

GETTIER-LIKE PROBLEM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Yathārthaṃ Sarvameveha Vijñānamiti.... Prabhakaragurorrbhāvaḥ
— Salikanatha

Sceptical philosophy doth make cowards of us all
— Alan R. White

The importance of (Gettier and) Gettier-like problem is best understood in the context of scepticism. And scepticism is a major concern of philosophers of every age and culture. In the first part of my paper I have distinguished a few kinds of scepticism and their sources. I have also shown that like the contemporary epistemologists¹ the classical Indian Philosophers were aware of these. But the approach the Indian Philosophers adopted to meet the challenge of scepticism is significantly different from the approach epistemologists adopt. These two approaches have also been distinguished and, in a general way, their relative value has been assessed. In the second part at least one Gettier-like problem to be found in Indian philosophy has been cited and explained. In the third part I have discussed an instance of the characteristic way in which the Indian Philosophers meet the challenge of scepticism.

I

It may be of interest to those who are exclusively or mainly acquainted with the philosophies of one culture to find some parallel philosophical concern and similar philosophical views among philosophers of different culture and age.² The interest is likely to deepen if the views have been defended (or rejected) on different grounds or clarified along different lines. This is not to suggest, of course, that the genuineness of concern or the importance of the views

or the soundness of the argument would have to lose anything if such parallelism had not existed. Any way, it seems that some of the contemporary epistemologists have been led³ to admit, sometimes perhaps inspite of themselves, the following positions:

- (P) Knowledge cannot be false⁴
- (Q) One cannot fail to know⁵
that one knows that *P* whenever
one knows that *p*

Some classical Indian Philosophers not only accepted these positions willingly but also argued strongly in favour of them. The philosophers of the Prabhākara School, for example, consider these two positions to be central to their philosophy.

These positions are held and defended, when they are held and defended, in defiance of scepticism. And this scepticism seems to be a concern of philosophers of all culture and age. The epistemologists seem to have inherited their concern over scepticism from Plato himself. Moore [Moore 1922/60 p. 163, Moore 1925], Russell [Russell 1912 pp. 37-40] and some other philosophers seemed to have achieved in the recent past considerable progress in clarifying the problem of scepticism if not solving it finally. But the discovery of the Gettier counter-example [Gettier 1963] seems to have again brighten the prospect of scepticism.⁶ The epistemologists in general have not, however, accepted the situation in the spirit of resignation. Various attempts have been made and are still being made to supply a fourth condition that would solve the Gettier problem.

This is as it should be. A philosopher true to his vocation can ill afford to accept or ignore scepticism [Stroll 1967, p. 3]. It seems that he is committed to the view that knowledge in general and also perhaps certain particular kinds of knowledge are possible. All the classical schools of Indian philosophy⁷ openly acknowledged this commitment. But just as in Greek and English Philosophies so also in Indian

philosophies we find there were thinkers who jealously formulated and defended scepticism. And it seems to have been felt by many philosophers, in any case, at least by some Indian philosophers, that to successfully meet scepticism one should accept and defend both (P) and (Q). It is, however, not apparent how one's admitting or even defending successfully both (P) and (Q) can be an answer to scepticism. For when the sceptics deny or doubt⁸ that one ever knows a single proposition, they can, as will be clear, at the same time consistently hold both (P) and (Q). Thus the nature of the approach to meet scepticism and the prospect of its success are determined, at least partly, by the source and type of scepticism.

Scepticism may arise from the fact or belief that there is no way or means of *getting* knowledge. Scepticism (S¹), which has such a source, denies or doubts that we *have* or can *have* knowledge in general or of some particular kind.⁹ But there may be another kind of scepticism (S²) which arises from the fact or belief that we cannot *know* that we have knowledge even if and when we have it. This (S²) may be taken as a variety (S^{1a}) of (S¹) in which case it is to be understood as denying or doubting that we *have* or can *have* knowledge of *knowledge* i.e., denying or doubting that we do or can know that we know.¹⁰ But (S²) may also be understood as (S^{2b}) as denying or doubting that we have or can have any adequate *criterion* for identifying a case of knowledge as a case of knowledge.¹¹ Contemporary epistemologists often given this (S^{2b}) a predominantly linguistic formulation. And hence even when they speak of analysis of knowledge they mean analysis or definition of 'know' or 'knowledge'.

Now one possible variety or scepticism (S^{2b}) is certainly scepticism about criterion. We shall call it *test-scepticism*. But this variety of scepticism is incompatible with the scepticism (S¹) which denies or doubts that we have or can have any knowledge.¹² (We call it *act-scepticism* to distinguish it from test-scepticism.) For a test-sceptic will most

probably adopt the strategy of demonstrating the failure of any particular proposed definition of knowledge by showing either that it covers a case which is not knowledge or fails to cover some genuine act of knowledge. But once act-scepticism is accepted, or so long it remains unanswered, there is no knowledge-act the failure to cover which can render a proposed criterion of knowledge too narrow and for that matter unacceptable.¹³ Nor can it be shown in any significant sense that a proposed criterion is too wide or even non-applicable. The test-sceptic has therefore a few advantages. His position is not liable to be rejected outright on the ground that it violates commonsense.¹⁴ But for the same reason one may easily be led to think that the issue with the criterion or test-sceptic is linguistic. And not infrequently the issue is construed in this way: Do we or can we have an acceptable criterion of knowledge? And the approach usually adopted by many contemporary epistemologists is "logic of the expression" approach or *LE* approach. In other words, these epistemologists while having only test scepticism in view, appear to think what is needed to meet such scepticism is (the proper) analysis or definition of knowledge. In other words, we shall have to have a logic of "know". By a logic of an expression is meant the (totality of the ?) rules determining meaning of that expression. But those who view things like meaning with suspicion or those who for whatever reason do not like to speak in terms of meaning, mean by logic of an expression the (totality of the ?) rules of the correct use of that expression. These rules are supposed to specify the necessary and sufficient conditions of the correct use of the expression under reference.

It should be noted, however, that while the test scepticism was not unknown to the classical Indian philosophers, this did not have for them essentially a linguistic character. They did not equate criterion with nominal definition. And perhaps for this reason they could keep distinct the conditions of knowing from the conditions of our ability to say

that we know, even though they maintained that (real) definition does at the same time provide us with a criterion of use for the relevant expression. And it may be that we could have taken from the discovery of the Gettier problem the lesson that we need to keep distinct more carefully and consciously the linguistic approach (and for that matter, conditions of our ability to say that we know) from the ontological and/or psychological approach (and for that matter conditions of knowing). It may incidentally be mentioned that Plato, to whose writing the epistemologists trace their classical definition of knowledge, did not want to formulate simply a criterion of our use of "know" or its synonym when he distinguished knowledge from belief. [Cf. Cross 1979, pp. 168-170]. Anyway, the Indian Philosophers do not deny the importance of the fact of usage. But their approach is not linguistic. They do not think that the only or even the best way to philosophical truth is through the study of language. In any case, in their treatment of knowledge and scepticism they do not adopt the logic of the expression approach. Their approach may better be characterized as the nature of the thing approach.¹⁵

It is not my purpose here to judge either the absolute or relative merit of these approaches. And it is very difficult to pass such judgments. I have discussed the point elsewhere in greater detail. Consideration of space prevents me from recounting those points. I shall only make some brief remarks. In the first place, I understand the attitude of the Indian philosophers in this way. Linguistic approach in general and logic of the expression approach in particular is all right as far as it goes. But it does not go very far. If such a logic is to be justified¹⁶ or preferred to some other logic then we shall have to have recourse to the consideration of the nature of the thing concerned. This brings me to my second remark. Logic of the expression approach is a very slippery ground. If the Gettier problem has taught us anything it is this that we use or withhold the expression "known" or even "know that" in so diverse cases that

it is practically impossible to cover all those cases by a logic which would satisfy the Griffiths preference criterion [Griffiths 1967 p. 5]. And this may be the reason why some epistemologists doubt that any satisfactory (nominal) definition of knowledge can at all be provided. [Chisholm 1977 p 106]. Anyway, logic of an (natural language) expression cannot be, it seems, its own justification. An inadequate awareness of this truth leads to delicate situations in philosophical discussion. I shall give just two examples. In course of philosophical exchange over an issue deriving directly from Gettier (counter) example Hoffmann appears to suggest [Hoffman 1975] that Almeder does not have the same sense of language as, perhaps, he himself has. This leaves us with the delicate task of deciding their relative competence as user of the English language. The other example is this. Alan R. White writes "I do not think that we ever do use 'know' in the way that Malcolm says we do". [White/Griffiths 1967 (68) p. 103].

II

Some Indian philosophers have discussed a Gettier like example. Let us compare the three cases [Vidyāranya 1949 9/2-12 and 9/23-24].

Case 1

- (A) (i) A man M_1 suddenly saw from a distance(p) *that a piece of gem was lying on the floor of a temple T_1 .*
- (ii) He rushed to collect it.
- (B) He got it and left the place.
- (C) The fact, however, is this. (i) M_1 has in the past visited the temple (T_1) on many occasions, (ii) came to know that there were many gems and gold ornaments in the temple; (iii) on this particular occasion it was dark when M_1 looked at the temple from a distance.

- (D) (i) That particular night the priest₁ had left inadvertently a piece of gem on the floor, (ii) left the door open and (iii) went for a short visit to a house in the vicinity.

Case 2

Set of conditions (A) are the same except for it was a different man M_2 and a different temple t_2 . Condition (B) does not hold. What holds rather is (B_1) : M_2 (found a closed door) did not get the gem and left t_2 frustrated. Set of condition (C) is the same with suitable adjustment with respect to M and t. But there obtained instead of (D) a different set of conditions (D_1) . Here (i) the priest₂ did not leave any gem but only a lit lamp behind, (ii) closed the door firmly and (iii) went for a short visit to a house in the vicinity. But (E_1) there was a hole in the door through which M_2 could see the glow of the lamp and mistook it for gem.

Case 3

With the change M_3 and T_3 set conditions (A), (B) and (c) prevailed. But instead of (D) or (D_1) there obtained (D_2) : (i) the priest₃ left a gem on the floor (ii) closed the door but not securely and (iii) went for a short visit to a house in the vicinity. And (E_1) in the door there was a hole through which M_3 could see the glow of the real gem, mistook this glow for the real gem and rushed to have the gem. But before he reached the temple and unsuspected by M_3 a gust of wind threw open the doors of the temple widely.

In case 2 the man involved could reasonably believe that p was true. Yet in fact it was false. But in the first and the last case p is in fact true. And yet in the last case M_3 cannot be said to know that p . It may be that M_3 would never know that he was mistaken.

The Indian philosophers, it may be held, are unanimous that M_3 was mistaken. They are of the opinion that M_3

could not be said to have seen the gem and could not have *known* that *P* even though he falsely believed that he knew. He only mistook the glow of the gem to be a real gem. And Gettier also meant to illustrate with his examples that smith could not have known (e) or (h) of his examples. His illustrations were offered as counter examples where classical definition of knowledge fails. And now it may be thought that the Indian philosopher from whom I have taken the examples (formulation is of course mine) only wanted to illustrate by their means, that a falsehood may be as effective as a truth or more accurately a not properly accredited source of knowledge can lead to exactly the same result to which an accredited source can lead. Even so this can be construed as a counter example to some particular definition of *pramā* in accordance with which, roughly speaking, non-deceptive cognition is what counts as knowledge.¹⁷ It has been noted in the literature that this definition applies in the *case 3* cited above. But for all that, philosophers of different schools are unanimous that *case 3* is not a case of knowledge and have tried to revise or reinterpret the definition so that it can be seen that *case 3* is not covered. This shows quite independent of a particular criterion we have some intuitive notion of what constitutes a knowledge. And if we are to defend this intuitive notion, we cannot, it seems, do so simply on the basis of actual linguistic practice or by simply refusing to admit any counter example.

It may still be urged that neither the Gettier example nor the said Gettier-like example (*case 3*) has anything to do with scepticism. Gettier himself, it is true, did not draw any sceptical conclusion, or any general conclusion whatsoever from the existence of counter-example. But the fact that any adequate defense of traditional definition of knowledge against Gettier-like (counter) example is yet to be found out, and the fact that already many have begun to despair [cf. Chisholm 1977, p. 106], one may be inclined to think that scepticism may have in it more truth than is

normally recognized. And some Indian philosophers seem to maintain that existence of *case 3* invalidates Vātsyāyana's attempted demonstration to the act sceptics that there are cases which can truly be regarded as knowledge. His demonstration in essence consists in distinguishing as cases of knowledge those beliefs which lead to successful volition [Vātsyāyana, p. 1]. But if as in our *case 3* a falsehood can also lead to successful volition then such demonstration is rendered invalid. On the other hand without some such demonstration extreme nihilist or *Sarvaśūnyatā vādi*, who can be regarded as act-sceptic [Tarkavāgiśa, vol.-I, p. 6] cannot be properly met. And some maintain [Tarkavāgiśa, vol.-I, p. 4 footnote] that Buddhists have cited this *case 3* to show that Vātsyāyana has failed to meet the act-sceptic whether or not it was directed in particular against Vātsyāyana's argument, Dharmakīrti cites the *case 3* [cf. Dharmakīrti 3/51; incidentally the edition I consulted contains a serious but obvious printing mistake.] and Citsukhāchāryya [Citsukha, p. 359] utilises this example to show that the sort of demonstration Vātsyāyana offered against act-sceptic does not work.

A Naiyāyika or, for that matter any one who may think that *case 3* can be utilized by sceptics to their advantage is likely to adopt the strategy of not accepting *case 3* as a counter-example.¹⁸ Such Naiyāyikas would regard this case as a case of error plain and simple and would hold that in such cases our volition is not and cannot be successful [Tarkavāgiśa Vol-I, pp. 3-4]. But others may urge that the Nyāya strategy would lead to obliterating an experienced difference between *case 2* and *case 3*. In both cases the respective man was mistaken but while in *case 2* the abortive attempt to collect the gem ends in dismay in *case 3* M_3 is successful. Hence *case 2* and *case 3* should be kept distinct. But the Nyāya strategy seems to obliterate this. Under the circumstances it seems better to admit frankly the failure of any pragmatic test of truth.

III

To come back to our point, (*P*) or something like it has to be defended in order to resist scepticism. But (*P*) cannot convincingly be defended by pleading in each case that whoever advanced a counter example lacked proper sense of language concerned or by resorting to sophistical strategy to show that the counter-examples are not counter-examples at all.

Thus use of natural language expression is neither consistent nor clear to the desirable extent so that *LE* approach to answer criterion scepticism could be hoped to succeed immediately. This is not to deny that careful examination of the ways in which we actually use a word is perhaps one of the best starting points in search of a corresponding criterion. And (*P*) may be viewed as showing that truth is a part of our ordinary notion of knowledge. But how to decide whether this (*P*) or any such other criterion, e.g. the traditional definition of knowledge which the epistemologists accept in one version or other, is adequate? One way may be to disallow any counter-example. From this point of view one may defend the traditional definition of knowledge against Gettier counter-example by saying that Smith does know (e) and (h) since all the conditions set forth in the traditional knowledge have been satisfied. But except in a formal system one is hardly likely to adopt *LE* approach in this sense. Ordinary language philosophers who practice *LE* approach would rather admit the possibility of counter-examples and would either deny the possibility of a fool proof criterion or remain ready to revise indefinitely any criterion adopted provisionally. On this view Gettier like counter-examples only show that the traditional definition is inadequate. In other words it is taken for granted that knowledge is at least what it is said to be in the criterion. But one may even challenge this or one may doubt if the criterion has any justification i.e., if it has any application whatsoever. It will not do to say that this criterion has been developed by a study of the ways in

which the word is actually used. For the obvious retort will be that if the criterion can still be inadequate what guarantee is there that it is not false altogether. Can it not be the case that sometimes what is known is not true. "Only what is true can be known, in the propositional sense of knowledge. . . ., but this is a fact of grammar, not of psychology". And the ability of this criterion to distinguish knowledge from belief is doubtful. ". . . one reason for this being that in common speech the distinction is not sharp. We are usually able to decide the point in particular cases, *though even here there may be differences of opinion*, but it is open to doubt whether the particular decisions can be fitted tidily under any general rule. [But compare Griffiths 1967, p. 5]. This might be thought a ground for emending our usage . . ." [Ayer 1973/79, p. 55] Prābhākara for example, may urge that we have in our language such uses as "mistaken belief", "erroneous belief", and we have in the history of philosophy many theories and account of error or erroneous belief. But most of them proceed by taking the said expressions as fact of psychology while error is only a fact of grammar. Thus need for justifying a criterion even when the same is based on ordinary usage cannot be ruled out. And a criterion-sceptic may not be satisfied only by formulability of a criterion which is generally satisfactory in the sense, it applies in most of the commonly accepted cases of knowledge the way demand that we should be further able to justify the criterion on a firmer basis. .

I want to emphasize the point that the Prābhākaras defend our claim to knowledge in a way which is to be distinguished from the way we characterize as *LE* approach. But their crucial argument in favour of (P) is usually put in a way which does not bring this out clearly. Now one who attempts an *LE* approach towards the problem of knowledge at hand is likely to take (P) as a very inelegant formulation of at least one part of the logic of "know".¹⁹ There is a sense of "know" in which not only no knowledge can be false but also no knowledge can be true either. Even

when we take knowing to be a propositional attitude, it is not knowledge which is true or false. What is true or false is not the (act or) propositional attitude but only the content of propositional attitude. Hence (P) needs be reformulated to read

(P₁) If there is a proposition (or object of propositional attitude) which is false then the propositional attitude which it determines as object cannot be an (propositional) attitude of knowing.

The truth of the content of a propositional attitude is a necessary condition for the attitude being an attitude of knowing. Thus its being the content of a propositional attitude of knowing is a sufficient condition for concluding the proposition to be true. Thus knowing becomes, by definition, such propositional attitude the content of which is a true proposition. And the only sense of a knowledge being true is that it has for its content a proposition which is true. It therefore follows that no knowledge can be false. One cannot be said to know unless what one knows is true. Some such logic is already admitted by a common user of English language. So if such a person is not ever found to talk in the way (P₁) nor is he expected to utter such expression as, say, 'my knowledge is false' or even (P). He would rather use instead of (P), say (P₂) 'one cannot be mistaken about what one knows'. This, it seems, is not the way he simply talks but the way he feels; the way the things are. So if asked to justify he is hardly expected to say, what requires a good deal of philosophical sophistication to say: that is the way the word "know" behaves in English language. It may be and perhaps it is true that he has picked up (P₂) from common usage, that the linguistic convention in which he has been brought up has given him this conviction, but convention did not also teach him to believe that convention in its own right is a principle of justification over and above being a principle of explanation. Besides, just as logic of the expression ("know") rules out the possibility of knowledge being false so also logic of the ex-

pression ("belief") permits belief to be false. Thus both what can be false and what cannot be are *a priori* determined. Sceptical question can hardly be put in the usual way. Only way it can be put now is this: can there be a case which is counter-intuitive to regard as a case of knowledge and yet passes for knowledge if we adopt a particular logic of the expression (or if we accept the logic of expression we do accept) ?. The question becomes a question as to how adequately our logic of "know" tallies with our intuitive understanding of what knowledge is. But to begin with such a question may be interpreted as being the question against the sceptic.

Prābhākara argument in favour of (P) or its analogue is sometimes so presented as to carry the impression that they also beg the question against their sceptical adversaries. For the argument is put in this way.²⁰ K₁, an instance of knowledge, is veridical (true)²¹ just because it is a case of knowledge. It seems therefore it would be contradictory to *describe* the same single cognitive state as both a state of knowledge and a state of ignorance or error (error pertains to some other thing). It may seem that what is being urged is that the range of the application of the word "*pratyaya*" (Knowledge") excludes the range of application of the word "*bhrama*" ("error") as much as the range of the word "*niścaya*" (conviction) excludes that of "*Samśaya*" ("doubt"). It appears therefore that the issue is linguistic. For if its being *pratyaya* entitles a *pratyaya* to become *yathārtha* then no counter example can be offered. If one offers a case of experience which is not veridical then by the logic of "*pratyaya*" or "*jnana*" it will not be a cognitive experience at all. It will be wrong, however, to represent the Prābhākaras as arguing a linguistic point.

One may, however, hold that the Prābhākaras do maintain a case of error to be a linguistic fact and a truth about language. Error is not a psychological fact, a distinct kind of experience. It is not an item of ontology. Only we have in our language words like "*bhrama*" (or "error") and we

have some uses of such words in our language. *Bhrama* may also be a certain type of non-cognitive activity or certain situation of such activity [Śālikanātha, p. 127]. And what "*bhrama*" in this sense requires is an explanation of how and when we find occasions for the use of the word "*bhrama*" and so on. [*Name tarhi purovartini 'idam rajatam' iti viśiṣṭa nirvahaḥ Katham?* etc. Rāmānujāchārya, p. 2]. It is not further required to admit a distinct type of cognitive experience called error. If thus the Prābhākaras can show on independent ground that there is no such cognitive experience which is erroneous then they can argue in the way they have been presented to argue above without implying that they are arguing simply a linguistic point. And the argument why the Prābhākaras cannot accept error as a distinct kind of cognitive experience is not because the accepted convention about our use of "*jnanam*" is what it is, but because of an accepted feature of the thing *jnana*. It is accepted that cognition is essentially intentional. There cannot be a cognitive experience which is not cognitive experience of something. And that something of which a cognitive experience is a cognitive experience is called the *viśaya* of that experience. Every cognitive experience must have a *viśaya* in this sense. In other words every cognitive experience is *saviśayaka*.

The Prābhākaras now argue that the condition of a cognitive experience being *that* experience excludes the possibility of its being erroneous. Either a particular cognition, say, a cognition of a snake (that that is a snake) is not a cognition of a snake or it is not erroneous. And this can be generalized to yield the conclusion: no particular cognitive experience can be erroneous. The point of the Prābhākaras is this. A cognition of a snake is what it is because it has snake for its object (or the proposition, say, 'that it is a snake' for its content). But a cognition cannot claim something to be an object unless it informs us of or reveals that thing. On the other hand, if it reveals the thing which it claims to be its object i.e., if it reveals that object or fact

of which it is the experience then it is necessarily bears that relation to its object which is sufficient to turn it into a veridical experience (*Kathaṃ yāthārthyaṃ Sādhāraṇaṃ Sarvasyāpi jñānasyārthāvyavicāritvena tanniyamāt. Rāmānujāchārya, p. 2*). But if it does not reveal that object then it is not that particular experience. So one cannot significantly say that that particular cognitive experience is non-veridical [cf. Śālikanātha *Nyayavīthī* 23-25, and in p. 122 Śālikanātha also writes "*Yadi rajatajñānaṃ rajataviśayaṃ na Syāt tato vyavicaratyartham. Rajata viśayatve tu ko vyabhicāraḥ?*"]. Thus we take the Prābhākaras to defend (P) not simply on an argument from usage but from essential untenability of the contrary position that knowledge can be false. And the untenability of a cognition being false is not simply taken as *a priori*, as certified by our use of language alone. Śālikanātha argues separately in each case to show that the kinds of cognition ordinarily regarded as *ayathārtha* cannot be so regarded. And what is important is that he feels it necessary that we should take the trouble of showing by argument that so-called cases of error are not really so in order to prove that each cognition is veridical. [*Anenaiva Prakāreṇa Sarvabhāntiṣu panditaiḥ; Uhanīyā hetubhedā yathārthajñānasiddhaye. Śālikanātha, p. 58*]. And this he feels necessary as otherwise scepticism could not perhaps be resisted. [*Jñānaya vyabhicāre'pi viśvāsaḥ Kiṃ nivandhanaṃ. Śālikanātha, Nyayavīthi, p. 68*].

I shall end my paper here after simply noting that this view of the Prābhākaras should not be confused with the doctrine of *Svataḥ prāmāṇya (utpatti pakṣa)*. For I think while admitting the theory of *Svataḥ prāmāṇya* the Bhāṭṭas, particularly, resist scepticism by defending a weaker assertion. They would not argue that every case of cognitive experience is veridical. They argue that every veridical cognitive experience is veridical just because it is an (cognitive) experience. This is a weaker but, it seems more convincing position to adopt against the sceptics for it admits the possibility of our experience being mistaken

sometimes. Just as the position of the *śūnyavādi* or of any thoroughgoing sceptic appears self stultifying [cf. Vacaspati, pp. 1088-89]. So also sort of position the Prābhākaras hold may be viewed as "A kind of dogmatism or infallibilism that is inconsistent with the spirit of free inquiry." [Chisholm 1977, p. 116]. The fact however remains, even the Bhaṭṭas defend their position not by adopting an *LE* approach.

14, Kolvin Road,
ALLAHABAD

ROMA RAY

NOTES

1. Hereafter I shall refer to the contemporary analytic English Speaking epistemologists as simply epistemologists.
2. Such comparison is not only interesting but is also an indispensable aid for understanding philosophical views of different culture which is at times a very difficult job. [cf: Gram 1974, pp. 114-15].
3. I simply mean that sometimes critics derive from his views which the author did not wish to profess.
4. This position will be more elegantly and precisely formulated below.
5. Unless otherwise mentioned I shall confine my discussion to propositional knowledge only. And whenever I use cognition as synonym of *jñāna* I may be taken to have in mind belief or cognition in the propositional sense. Except for indeterminate cognition or *nirvikalpaka jñāna* which can be neither true nor false, "*jñāna*" may safely be understood as propositional cognition. For every determinate cognition or *savikalpaka jñāna* is expressible in sentence. And the cases of *Savikalpaka jñāna* I have in mind are expressible in indicative sentences. It may be noted in this connection that the Indian Concept of *Pramā* involves both the notions of truth (*yāthārthya*) and conviction (*nīścayatva*).
6. "Other philosophers, after reflection upon this problem, have despaired of providing any definition of knowledge at all." [Chisholm, 1977, p. 196].

7. There has not been a school of throughgoing sceptical philosophy in the sense in which there was and still continues to be a school of, say, the *Advaita Vedanta* or the *Nyāya Vaiśeṣika*.
8. A thoroughgoing and cautious sceptic will not deny a position if that amounts to accepting the position identical with the negation of the position rejected. A. Stroll puts it nicely, "what makes the skeptic such a redoubtable foe (no pun intended) is that, at his best, he does not take any stand or put forth any view; his technique rather is to undermine the positions which systematic thinkers themselves advance...." Vātsyāyana in his commentary on 1/1/1 writes "*Vitaṇḍā...parapakṣapratishedha jñāpanaṃ prayojanam Vākyasamuhaśca sthāpanāhino vitaṇḍā, tasya ydyabhidheyam pratipadyate, so'sya pakṣa sthāpaniyo bhavati*"

When I speak here of scepticism I do not mean such provisional scepticism as Cartesian Scepticism which is admitted for some ulterior methodological or other purposes. In India methodological scepticism has been clearly distinguished from mere scepticism. Methodological sceptic has his own stand or view. But instead of making his belief a matter of faith he seeks to turn it into a philosophical (academic) truth. With this purpose he begins by accepting, even if provisionally, the possibility of his belief being false. But at the same time he believes that the truth is attainable, that rational doubts can be met by offering philosophical arguments and considerations. And he enters into philosophical discussion with his preceptor or with his philosophical colleagues or philosophical rivals (vitaṇḍā need not be used for sceptical purposes alone). Anyway the sort of doubt thus presupposed for the procedure of turning a belief into philosophical truth, this methodological scepticism, is regarded by Indian philosophers as prerequisite for philosophising. And they have elaborate theory of such methodological scepticism. The way to philosophical truth or *nirṇaya* is through doubt. *Vimrśya pakṣapratipaksāvhyām arthāvadhāraṇaṃ nirṇayah'* [Gotama 1/1/41].

9. One may doubt whether such a form of scepticism ever existed or not. I believe it did. And many things can be said in this connection. But I shall only briefly illustrate my point by citing passages and occasionally giving some explanations but avoiding arguments as far as possible. Some hold that to believe that "x knows that p" (when true) is a description of some situation or state of affairs is to commit descriptive fallacy. And there are others who hold not to believe this is (at least in case of certain person) to commit performative fallacy. One may view

such controversies as one which involves the issue that concerns the sceptics who uphold (S¹) [cf. Griffiths 1967, p. 14, also Chisholm 1966, p. 18]. In Indian philosophy it is difficult here to quote any passage in support without expalnation. For those who do not believe that pure negation is possible on the ground that pure negation *sāmanyataḥ nisedaka* deprives the negation of any content will tend to turn (S¹) into the impossibility of *alīka pratiyogika abhāva* [cf. Tarkavāgiśa, Vol. II, p. 61]. "Anupalabdhasya chapratishedhānupapatti" [Nāgārjuna, p. 4 and 7]. "Sata eva pratishedho nasti ghato geḥa ityayaṃ yasmāt. Dṛṣṭaḥ pratishedho yaṃ sataḥ svabhāvasya te tasmāt."

"Itha cha Sato'arthasya pratishedhaḥ Kriyate nāsataḥ. Tat yathā nāsti ghato geḥa iti sato ghatasya pratishedhaḥ Kriyate nasataḥ. Evameva nasti bhvo dharmanamiti sataḥ Svabhāvasya pratishedhaḥ prāpnoti nāsataḥ." "Pratishedhasambhavāt eva Sarvabhāvasvabhavopratishedhaḥ", p. 7.

But such arguments do not apply to or even appeal to a thorough going sceptic. Such a view of negation should not be imposed on them. Nāgārjuna's (p. 14) argument may be read together with a passage from Uddyotkara [Uddyotkara, pp. 421-22]. 'Pratyaksādināmaprāmāṇyamiti cha pratijñāpadayorvyāghataḥ pratyaksādinī nārtham sādhyantityayamarthaḥ, ayam cha vyāghataḥ, Kathamiti? Pratyaksādinī cha nārtham sadhyanti iti cha yathedaṃ vastu nopalavyata iti. Idaṃ cha nopalavyate cha iti vyāghataḥ.' Nāgārjuna [p. 3] himself formulates such view or objection of the opponent in this way — "pratishedhyepyevamiti matam bhavet tadasadeva Evam tava pratijñā lakṣanato dusyate na mama." And in reply he writes [Nāgārjuna, p. 14]. "Yadi Kāchana pratijñā tatra syāt esa me bhavet dosah. Nāsti cha mama pratijñā tasmānnaivāsti me dosah." "Yadi cha kāchit mama pratijñā Syāt tato mama pratijñālakṣana prāptavāt Sa dosah....na mama Kāchidasti patijñā." In addition to offering this argument Nāgārjuna also cites a beautiful example which can go a long way to support the doctrine of pure negation. "Vālānāmiva mithyā mṛgatṛṣṇāyāṃ yathā jalagrāhaḥ. Evam mithyāgrāhaḥ Syāt te pratishedhyato hyasataḥ" K/13 Syāt te buddhiḥ yathāvālanam mṛgatṛṣṇāyām mithyājalamiti grāho bhavati. Nanu nirjalā sā mṛgatṛṣṇeti tatra panditajatiyena puruseno chyate tasya mithyāgrāhasya vinivartanārjham Evannihsvabhāvesu ya Svabhāve grāhaḥ satvānam tasya vyāvartanarthannihsvabhāvaḥ sarvabhāva ityuchyata iti (13) [cf. also Vācaspati, p. 419].

10. Sceptics sometimes argue that this doubt concerns every act of knowledge (let me for the present speak in terms of act for

convenience of exposition) and every variety of act of knowledge. Under the circumstances a particular act of knowledge cannot without circularity be known by itself; nor can it be held to be known, without infinite regress by another act of the same or different variety. But unless known, we cannot assert its existence or refer to it. "*Tesāmīdanīm pratyaksāunmānopamānāgamānam caturmnām pramānanām Kutah praśiddhiḥ ... anyaiḥ yadi pramānaiḥpramā nasiddhirbhavatyanavasthā, Nādeḥ siddhitārāsti naiva madhyaśya nāntasya..... Tesāmatha pramānavinū prasiddhiḥ vikiyate vadah*". [Nāgārjuna, p. 16]. Charge of circularity can be construed in the light of K/50-51. Such objections have been formulated and answered in the *Nyāya Sūtras*. And this is well-known. Besides our purpose is not to discuss scepticism for its own sake.

11. I use here 'criterion' in the sense of definition or *Lakṣaṇa*. As one example of explicit formulation Śriharsa in his *Khandanakhanada khādyā* clearly distinguishes between act scepticism and criterion scepticism [pp. 9; 130].
12. This variety of scepticism admits of different formulations or sub-varieties, depending, among other things, on the ground on which this scepticism is defended.
13. I do not wish to enter into the discussion if the act-sceptic does not already accept a criterion of knowledge.
14. This may be the reason why test-scepticism could flourish and engage serious attention of contemporary epistemologists so soon after the robust realism of Moore. This reminds me of these words of Prof. Chisholm: "The point of view in the present book has been that of 'common-sensism'. Unlike empiricist, we have not begun with general criteria of knowing. Rather we have attempted to derive criteria of knowing, *accommodating those criteria to our prior assumptions about what it is that we do know* there is, of course, an element of arbitrariness involved in accepting any one of these three possible points of view and rejecting the other two. But our views is no more arbitrary than either of the others. And unlike them it *corresponds with what we do know*." [Chisholm 1977, p. 121 italics mine].
15. Two points to note. I do not mean to say that Indian epistemology is nothing but empirical psychology. I would rather say it is ontology. This approach was neither unknown nor unusual with the epistemologists who even if they are not strictly speaking contemporary, are studied along with the contemporary epistemologist. "Cook Wilson and Price, then regard an examination of ordinary language as useful and suggestive, but as *no*

more than this. And this is primarily because it is not the use of the word 'know' with which they are concerned, but with facts: with, one might say, the states of affairs to which the words refer, rather than with the words we use to refer to them. The search in which Cook Wilson regards himself as engaged is one for the *explanation of the nature of the thing*, not the *word*, knowledge." [Griffiths 1967, p. 5, the italics are mine]. This is almost the same as what I characterized as the nature of the thing approach.

16. And the need for justification seemed to be admitted by every one who takes the Gettier problem seriously. "...it is not obvious that the definition is correct. The definition is one that must be defended". [Chisholm 1977, p. 111]. And though various definitions and/or repairs of the classical definition have been suggested it is not clear if any one has been successful [*ibid.*, p. 106] at least in terms of Griffith's preference criterion.
17. *Avisamvādi jñānaṃ pramāṇaṃ* [Dharmakīrti, p. 3]. The translation is in line of Manorathanandi's initial elucidation [Manorathanandi, p.]. This definition sometimes attributed to the *Sau-trāntikas* is, however, common and attributable to the *Yogācāras* as well [*ibid.*, p. 4].
18. But Vācaspati seems to accept such counter-example. [cf. Vācaspati on 4/2/30-31].
19. I ignore the issue whether there is any that can be the logic of "know" or for that matter of any other natural language expression.
20. *Vimatā pratyayāḥ yathārthā pratyavāt* [cf. Vidyāraṇya, p. 18]. But when such formulation of the inference occurs in the proper context such unwanted suggestion is unlikely to be received.. [Compare Śrījayapuri, p. 49]. Not only the Prābhākaras do not want to advance an argument from ordinary usage. They have explicitly noted the non-dependability of such usage. They have cited cases where though a cognition should have been declared erroneous it is not so declared in ordinary experience and usage because it does not affect our conduct or *vyavahāra*.
21. Even though they hold knowledge (*jñānaṃ*) as such to be infallible yet the Prābhākaras do not equate *jñāna* with *pramā*. They define *pramā* more narrowly as *anubhūtiḥ* or non-recollective awareness. And in this respect they agree with many other philosophers of other schools including the *Advaita Vedānta*. Even if an *Advaita Vedāntin* does, which he certainly can, equate *pramā* with *jñāna* he means by *jñāna antahkaranavṛttiviśeṣa*.

Any way, being veridical is only a part of the Prābhākara notion of *pramā* which does not require to be stated since every cognition for them is veridical.

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