

CONTEMPORARY REACTION TO ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY: SOME REFLECTIONS

I

The main purpose of the present paper is descriptive rather than critical. The description is incomplete, as it has to be; but it is, I hope, representative. In sum, the finding is that especially during the recent years there has been a counteraction to what is roughly known as analytic philosophy: there has been a rather powerful drift towards synthesis without, of course, denying the importance of analysis; and yet the envisaged synthetic philosophy (or synoptic metaphysics) cannot be said to have *fully* demonstrated its plausibility or illuminative value.

The subject, however, cannot even begin to be discussed until the meanings of the crucial words in its title are sufficiently specified. Let us, then, begin with the word 'analytic.' What is analytic philosophy? Which philosophers are analytic philosophers? Was Russell, for example, an analytic philosopher? But he gave us a kind of metaphysics as well: his neutral monism is almost notorious. Again, notice that J. O. Urmson, in his well-known book, *Philosophical Analysis*,¹ concludes with a reference to what he calls "a decisive break" — i.e., a break between Russell's mode of analysis and the later developments after the end of 1930's. What all these suggest is that analytic philosophy, as so called, does not embody a single, unambiguous kind of philosophizing. Since its inception, mainly with Russell and Moore, it has assumed various forms, not even applying precisely one, single method, i.e., the method of *analysis*. Let us, therefore, take a brief glance at its geography and recent history.

Philosophy has always been partly analytic. Plato analyzed — so did Aristotle and numerous others. Still, by analytic philosophy is generally understood (as will be understood here) a kind of philosophy which has developed, roughly, since the beginning of the third decade of the pre-

sent century, having its hey-day during 1930's with the advent of logical positivism. With Russell and his logical atomism, it aimed at *reducing* complex and less ultimate facts to simple and more ultimate ones — at discovering the logically ultimate simples that constitute the real world. But his method of reductive analysis was later criticised and abandoned by those who have come to be called "ordinary language philosophers," such as Ryle, Wisdom, Wittgenstein and J. L. Austin. With them and their more recent followers, philosophy has come to be a matter of *elucidation*, rather than analysis. Only, the old epithet "analytic" has continued to be applied to these later and relatively recent developments, although the analytic procedure, as previously conceived, has become very essentially transformed.

The result is that the term "analytic philosophy" can no longer be used without a distinction between its wide and narrow senses. In its narrow sense, analytic philosophy aims merely at unpacking conceptual or linguistic complexes, or reducing such complexes into their ultimate, simple components. It presupposes the existence of relatively unclear "complexes," and its objective is to *analyze out* relatively concealed meanings. In the wider sense, analytic philosophy is this and something else besides (but nothing more): it wants to *elucidate*² the use of a linguistic expression by *whatever* adequate procedure, and the aim is not to discover structures of complex facts, but to dissolve conceptual puzzles and guard people from being misled by language.

Analytic philosophy is being taken here in this sense, and by 'contemporary' is being meant roughly the period after 1950, which was harbingered by the publication of Prof. H. H. Price's paper, "Clarity is not Enough," in 1945.³ Analytic philosophy (i.e. twentieth century analytic philosophy) has never been without challengers — rather mighty challengers such as Stace, Blanshard and Ewing. But Prof. Price's article perhaps gives the most typical ex-

pression to this challenge and, therefore, it seems legitimate to treat it as the first clear signal to the reverse current.

There is, of course, a still wider sense in which the term 'analytic philosophy' may be taken. In this wider sense these challengers as well are analytic philosophers. Any philosopher, in this wider sense, is an analytic philosopher, provided he is interested in analysis (taken in *its* wider sense) and applies the analytic techniques. Russell and Moore are, of course, analytic philosophers in this broad sense. But in the moderately wide sense (the second of the senses explained above) in which the term is being taken here, even these two giants of analysis cannot be called by that name. What, then, makes all the difference?

In the moderately wide sense, an analytic philosopher believes in the following four theses:

- (1) Analysis or elucidation is a theoretically useful and essential activity.
- (2) Analysis or elucidation (either linguistic or non-linguistic) is the *sole* function of philosophy.
- (3) Metaphysics (either immanent or transcendent) is futile or simply meaningless.
- (4) Philosophy has no concern with the so-called problems of life and is not to make normative pronouncements. (A philosopher need not be a "wise man.")

Now, a philosopher like Russell accepts only the first of these four theses, rejecting all the rest, either in principle or in practice. He is, therefore, not an analytic philosopher in this moderately wide sense. The same or much the same is true of H. H. Price, C. D. Broad and numerous others. In other words, they all accept the first thesis, but rejects some or all of the remaining theses. Let us then consider their reaction to these different theses in some details.

II

Critics of analytic philosophy have sometimes given a frank and clear expression to their deep appreciation of the

merits of analysis. Thus, H. H. Price, in his paper referred to above, develop a rather elaborate defence against what he considers to be inelegant attacks on analytic philosophy. He considers analysis to be an absolutely necessary part of the philosopher's occupation, stamps its long history as honourable, and remarks that its history is worthy of being studied for its own sake as one of the monuments of human genius.

Again, Blanshard observes that, in spite of its grave short-comings, the analytic movement has led to "genuine gains." It has lifted philosophy to an unforeseen level of definitiveness, clarity, carefulness and precision; it has made philosophical writing more simple and lucid, and brought philosophy and science together, to the advantage of the former. And, finally, he remarks:

"The new movement has stung him [Englishman], bewildered him, flouted him, angered him, made him thrash out at it in desperate, frustrated indignation. But it has also chastened him. He will find, I hope and expect, that all this whetting of knives has been in his service. It has at least given him a weapon of very sharp edge which, if he knows how to use it, will win him even more honourable trophies than those that are now on his walls."⁴

This, as it appears, has been well said. The merits of analysis or clarification should be obvious to any serious-minded thinker, whatever other affiliations he may or may not have. The first thesis of analytic philosophers is, therefore, beyond question.

But is analysis the *sole* function of philosophy? This brings us to the second thesis, and to all the strictures that have fallen even from such sympathetic critics as already quoted. Thus, Prof. Price, who has had so much to say in defence of analysis and clarification, observes:

"I think that clarification is a part of the philosopher's task; an indispensable part moreover, and one which he must be allowed to fulfil by whatever methods. . . . But I do

not think that it is the whole of his task. And certainly clarification is not all that the educated public demands of him."⁵

In the same vein C. D. Broad observes that "I do *not* think the analysis of propositions of various important kinds is the *whole* business of philosophy."⁶ Referring to what is called the therapeutic view of philosophy, he trenchantly remarks:

"It is not for me to judge whether it is altogether *prudent* for professional philosophers thus publicly to proclaim that their business is to take in and wash each other's dirty linen. Nor will I speculate on how long an impoverished community, such as contemporary England, will continue to pay salaries to individuals whose only function, on their own showing, is to cure a disease which they catch from each other and impart to their pupils."⁷

Quotations of this kind could be multiplied, but they need not be. It should be enough to notice that, among contemporary philosophers, it is far from being a general position that analysis or elucidation is the sole function of philosophers. With the onward march of analytic philosophy there has always been, in Passmore's language, "recalcitrant metaphysicians" such as Whitehead, Collingwood, Ewing, Cassirer, W. M. Urban, and even Russell and Moore themselves. Long ago, in his Morley College lectures during 1910-11, Moore stated that the first problem of philosophy, as generally practised, is the problem of giving a general description of the universe as a whole; and it appears that, in spite of his intense analytic occupation, he has never disowned this as a philosopher's task.

Again, in *My Philosophical Development*, one of his latest works, Russell, while defending analysis (i.e., reductive analysis) against its critics like J. O. Urmson, rather violently reacts to the model of philosophizing based on the later Wittgenstein. One would feel tempted to quote some of his strictures:

"I do not for one moment believe that the doctrine [i.e., Wittgenstein's doctrine concerning the function of philosophy] which has these lazy consequences is true. I realize, however, that I have an overpoweringly strong bias against it, for, if it were true, philosophy is, at best, a slight help to lexicographers, and at worst, an idle tea-table amusement."⁸

He observes that his most serious objection to the new philosophy (i.e., analytic philosophy) is that it has abandoned the grave and important task of *understanding* the world. He then remarks:

"I cannot feel that the new philosophy is carrying on this tradition. It seems to concern itself, not with the world and our relation to it, but only with the different ways in which silly people can say silly things. If this is all that philosophy has to offer, I cannot think that it is a worthy subject of study."⁹

As further symptoms of a rather wide-spread dissatisfaction, in the west, with clarificatory restrictions on the scope of philosophy, one could also mention the publication of certain key-books or series of books on metaphysics and, more generally (in the words of A. C. Ewing), on "non-linguistic philosophy." The Prentice-Hall series, for example, which is by no means restricted to linguistic philosophy, includes a volume entitled "Metaphysics," whose author contends that metaphysical problems are fundamental, so that the other branches of philosophy, directly or indirectly, bear upon them. "This suggests," he remarks, "contrary to what is widely assumed, that metaphysics is a foundation of philosophy, not its capstone." W. H. Walsh's book,¹⁰ bearing the same title, puts forward an elaborate defence of what he calls immanent metaphysics, in spite of its recognition of the great merits of analysis.

To take one more interesting example, Prof. J. J. C. Smart of the University of Adelaide, Australia, intends his book, *Philosophy and Scientific Realism*, "as an essay in synthetic philosophy, as the adumbration of a coherent and

scientifically plausible world-view."¹¹ In opposition to what he calls "the prevailing conception of philosophy,"¹² he believes that, as philosophers, we can and ought to think not only *clearly* but also *comprehensively*, and suggests that part of the philosopher's task is the attempt to acquire a synoptic view of the world."¹³ Candidly he remarks:

"That philosophy is at least the elimination of nonsense and the clarification of thought is something of which I have not the least doubt. However, I should also wish to argue that philosophy is more than this, and that it is the business of the philosopher to decide between various synoptic hypotheses on grounds of plausibility."¹⁴

Again, in another of his works, he not only develops theories in what might be called scientific metaphysics, but tries to make out a case for the plausibility of this kind of philosophy, adding that "to see the world not as a physicist or chemist or biologist or psychologist but as a complete whole is surely something which is worth doing for its own sake."¹⁵ As against W. H. Watson's (Wittgensteinian) criticisms of synthetic philosophy, he contends that it is not only not-too-sensible but even partially wrong to say that such a philosophy "decides nothing," and also that a philosophical synopsis of scientific facts is not nonsense just because it is above the barely scientific level.

This, however, virtually covers up even the *third* of the analytic philosopher's common theses. In other words, this shows that there has always been some opposition, more or less strong, against the analytic philosopher's opposition to metaphysics and, more generally, to non-linguistic philosophy. As late as 1956 Friedrich Waismann, once a member of the Vienna Circle, remarked: "To say that metaphysics is nonsense *is* nonsense."¹⁶ With the wide-spread rejection of the verifiability theory of meaning, this trend seems to have become palpably strong during the current years. In a recent work on the philosophy of language,¹⁷ it has been argued that 'meaningful' is a vague term and should not be restricted within empirical verifiability; which suggests that

the verification principle is not necessarily a fatal threat to metaphysics.

We may now come to the last thesis of analytic philosophers. Since Wittgenstein bade good-bye to ethics in his *Tractatus*, normative ethics largely fell out of fashion. Normative ethics, it was supposed, is essentially a matter of preaching, and as Schlick put it, for a philosopher "there is no greater danger than to change from a philosopher into a moralist, from an investigator into a preacher."¹⁸ Ayer divided "ethical contents" into four different kinds, and remarked that ethical philosophy comprises only the first of them, i.e., propositions which express definitions of ethical terms, or judgments about the legitimacy or possibility of certain definitions." "A strictly philosophical treatise on ethics should therefore make no ethical pronouncements."¹⁹ The changed situation can well be understood from a study of the books and articles recently published on ethical problems, as well as the courses offered particularly in Great Britain and America. Ethical writers, in general, have inculcated the kind of detachment in favour of which C. L. Stevenson spoke in the opening page of his well-known book, *Ethics and Language*.²⁰ It is a detachment from all normative and evaluative questions and, through that, from all questions which constitute what is called the philosophy of life.

But this attitude has also not gone unchallenged, even in the land of its origin. Thus, in the Introduction to *Value and Obligation* (edited by him) R. B. Brandt divides ethical problems into *normative* and *metaethical*, and very candidly observes: "A study of the problems of ethical theory naturally must include the problems both of normative ethical theory and of metaethics."²¹ And his anthology shows that he meant business. To take another slab of evidence, the Macmillan series on the Sources in Philosophy includes a volume, published in 1965, which assimilates materials from such traditional figures as Plato and Rousseau. In the Introduction, the editor rather insists that the task of ethics is, inter

alia, to show the grounds of reasonable choice in relation to happiness and to decide what ought to be done.

This challenge is perhaps best articulated by Prof. Henry Veatch who, referring to the detachment which Stevenson advocates, rather passionately questions the propriety of that detachment:

“Still one wonders whether, when the house is burning or the ship sinking, detachment is quite the proper attitude. . . . As a professor, one may relish controversy with other professors; as a teacher, one may needle and cajole one’s students; but as a human being one feels a responsibility to engage in frank and open discussion with other human beings about those moral and ethical questions that have plagued the thoughtful men of all ages.”²²

He warns that the theory that he is going to present in his book may involve “a plea for some special code of ethics” (his quotation marks), but, so he thinks, a special plea is not necessarily special pleading, and, therefore, his book rightly professes to be “through and through a book of philosophy.”²³

In fine, a curious reference may also be made to some of the standard introductory works on philosophy, currently published, which have consciously taken liberties with all but the first thesis of analytic philosophers. Apart from such works as *A Modern Introduction to Metaphysics* edited by D. A. Drennen²⁴ and *Introduction to Philosophy* edited by Arthur Smullyan and others,²⁵ I would specially mention two: John Hospers’s *An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis* (Rev. ed., 1967),²⁶ and *A Modern Introduction to Philosophy* edited by Paul Edwards and Arthur Pap.²⁷ Among these writers, who are known more for their original contributions than their text-books, Prof. Hospers does not hesitate very much in including discussions on metaphysics and normative ethics, while the other two, in preparing a “modern” introduction to philosophy, have not chosen to accommodate analytic philosophers alone, their only consideration in selecting contemporary material being

“clarity and intelligibility of the writer’s language, the importance of his ideas” etc. They (these two) indeed do not believe that any definition of philosophy can be wholly unbiased, and yet proceed to define philosophy in as unbiased terms as possible, so that extra-analytic problems also can be comprised within its scope. Of course, the reference to such introductory works derives its significance not so much from what views these philosophers explicitly hold regarding the scope of philosophy as from how they have actually planned their works.

III

This, however, is all about the west.²⁸ What is the situation in the east? As it seems, the picture here is comparatively simple. The philosophical tradition in the east is generally marked by speculation, spiritualism and a concern with salvation. These metaphysical and practical moorings, generally speaking, are still almost as forceful in eastern philosophy as in earlier times. Chinese philosophy, with its great Confucianism, Taoism and Neo-Confucianism, has ended up with Marxism, and Japanese philosophy, in spite of its late contact with western thought, has substantially remained the same as it was many generations ago.

More than two decades back Prof. D. T. Suzuki, renowned Buddhologist of Japan, wrote:

“We can thus state that the *kannagara*²⁹ summarizes Japanese thought. The Japanese mind ever since its awakening to reflection has been under the influence of foreign culture, Confucian, Taoist, and Buddhist, and recently the Western mode of thinking has found its way here, the scholars are now endeavouring to unfold what is essentially Japanese by adopting Western methodology. At the same time most young men these days are so taken up by Western thought, and those who read recent Japanese humanistic literature will find there every possible shadow of the West. But in spite of all these foreign accretions, what flows deeply underneath is this Japanese thought and feeling of the *kannagara*, which will always

assert itself in one way or another whatever its superficial coatings may be."³⁰

I think that, in spite of a greater impact of western thought, especially of Marxism and analytic philosophy, on Japan since that time, this summarization of Japanese thought is still, in substance, correct. By virtue of her general non-intellectualistic temperament Tokyo is, presumably, still very unlike Vienna.

As for the Indo-Pak-Bangladesh subcontinent, one could surmise the situation as something most typically and also most powerfully representing the general philosophical heritage in the east. In respect of epistemic attitude and regard for tradition, it resembles continental Europe much more than Great Britain and North America. As we all know, people here are relatively conservative, and naturally lag behind. As it appears, philosophers here are only beginning to feel the impact of the western analytic movement, and the story may be summarized by saying that they, in general, do not accept any of the four theses mentioned earlier with apparently some partial reservation for the first. Metaphysics of the transcendent variety has been and still is rampant in this area, and philosophy is still, almost as before, conceived and professed as something tightly wedded to life, particularly to the problem of good life and salvation.

Quite long ago the late Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, the best-known contemporary Indian philosopher, expressed his dissatisfaction with what he termed "the pious sophistries or the sacrosanct hair-splittings"³¹ of professional philosophers, and later remarked in another of his well-known works: "Philosophy is understanding, contemplation, insight, and a philosopher can find no rest until he gains a view or vision of the world of things and persons which will enable him to interpret the manifold experiences as expressive, in some sort, of a purpose."³² Nay, the same spirit is re-expressed in the fact that the *History of Philosophy Eastern and Western* published under his editorial chairmanship was intended as something "that may serve as a release

at a time when philosophy is becoming restricted in scope and limited to logical and linguistic analysis."³³

As late as 1957 a scholar of Indian philosophy observed: "In the Orient, philosophic wisdom does not come under the head of general information. It is a specialized learning directed to the attainment of a higher state of being."³⁴ This is as much true of Bangladesh as of India, and numerous utterances of the philosophers of both countries could be quoted to substantiate it. To take only one example from Bangladesh, the late Dr. G. C. Dev, former Chairman of the Department of Philosophy, Dacca University, and a dedicated exponent of idealism, once candidly remarked: "From my life-long endeavour to connect myself intimately with philosophy I have come to the realization of this truth that any fruitful philosophy is philosophy of life. Philosophy, therefore, is only a synonym of the philosophy of life."³⁵ He reiterated the same or much the same thing in many other places of his works,³⁶ and he seems to have been followed by so many that the identification of philosophy and philosophy of life, accompanied by a sort of distaste or even contempt for logical rigour and analytic circumspection, may be said to have become something of a fashion in this area.

Back in 1936, when logical positivism was already playing havoc with traditional speculative philosophy in Europe, *Contemporary Indian Philosophy* appeared with the philosophical views of twenty-four leading thinkers of this sub-continent. These views, in many of which something had been said about the nature and value of philosophy, clearly indicate an anti-analytic trend. This, however, had its most systematic expression in the words of D. M. Datta who pointed out what he called "three undesirable tendencies" in modern western philosophy, viz., its anti-metaphysical tendency, its questioning the rationality of a comprehensive view of the universe as a whole, and its divorce from practical life. He no doubt admitted the great usefulness of analysis because without analysing facts and ideas and particularly the meanings of words "we cannot arrive at any precise and accurate conclusion." "But," he then remarked,

"it is going too far to suggest that analysis is the only or the main business of philosophy."³⁷ It may be observed, in a nutshell, without producing further specific evidence, that this position is still typical of the *general* currents in Indian thought.

IV

This brief survey of the situation in contemporary philosophy, however, suggests that, insofar as the merits of analysis are concerned, hardly any comments are called for. Both parties join hands on this front. But could we say, following Wisdom, that to philosophize is always to analyze? Clarity, indeed, is what philosophy primarily aims at (except in the philosophy of life, in the broad sense of the term); but, as Prof. Price demands, clarity may be either synoptic or analytic, and both may be essential to a complete intellectual satisfaction. We shall demand analytic clarity in the case of individual concepts or individual verbal expressions; but it *seems* true that any area of experience will remain ultimately unclear unless the *whole* is put together and a synoptic insight into the whole is attempted. This seems even truer in the case of the totality (i.e., the largest possible totality) of experiences. We want not merely to analyse the world but to *understand* it. But sciences give us only partial pictures, and it is traditionally the business of philosophers to build up an integrated, comprehensive view out of these rudiments. If this is metaphysics, something of this sort seems to be a basic demand of our intellectual frame.

Price tacitly distinguishes between two types of speculative metaphysics: (a) the undesirable type which aims "to establish conclusions about matters of fact by means of purely *a priori* premises";³⁸ (b) the desirable type which wants "to produce a conceptual scheme under which all the known types of empirical facts may be systematically arranged."³⁹ He compares the latter to a kind of map, and contends that its function is not to furnish new information about matters of fact, but only to device a conceptual scheme

which brings out certain systematic relationships between them.⁴⁰ It seems that interest in metaphysics of this kind, and perhaps only of this kind, is both natural and reasonable, and at least one thing that the analytic movement has achieved is that there will probably be no going back (or, at least no *unhesitant* going back) to the too imaginative speculations about the transcendent, the supersensible or the so-called unknowable.

It is palpably in the air that the days of logical positivism are long past. But even if it be a fact that the verifiability principle does not succeed in demonstrating the meaninglessness of metaphysics, that itself does not show that transcendent metaphysics is meaningful. Logical positivism seems to have a deep-seated point, but it gets lost in positivism's peculiar approach to the issue. It seems that the problem of meaning should be approached, not by asking which statements are verifiable, but by asking how meanings are actually assigned to particular symbols. It seems correct to say that *basic* symbols are assigned (or spontaneously acquire) meanings through instantiation of their respective uses; but, if so, a sentence turns out to be meaningless if it contains any symbol or part of a symbol whose meaning cannot, in principle, be assigned through instantiation of use.

It is also to be noted that the metaphysical concept of transcendence does not, by itself, take us very far, because bare transcendence or absolute "otherness" is conceptually empty. Like existence and non-existence, such concepts as knowability, verifiability, acquaintanceability, and their negatives are not predicates. Nothing can, therefore, be *defined* into them, because the function of a definition (i.e. unostensive definition) is to mention predicates. The so-called reality cannot, therefore, be defined simply in terms of transcendence; we must mention some genuine predicate if we want to say what it is. And once a predicate is mentioned, it would be necessary to *explain* why an entity bearing the predicate should transcend all knowledge. But can any such explanation be given, *in principle*? It might be

argued that it is unknowable or unacquaintanceable precisely because we do not have, and will never have, the appropriate faculty by which it could be known or be acquainted with. But to say this is only another form of saying that it is unknowable or unacquaintanceable, and hence it would not count as the explanation in question.⁴¹

But, however undesirable Price's undesirable metaphysics may be, his desirable metaphysics too is not quite above all suspicion. Price observes that this map-like metaphysics may legitimately assume more than one form, and these different forms are not either true or false, but only either *good* or *bad*, or less good or better.⁴² But if the sentences in synoptic metaphysics are to state *facts*, they have to be either true or false; and if they need not state *facts*, will they really satisfy the "consumers" (the educated public) Price has in mind? Will not such sentences really be a kind of normative utterances? But, if so, will not synoptic metaphysics be unable to *say* anything about the world as it is, and also be faced with the danger of becoming a matter of individual, conceptual choice?

Furthermore, it is also to be considered whether the conceptual scheme, under which all the known types of empirical facts are to be arranged, will be anything like an empirical, scientific hypothesis. If it is, such metaphysics will be something like a super-science. But it is odd to believe that a super-science is not liable to be either true or false. If, on the contrary, it is nothing like a science, it is hard to see how empirical facts can be systematized within it.⁴³

I am not necessarily suggesting that these difficulties cannot be overcome, but only insisting that unless these difficulties are adequately dealt with, this scheme of synoptic metaphysics will not cut much ice. It seems that, keeping in view philosophy's distinction from science, the most fundamental issue in both analytic and non-analytic philosophy is the relationship between philosophy and fact.

There is, however, another front at which non-analytic philosophy will have to fight out its course. This front

is the whole area of normative philosophy — social, political and moral. If philosophy here is to remain distinct not merely from science but also from mere preaching, it must make clear the kind of logic it is applying and the kind of relationship it has with its analytic and synoptic counterparts. In the moral sphere, for example, normative philosophy is supposed to suggest the best code of life. But who or what is the real arbiter in pinning down the *best* code? Is it general happiness, or the Socrates of J. S. Mill as opposed to the pig? Are we here applying discursive logic or only personal intuition? How can a philosopher, in such a situation, preserve his love of "truth" or respect for evidence as apart from individual or universal (human) bias? How, again, is such a code of life to be connected with the metaphysical map-making? Need it be connected at all, in case any attempt at such a connection is likely to result in the best code getting lost in abstruse conceptual wilderness?

These are some of the fundamental matters to be considered, if the contemporary reaction to analytic philosophy is ultimately to maintain its stand and to be really fruitful as philosophy and not as either fancy or sheer sermon.

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NOTES

1. Oxford University Press, 1956.
2. Recall here the distinction between elucidation and analysis in the strict sense.
3. First published in the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Vol. XIX, and later reprinted in *Clarity Is Not Enough*, edited by H. D. Lewis (George Allen, 1963).
4. H. D. Lewis, ed., *Clarity Is Not Enough*, p. 109.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 58.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
8. Russell, *My Philosophical Development*, p. 217.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 230.

10. Hutchinson University Library, London, 1963.
11. *Philosophy and Scientific Realism* (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), p. 1.
12. *Loc. cit.*
13. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
15. *Between Science and Philosophy* (Random House, 1968), p. 13.
16. "How I See Philosophy," *Contemporary British Philosophy* (1956), edited by H. D. Lewis; reprinted in *Logical Positivism* edited by A. J. Ayer, p. 380.
17. W. P. Alston, *The Philosophy of Language* (Prentice-Hall, 1964).
18. Ayer, ed., *Logical Positivism*, p. 247.
19. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic*, p. 103.
20. Yale University Press: New Haven, 1944.
22. Veatch, *Rational Man*, (Indiana University Press), pp. 14, 15.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
24. The Free Press of Glencoe, New York, 1964.
25. Prentice-Hall, New Delhi, 1962.
26. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., USA.
27. The Free Press, New York, 1957, 1965.
28. Affixing Australia, of course.
29. "... the way natural to the gods, or the way of the gods as they are by themselves without being affected by human intellectuality." Radhakrishnan and others, eds., *History of Philosophy Eastern and Western* (George Allen, 1952), p. 605.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 606.
31. *Indian Philosophy* (1926), p. 781.
32. *An Idealist View of Life* (George Allen, 1932), p. 10.
33. *History of Philosophy Eastern and Western*, p. 6.
34. Heinrich Zimmer, *Philosophies of India* (1957), p. 56.
35. G. C. Dev, *Amar Jivan Darshan* (My Philosophy of Life; Dacca, 1961), p. 6-7. My translation.
36. E.g., his *Idealism: A New Defence and a New Application*, pp. 16-17, and *Aspirations of the Common Man*, p. 146.

37. *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, pp. 290-91.
38. *Clarity Is Not Enough*, p. 39.
39. *Loc. cit.*
40. Cf. W. H. Walsh, *Metaphysics*, pp. 177, 181.
41. Probably an epistemic predicament of the Kantian type could alone be successfully put forward in support of the belief in a transcendent reality. The Kantian predicament arises because it necessarily limits human thought to a fixed number of immutable categories which are inescapable and yet ultimately vitiated by contradictions. But one could wonder why at all we would need categories of this very specific variety. This, however, is a point which will not be entered into at the moment.
42. Cf. "And if metaphysical assertions cannot of their nature be set down as strictly true or false, we may all the same want to characterize a set of them as illuminating or the reverse, or to describe them as authentic or spurious." Walsh, *Metaphysics*, p. 183.
43. Notice also Warnock's thought-provoking remarks concerning the feasibility or "attractiveness" of such a conceptual scheme in pp. 144-45 in his little but very useful book *British Philosophy Since 1900* (Oxford University Press, 1958).