identified at all means that it must retain its identity in class membership at the risk of sharing this identity with some other subclass, or of having this identity substituted for by another like subclass or even of losing its original identity altogether through accidental or definitional cognate terms in paronymy. A property that is assumed to be identical 'de re' may be said 'de dicto' to have the 'near' property of identicalness essentially if  $F$  is the stipulated property of possessing the all-sufficient property  $G$  of identicalness necessarily and in some or all respects  $H$ .  $F$  and  $G$  share in common the actual identicalness of the thing that has it such that they are the same in class identity and their referring object necessarily is truth, with still some risk of error. I have the property of being identical with myself, but not absolutely, since I am identical with myself (a) 'de re', whereby I am identified with myself substantively and in assumption as object and at best only as a symbolic variant and (b) 'de dicto', in which I am self-identical and reidentified with myself symbolically in at least two ways, (i) self-attributively and (ii) successively and in class substitutivity, dissoluble and limited in the time context.

We reconstruct, not by way of predication given accidentally only, but assuming identicalness first definitively, pure and simple, and by reidentifying through the not-inconsistent substitution at law of one class identity for another class identity based upon a 'maximal' subject proposition stated in the contrafactual sense and in consideration of all ways of equal possibility in which this or that subject-word might be given in existence.

There is no guarantee that we are always talking about the same thing; there is no certainty that an entity is identical with itself at every moment of its existence unless it is first supported by an assumption of the property of identicalness in kind and in some respect. In some sense, however, the self-identity of a thing or an event as subject is not essential to it. That is to say if the identity in question is known to be unique and explicitly distinctive to itself alone it may be substituted for and shared, but only tacitly, symbolically and in provisional synonymy. But in another respect a thing, to be identified, requires the shared identity of something else in common with it, and it may bear identity only when its own identity in essence is substituted for by at least one other identity in kind and in some degree of freedom coextensive with a time limitation. A thing need not always be identified in identically the same respect in order to remain identically the same object with itself.

We are saying that  $x$  is the same in *phi* as  $y$ , that is, that  $x$  and  $y$  are indistinguishable in respect to some property *psi*, which is expressed as a predicate. Two objects, for example,  $u$  and  $z$  are identically the same in some respect, coterminous in time and in some degree of freedom, that is, within a time gradient. These two objects may have identically the same height or whatever, which is to say that they share some property in common and that this common property must be selective and

may be substituted for symbolically. This in turn is to say that a property in common expressed as a proper predicate in causal connectivity and instrumental in furthering a continuing identity may be meaningfully substituted for in two ways, (1) uniquely and by itself alone and (2) essentially and by another in kind. In either case the substitution occurs along with a referential object if necessary, verifiable in the time context.

The predicates *psi*, *psi*, can change class membership within *Delta phi*, requiring a stabilizer, i.e., *psi epsilon Delta Phi*, such that we are able to speak of this or that individual table as a class member that changes in membership either as it changes its own identity, where one identity is substituted for another identity resulting in its reidentification, or as its identity remains the same substantively. Where these identities prove to be logically and semantically true, identicalness is established truth functionally, i.e.,  $\forall (F \equiv G) = T \rightarrow \square (F = G)$ , where *F* is the property of necessarily having the property of an indeterminate identicalness *G* in some respect coterminous with time, i.e., in a time gradient. Read: the truth of the logical or semantic equivalence of all free instances of properties *F* and *G* implies the necessary identicalness of *F* and *G* in kind in some or all respects in existence but not absolutely. If the nominal subject *G* has the 'near' property *F* as a necessary property in order to identify it essentially, then the proposition 'necessarily *F* is *G*' is necessarily true.

We resymbolize and substitute for the symbol, i.e., for the predicate variable and in kind; the symbolic property as such and as subject may be taken as an interim or designated entity, an abstract yet particular subject in its own right where it is assumed to be meaningful. 'Socrates is wise' says something about Socrates and tells of one of the attributes of the man we no longer have with us. Wisdom is not a property at all of the

name 'Socrates,' for it is Socrates himself who is wise and not his name. It is the attribute wisdom rather than the predicate 'wisdom' which is the property that Socrates has. Yet in fact it will be the fledgling identity 'Socrates' held provisionally as subject rather than Socrates the man that we may first hope to predicate of in a categorical sense and to reidentify subsequently at law. To do this means to predicate essentially of 'Socrates' as a subject in existence at least the unique property of identicalness, i.e., the symbolic or 'close' property  $F$  in kind of having the all-sufficient and indeterminate property of identicalness  $G$  in some or all respects generally and coextensive with the time gradient, or, as we might say, having the property  $G$  maximally and in all possible contingencies. We predicate of subjects and not of things, or at least the most we are able to say is that we predicate of things taken as maximally possible subject entities held nominally in existence. The point seems to be that the subject-name possesses the 'near' property of e.g. wisdom in kind, which is not wisdom at all, but only a predicate placeholder which marks out a logical space giving entitlement to a wisdom that has applicability, a wisdom that may or may not be instantiated at any appropriate time contingency.

Predication in terms of identification theory, as in second-order quantification logic must needs be in the form of a universal instantiation and incompletely dispositional, an identification by means of a universal formula accepted in consensual agreement in order to make good the claims that we are actualizing and synthesizing one and the same thing. The only property about which are concerned is that of a common and in some respect limited identicalness shared by some subject that is already provisionally held and tacitly designated in name, not at first essentially but uniquely and virtually. To identify a thing is

to be able to subsequently and in succession and in kind substitute one given identity for another given identity negatively such that this reidentification may be open to verification in the ongoing time milieu.

The aim has been to establish reidentification by means of a universally agreed upon formula in order to make good the claim that we are talking about one and the same entity in its identicalness, and to unify and synthesize the entity in question into one ordered paradigm of interchangeable parts, i.e., substitutable terms. The paradigm with which we are concerned can only be a language model. Not that we do away with predication, but that predication is achieved in terms of class identicalness which is repeatable and substitutable in kind in order to identify an entity in terms of some kind of identity predication which will be uniform and universal in substitutable class membership. To claim identity is to be able to substitute one identity for another identity in kind and to not know that it is not substitutable such that the identity is still open to risk in rational possibility. The thing or event to which we refer can then be comprehended in terms of a universal symbolic formula upon which we are subsequently free to establish an ongoing litigious agreement or disagreement by means of our own peculiar kind of communicable discourse.

59 Victor Street,  
London, Ontario,  
Canada N6c 1B9

A. W. J. HARPER

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