21. Kumarila's analysis of knowledge is based on four factors viz. a cognising self, an object of cognition, an instrument of cognition and result of cognition or cognizedness. Corresponding to these four factors of knowledge he also conceives four factors of voluntary action viz. an agent of action ( Kartā), an object of action ( Karma), instrument of an action ( Karṇa) and a result of an action ( Phala).

22. Charls Taylor has defended such view in his book: *The explanation of Behaviour*; ' Humanities Press, New York ( 1964). Also see Richard Taylor: *Action and Purpose*; Englewood Cliffs N. J. Prentice Hall Inc. 1966.

23. Peter Winch: *The idea of Social Science.* p. 52.

24. Peters, R. S. *The Concept of Motivation*, London. p. 5.
It is controversial that all the actions of man are explicable by reference to social standards and conventions or all our actions are rule governed. It may be argued that not all actions are to be elucidated by reference to rules whether one considers these to be social or moral or prudential.

25· Kant, I: *Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals*; Academic edition p. 416 ( Although both Prabhakara and Kant advocate rigorism but Kant's categorical Imperative is a subjective law of practical reason, while Prabhakara's moral imperative (Niyoga) is super sensuous variety of the moral order; Kant's categorical Imperative is an ought. But Prabhakara's moral Imperative is a transcendental Being or an accomplished fact. The similarity between Kant and Prabhakara should not be pushed too far. Prabhakara is an exponent of rationalism and rigorism ) Ethics of Hindus pp. 137-140.

26. Vishvanatha: ' *Siddhānta Muktāvali*' pp. 473-44.

27. For defence of such views Melden's *Free Action* and R. S. Peter's *The Concept of Motivation* may be seen.

28. MS 2:1: 10.

29. MS 2:1: 9.

question consists in providing justification for what he claims to know. So, in reply, the speaker tries to adduce grounds in support of his claim to knowledge. If the grounds adduced by him are found to be in place, then his claim is granted the accredition of knowledge; or else, it is overthrown or withdrawn. If a claim to knowledge is duly established in this way, it is regarded as knowledge. The different forms of justification of knowledge-claims are different methods of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). As such, *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, etc., are different methods of knowledge rather than sources of knowledge. The question regarding the origin and growth of knowledge may be psychological or socio-logical but it is not philosophical. The question regarding the justification of knowledge-claims is philosophical. The philosopher who is concerned with the problem of knowledge seeks to analyse the epistemological concepts, the concept of knowledge itself and other related concepts that form a family around the concept of knowledge. This analysis consists in finding out which concepts form this family, what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the employment of such concepts and principles that are ultimately involved in any situation of human knowledge.

For the philosopher, the word 'knowledge' is an achievement word but not a process word because to know is to have known. Something might be there without being known. But this is not to say, as some philosophers do, that something might exist without entering into a cognitive relation. Something can be said to exist only in so far as it is known to exist. Of course, particular persons like Devadatta, Viṣnudatta or Yajñadatta might not know that this something is there, yet this might be there. But this cannot be said to be there without committing logical oddity when nobody knows that this is there. So, something that is said to be there must be known to somebody or other and be knowable to everybody in principle. This idea of something being known to a person is bound up with certain other ideas.[2]

This requires some explanation. To say that I know is to lay a claim (*garva*) and say that I can adduce grounds in support of the claim so that my claim to knowledge is not treated as groundless. Again, I am in a position to adduce grounds because I have had doubts (*saṁśaya*) and deliberations by way of making certain (*niścaya*) regarding what I claim to know. This implies that I am able to apply concepts, assimilate and classify because I am a person endowed with memory (*smaraṇa*). Hence, *saṁśaya*, *niścaya*, *garva* and *smaraṇa* are a set of ideas which are necessarily linked up with the idea of knowledge. It may be emphasised that what is said above is not a description of a sequence of events that take place in the mind when one conveys what one knows. It only points out that a set of ideas hinge with one another so that if we bring in one we bring in all.

As we know, the Advaita Vedāntin enumerates six methods of knowledge, *viz, pratyakṣa* (direct cognition), *anumāna* (inference), *upamāna* ( comparison ), *anupalabdhi* ( cognition of something not being the case), *arthāpatti* (postulation) and *śabda* (logico-linguistic analysis ). These methods are not recipes which suggest how to acquire knowledge and these are not modes either through which knowledge flows into its repository called the ' soul '. These are the methods by which persons seek to establish their assertions of knowledge. The corresponding types of knowledge which are established by these methods are *pratyakṣa–jñāna* ( direct knowledge), *anumitijñāna* ( inferential knowledge), etc. ...

Thus, we find that the idea of memory goes together with the idea of knowledge. We also find that knowledge can be categorised into so many types on the basis of method. Hence it is but logical that all these types of knowledge, namely, direct knowledge, inferential knowledge, etc., involve memory in this sense. We shall now find out that the idea of knowledge and the idea of memory do not go together when we consider the distinctive character of knowledge as distinguished from other cognitions.

In Advaita Vedānta knowledge is defined as that cognition which is not internalised previously and which is not set aside.[3] To know is to know that something is thus and so. This is what we did not cognised before (*anadhigata*). If I cognised it before, then I cannot be said to know it now. I am said to remember what I knew before. It is a piece of memory cognition, not a piece of knowledge. Hence, although in a general philosophical sense, all cases of cognition, that is, all cases of use and application of concepts involve memory, yet there is a distinction between a case of cognition which becomes a member in the body of my knowledge for the first time and a case of cognition which became a member in this body previously and renews, so to say, its membership now. In this sense, the former case of cognition is devoid of memory (*smṛtivyāvrta*) and the latter case of cognition is nothing but memory (*smṛtisādhārana*). Accordingly, "I was happy" is not a case of knowledge, it is a case of memory cognition. In order to assert "I was happy", I must have had knowledge about myself being happy already before.

However, "I was sound asleep" or "I was dreaming" are not cases of memory cognitions like "I was happy". They appear to be similar in respect of their grammatical structure but they are dissimilar in respect of their logical behaviour. "I was sound asleep" and "I was dreaming" are cases of knowledge—cases of direct knowledge, to be exact, like "I am happy". In the case of my being happy, I make the assertion "I am happy" while I am happy, so that my assertion is true. But in the case of my being in sleep or in dream, it is impossible for me to assert "I am asleep" or "I am dreaming" while I am in sleep or in dream so that my assertion is true because the making of such an assertion requires that I cannot be asleep or that I cannot be dreaming. In such cases, the relevant assertions are of the form "I was asleep" or "I was dreaming." The author of *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* calls such forms of knowledge as *Isvarasākśipratyakṣa* (self–established direct knowledge in an infinite sense.)[4]

Whatever this might be, the point which I want to drive home is that the word 'memory' is used in at least two senses as our above discussion seeks to show. In one sense, memory is one of the necessary conditions for the employment of the word 'cognition'. In another sense, memory constitutes a form of cognition which cannot qualify as knowledge.

Prof. Arvind Sharma appears to play fast and loose with the idea of memory. He does not appear to steer clear of the two different senses in which the idea of memory is related with the idea of knowledge. As such, the implications with regard to religious matters which he seeks to draw on the basis of ' memory' are without any logical warrant.

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## NOTES

1. " The Role of Memory in Hindu Epistemology and Its Religious Implications ", *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, July, 1983, pp. 485-91.
2. The word ' idea ' is not used here in the psychological sense of ' image ' but in the logical sense of ' concept '.
3. *anādhigata abdhitartha viṣayaka jñānatvaṁ pramatvaṁ*, Vedantaparibhasa of Dharmarajadhvarindra, S. S. S. Sastri edition, *Upodghāta*.
4. For a detailed discussion of the topic *vide* my paper entitled ' The Philosophical Problem of Perception ", presented at the 56th session of the Indian Philosophical Congress, 1981.