

Discussions :

A NOT-SO-NOTORIOUS UDAHARĀNA

Prof. Arvind Sharma (Department of Religious Studies, The University of Sydney) in his 'critical note' on 'Udaharāna' ('Indian Philosophical Quarterly' Vol. XII, No. 3) has shown lots of concern about the tag which the third *avayava* of the Nyāya *parārthānumāna* carries. The purpose of my paper is to show that the *udāharaṇa* under consideration is not as notorious as it seems to be.

I

It is not the case that the Nyāya system is propounded by a couple of philosophers and then made to rest! It is not a static system. It is a system which grew and continued to develop while clashing with the rival schools of thought. Its metaphysics underwent a considerable development in the process of its attempt to defend the realistic philosophy. Its epistemology too dynamically grew when its proponents were very bitterly shown their limitations by the rivals. Accordingly, very many concepts introduced by the *sūtrakāra* Gautama (c. 200 B.C.) evolved and took different shapes when they were discussed by Uddyotakara (end of the 6th century A.D.) for the purpose of defending the Nyāya position against the Buddhist Dignāga attack. And this evolution went on through Jayantabhaṭṭa (beginning of the 9th century A.D.), Bhāsarvajña — the *ekadaśin* Naiyāyika (close of the 9th century), Vyomaśiva, Vāchaspatimiśra (flourished 841 A.D.), Śridhara and Udayanāchārya (both belonging to the close of the 10th century). The picture again changed when Śivāditya (10th century) officially united the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika to form the syncretic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. And then with the introduction of

the Navya Nyāya in the 12th century A.D. through 'Tattva-chintāmaṇi' of Gaṅgeśa, there was a complete revolution. Vardhamāna (12th century), Jayadeva Pakṣadhara (15th century), Raghunātha Śiromaṇi (beginning of the 16th century), Gadādhara (middle of the 17th century) and others carried on the Navya Nyāya methodology. But side by side, the syncretic manuals like 'Tarkasaṅgraha' of Annambhaṭṭa (17th century) and 'Bhāṣāparichchheda' with 'Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvali' of Viśvanātha (17th c.) also raised their heads.

It is in the light of such facts that I ask: Is there not a possibility of our finding a definition of 'udāharaṇa' in the 17th c. work like 'Tarkasaṅgraha' different from the definition of the same term as put forth by 'Nyāyasūtram' of Gautama — c. 200 B.C.? Here is a span of about one thousand eight hundred years! And the connotation, and hence the definition, of 'udāharaṇa' did not remain identical in this period of time. It is difficult to trace the whole history of it in this small note. Hence I have selected the earlier work. 'Nyāyasūtram' and a relatively modern piece — 'Tarkasaṅgraha', and have shown the differences.

II

Gautama introduces 'anumāna' in the third sūtra of *adyāya* one and *āhnika* one, as one of the four *pramāṇas*:

"Pratyakṣānumānopamānaśabdāḥ pramāṇāni" (1/1/3) At this stage he is analysing the first of the sixteen epistemological topics enumerated in the very first sūtra: "Pramāṇa prameya saṁśaya prayojana dṛṣṭānta siddhānta avayava tarka nirṇaya vāda jalpa vitandā hetvābhāsa chhala jāti nigrahasthānānām tattvajñānāt nisreyasa adhigamaḥ" (1/1/1). The fifth sūtra mentions kinds of *anumāna*: "... trividham anumānam pūrvavat śesavat sāmānyatodṛṣṭam cha" (1/1/5). And it is only in the 32nd sūtra that Gautama introduces the constituents of reasoning: "Pratijñā hetu udāharaṇa upanaya nigamanāni avayavāḥ" (1/1/32). Analysis of these is in the sūtras 33 through 39. The 33rd

sūtra reads as: “*Sādhyā nirdeśaḥ pratijñā*” — “*Pratijñā* is the declaration of *sādhyā*,” As an example of this we may have the assertion: “*Parvato vahnimān*”. *Vahni* (fire) the existence of which is to be demonstrated on the *parvataḥ* (mountain), is the *sādhyā*.

The 34th *sūtra* defines ‘*hetu*’ — the second *avayava*: “*Udāharāṇa sādharmaṃsādhyasādhanam hetuḥ*” (1/1/34) “*Hetu* is the *sādhanā* (which makes known) the *sādhyā* through its similarity to the *udāharāṇa*.” Mind well, Gautama says “*Hetu* is the *sādhanā*”. He does not say that *vyāpti* is the *sādhanā*; he does not consider *parāmarś* as the *sādhanā*; he says “*hetu* is the *sādhanā*”. Glimpses of *vyāpti* can be seen much later — in Vātsyāyana’s *bhāṣya*. There is a span of about 500 years between Gautama and Vātsyāyana! And even Vātsyāyana, while commenting on this *sūtra*, has not used the word ‘*vyāpti*’. *anumāna* in ‘*nyāyasutram*’ is still in its infancy. As an example of this second *avayava*, we may have the assertion: “*Dhoomāt*”. We assert the existence of fire on the mountain because of the presence of smoke there. But how does the *hetu* (the presence of smoke on the mountain) work as the *sādhanā* of *sādhyā*? The *sūtra* answers: “*Udāharāṇa sādharmaṃ*” — “through its similarity to the *udāharāṇa*”. The 35th *sūtra* continues the point. “*Tathā vaidharmaṃ*” (1/1/35)— “And also through dissimilarity”. A lake is an instance which is dissimilar (because of the absence of smoke). Thus the kitchen hearth has been observed to have smoke and fire; but the lake has been observed to have the absence of both. In this way, it is reasoned that the mountain like the kitchen hearth has the presence of fire as there is the presence of smoke. Again, unlike the lake, the mountain has the presence of fire as there is no absence of smoke! (It is very strongly felt here that Gautama has made a mistake in making non-smoke to imply the absence of fire. While in Gautama’s case this wrongness is doubted, in the case of Vātsyāyana, the error is very explicit. His example in the *bhāṣya* reads as follows: “*Anit-*

yaḥ śbdah” (Sound is non-eternal) “*utpattidharmakatvāt*” (“because it has the property of being produced”)— “*Anutpattidharmakam nityam*” (“That which has not the property of being produced is eternal”) “*yathā ātmādi dravyam iti*” (“as in the cases of substances like soul”). If we substitute this by *dhooma-vahni* example, then very clearly non-dhooma is seen as having made to imply non-vahni! And this is wrong. ‘If X then Y’ is *not* materially equivalent to ‘If non-X then only non-Y’; it is equivalent to ‘If non-Y then non-X’.

As the second *avayava*, *hetu*, is defined in terms of *udāharana*, the onus to define ‘*udāharana*’ itself is very much there on Gautama. And this leads us to his 36th *sūtra*: “*Sādhyā sādharṃyāt tat dharma bhāvaḥ dṛṣṭānta udāharanam* (1/1/36)

“*Udāharana* is that *dṛṣṭānta* which possesses a property of the *sādhyā*, by similarity.” As a concrete instance of *udāharana* we may take the assertion: “*Yathā mahānasah*”. Thus the kitchen hearth (*udāharana*) is the *dṛṣṭānta* which possesses smoke — a property of fire (*sādhyā*), as on *parvataḥ*. Mind well. Gautama says: *Udāharana* IS a *dṛṣṭānta*; he does not say that *udāharana* is a combination of *vyāpti vākya* and a *dṛṣṭānta*! He identifies *udāharana* with *dṛṣṭānta* and what is a *dṛṣṭānta*? His definition in the 25th *sūtra* reads as follows: “*Laukika parikṣāṇām yasminnārthe buddhi sāmnyam sa dṛṣṭānta*” (1/1/25). “*Dṛṣṭānta* is that instance about which an ordinary man and an expert entertain the same views.” Thus the *vādin* and the *pratvādin* both agree that *mahānasah* is an instance where smoke and fire both are found.

After *udāharana* comes *upanaya* — the fourth *avayava*, and this is defined in the 38th *sūtra*: “*Udāharana apekṣah tathā iti upasañhāra na tathā iti vā sādhyasya upanayaḥ*” (1/1/38) — With reference to the *udāharana* of the *sādhyā* when we sum up (our assertion in the form) “*Like it*”

or "Unlike it", it is *upanaya*. To illustrate: If "*Yathā mahānasaḥ*" is the *udāharāṇa* under consideration, then the *upanaya* will be: "*Tathā chāyam parvataḥ*". "(So like the kitchen hearth) there is smoke on this mountain."

And as regards the fifth *avayava*, *nigamana*, Gautama says: "*Hetu apadeśāt pratijñāyāḥ punarvachanam nigamanam.*" (1/1/39) "*Nigamana* is the re-statement of the *pratijñā* as a result of adducing *hetu* as the cause." "*Tasmāt vahnimān asau parvataḥ*" — "Therefore there is fire on the mountain" states the conclusion in our example.

Let us now gather the fragments and put them in order so as to form a concrete example as conceived by Gautama:

"Parvato vahnimān"	(Pratijñā)
"Dhoomāt"	(Hetu)
"Yathā mahānasaḥ"	(Udāharāṇa)
"Tathā chāyam parvataḥ"	(Upanaya)
"Tasmāt vahnimān asau parvataḥ"	(Nigamana)

Surely this is not a fully developed *anuāna*. It is a *kalikā*, a bud, a growing *anumāna*. Nevertheless, does it not clarify the reason behind the third *avayava*'s carrying the tag "*udāharāṇa*"?

III

Years rolled by. For centuries the rival philosophers thrashed the Naiyāyikas. And this resulted in a doctrine of *ānumana* in a much decent, tolerable, garb.

"Pratijñā hetu udāharāṇa upanaya nigamanāni pañchāvayavāḥ.

Parvato vahnimān iti pratijñā

Dhoomavattvāt iti hetu

Yo yo dhoomavān sa sa agnimān, yathā mahānasaḥ iti udāharāṇam

Tathā chāyam iti upanaya

Tasmāt tathā iti nigamanam."

This is how the 46th *sūtra* of 'Tarkasaṅgraha reads after a distinction between *Svārthānumāna* and *Parārthānumāna* having made in the previous *sūtra*. While commenting on it, the 'Dīpikā' defines 'pratijñā' as "*Sādhyavattayā pakṣa vachanam*" — "Speaking of *pakṣa* as possessing *sādhyā* is *pratijñā*." Its job is to make the listener mentally set for *nigamana*.

The 'Dīpikā' continues: "...*liṅga pratipādakam vachanam hetuḥ*" — "*Hetu* is the statement which declares the *liṅga* (the characteristic mark of *sādhyā*)."

Then comes the definition of '*udāharaṇa*': "*Vyāpti pratipādakam udāharaṇam*" — "*Udāharaṇa (avayava)* is that which declares the *vyāpti*". Another definition in one of the later editions of the 'Dīpikā' with the commentary of Nīlkantha, printed at Benares in 1875 (which possibly is a later interpolation) includes even *dr̥ṣṭānta!* It reads thus: "*Vyāptipratipādakam dr̥ṣṭānta vachanamudāharaṇam*" —

"*Udāharaṇa (avayava)* is that which declares the *vyāpti* and *dr̥ṣṭānta*." And the same later edition puts forth a very accurate definition of '*upanaya*': "*Vyāpti viśiṣṭa liṅga pratipādakam vachanam upanaya*" —

"*Upanaya (avayava)* is the statement which declares the *liṅga* as qualified by *vyāpti*." Accordingly, "*Tatha chāyam*" gets a detailed analysis so as to read as: "*Vahni vyāpya dhoomavānayaṃ parvataḥ*" —

"*Dhooma* which is the *vyāpya* of *vahni* is on the mountain."

Finally, the 'Dīpikā' defines 'the purpose of *nigamana*' as follows: "*Abādhitatvādikam nigamana prayojanam*" — "The purpose of *nigamana* is to exclude the possibility of any contradiction as to the existence of *sādhyā*."

IV

Thus we find that although the *avayavas* are five in the doctrines of both the 'Nyāyasūtram' and the later works, the content going into this garb is very much different in essence in the two. While the former doctrine puts forth a growing *anumāna*, the latter gives a much more matured theory. While in the later works *parāmarśa* is regarded as the *asādhāraṇa kāraṇa*, i.e. *kaṛaṇa*, of *anumiti*, Gautama regards *hetu* as demonstrating the *sādhya*. "Vyāpti viśiṣṭa pakṣadharmatā jñānam parāmarśaḥ" — "Parāmarśa is the knowledge of *pakṣadharmatā* as qualified by *vyāpti*." Once the correct *parāmarśa* is obtained, the *anumiti* follows of necessity. Once having stated "*Vahni vyāpya dhooma-vānāyam parvataḥ*", "*Tasmāt vahnimān asau parvataḥ*" follows logically.

Again, while the later works define '*udāharaṇa*' as "*Vyāptipratipādakam dṛṣṭānta vachanam*", Gautama identifies '*udāharaṇa*' with '*dṛṣṭānta*'. While in the later works "*Yatra dhooma tatra vahni, yathā mahānasaḥ*" illustrates *udāharaṇa*, in Gautamasūtra "*Yathā mahānasaḥ*" by itself illustrates it.

Thus while the theory of *anumāna* changed a lot, and of course for the better, the original tags attached to the five propositions lazily stayed on. If Gautama had put forth the *vyāpti vākya* and a *dṛṣṭānta*, and had he labelled the *avayava* as *udāharaṇa*, then the tag would have been very notorious! But this the sūtrakāra did not do. He laid down a *dṛṣṭānta* as a *tritīya avayava*, and labelled it as *udāharaṇa*. He defined '*udāharaṇa*' in terms of *dṛṣṭānta*. And this is consistent. The later Naiyāyikas while seeing the limitations of Gautama's theory, added, and rightly so, the *vyāpti vākya* to the *dṛṣṭānta*. Thus while in Gautama's theory *dṛṣṭānta* was indispensable, in the later doctrine surely it is dispensable. And it has been dispensed with by Laugākṣi Bhāskara in 'Nyayasiddhāntamañjariprakāśa.' He says: "*Dṛṣṭānta prayogastu samayiko no niyataḥ*" — "The use of

dr̥ṣṭānta is (now) purely conventional and not essential." In many other modern works, however, the *dr̥ṣṭānta* has just lazily stayed on. True, the label 'Udāharaṇa' needs to be changed. But to a person who has grasped thoroughly this developmental aspect of *anumāna khaṇḍa*, the label is not at all puzzling. It too has just lazily stayed on. It is not notorious.

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A NOTE ON MODALITY AND THE LAW OF ADDITION

The discussion of necessary a posteriori truths presents an interesting example* where a tautology is derived from an empirical premise and thus inherits its a posteriori modal status e.g. to the proposition, 'It is raining' known to us empirically we add its contradictory 'It is not raining'. This we do on the basis of our knowledge of the laws of logic one of which is the law of addition which permits that to any true proposition we can add any other. The resultant proposition viz. 'Either it is raining or it is not raining' is a tautology or a necessary truth while the proposition from which it was obtained was contingent but the a posteriori character of the first proposition must be preserved in the latter thereby making our knowledge of the necessary proposition a posteriori.

The truth of a disjunctive statement is known if the truth of one of its disjuncts is known, so from the knowledge of 'p' we can claim the knowledge of $p \vee q$ and derivation from empirical premises must certainly result in other empirical ones.

This derivation however seems to have two undesirable consequences. Firstly it amounts to the denial of the mutual exclusiveness of the distinction between a priori and a posteriori propositions and secondly it permits the transition from some specific knowledge to no knowledge or the absence of that knowledge.

It is obvious enough that ' $p \vee \sim p$ ' or the proposition 'Either it is raining or it is not raining' as it is in our exam-

* The example appears in Professor P. K. Sen's 'The Necessary and the A priori' Appendix 1 to his *Logic, Induction and Ontology*, Macmillan 1980.

ple, which expresses a necessary truth that can be known a priori. The 'same' proposition it can be claimed is a posteriori for it can be demonstrated to follow from an empirical premise. The mutual exclusiveness of the two modes of knowledge has been evidently blurred here.

The second point is an intuitive one which questions the universality of the burden loaded on a logical inference that it must always preserve the epistemic modal status of the premise in the inferred proposition. In a fairly clear sense a disjunctive statement of the type ' $p \vee \sim p$ ' does not give us any information and we neither know that p is true nor do we know that $\sim p$ is true. The truth of neither of the disjuncts is a part of the assertion of the disjunctive statement. Since the truth of p does not form a part of assertion of $p \vee \sim p$, knowledge of p should also not be taken as a part of the knowledge of $p \vee \sim p$. Even if p is known to be true a posteriori.

The law of addition here is allowing us to proceed from the knowledge of p 's truth to the absence of knowledge regarding it. This however is not to be understood in any way as an expression of the British virtue of understatement where 'I am happy' can be expressed (or is it under expressed) as 'I am not despondent' from the truth of the former the latter obtains, for here it is not a case of knowing all and expressing little but a case of knowing something and not knowing it at all. It is strange how my knowing of p empirically should effect the epistemic modal status of a statement in which that knowledge claim does not appear at all. Perhaps some gross injustice has been done to our intuitive characterisation of 'knowing' in this move.

It may also be pointed out that laws of logic permit the derivation of true conclusions from false one. Valid inferences do not preserve truth values. Metaphysical Modalities too are not preserved as tautologies can be derived from contingent propositions but why then should we insist that the epistemic modal status of the premise must be pre-

served in the conclusion? Even if we do not want to give up the general belief that from a posteriori propositions other a posteriori ones follow we can put a condition on the law of addition that to any proposition we are not permitted to add either itself or its negation and this condition will be violated only at the peril of violating the general belief.

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