

## ANTHROPOLOGY, PHILOSOPHY AND INDIA

The German philosopher of man and culture, Michael Landmann, has told us in a book of more than 600 pages entitled *De Homine : Der Mensch im Spiegel seines Gedankens* ( Man in the Mirror of his thought ) that man has speculated about himself from early times to the present day. Landmann's book is concerned with philosophical thought on the subject and it extends mainly from the Greeks upto Friedrich Nietzsche. But anthropologists and students of ancient civilisations have shown us that primitive people as well as mankind at the dawn of civilisation have speculated about the origin, nature and destiny of man and have invented myths and speculative systems of thought to account for his presence on the earth and his place in all of reality.

Illustrative of primitive thought on the subject is the phenomenon of totemism which I have tried to interpret in one of my books as an aberrant manifestation of man's finitude and his misis towards dependence and complementarity; and which the celebrated French anthropologist, Claude Levi-Strauss, views as a shining example of a primitive classificatory system based upon fundamental structures of the mind such as binary opposition. Levi-Strauss's own system of thought which is known as structuralism resembles the totemism of the primitives. He decries the historical world-view which has emerged in the civilisations of Asia and Europe as the result of the 'totemic void' in them because history is only a 'point of departure in any quest for intelligibility.'

However that may be, few will dispute the statement that the study of man is fundamental. It is fundamental because one can not fully understand the works or creations of man without trying to understand man himself. The creations of man bear the stamp

of his nature, if he can be said to have a nature. I say 'if he can be said to have a nature' because there are thinkers of recent times who question the affirmation that man has a nature. Thus the Spaniard Ortega Y. Gasset tells us that man has no nature. He has history. And the French structuralist Jacques Lacan says cryptically: 'I think where I am not, I am where I do not think.'

At any rate I should like to refer to two well-known philosophers who affirm the fundamental nature of the study of man before I go on to Charles Darwin (1809-1882) and his influence on that study. The two philosophers are David Hume (1711-1776) and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), the first an Englishman and the second a German, the German being influenced by the Englishman in a radical direction, as everybody knows. Although an absolute sceptic who doubted the existence of God, the truth of revelation and the reality of other facts, Hume regarded the study of man as fundamental. He believed that unless we are fully familiar with the 'science of man', no genuine progress can be expected or achieved in other directions. Oddly enough, the absolute sceptic speaks of the 'science of man'. Little did he realize that soon thereafter frantic efforts would be made to place the study of man on a scientific basis and yet with very little to show by way of substantial advance in resolving the enigma of man. Kant, who was awakened from his dogmatic slumber by Hume, ventured on his part to mark off the field of philosophy into the following four questions: (1) What can I know? (2) What ought I to do? (3) What may I hope? and (4) What is man? After pointing out that metaphysics attempts to answer the first question, ethics the second, religion the third and anthropology the fourth, he goes on to say: Fundamentally all this would be reckoned as anthropology, since the first three questions are related to the last.'

As Marvin Harris tells us in his *The Rise of Anthropological Theory*: 'Anthropology began as the science of history.' What he means by this statement is that the students of man in the second half of the nineteenth century were dazzled by Darwin's achievements, and so they endeavoured to apply the concept of evolution to man as a physical being and to his cultures. Darwin published his *On the Origin of Species* in 1859 and followed it up with his *The Descent of Man* in 1871 and *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* in 1872. Before Darwin biology

was only a classificatory science. Thereafter it found in the concept of evolution a unifying principle based on the fundamental notions of time and change and of unfolding and becoming. Presumably biologists like T. H. Huxley, who applied their energies to tracing the descent of man along evolutionary lines, were evolutionary naturalists who tended more and more to exclude from their scientific purview any notions of an extra-scientific nature. As time went by this tendency grew stronger and is no doubt still the vogue among most biologists, the geneticist Theodosius Dobzhansky with his biology of ultimate concern being one of the rare exceptions to the general rule.

If, however, we turn to the evolutionary study of culture, the philosophy underlying these efforts has not been a straight-forward affair, and has even been called a muddle between idealism and materialism, particularly in the second half of the nineteenth century. The doctrine by which these ethnologists or cultural anthropologists of the nineteenth century were guided has been called unilinear evolutionism. A number of scholars contributed to the growth and dissemination of the doctrine. The German P. W. A. Bastian (1826-1905) was convinced of the psychic unity of mankind and believed that in philosophy, religion, language, law, art and social organisation there were a limited number of elementary ideas common to all mankind. Hence similar ideas and cultural traits rose independently in various tribes and regions. The Swiss J. J. Bahjofen (1815-1887) tried to set out the order of development in the family, and so spoke of a first stage of sexual promiscuity followed by mother-right and then by father-right. These stages were supposedly universal. The Scotsman J. F. McLennan (1827-1881) was also essentially a parallelist. He maintained that all of mankind has had the same broad development from savagery. The Englishman Herbert Spencer (1820-1905) defined evolution as a passage from 'a relatively indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a relatively definite, coherent heterogeneity.' He added that social evolution took place from the militant societies to industrial ones. He emphasized the notion of struggle for existence and therefore supported extreme laissez-faire in politics and economics. Stressing the role of fear in religion, he traced its origin to ancestor-worship. The American Lewis Henry Morgan (1818-1881) who influenced Marx and Engels spoke of

three stages of development — savagery, barbarism and civilisation. He was a typical evolutionist who believed in a law of progress, in a stage of sexual communism which was followed by matriarchy and so on. The Britisher Edward B. Tylor (1832–1917) regarded primitive societies as survivals into the present of earlier stages of cultural development and also traced the evolution of religion from animism, to polytheism and then to monotheism. There were many other anthropologists and sociologists who tried to apply the concept of evolution to cultures and societies in the second half of the nineteenth century and later. The names of J. Lubbock, J. G. Frazer, R. R. Merrett and L. T. Hobhouse may be mentioned here. In fact, evolution proved to be so contagious as an idea that in 1909, as Donald G. Macrae says, anthropology, sociology and comparative religion were largely evolutionary sciences. Political science was strongly under the influence of the evolutionary concept. Eugenics was the height of fashion. And the economists were asking one another worriedly why their discipline was not evolutionary. With so much of evolutionary enthusiasm all over the place, it is not altogether surprising that T. K. Penniman says: ‘With the publication of the *Origin of Species* in 1859, the Constructive Period of Anthropology as a single, though many-sided science, begins’; or that Sol Tax, speaking of the period from 1860 to 1890, should say that cultural anthropology had ‘grown from nothing to maturity.’ Philosophically, however, the position of the unilinear cultural evolutionists was not clearcut. Marvin Harris tells us categorically that they were not materialists. Another writer, George Stocking, who has taken the trouble of examining their philosophical orientation at length informs us that idealism and materialism are not the proper philosophical categories by which to judge them. Were they, then, dualists? Perhaps. At any rate Morris Opler calls Lewis Henry Morgan, whom Marx and Engels had regarded as a materialist, a dualist.

The cultural anthropologists of the second half of the nineteenth century were arm-chair anthropologists. In other words, they relied on information collected by travellers and missionaries for their evolutionary interpretations; and so when more reliable field-data became available later, the weaknesses of the evolutionary position came to light, and unilinear cultural evolutionism received

a set-back. In recent times, however, evolutionism has been revived in some quarter in the form of general evolution and multi-linear evolution. Thus Leslie White and his students, M. D. Sahlins and E. R. Service, argue that evolutionary changes of culture are of two kinds— general unilinear evolution which is a transition of cultures from lower levels of development to higher ones, and specific evolution or the adaptation of culture to the diversity of local conditions. The latter, they add, is the concern of historians. Leslie White is a rigorous materialist, and so one can presume that his students, Sahlins and Service, follow him in this respect. Another prominent American anthropologist who has proposed a theory of multi-linear evolution is Julian Steward. He maintains that cultural developments occur differently in different culture areas, but that these different developments pass through broadly similar stages. Since Steward lends his allegiance to nomothetic causality, he is doubtlessly a materialist.

The weaknesses of the unilinear evolutionary interpretations and the belief that the anthropologists who made them were nomothetic materialists produced a reaction in the form of diffusionism. This reaction was anticipated by the British historian F. W. Maitland (1850–1906) who said: 'By and by Anthropology will have the choice between becoming history or nothing.' Diffusionism took two extreme paths, one of which was pursued in Britain and the other in the German-speaking countries. British diffusionism was represented by G. Elliot Smith (1871–1937) and his disciple W. J. Perry (1887–1949). They believed that all civilization had originated in Egypt and had spread from there all over the world. This pan-Egyptian or heliolithic theory thus sought to cut the ground beneath the concepts of independent invention, psychic unity, progress and evolution, but it was not taken seriously and so died an early death. German diffusionism was founded and elaborated by, among others, Friedrich Ratzel (1844–1904), Leo Frobenius (1873–1938), Fritz Graebner (1877–1934) and Wilhelm Schmidt (1868–1954). Under Graebner and Schmidt it came to be called the *Kulturkreislehre* or Culture Circle doctrine.

Like the unilinear evolutionists, the British and German diffusionists are rightly placed under the general label of history. But while the unilinear evolutionists hoped to attain to a science of history in the sense of unveiling universal stage of cultural development, the

British and German diffusionists believed that man was relatively uninventive, and so the rare cultural inventions, when made, tended to diffuse from their place of origin to other parts of the world. The British and German diffusionists were basically idealist in their philosophical orientation. And although the German diffusionists or historical ethnologists, as they more often called themselves, made their bow towards science, they were no doubt using the word in a wide or loose sense.

As a branch of history, historical ethnology adopts the fundamentals of historical methodology, and historical facts as systematically as possible. Historical methodology aims at ascertaining historical facts and not general concepts; and historical knowledge is knowledge of such facts and their concrete interconnections. As Feder, whom Wilhelm Schmidt quotes approvingly, puts it, 'If historical facts are separated from their particular time and place, or from the special character given them as consequences of volitional acts, or if they are separated from their individual relations, their very nature is lost.' Hence historical knowledge assumes the freedom of man.

Since, however, the historical ethnologist attempts to reconstruct the culture history of preliterate peoples, he does not have at his disposal written documents on which the historian heavily relies. How, then, does he endeavour to overcome this difficulty? Accepting with E. Bernheim and F. Graebner that there are no peoples without history, the historical ethnologist supports the view that contemporary primitive cultures embody survivals from earlier phases of development, that they are, in Schmidt's words 'living witnesses representing the oldest phases of development.' By applying the criteria of quality (characteristic similarities between cultural elements which did not originate from the nature of the object concerned or from the stuff out of which it was made indicate historical connections) and of quantity (a multiplicity of criteria of quality independent of one another confirms the criterion of quality and a battery of other rules and techniques of procedure to the ethnographic material, he supplements historical methodology in this way when it is brought to bear on the preliterate peoples. Thus historical ethnology acquires a special character as a historical discipline, as Graebner pointed out, by developing the above criteria and rules to surmount the above-mentioned difficulty. To

Graebner goes the credit for formulating the first elaborate statement of a method bearing directly on historical ethnology influenced primarily by Graebner and secondarily by the other forerunners of historical ethnology, Schmidt endeavoured to perfect the method and to build on that basis a reconstruction of culture history in its preliterate phase. Wherever it was possible, Schmidt also used the findings of auxiliary disciplines of which prehistory was the fore-most. As ethnographic and prehistoric knowledge increased, however, Schmidt's reconstructions of preliterate culture history were found wanting in various directions; but it must be noted that this great scholar did not hold his reconstructions as final achievements.

The shortcomings in Schmidt's reconstructions were sought to be corrected by J. Haekel who made many refinements, included the insights of many disciplines and avoided sweeping interpretations. But the philosophy underlying historical ethnology becomes pointed in Engelbert Stiglmayr's *Genzheitliche Ethnologie* in which he reflects on the foundations of the discipline. In doing so he depends on the Aristotelian-Thomist philosophy which he regards as the proper perennial philosophy, as the most thoroughly thought out of all philosophical systems and as a philosophy of order and being. From this philosophy he derives the necessary and universal concepts on which he bases his own reflections on the foundations of ethnology.

In keeping with this philosophy Stiglmayr points out that every science has a double aim or object: one, to understand a particular aspect of reality, its formal object; and two, to relate it to all of reality, its material object. Since reality has many aspects, it can be considered from various standpoints. Knowledge of the formal object is attained through abstraction from the material object. Since the specific character of each science emerges from the aspect of reality which it takes for its formal object, the method of a science will depend on its formal object and not vice versa.

The object of ethnological study, says Stiglmayr, is always culture. But, then, what is culture? Culture is the epi-hyper-natural form of things, he answers. In defining culture in this somewhat extraordinary fashion, Stiglmayr wishes to convey that culture is man's attempt to improve and perfect the natural circumstances with which he is endowed and by which he is surrounded. Man can do this because he is the efficient cause of culture; culture stems

in the final analysis from man alone. Every science which is concerned with the cultural phenomenon is a cultural science. Hence there is a general science of culture and special sciences of culture. Ethnology is a special science of culture because it studies the ethnics; that is to say, the bearer of a culture is a folk. Indeed, an ethnics may be defined as a person or group which distinguishes itself from others through that which it has made its own or through its culture. In contrast with the natural sciences, ethnology is a science of mind (*Geisteswissenschaft*) and a historical one at that. Ethnology is a holistic or integral science. It studies ethnic groups as wholes. Those ethnologists who do not support the Aristotelian-Thomist philosophy would presumably take up the neo-Kantian position or some position more or less akin to the Baden branch of the neo-Kantian orientation represented by Windelband, Rickert and others who turned their attention to the study of the *Geisteswissenschaften* as the domain of values. To what extent the new realism, phenomenology and existentialism have had an effect on the historical ethnologists is not clear.

Evolutionary historicism and historical ethnology were in turn attacked from 1922 onwards by the British social anthropologists. The founding fathers of British social anthropology were A. R. Radcliffe-Brown and Bronislaw Malinowski. The former was a positivist and the latter a pragmatist. Radcliffe-Brown believed that all of reality was natural and therefore capable of being studied with the methods of the natural sciences. Following pragmatism, Malinowski tried to understand the meanings of things in terms of their practical consequences. Both of them were of the view that all attempts at reconstructing culture history without written documents was a vain endeavour. They, therefore, described such attempts by the unilinear evolutionists and diffusionists as speculative or pseudo-history.

The task of social anthropology, they said, was the analysis of existing societies in terms of the concepts of structure and function. Thus one of Radcliffe-Brown's books is entitled *Structure and Function in Primitive Society*. The British social anthropologists were strongly influenced by the French sociologist, Emile Durkheim and his followers. They, therefore, concentrated on society rather than culture in contrast with the American anthropologists who took up culture as their point of departure. They regarded social



systems as natural systems and hoped to discover the invariant relations or laws of social organisation.

The study of structure began with Radcliffe-Brown. It may be defined broadly as the framework of society considered as the ordered relation between different social units or groupings based on kinship, sex, age, common interest, locality and status, or it may be regarded as a model constructed after this relation. Radcliffe Brown developed the concept around the concept of organism in biology. But the term has been interpreted in various ways. Kroeber and Kluckhohn, for example, say that the word sometimes stresses form as when one refers to the structure of a boat, and sometimes organisation as in the term social structure. They define it as 'the mode in which the parts stand to each other.' L. Warner defines it as 'a system of formal and informal groupings by which the social behaviour of individuals is regulated.' M. Fortes tells us that it is not an aspect of culture but the entire culture of a given people handled in a special frame of theory.' And, C. Levi-Strauss tries to interpret in mathematical terms and regards it as a model built after the empirical reality but not identical with this Social reality. It is an order of orders.

The first definition of function was attempted by Malinowski in 1926. By function he meant the manner in which 'the various aspects of culture influence one another' and the measure of their contribution to the 'integral working of the cultural scheme.' Radcliffe-Brown defines it in the following way: '...the contribution a partial activity makes to the total activity of which it is a part.' Thus these two British social anthropologists meant by the term function the interconnection between cultural and particularly the contribution that a part of a culture made to that culture in its entirety. The concept of function is very vague. It may stand for activity or for the relation of interdependence with other aspects of a culture, or again for a relation of interdependence with certain purposes such as the maintenance of a culture. G. C. Homans enumerates three types of functionalism ... quasimatheamatical, Durkheimian or Radcliffe-Brownian and Malinowskian functionalism. And R. K. Merton draws a distinction between latent and manifest functions.

Soon thereafter British social anthropology experienced an interesting turning-point. This happened through E. E. Evans-Pritchard

who, although a pupil of Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski, affirmed that social systems are not natural systems but moral systems, that social anthropology is therefore, not a natural science but is like certain kinds of art and historiography and that it is not an applied science like medicine and engineering but is useful only in a general cultural sense. So likewise Edmund Leach confesses that social anthropology today is well aware of its ignorance unlike Sir James Frazer who imagined he knew a good deal for certain. Turning to John Beattie who studied under Evans-Pritchard, we learn that the social anthropologist tries to understand, whereas the natural scientist attempts to explain, a distinction which has long been familiar to the Germans. He adds further that in studying social change the social anthropologist must take on the role of a historian because changes occur in time. More recently I. M. Lewis does not hesitate to connect social anthropology with history because, according to him, it is concerned with possibilities and probabilities. Lastly, Lucy Mair, who was for several years Professor of Applied Anthropology in London University, informs us that very few British anthropologists have looked at social change as a subject of explanatory generalisations because the pursuit of one's interests through choices made by a person is something that all members of all societies can do. She says very frankly that much of the advice that anthropologists offer is just common sense.

One can, therefore, conclude that the poverty of social anthropology consists, first, in the fact that it has not been able to live up to the positivist aims and claims of its earlier phase, and second, in the fact that its methods, concepts, and self-denying ordinances do not enable it to understand and describe the first, fine flowerings of freedom and creativity and the events that followed thereafter. Social anthropology has also tended to succumb to the exaggerations of scientism and sociology. Where social anthropology stand after more than fifty years of hectic activity? Adam Kuper in his historical survey of the subject ends by quoting Edmund Leach's remarkable question: 'What in heaven's name are we trying to find out?' And two Indian anthropologists, B. L. Abbi and Satish Saberwal, point out that social anthropology suffers from a blurred identity today.

Therefore, the central question of our time is: In what sense, if

any, is anthropology a science? We are of course mainly concerned with cultural and social anthropology and not with physical anthropology. We have seen that the unilinear evolutionary anthropologists of the second half of the nineteenth century wanted to eat their cake and have it too, that is to say, they wanted to view history from the perspective of evolution and science, but could not make up their minds in favour of materialism or idealism, and alternated between the two or endeavoured to arrive at compromise solutions. We have seen, further, how the diffusionists, both British and German, did not want to have any truck with evolutionism and viewed history, as it should be, as emerging from man as a free being capable of knowing, desiring and willing, which is its *raison-d'être*. We have also seen how the founding fathers of British social anthropology gave themselves up whole-heartedly to positivism or scientism, how with Evans-Pritchard, who incidentally became a convert to Catholicism, the pendulum swung to the opposite extreme, and how social anthropology has ramified in various directions, is uncertain of its status or its aims, and consequently has lost its identity. It remains for us to examine the view of the American cultural anthropologists and of the French anthropologists as represented by their most eminent personality, Claude Lévi-Strauss. Presumably cultural anthropologists in America can be divided into three groups, one, those who regard cultural anthropology as a natural science like physics and chemistry; two, those who regard it as one of the humanities and class it with history, art and literature and, three, those who take up an intermediate position or vacillate between the two extremes. Thus, to choose three examples by way of illustration. Abram Kardiner and Edward Prebble in their book *They Studied Man* state that the cultural history of the 19th and 20th centuries demonstrates that cultural anthropology grew into a scientific discipline from nebulous origins. They are not very clear about what they mean by a 'scientific discipline', but add later that cultural anthropology does not yet have a unified theory or method. On the other hand, E. Adamson Hoebel has no doubts that man is a part of nature, that, therefore, he is a natural phenomenon and belongs within the animal kingdom and that the study of man called anthropology is a natural science when it is pursued in accordance with the principles and methods of science. But he goes on to say that it has an almost

unique quality which is that as a natural science it is at one and the same time a physical science and a social science. John J. Honigsmann, however, does not agree, if one judges from his views on the subject. He would prefer to classify cultural anthropology under history and the humanities but without abstaining from the use of the positive methods in gathering and analyzing data.

The French anthropologist, Claude Lévi-Strauss, who has acquired world-renown, is largely concerned with the quest for universals or basic mental and social processes which project themselves concretely and objectively in cultural institutions. He says that anthropology should be a science of general principles and argues that such a general science can only be achieved on the basis of structural considerations which would include both unconscious and conscious processes. Inspired in the main by the linguist Ferdinand de Saussure, he affirms that linguistics offers a model of scientific method for anthropology. Referring to Karl Marx who said : ' Men make their own history, but they do not know that they are making it, ' he says that this statement legitimizes both history and anthropology and that the two are inseparable. How, then shall we evaluate Levi-Strauss ? Annemarie de Waal Malefijt in her *Images of Man* points out that positivists are generally critical of structuralism and adds : ' Nevertheless, some have also realized that positivism is a scientific method using verifiability as its code, and that it is possible that other codes for understanding exist. Perhaps, then, Levi-Strauss is embarked on a scientific revolution, although at present it seems to be a faltering one. So far, he does not say much more about the human mind than that it is structured, and that its tendency is to think in binary patterns. ' And Marvin Harris, who is a cultural materialist sympathetic to Karl Marx, states : ' Unlike Marx, Levi-Strauss confronted a great opportunity to which he did not respond. He found Comte, Durkheim, and Mauss standing on their heads, and he joined them. ' We may, therefore, conclude that Levi-Strauss is a crypto-positivist.

Is anthropology a science or is it not ? The anthropologists, it is evident, do not give us a clear answer, as a group whose formal pursuit is the study of man. There are some who say that anthropology is a natural science; others that it is a science but not a natural science; still others that it's not a science; and several that it is both a science and history or that it is in part a science and

in part not a science.

A part of the confusion arises from the word science itself which may be used, as in the German term for it *Wissenschaft* in a wide or loose sense, or in imitation of the natural science in narrow or rigid sense. But most of the confusion arises because the concept of man has become polarised, or, as Max Scheler puts it, 'We are the first generation in which man has become fully and thoroughly problematic to himself; in which he no longer knows what he essentially is, but at the same time also knows that he does not know.' Paradoxically the quest for certainty which took its most accentuated form in the positive sciences, and which has resulted in the technologizing of human life and its environment with its attendant consequences of the pollution of the air and the waters, the unbalancing of the ecological system, the exhaustion of the earth's resources and the shrivelling of the quintessentially human, has made man uncertain of himself and his scientific powers and uneasy in his inward life. Accordingly, the reaction which has set in and which manifests itself in the restlessness of the student world in the rise and decline of the counter culture movement, in the quest for solace through eastern religions, through a bucolic existence or through the insights of the primitive peoples and the like, can only be satisfactorily supported, presuming that it is basically on the right track, first, by the acceptance of a wide definition of the term science and, second, by bringing anthropology and philosophy together in a philosophical anthropology which is in correspondence with the emerging *Zeitgeist*.

So far as a wide definition of the term science is concerned, we would do well by taking the French philosopher Jacques Maritain as our mentor. Contrasting the ancient and the modern approaches to science, Maritain points out in *The Degrees of Knowledge* that to the ancients 'the eminent dignity of metaphysics' gave shape to the word, whereas in modern time it is the experimental, positive or natural sciences or sciences of phenomena which are taken as a model. Maritain next asks how science in general can be defined in accordance with its ideal type; and he answers 'We can say that science is a form of knowledge perfect in its mode, more precisely, a form of knowledge where, constrained by evidence, the mind assigns to things their reasons of being, the mind being only satisfied when it has attained not only to a thing, to a

given datum, but when it grounds this datum in being and intelligibility.'

Such a definition would do justice to the dual nature of man which David Bidney stresses in these words: '...man is not only a part of nature but also a being who, through his selfreflective intellect and creative imagination, is able to transcend the cosmic order of nature by setting up for himself norms of conduct which do not apply to the rest of nature.' In keeping with this wide definition the imperial claims of the positivist doctrine of the unity of scientific method will have to be denied, and we will have to acknowledge the validity of other methods of acquiring knowledge and insight. What the Canadian philosopher Bernard Lonergan has to say about knowledge and insight in his great book *Insight* should be noted in this connection. At any rate, in addition to the positive method of observation, experimentation, hypothesis-formation and verification, we have the method of knowing by indwelling. Michael Polanyi, who in his profound book *Personal Knowledge* underlined the significance of tacit understanding, tells us how knowledge may be acquired by dwelling in that which we desire to know. We have a very close knowledge of our body because we dwell in it. By dwelling in the parts which constitute a whole, we come to know the whole. By dwelling in a man's actions we secure a knowledge of his mind. It is through this theory and method of knowledge, says Polanyi, that we succeed in both knowing and experiencing the higher tangible levels of life.

A Philosophical anthropology which corresponds with the emerging *Zeitgeist* and paradigm science can of hardly be said to have crystallized fully as yet. It is still in the making. But Francisco Romero's theory of man and J. F. Donceel's philosophical anthropology may be regarded as fore-shadowings.

Francisco Romero (1891-1962) was one of the most influential Latin-American philosophers. In turn he was influenced by Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler, Nicolai Hartmann, Martin Heidegger, Henri Bergson and Ortega Y Gasset. Romero's main aim was to lay down a theoretical basis for creativity, freedom and responsibility in man's cultural and social life. He opposed scientism because it looked at man's moral, aesthetic, mental and spiritual life in terms of determinism, atomism and mechanism. He also opposed fascist and communist totalitarianism. To Romero philosophical tho-

ught was a movement within cultural activity through which a critical attitude was brought to bear on the cultural activity itself. As such philosophical thought increases the development of freedom. Aiming at a humanistic philosophy which tries to maximize the realization praiseworthy human values, he attacks positivism and reductionism because they impoverish the higher meanings and possibilities of the human spirit. To this end he adopts the phenomenological method. Experience, he believes, is dynamic and transcendental. A transcendental entity is one which radiates its action and exercises influence beyond itself. In Romero the notion of structure is basic, but he supports the proposition that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. He distinguishes four levels of reality, each of which depends on the one below it. The first level is the inorganic which is characterised by stability, regularity and gravitational force. Next comes the organic which depends on the inorganic. It is characterized by assimilation, elimination, continuing identity, growth, spontaneous movement, reproduction, and hereditary transmission. Its psychic life is pre-intentional and non-conscious. The human level which depends on the organic level becomes more and more complex acquires consciousness which, as Franz Brentano said, is always directed towards an object, that is, it is intentional. The self emerges at this level. The self or subjects becomes conscious of an object by knowing, willing and feeling it. The self, therefore, has a measure of control over its world. It creates culture and is created by it. Intentionality is a bridge to the spiritual. Since man bestrides both the natural and the spiritual worlds, he is a dual being. The actualization of man's possibilities as a person can only come about through the growth of freedom and responsibility, and through a culture which takes as its main aim the development, refinement and creative expression of his unique spiritual capacities. Spirit is order and harmony. It moulds life and intentionality to its own image. Political freedom, says Romero very relevantly for us in this country, is the foundation of other freedoms. All these freedoms are necessary so that a community or society of persons can strive towards a more adequate culture which struggles to achieve responsibility, universalism, altruism creativity in the arts and sciences and the promotion of human dignity in the economic, political and social spheres. Romero concludes with the paradox that truth can be reached, but that no version of it

should be free from doubt or accepted as a final presentation.

J. F. Donceel defines philosophical anthropology very simply as the philosophy of man and points out that it makes considerable use of philosophical, reflective and phenomenological psychology. In particular reflective psychology studies man as a subject, an ego, I, that is, as a being for whom there are objects and values and wills. It adopts a first person approach; it is a study of myself as myself. Through reflective psychology I endeavour to become conscious of and understand myself. But since I and thou are closely interrelated, since I become conscious of myself through communion with you, the study subjectivity is closely connected with the study of inter-subjectivity. A man has a nature and is a person. His nature is that which is given to him as a person to utilize as he deems fit. Hence man is facticity and project. Man's nature can be studied as an object, but the study of the person as person requires the phenomenological method. In order that the pure subject can live in and absorb the world it needs roots. Its roots are its quasiobject—fingers, hair, emotions, memory, perception and the like. Therefore, anthropology is the study of being-in-the-world, and its highest form of knowing is 'the luminous self-presence and self-awareness of the subject.' There are several egos in us, the physical, the social, the personal egos; but there is a deeper ego which knows these egos and this deeper ego is the primordial or originating or pure ego, the real self. Who or what is this pure ego? In the act of knowing and willing I coincide with myself and thus coincide with being. This is the pure ego or subject and the proof of this fact is that I cannot deny that I know something without contradiction. The pure I can only be known by pointing towards it. Having thus dealt with the question—Who is man?—we can turn to the question: What is man? Man is an organism but he is different from animals in that he has the power of reflection, co-reflection and ultra-reflection, in other words, he is a person. A person is an individual with a spiritual nature, and spirit is essentially self-knowledge, self-volition, self-consciousness and self-position. But man is both a material and spiritual being; therefore he participates in individualisation through both modes, the material and the spiritual. A fundamental feature of the human spirit is the power of transcendence. Where does this power ultimately propel man?



In a loving affirmation of the Infinite. But in his actual situations man is faced by a dialectical tension between that which is always already there or facticity and that which is always already beyond it or project. Man, accordingly, incorporates in himself several paradoxes. For one, since he has a body he is subject to the laws of matter, but since he is a spirit he is above space and time. For another, the human being is at one and the same time subsistent and open. He is open both horizontally and vertically. For a third man is existent and yet to be achieved. As a person man has inalienable rights, that is to say, 'he is a sovereign being, an end in himself, never really a means; because he is a spirit, albeit in matter, because the core of his being is self-consciousness, self-possession and self-position.'

And so having briefly and rapidly examined developments in anthropology from the second half of the nineteenth century to the present-day, having considered the struggle to render it a science and the counter-struggles against that endeavour, and having concluded that the time is ripe for a philosophical anthropology in correspond with the emerging *Zeitgeist* in general and the emerging paradigm of science in particular, we can turn finally to the third term in the title of this paper, that is to say, to India. Two facts stand out prominently—one, we are dominated by a mentality of dependence; and two, we have, therefore become theoretically and philosophically sterile. The mentality of dependence has by and large arisen from the spiritual impact of a long-enduring colonialism; and the theoretical sterility is to a great extent a consequence of that impact. We have been cut off from our roots, and have not yet been able to strike fresh roots which would derive their nourishment from both tradition and modernity simultaneously. In other words, we have not yet developed an authentically synthetic culture which is a necessity today and our only hope of economic and spiritual salvation. Regrettably, our anthropologists have also followed the paths of dependence and imitation and have either resorted to descriptive ethnography and on that basis sought to trace affiliations and affinities or have taken very largely today to analytical ethnography after the manner of social anthropologists in Britain or cultural anthropologists in America. Hardly any of them have tried to reflect on the foundations of their discipline in relation to the concrete situation in which they are unavoidably participant observers, obs-

ervers, who paradoxically observe themselves. And so, as I have pointed out time and again, we have grown theoretically and philosophically sterile. Our changing situation changes for the worse because we have no theoretical or philosophical grip on it at all; and our endeavours to secure a grip on it through an imitation of western theoretical models or philosophical orientation have uncovered the weaknesses, if not the worthlessness, of the enterprise.

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### NOTES

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