

EDMUND HUSSERL :
FOUNDING PHILOSOPHY AS RIGOROUS SCIENCE

Introduction :

Edmund Husserl's life work in philosophy was entirely oriented toward one goal—founding philosophy as a rigorous and first science. The purpose of this paper is to explore Husserl's conception of rigorous science and the manner in which he formulates the phenomenological method, the problem of constitution, and transcendental idealism (as a theory of knowledge) as the doctrinal and directive systems of scientific philosophy. In addition, some criticisms of Husserl's thought aimed at clarifying and furthering the enterprise of instituting rigorous scientific work under the title Philosophy will be made. Husserl's thought is complex but exceedingly important. It is hoped that this essay does some justice to his work and adds to our understanding of what we must do to realize his goals.

I. The Guiding Ideal :

The ideal of rigorous science, Husserl says in his essay "Phenomenology and Anthropology", originated with the Greeks, and its original name is philosophy. For the Greeks, the object of philosophical inquiry is the entire universe of existents. Philosophy branches out into the special disciplines, e. g. the natural and formal science, but "only those disciplines are called philosophical which deal universally with questions that apply equally to all that exists."¹ Philosophy in the Greek sense—the first science—is the ideal which Husserl wishes his philosophy to fulfill. It is, he says, the true aim of philosophy to be the science of the sciences, the discipline which will fulfill "huma-

nity's imperishable demand for pure and absolute knowledge"² of the universe we experience. But to realize this rigorous science, its foundations must first be laid. And to lay its foundations we must clearly understand what a rigorous science is.

Others have tried to lay its foundations, and some have claimed to have accomplished it with their brand of philosophy. But, Husserl notes, the condition of philosophy belies its claim to truly fulfill this ideal of rigorous science; it has not even begun as a science, largely because it has lost sight of the ideal. In philosophy, he says, "each and every question is here incontroverted, every position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given by a school, of a 'point of view';"³ not even "the proper sense of philosophical problems has been made scientifically clear."⁴ This is the diseased state of philosophy as it exists, a barren discipline which has added nothing to our understanding of reality.

On the other hand, Husserl is quick to point out that we do have some imperfect sciences, the natural and formal sciences. These sciences, although imperfect, do have well established and guiding doctrinal systems with methods that have helped us to understand the world we experience in a limited sense.⁵ They are limited because they are full of unjustified presuppositions which they cannot validate in their own frameworks, e. g. Newtonian physics cannot justify its laws of motion; these laws, it must be noted, are nevertheless vital presuppositions to the science of physics, for they make physics as a science possible by providing universally accepted insights into the workings of physical reality as we experience it. Hence the de facto sciences are not true, rigorous sciences, though they most certainly are attempts to realize a rigorous science. That they are such an attempt is evident, Husserl maintains in his *Cartesian Meditations*, from the fact that guiding them are the three closely related ideals of

rigorous science—objective validity, absolute grounding, and perfect evidence.

The de facto sciences are carried out by communities of men interested in obtaining by their investigations objective results that cannot be challenged because clear, valid evidence is offered to justify them. This is clearly an attempt to realize the ideal of objective validity in results. However, that the de facto sciences have failed to realize the ideal is evident from the fact that all of their results can be challenged by challenging their ungrounded presuppositions. Hence, Husserl says that they are productive of knowledge “tied to (the) specific situations”⁶ stated in their presuppositions. Rigorous science, however, will not settle for this relative truth, but rather “aims at absolute, ultimately valid truths which transcend all relativity.”⁷ The truths of genuine science must be completely immune to any criticism.

Truths of genuine science cannot be criticized on any grounds because they do not rest on *any* presuppositions. The de facto sciences each operate on universally accepted presuppositions concerning the nature of reality; e. g. space is Euclidean or non-Euclidean, causality, laws of motions, etc. True science, Husserl maintains, can have no presuppositions at all — all of its doctrinal content would be absolutely grounded in perfect evidence.

Perfect evidence, Husserl says in his *Cartesian Meditations*, guides the de facto sciences' demand for evidence grounding their propositions, but they never fully realize the ideal. In the de facto sciences nothing is accepted as truth without some evidence—they expect their propositions to be verifiable *via* some experience offered as evidence. But they by no means demand perfect evidence; clearly they have accepted their presuppositions as valid without being able to verify them absolutely. Perfect evidence in a truly rigorous science must be offered for *every* proposition. The evidence of genuine science, in contrast to the mere certainty of the de facto sciences, is apodictic, Husserl says : “not merely

certainty of the affairs or affair complexes (states of affairs) evident in it; rather, it discloses itself, to a critical reflection, as having the signal peculiarly of being *at the same time the absolute unimaginableness* (n-conceivability) of their *non-being*.”⁸ Pure and genuine science not only demands experiential evidence for its propositions, but it makes the demand for a kind of evidence that brings with it an intuitive “seeing” of the impossibility of things being differently presented. This is the only kind of evidence Husserl will accept for philosophy.

The de facto sciences have realized a limited success by following the ideal and have become approximations of true science. Philosophy, however, has gotten nowhere. Husserl knows why this is so. The empirical sciences have those already mentioned universally accepted insights as presuppositions concerning the nature of reality that clarify their problems and methods. Philosophy has not begun as science because it has not yet identified insight it needs to found itself as a science of all reality and to guide and clarify its methods and its problems.⁹

Husserl, having this (just presented) clear concept of what is required of a rigorous science and what is needed to get any science started—fundamental insights—sets out to found philosophy as a science. What philosophy needs, he knows, is apodictically given insight about the nature of reality as we experience it which will help to clarify philosophy’s methods and problems. Husserl has that insight from a former teacher of his, Franz Brentano.

II. Insights and Methods :

Philosophy is in its most pure form a “science of the sum total of reality”.¹⁰ What is this reality philosophy is supposed to be the science of ?, one might ask. Husserl’s answer is simple : *it is the world we live in and experience every day*. If philosophy, then, is to be a science of reality it must begin its work in the lived-world of experience. There it must find its fundamental

insights. Husserl thus looks to the experienced world to find his first apodictic insight.

From Franz Brentano Husserl has received what he considers to be an apodictic essential law "of far-reaching importance"¹¹ the doctrine of intentionality. What is this doctrine? Husserl states it thus :

Every single *cogito*, and every combination of them into the unity of a new *cogito* has its corresponding *cogitatum*. And the later, *qua cogitatum*, taken exactly as it appears, is essentially inseparable from the *cogito*.¹²

For Husserl, lived experiences are what they are because they are intentional. Every experience is an "experience of," every consciousness a "consciousness of." The correlation between consciousness and that which it is conscious of is apodictically given for Husserl—no lived experience is empty nor can it be imagined to be. This insight is the essential law concerning lived experience of reality which directs Husserl in his efforts to found philosophy as a science.

Husserl notes something further about lived experience—every ordinary "consciousness of" is influenced by a multitude of beliefs, theories, prejudices, and attitudes which Husserl calls "the natural attitude." That is, in everyday experience certain things are taken for granted that are by no means apodictically given. The most notable aspect of the natural attitude is "universal belief in existence, which pervades and supports" all life experience, scientific as well as pre-scientific.¹³ All lived experience is naive in this respect—it accepts the world as independently existent without apodictic evidence to support its belief. On top of this fundamental belief, lived experience has layers and layers of other aspects of the natural attitude which prevent us from seeing reality as it is apodictically given to consciousness.

Husserl's phenomenological methods logically follows from these insights concerning lived experience. It is clear that if philosophy is to be a rigorous science of reality it must have a method which will bare to consciousness the experienced world in a pure form; unconditioned by the unfounded beliefs, theories, and prejudices of the natural attitude. Only by somehow removing the influence of the natural attitude can the apodictically given essential structures of reality (lived experience) be available to man's consciousness. It is for the removal of the natural attitude that Husserl develops the phenomenological epoché; and for making evident the essential structures of reality he develops the eidetic reduction.

The phenomenological epoché is a process of setting aside or "bracketing" all beliefs, theories and attitudes about the world and oneself that are normally taken for granted. One neither affirms nor denies the natural attitude; it is simply brought into question. Since the belief in the independent existence of the world is a component of the natural attitude, it too comes into question. This epoché prepares consciousness for the reception of apodictic truths.

The epoché reveals a further apodictic insight concerning the nature of reality. There is one existent that cannot be questioned on the epoché—that is, the being who performs the epoché, who refrains from the natural attitude, must exist. As Husserl puts it :

Let the existence of the world be questionable for me now [after the epoché] because it is not yet grounded....I who question and practice the epoché, I exist nonetheless. I am conscious of my existence and can grasp it immediately and apodictically.¹⁴

The being who performs the epoché is *not* the psycho-physical man—that man is part of the world and the belief that one is a psycho-physical being is part of the natural attitude. The epoché

reveals one as pure transcendental subjectivity, the consciousness or Ego which experiences the lived world, and reveals this apodictically. This Ego is also revealed as ontologically prior to the world :

As this apodictic ego, therefore, I am prior to the existence of the world because I exist as this ego whether or not the world's existence can be accepted and accounted for. Only as such an ego, obviously, can I justify the existence of the world ultimately and can I, if at all, practice a science which requires radical justification.¹⁵

This insight, Husserl is saying, is the one necessary for any attempt at founding a rigorous science of the sum total of being. It is the insight which Descartes missed in his *Meditations* and led him to make his "cogito" a substance.¹⁶ It reveals the transcendental Ego, rather than Descartes' God, as the Being responsible for justifying all senses of being.

In connection with this insight is another : the world is revealed as a mere phenomena, a stream of cogitationes for the cogito.¹⁷ It is important to note that Husserl's position is that the basic structure of conscious life does not change after the epoché. Consciousness is still intentional; merely the attitude of the philosopher is changed—he no longer accepts the natural attitude. The new attitude of the philosopher is this: the world is not an objective existent but a mere stream of cogitationes for the transcendental ego. This insight and the related insight that the Ego is prior to the world clarify for Husserl the nature of the problems proper to philosophy as a rigorous science. Those problems will be discussed at length later.

After the method of epoché reduces lived-experience to the pure transcendental subject and its intention—the stream of cogitationes the philosopher using this phenomenological method subjects some aspect of lived-experience (reality) to an eidetic

reduction. The eidetic reduction is designed by Husserl to make evident the invariant, essential characteristics of any phenomenon. The philosopher in the transcendental attitude produced by the epoché investigates whatever phenomenon from various perspectives; e.g. perception, memory, and fantasy. Fantasy is especially helpful in this investigation, for it varies the phenomenon in question into "pure" possibilities while no regard is given to the ontological status of the possibilities.¹⁸ In this eidetic analysis, the invariant characteristics of the object in question will become intuitively and apodictically evident as the various different perspectives are taken in examining it. Whatever cannot be varied belongs essentially to the object in question; it alone is the object's "eidos."

The reliability of the eidetic analysis developed by Husserl depends on the degree of freedom from the natural attitude the philosopher enjoys. Hence the phenomenological enterprise progresses as rigorous science by increasing the scope of the epoché. Since the epoché suspends individual attitudes toward objects, all who perform the epoché with a specified level of success will obtain the same "eidos." A *complete* epoché will result in making evident to whoever accomplishes it the true essence of the object in question. The pure transcendental subjectivity obtained by a complete epoché is free from any individual prejudice of the psychophysical man in the world—hence phenomenology is the most "objective" science possible.

A complete eidetic reduction on "space", then, would reveal what space essentially is for us. It would uncover the "idea" of "space" which underlies all the kinds of space men talk about, e.g. internal space, mental space, Euclidean space, Einsteinian space, etc. For something to be called space and legitimately accepted as so by all men it must possess certain qualities. Phenomenology *via* eidetic reduction wishes to uncover these qualities essential to space, time, and all other aspects of the pheno-

menal lived-world. This is what Husserl demands when he calls for investigation into "things themselves"—he wants a science that uncovers the essential characteristics of all classes of things in the world of lived experience.

All of this clarification of methods and the accompanying revelation of insights concerning lived-experience as it is apodictically given apart from the naive beliefs etc. of the natural attitude leads Husserl to a clarification of the problems proper to philosophy as a rigorous science. Those problems are the problems of constitution, the next topic of discussion.

III. Constitutional Problems :

The phenomenological epoché reveals transcendental subjectivity as the only "absolute" being that is apodictically given, Husserl says.¹⁹ By this he means simply that the world of what is in the natural attitude considered "objective being" is shown to be merely relative to transcendental subjectivity. The world is given in the transcendental attitude as mere phenomena having no existence apart from consciousness.

These apodictic facts that are discovered in the epoché begin to clarify for Husserl the problems of philosophy, for they raise the question : if the world is first given to consciousness as a mere phenomenal existent relative to the transcendental ego, then how is it that in the natural attitude the world is accepted as an "objective," independent existent ? How exactly does a world existing merely relative to the transcendental ego come to have the sense for us "objective world ?"

Husserl's answer to these questions is that the world receives its existential validity from the only absolute being, the transcendental ego.²⁰ His reasoning for this answer is clear—the transcendental ego is apodictically evident as existing to itself and hence is the source of the meaning "absolute existent" it has for itself; therefore it must be the source of all meaning "existent" (or

“evidently existing”) in all senses of the term. Only the transcendental ego can confer the meaning “objective being” on what is given as a mere phenomenon (i. e., the world of lived-experience) after the phenomenological reduction via the epoché. In Husserl’s words, “any evidence gained for worldly things, any method of verification, whether pre-scientific or scientific, lies primarily in me as transcendental ego.”²¹

The world and all worldly objects or objective facts are given the meanings they have for us by transcendental subjectivity. It verifies all existence and is responsible for all evidence. “Making evident” is always “making evident to consciousness”. The transcendental ego is the source of the world’s sense “objective enduring existent” and in fact the source of any sense the world has for us, according to Husserl. In the natural attitude any object has a multitude of meanings including “independent being”. The epoché and the eidetic reduction together are designed to reveal the *essential* meaning any worldly object has for consciousness.

Since transcendental subjectivity is the source of the meaning of “evidently existing” the true task of a rigorous science of reality (lived-experience) is to discover “how this subjectivity confers meaning and validity upon a world objective in itself.”²² This entails somewhat of a twist in the direction of investigation. While the phenomenological enterprise starts out as and remains at all times a strict science of the world that exists for us, the world of all lived experience, in order to “explore the world radically and even to undertake a radical exploration of what exists absolutely and in an ultimate sense” it must “interrogate consciousness, in order to force it to betray its secrets”.²³ Those secrets are the unknown ways in which consciousness confers existential validity on what is given to the Ego in the transcendental attitude as a mere phenomenon with no independent existence. This is the central problem of constitution—How does the world come to have the meaning for us “objective existent”?

Philosophy as a rigorous science which attains absolutely grounded knowledge of the world must in the end be, in Husserl's words, "First a self-explication in the pregnant sense, showing systematically how the ego constitutes himself...as existent in himself and for himself; then, secondly, a self-explication in the broadened sense, which goes on from there to show how...the ego likewise constitutes in himself something 'other', something 'objective', and thus constitutes everything without exception that ever has for him, in the Ego, existential status as non-Ego."²⁴

This is what Husserl identifies as the problem proper to philosophy—it must methodically examine the self for which the entire world exists, and come to an understanding of the acts of constitution by which the transcendental ego gives to the world all sense and validity it has for us. By a thorough study of transcendental subjectivity acts of constitution will be made apodictically evident, and consequently how the world comes to be what it is for us will be clarified. Genuine presuppositionless science is then for Husserl an investigation of the nature of the one and only subject of all world experience—consciousness itself. This clarification of the problem proper to philosophy leads Husserl into a radical new theory of knowledge—Transcendental Idealism. This theory is the next topic of this paper.

IV. Transcendental Idealism :

Phenomenology as a philosophical method for rigorous science has as its focus the explication of the constitutive (meaning giving) acts of the transcendental subject of all lived experience. It is a purely descriptive science, seeking only to make evident and describe those acts of consciousness that constitute the world (which is given primordially as a mere phenomenon) as an objective, independently enduring existent. This identification of the true problem of philosophy by Husserl leads him to posit, as mentioned above, a new theory of knowledge—transcendental idealism—

which is based on the apodictic insights into the nature of lived experience that he has gleaned from his investigations, solves many of the problems of traditional theory of knowledge, and proves phenomenology to be the first science in the Greek sense of philosophy.

Traditional theory of knowledge, Husserl says, has one heretofore insurmountable problem—*transcendence*.²⁵ That is, it cannot account for the possibility of any certainty in our knowledge of the world; it has the problem of explaining how the attaining of certainty, which goes on wholly in conscious subjects, can acquire an "Objective" significance in the sense—significance more than merely a significance for consciousness.²⁶ But, Husserl says, just laying the foundations of phenomenology makes it quite clear that this problem is inconsistent :

The attempt to conceive of the universe of true being as something lying outside the universe of possible consciousness, possible knowledge, possible evidence, the two being related to one another merely externally by rigid law, is nonsensical. They belong together essentially; and, as belonging together essentially, they are also concretely one, one in the only absolute concretion (apodictically given existent); transcendental subjectivity. If transcendental subjectivity is the universe of possible sense, then an outside is precisely—nonsense.²⁷

Consciousness is the subject of all "making evident," the source of the meaning of evidence as a making present of what is, and hence is the only possible source of any uncertainty; there can, in principle, be no other source.

The above quoted passage makes it clear that Husserl's idealism is not Kantian idealism, which posits a possible world of "things in themselves" that are not available to consciousness

Nor is it a psychological idealism claiming that all "things" are illusions and that mind is the only reality. It is merely a theory of knowledge which recognizes that consciousness is the only possible source of any sense of evidence or certainty, and which demands a "systematic uncovering of the constituting intentionality itself."²⁸ Which means that the phenomenological enterprise is the proof of the truth of this idealism, for it uncovers the acts of consciousness that confer existential meanings on the world and worldly objects.

This recognition by phenomenology of transcendental subjectivity as the ultimate source of all certainty and its problem of explicating the constitutive performance of that subjectivity makes philosophy unquestionably the first all-embracing science the Greeks wanted it to be. It and it only has as its goal a complete understanding of the subject of all lived experience, scientific or pre-scientific, and the way in which that subject gives sense to "evidence", "certainty", and "knowledge". A complete understanding of the empirical sciences and an absolute grounding of them is dependent upon a thorough understanding of the consciousness involved in those sciences as the sole source of validity for all world-experience. Until consciousness is completely understood, the world it experiences and confers existential meaning upon will in some measure be an enigma.

The transcendental idealism attested to by phenomenological inquiry has the effect of resolving all of the traditional antitheses of theory of knowledge. Naive rationalism is overcome by a radical rationalism which recognizes consciousness as the sole source of certainty and essential meanings (*eidōs*); naive empiricism is overcome by a radical empiricism which seeks to make "*eidōs*" evident to consciousness in an apodictic intuitional experience. Phenomenology is radical relativism, for it takes the universe of "objective" being and through the methods reduces it to a mere phenomena relative to the transcendental ego;

and radical absolutism in that it deals with the universe of the absolutely given being, transcendental subjectivity. In its investigation of the Ego as the source of meaning, it is radical subjectivism, while its demand for apodictic objective truth makes it radical objectivism. In short, phenomenology recognizes a kernel of truth in all the "isms" of theory of knowledge, for each reflects one of the two aspects of the conscious experience the transcendental subjectivity or its correlated intentionality.²⁹ It is because phenomenology focuses on the correlation between these two—constitutional acts of consciousness—that it resolves all antitheses.

V. Discussion :

One of the first questions raised in response to Husserl's efforts to theoretically found philosophy as a rigorous science of reality is whether his conviction that strictly scientific knowledge of the totality of being is a possibility open to man. For it is recognized that man is by no means an obviously perfect being and Husserl's goal seems to conflict with this "fact"—he seems to demand perfection (in knowledge) from imperfection, certainly a demand doomed from the start to go unfulfilled. Is man incapable of rigorous science of the totality of existence ?

Husserl's answer to this is, No; for the simple reason that transcendental phenomenology is nothing more than an investigation of man himself. Its focus is the acts of man's consciousness which give to the world the meaning it has for us. By suspending the natural attitude (which includes, we may note, the pre-supposition that man is imperfect) man is revealed in essence to be the apodictically given being responsible for all meaning the world has for him—in fact, the source of all certainty and evidence. Since reality is nothing more than the totality of lived experience and is revealed as a phenomena which receives its sense "objective being" from man's transcendental ego via constitutive acts of that

ego, there is no reason at all to believe that strict apodictic knowledge of the world is not possible. Man must just turn his investigations toward himself, focusing on his acts of consciousness and accepting nothing as truth that is not given as certainly as the Ego.

The possibility of the rigorous science Husserl talks about clearly depends on learning to perform the epoché consistently and effectively. Unfortunately Husserl gives no specific directions on this matter. We are told what needs to be done but not how to do it. The closest he comes to giving specific instructions follows :

The transcendental attitude involves a change of focus from one's entire form of life-style, one which goes so completely beyond all previous experiencing of life, that it must, in virtue of its absolute strangeness, needs be difficult to understand.³⁰

Elsewhere he says that the philosopher by "an all-inclusive resolve of his will" performs the epoché.³¹ It is clear that Husserl does not know or does not say just exactly what must be done to effect the epoché. It seems, then, that we are at a loss if we truly wish to do phenomenology.

But if we look at the requirement of suspending the natural attitude closely, we can ourselves see what needs to be done, and in the process reveal some faults in Husserl's investigations. The natural attitude consists of all naive beliefs, theories, and attitudes we have concerning the world presented to us. What are beliefs, theories, and attitudes? They are conceptual constructs of the intellect—mere images of reality, either borrowed or one's own. Thus to suspend the natural attitude is to suspend intellectual activity of all sorts without ending consciousness. This is indeed a tall order—yet some ancient philosophies have developed methods

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of psycho-physical discipline which indeed involve what Husserl speculated would be radical changes in life-style to accomplish this purpose.³² It certainly would do us well to study these disciplines closely.³³

When this is clarified, an inconsistency is revealed in Husserl's thoughts on constitution. First of all, he states that, via the epoché, which by the analysis above means the suspension of intellectual activity, the world is revealed as a mere phenomenon which only in the natural attitude has the significance "objective, independent world." This clearly means that it is the naive theories, beliefs, and attitudes—in short, intellectual activity—which are responsible for the constitution of the meanings the world has for us, rather than transcendental subjectivity. Acts of meaning-giving are acts of the intellect—as Husserl says, by suspending the acts of the natural attitude, the world is reduced in meaning from "objective existent" to "mere phenomenon." Thus it must be that the natural attitude (which is, as has been clarified here, intellectual activity) is the source of meaning. Therefore, investigation into constitutional acts must be, rather than an investigation of consciousness, an investigation of the activity of the intellect.

Husserl does not seem to realize that if it is the task of phenomenology to uncover and explicate constitutional acts, those acts themselves must be made evident to (objects of) consciousness. And if they are made evident to consciousness, they are revealed to be, not acts of consciousness, *but acts consciousness is conscious of*. Consciousness then has acts and objects revealed to it, and remains itself passively aware. Again, indirectly Husserl has admitted that the natural attitude, or intellectual activity, is responsible for the meaning "objective existent" given to the world.

Indeed it is the *naive* meanings of the natural attitude which interfere with the presentation to consciousness of essential (eidetic) meanings. And even these "eidos" are not constitu-

ted by consciousness itself. Husserl comes quite close to realizing this as he states that any "eidos" must be ideal, although it is not a concept.³⁴ An ideal form of invariant characteristics is the "eidos" of an object or class of objects. But even pre-conceptual essential ideas of objects are products of the intellect. Intellect produces ideas while consciousness is only aware of ideas, both when one is in the natural attitude and during the eidetic reduction in the transcendental attitude.

What all this amounts to is that Husserl does not make a clear and much needed distinction between intellectual activity and consciousness, and this probably has much to do with his inability to provide more clear cut directions for performing the epoché. For if, as it seems he does, he identified intellectual activity—thinking—with consciousness, he could not call for a suspension of that activity as it would entail for him a suspension of consciousness, and that would spell doom for the entire phenomenological enterprise.

To go on further from this, if it is intellectual activity which confers the meaning "independent object" on the world and worldly phenomena, a fact Husserl seems to be vaguely aware of when he declares that the epoché reveals the world as a mere phenomenon, then when it is really accomplished, the world loses that sense. That is, it is no longer an object of the transcendental ego—in fact, it would lose all existential status. Husserl says the world loses *valid* existential status, but he merely means it is no longer *accepted* as existing, though, as pointed out above, it still appears to consciousness. But if it loses all existential sense for consciousness, how could it appear at all? If "the world" no longer has the sense "objective existent" after the epoché, then it must disappear, for it can no longer be distinguished from consciousness. In a radical epoché, then, all that remains is a completely purified consciousness devoid of intentional objects. Husserl almost concedes this—for him only consciousness is apodi-

ctically given; he maintains, however, that all consciousness is intentional, even transcendental consciousness.

This brings up an objection to Husserl's doctrine of intentionality. Above it was noted that he considers the intentional structure of consciousness to be apodictically given. This is just plain dogmatic. That consciousness in ordinary experience is intentional is certain, but that by no means guarantees that *all* consciousness is intentional. The doctrine that *all* consciousness is intentional is a presupposition, a belief, with no *absolute* founding in phenomenological investigation. It is merely a generalization based on limited evidence. Indeed, it seems from this discussion that a consistent application of the epoché would reveal that consciousness in the transcendental attitude it is objectless. It is undoubtedly his attachment to the doctrine of intentionality and his seeming equation of intellect with consciousness that prevented him from seeing this consequence of his phenomenological reduction.

All this clarifies the actual problem of philosophy as a rigorous science. Its true task should be to see how the world becomes constituted as an identical objective existent *by the intellect*. The focus is still on the constituting subject. Philosophy must make evident to consciousness the processes of the intellect that give the world of lived experience the meanings it has for us by systematic investigation into conscious life, particularly an investigation of the processes of thought *as a phenomenon*. That is, thought itself must be studied, rather than the content of thoughts. Only by understanding thought as a phenomenon can we ever come to see how it is capable of constituting an "objective" world which in a *radically* purified consciousness produced by a complete epoché (as clarified here) will, it seems, have no existential status at all. Of course all of this investigation hinges on our being able to perform the epoché, thereby allowing us to regard intellectual activity as a phenomenon without being,

as we ordinarily are, totally engrossed by its content. The first task, then, of all who wish to follow up Husserl's theoretical founding of philosophy as a rigorous science with actual work is to find methods to suspend intellectual activity without suspending consciousness.³⁵

Husserl has shown, I believe, that a rigorous science of reality is indeed possible; our task is to make it actual. History is full of dogmatic claims by men who, frustrated in their demand for "pure and absolute knowledge," have wreaked havoc on others when their presuppositions were questioned. It seems that if men don't have this knowledge, they will pretend that they do, with horrible consequences. If we are to avoid this trap, we must follow Husserl and others who have made it their task to investigate human consciousness and its relationship to lived-experience.³⁶ It is hoped that the few criticisms of Husserl made here will help to further the phenomenological enterprise in its search for knowledge of the essence of lived-experience.

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NOTES

1. Edmund Husserl, "Phenomenology and Anthropology", in *Husserl : Shorter Works*, ed. by Peter McCormic and Frederick Elliston (Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), p. 316.
2. E. Husserl, "Philosophy as Rigorous Science", in *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy*, trans. by Quentin Lauer (New York, Harper and Row, 1965), p. 72.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 74.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 72.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 73.
6. Husserl, "Phenomenology and Anthropology", p. 316.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 316.
8. E. Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations : An Introduction to Phenomenology*, trans. by Dorion Cairns (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), pp. 15-16.

9. Husserl, "Philosophy as Rigorous Science", p. 73.
10. Husserl, "Phenomenology and Anthropology", p. 316.
11. Ibid., p. 321.
12. Ibid., p. 321.
13. Ibid., p. 318.
14. Ibid., p. 318.
15. Ibid., p. 318.
16. Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, p. 24.
17. Ibid., pp. 20-21.
18. E. Husserl, "On Eidetic Reduction", in *Phenomenology*, ed. by Joseph J. Kockelmans (New York, Anchor Books, 1967), pp. 111-12.
19. Husserl, "Phenomenology", in *Husserl: Shorter Works*, p. 34.
20. Husserl, "Phenomenology and Anthropology", p. 320.
21. Ibid., p. 320.
22. Ibid., p. 321.
23. Ibid., p. 322.
24. Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, p. 85.
25. Ibid., p. 81.
26. Ibid., p. 83.
27. Ibid., p. 84.
28. Ibid., p. 86.
29. Husserl, "Phenomenology", p. 34.
30. Ibid., p. 31.
31. Ibid., p. 30.
32. For a discussion on this topic, see Ramaktishna Puligandla, "Phenomenological Reduction and Yogic Meditation", in *Philosophy East and West*, Volume 20, Number 1 (January 1970).
33. For an excellent treatment of this topic, see Ramakrishna Puligandla, *An Encounter With Awareness* (Wheaton, Theosophical Publishing House, 1981).
34. Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, pp. 70-71.
35. Methods for this purpose are found in numerous Eastern disciplines concerned with Self-realization, eg. Yoga and Zen Buddhism, and in Carlos Casteneda's books detailing his experiences with a Yagui Sorcerer, don Juan. God Sources are : Kapleau, Philip, *The Three Pillars of Zen* (New York, Beacon Paperbacks, 1967); Casteneda, Carlos, *Tales of Power* (New York, Pocket Books, 1974); and Patanjali's *Yoga Sutras*.
36. Here I am referring to all philosophies which have as their foremost goal Self-realization and as their method phenomenological inquiry e.g. Yoga and Zen. It is interesting that Husserl refers to his work in the *Cartesian Meditations* as founding of a "philosophia perennis" (p. 87). Since his time much work has been done in the area of Comparative Philosophy to uncover a "perennial philosophy" by men such as Huston Smith and Joseph Campbell. This philosophy arises wherever there is research into consciousness along phenomenological lines—always entailing some sort of meditation practices that are aimed at stopping thoughts. Husserl seems to have stepped into phenomenology from a different motivation, and unknowingly became a member of an ancient tradition. He, I'm sure, didn't know how close to the mark he was when he called phenomenology the perennial philosophy.