

ŚAṆKARA'S CONCEPTION OF ADHYĀSA :*
HAS PROF. S. K. CHATTOPADHYAYA REFUTED
PROF. G. MISRA ?

Prof. S. K. Chattopadhyaya's paper entitled 'Śaṅkara's Concept of Adhyāsa: A Textual Interpretation' published in the *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*¹ is a sequel to Prof. G. Misra's paper entitled 'Śaṅkara's Doctrine of Adhyāsa: Difficulties of Propositional Symbolism' published in the same journal² carrying an impression that the former is a rejoinder to the latter. But a watchful reader must have found that Prof. Chattopadhyaya has once more expressed his difference and disapproval which he has been doing long since the publication of Prof. G. Misra's interpretation of Śaṅkara Vedānta.³ Prof. Misra's interpretation is found in a number of papers and books, out of which Prof. Chattopadhyaya has referred to a select few. Prof. Chattopadhyaya perhaps thinks that Prof. Misra's account of Śaṅkara Vedānta in general and that of the concept of *adhyāsa* in particular are not based on a close study of texts and claims his own as a 'textual interpretation'.

We are, however, not given to understand what this 'textual interpretation' or what is later called as 'textual rendering of the words and sentences' is. We merely find Prof. Chattopadhyaya labouring hard to comment profusely on sentences and components thereof, i.e., words and punctuation marks *Adhyāsa Bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara. Prof. Chattopadhyaya perhaps intends to expatiate on what Śaṅkara actually said or/and meant to say.

It must be unfortunate for us that Śaṅkara was not alive to Prof. P. A. Schilpp's day so that the latter could have edited a volume on Śaṅkara in *The Library of Living Philosophers* series with a view to freezing endless and fruitless speculation about what a philosopher must have meant. Even then the aims and achievements of Prof. Schilpp would have been much less than those claimed by Prof. Chattopadhyaya. It was never expected that *The*

Library would present the final word on the writing and thought of the philosopher concerned putting an end to all differences of interpretation and criticism. But Prof. Chattopadhyaya is very much ambitious to say the last word on Śaṅkara's views, which he could have hardly given even if he were Śaṅkara himself in one of his previous births.

Prof. Chattopadhyaya must not have been oblivious of the fact that there cannot be anything like the *interpretation* or 'indisputable interpretation' of the thought of a particular philosopher. Because, had there been such an one, he would not have wasted so much time and energy in scribing not a cursory but, an elaborate and lengthy account of what Śaṅkara said; but, would have, instead, pointed to the work of any one of the galaxy of writers, traditional and modern (supposing they do not say different things). And why is there a galaxy of writers, glossers and reviewers? Why are there glosses after glosses and reviews after reviews? The simple reason is that they were called for. Is there any harm then to add another body to the galaxy if that body has something to offer? Would the galaxy then explode or what?

If Prof. Chattopadhyaya means by 'textual interpretation' going to the original texts of Śaṅkara, then so far so good. In the words of Prof. Schilpp, 'There is no substitute for first-hand contact with the original thought of the philosopher himself.'⁴ If this is Prof. Chattopadhyaya's design, this is also prof. Misra's design.⁵ They do not, therefore, differ as regards their referring to the relevant literature, but they differ in their rendering them. This is but inevitable, for the original thought of the philosopher has got to be rethought by the interpreter and rephrased in the diction of his own age, so that others may be able to understand and appreciate the thought of the philosopher. A pleonasm worth repeating is that interpretation is interpretation and not the work interpreted. If someone is puzzled over the conflicting interpretations and in a desperate state decides, as Prof. Chattopadhyaya, in effect, does, to go back to the original writing of the philosopher

himself and then make his own decision, the result is not that one has arrived at the original import of the philosopher, but rather that one has added one more body to the galaxy of interpretations which may differ to a greater or lesser degree from the existing interpretations. Prof. Chattopadhyaya seems to entertain the idea that there is something like original, objective, pure, pristine and philosopher's own view which can be bodily picked up — though not by anybody and everybody — and presented apart from the interpretation of that view. But that is the discredited dogma of the thing-in-itself. Prof. Radhakrishnan, whose authority Prof. Chattopadhyaya admits, writes in the preface to his *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I: 'My aim has been not so much to narrate Indian views as to explain them, so as to bring them within the focus of Western traditions of thought.' And commenting on the task of historians of philosophy he says, 'However much he may try to assume the attitude of a mere chronicler and let the history in some fashion unfold its own inner meaning and continuity. . . . still the judgments and sympathies of the writer cannot long be hidden.'

This judgment which Prof. Radhakrishnan talks about is given against the background of the climate of thought of the age and needs the acclimatisation of the commentator. Elsewhere he says, 'Our system of thought must act and react on the world progress. . . . There is nothing wrong in absorbing the culture of other peoples.'⁶ If citation of Strawson's words, 'If there are no new truths to be discovered, there are old truths to be rediscovered'⁷ does not become agreeable to Prof. Chattopadhyaya as an alien trend of thought, then indigenous Jayanta may be cited to buttress the above stand:

Kuto vā nūtanam vastu vayam utprekṣitum kṣamāḥ/⁸
Vacovinyāsavaicitramātram atra vicāryatām/ /

[(How can we discover a new fact (or truth in philosophy?) Hence (as far as this book is concerned) one should only consider our novelty in rephrasing (the older truths propounded by the ancients in modern terminology.)]

If Prof. Chattopadhyaya insists to ignore all these, he is surely choosing to put the clock back with a doubtful deference to the tradition. Even if this deference is sincere and sympathetic, it is not worthwhile. In the words of Warnock, a contemporary writer, 'Excessive deference to the past, however sympathetic, may often be cramping and harmful; but an unapologetic deference to the future, however unhelpful it may be in the present, is certainly both prudent and becoming.'⁹ Instead of sustaining or ruminating on dessicated fodder, to use Schiller's severe language, it is definitely worthwhile to change the food habits when there is plenty of green grass. If Prof. Chattopadhyaya is not able to find it and goes on complaining of hunger, then one would very much be inclined to liken him to Warnock's hungry animal who is looking in the wrong direction and does not realise that he himself is at fault.¹⁰

Anybody who is acquainted with the current philosophical literature would not fail to take note of the *zeitgeist*. Robert R. Ammerman writing in 1965 says, 'Around the turn of the century a revolution began in philosophy which is not yet over.'¹¹ This revolution is neither British, nor Polish, nor American, nor German, but it is human. It is a revolution in the history of human civilisation signalling progress and prosperity as was the industrial revolution at one time. Nobody today, queer characters excluding, objects to using a safety pin, or a razor blade, or a radio receiver because these are not indigenous but alien knowhows. This is the age of internationalism which aims at co-existence, co-operation and convergence of understanding. 'Races and nations which dwelt and flourished apart', Prof. D. M. Datta, whose authority also Prof. Chattopadhyaya admits, speaks seriously as back as 1930 in the preface to his *The Six Ways of Knowing*, 'are now coming into intimate contact and gradually tending to evolve a world of common ideas and beliefs.'¹² Philosophy cannot keep herself aloof from the mainstream of thought. Prof. Datta himself tried to give an exposition of the epistemology of Advaita Vedānta 'in the light of modern Western concepts.' His aim was 'to bring the problems, concepts and theories of the Vedāntins within

the focus of modern Western thought' and the method he adopted for the purpose was 'critical analysis, comparison and evaluation.'¹³

Prof. Chattopadhyaya does not appear to appreciate the true spirit of the thought and writings of these 'renowned scholars and great masters in the subject'; he only acclaims and approves their authority when he feels that he has found in them support for his angry railings.

Prof. Misra, in this sense, is very much on the right track, only that he replaces the worn out rails and tightens the loose bolts. If this be disclaimed as destroying the orthodoxy, then one is hardly sure of one's intentions. Prof. Misra's work is surely called for and not guided by some sort of personal or national pride to bring the Indian philosophic tradition *somehow* on a par with the modern Western philosophic tradition.

Prof. Chattopadhyaya appears not so much ignorant of the change in the philosophic scene, but he cannot fully reconcile himself with that. For, even though he objects to Prof. Misra's use of certain terms as alien, he, himself, quite confidently appropriates them.¹⁴ This leads one to think that Prof. Chattopadhyaya has fixations and motives. Frequently he argues to the person and talks slightly of Prof. Misra as a 'new theorist', 'innovator', 'ādhyāsika' and calls his view as 'noxious theory', 'nonsense'. He becomes unnecessarily garrulous in condemning Prof. Misra because he will milk the he-goat all the time and, on the contrary, in commending Prof. Datta because he can never make mistakes. So one would find it very hard indeed to consider this as a dispassionate and unbiased piece of writing as one expects from a senior academician like Prof. Chattopadhyaya.

Prof. Chattopadhyaya does not wish to come out of his shell for fear of destruction of his unflinching faith in the great spiritual climate of Indian peninsula perhaps, which is best brought out in Prof. T. M. P. Mahadevan's words, 'something in her very soil and air which makes a man at some stage or other in his life realise the futility of finite

ends and seek for righteousness (*dharma*) and there-through release (*mokṣa*) from finitude.¹⁵ That is a question of faith and Prof. Misra would not question that. Prof. Misra wants to find out the key concepts and categories used in a particular system of thought or by a particular thinker and see whether those concepts and categories can admit appropriately and thoroughly an alternative interpretation in terms of the concepts and categories so very current in his age. It is a fruitful and interesting line of philosophical research to which many in the West as well as in India have come. It should not be supposed that Prof. Misra or any one in the line claims any finality for his interpretation, his programme rather implies that he keeps the line open for others, but a contender should not feel restless and injured and be prepared for a patient and decent debut in terms of sound reasoning.

The whole debate between Prof. Misra and Prof. Chattopadhyaya seems to veer round the following points:

1. Whether the account of the concept of *adhyāsa* which Śaṅkara gives is logical or psychological? This point involves a wider one.
2. Whether philosophy is concerned with analysis of language or explanation of fact? These two points lead to a third one.
3. Whether *śabda* as a *pramāṇa* or source of knowledge signifies critique of language or scriptural revelation? Prof. Chattopadhyaya does not deal in detail with *śabda* but makes only a passing reference to Prof. Misra's views on it in his paper under reference. It needs a discussion because Prof. Chattopadhyaya has a lot to speak about it elsewhere.¹⁶

Let us now dilate a little upon the above points to decide whose view appears more sound and convincing. We shall take points (1) and (2) together because they are inter-related.

To begin with, philosophy does not enquire about physical facts in the way in which chemistry and physics, his-

tory and politics, psychology and cybernetics do. The framework which a philosopher presents may, of course, serve as a model for enquirers in other areas of knowledge and there is no bar on the philosopher to pursue enquiries other than philosophy and he might engage his own framework as a model in those other enquiries. But then the distinction between philosophical enquiry and non-philosophical enquiry should not be lost sight of and when one has got to appreciate the contribution of a particular thinker to philosophy one must disengage his pursuit of philosophy from other pursuits.¹⁷ It might also be that a philosopher gets a motive to think over a particular problem from a particular matter of fact (e.g., development of Wittgenstein's picture theory of meaning from a road accident), but that is an extralogical aspect of a philosophical problem. Particular matters of fact do not go to corroborate or controvert a philosophical doctrine. 'They are neutral with respect to particular matters of fact,' as Ayer puts it.¹⁸ When one gives Śaṅkara the regard of a philosopher, it is by virtue of this regard that one must not view him as propounding factual — psychological or physiological — doctrines. Śaṅkara is not preoccupied with explaining as to why and how do perceptual illusions occur and suggesting means of release from them. He is preoccupied with explaining the logic of perceptual judgments. *Adhyāsa* is his technical name for the logical unsoundness of perceptual judgments.

Prof. Chattopadhyaya interprets *adhyāsa* as 'an error of experience whose illogicality(?) consists in this that in it a thing turns out in experience what it cannot be materially and in fact.' Prof. Misra on the other hand, says that *adhyāsa* does not stand for 'an eternal process of psychological illusion and Śaṅkara is not offering any account of illusion at all.' He interprets Śaṅkara as propounding 'a critique of language' with the conclusion that 'language necessarily falsifies the reality it purports to represent.' It is, therefore, entirely a logical point and the situations of rope-snake or shell-silver illusions are merely illustrations of that point.

When a philosopher gives an illustration, it may be clarified here, he does not report about a situation as a scientist does, either to ratify or to reject a particular generalisation. He lays down a logical rule and then cites linguistic use either for its ratification or for its rejection. The linguistic use cited may or may not describe an actual situation; it is sufficient for his purpose if it can describe a possible one. In other words, he tries to find out the permissible uses of language. A use is permissible not because it describes an actual situation; but because it is capable of describing a situation actual or possible. Here 'possible' means 'logically possible' or 'not self-contradictory'. A linguistic use can be said to be logically possible when a situation actual or imaginary sought to be described by it is intelligible and can be said to be self-contradictory when a situation actual or imaginary sought to be described by it is not intelligible. The philosopher is only concerned with the description and intelligibility of a situation. It does not matter whether the illustration chosen by him is actual or possible. In either case he only tries to describe a situation and make it intelligible.¹⁹ Again, this calculation of possibility worked out by the philosopher is not like that worked out by the scientist as when he forecasts a rainfall tomorrow or cooling down of the sun two thousand years after. The philosopher tries to find out whether 'rainy tomorrow' and 'cool sun' are permissible expressions or not and whether they are capable of making sense or not; whether they are self-contradictory or not and whether they are intelligible or not.

Now, if we view Śaṅkara as explaining the logic of perceptual judgments instead of explaining the actual cases of perceptual illusion, then the concept of *adhyāsa* and other related concepts, otherwise remaining cloudy in Prof. Chattopadhyaya's rendering would appear in clear light. Śaṅkara sets in the discussion of *adhyāsa* with the pre-supposition that the ideas of 'you' and 'I', or to be more specific, the ideas of 'object' and 'subject' are opposed to each other like light and darkness.²⁰ It is important to notice that light and darkness as matters of fact may combine and

co-exist, but as concept they cannot on point of logic. The expression 'light and dark' is self-contradictory in terms of rules of logic. In any propositional symbolism '*viṣayī*' and '*viṣaya*' are two distinct and opposite ideas. Prof. Misra takes *viṣayī* and *viṣaya* to be logical subject and logical predicate where Prof. Chattopadhyaya takes them to be conscious self and material object respectively. Prof. Misra's interpretation keeps harmony with the conception of *viṣayī* as *svayamtiṣṭha* (self-existent) or *svayamprakāśa* (self-expressing) but not with the conception of it as conscious self and the conception of *viṣaya* as *aparatiṣṭha* (existing by other's help) and *aparaprakāśa* (expression by other's help) but not as material object. Logical subject and logical predicate are diametrically opposed to each other in respect of their behaviour in a propositional symbolism. One may try to blur the distinction of subject and object in outward form, that is in surface grammatical structure; but one would not succeed to do it in depth grammatical structure. (*sansargena na tu svarūpeṇa*). This is a distinction of fundamental sort that the logical subject and the logical predicate or their attributes (*taddharmāṇāmapi*) are distinct and asymmetrical in respect of their roles, functions or activities. The logical subject and the logical predicate are philosophical categories to analyse a propositional form. They are not supposed to be articles of furniture of the world as Prof. Chattopadhyaya's interpretation leads us to suppose. In the *Gītā Bhāṣya* Śaṅkara says,

Tat pada sarvanāma

Tasya bhāva tatva

Tat viṣayaka jñāna tatvajñāna

(The term 'that' is a ubiquitous name; the manner of its occurrence is ontic; and the knowledge of it is ontology.)

Śaṅkara is interested in discussing about *pratyayas* and *padas* or concepts and terms and their logical behaviour. Philosophical knowledge consists in apprehending that the 'that' or the subject part is incorrigible and stable (*satya*) part in a propositional form whereas the predicate part is corrigible and unstable (*anṛta*) part. But for all practical

purposes (*lokavyavahāra*), they are coupled together (*mithunikṛta*) — I shall not say 'herded together' because it is not an appropriate and happy expression.

Now, let us come to the various explanations of *adhyāsa* given by Śaṅkara. They are the following three:

1. *Smṛtirūpaḥ paratra pūrvadr̥ṣṭāvabhāsaḥ,*
2. *Anyasya anyadharmāvabhāsatām,* and
3. *Atasmin tadbuddhiḥ.*

The first explanation says that a judgment is a kind of apprehension like memory but not identical with it. In this apprehension, the present is likened to what was apprehended previously and hence is corrigible. An ordinary judgment involves the application of class concepts. And this application is made possible by means of memory. No one who does not possess the faculty of memory can make a judgment. And where there is judgment, there is possibility of misjudgment. The present judgment regarding application of *viśaya* or attribution of *viśayadharma* to *viśayī* is liable to be replaced by a subsequent judgment. This is one aspect of *adhyāsa*.

The second explanation considers another aspect of *adhyāsa*. It says that if something comes to be represented with the credential of another, then it is a case of *adhyāsa*. In an ordinary judgment the *viśayī* is represented with the credential of *viśaya*. That is to say, *viśaya* or its *dharma* are attributed to the *viśayī* where it is not to be attributed and so the judgment becomes logically unsound.

The second explanation of *adhyāsa* views the matter from the side of *viśaya*, while the third one views it from the side of *viśayī*. It says that *adhyāsa* is the representation of that as what it is not. *Viśayī* represents itself (*svayam-prakāśa*), but it is made to be represented through *viśaya* which results in logically unsound judgments.

Now, these explanations give rise to two questions. Every judgment, it is maintained, apprehends the referent under the class concepts and combines *viśayī* and *viśaya*. The first question is whether Śaṅkara intends to charac-

terise each and every judgment as logically unsound. The reply to this question would be that Śaṅkara does not accept the ordinary distinction between true and false judgments. All the so-called true and false judgments of the ordinary level are declared logically unsound excepting those which are called identity judgments (e.g., 'This is that'). The second question is, whether there are two types of *adhyāsa*, one concerning the use of class concepts and the other concerning the combining of *viśayī* and *viśaya*. The reply to this question would be that there are not types of *adhyāsa*, but there are two aspects of the self-same *adhyāsa*. The *Vivaraṇa Prameya Sangraha* calls these two aspects of *adhyāsa* as *jñānādhyāsa* and *arthādhyāsa*. It is called *jñānādhyāsa* from the point of view of *judgment* which makes use of class concepts and it is called *arthādhyāsa* from the point of view of *proposition* which combines *viśayī* and *viśaya*. A judgment is that which is expressed in a proposition and a proposition is that which expresses a judgment.

Before leaving the discussion of *adhyāsa* it may be emphasised that truth and falsity are concepts of epistemological appraisal in the cognitive level, not in the pre-cognitive level, that is what is called experience. So *adhyāsa* can be said to be there only with respect to judgments and propositions, but not with respect to experience. Experience is neither true nor false. It is simply there. What one believes or what one asserts on the basis of experience is said to be either true or false.

The next and important point to be considered is whether *śabda* is to be interpreted as a critique of language or as scriptural authority. Prof. Misra takes it in the former sense while Prof. Chattopadhyaya in the latter. According to the findings of Prof. Misra, Śaṅkara uses 'āgama', 'śruti', and 'śabda' interchangeably. The direct meaning of 'śabda' and 'śruti' is 'language'. Language is an instrument of communication used in a variety of ways. It has one of the uses, not *the* use in scriptures. *Śrutipramāṇa* is not presented by Śaṅkara as the supreme source of knowledge and the final court of appeal in respect of cognitive matters.

That Śaṅkara does not conceive *śabda* as the final and infallible source of knowledge overriding all others like perception, inference, etc. is confirmed by his statement, '*śrutyānugrhitatarkah anubhavāngatvena āśriyate*' and such others.²¹ *Śrutyānugrhitatarakah* is taken by Prof. Misra to mean 'reasoning proceeding alongwith the logical tracts of language' and '*anubhavāngatvena āśriyate*' to mean 'the very conditions of any determinate cognition.'²² Those who take *śabda* to mean scriptural authority do some sort of rigging and say that authentic knowledge comes from scriptures for the unenlightened people and that comes from intuition for the enlightened ones.²³ Statements of the scriptures and sayings of the sages may, at the initial level, provide information and material. And in this sense they may be regarded as authorities as Śaṅkara and Strawson are regarded as authorities by Prof. Misra or as Śaṅkara, Prof. Radhakrishnan, Prof. Dasgupta and Prof. Datta are so regarded by Prof. Chattopadhyaya or as all of these illustrious men so regarded by myself. But that does not credit any source as the final dispenser or arbiter of knowledge. That has got to be analysed and examined on the test ground of reason and then accepted or rejected on its own merit. As truth is revealed after analysis and examination of statements coming from any source whatsoever, it is called *āgama*. And as this truth does not come out of sources like perception and inference which are mediated, it is called *aparokṣānubhūti*. If *śabdapramāṇa* or *śrutipramāṇa* is supposed to be the most important of all *pramāṇas* and on the top in the series of importance, then the difference between this *pramāṇa* and other *pramāṇas* would be only a difference in degree and this would provide with the same factual information as others, *albeit* more faithfully and accurately. But the difference between this *pramāṇa* and other *pramāṇas* is one of kind as the following statement of Śaṅkara amply shows.

*Pratyakṣādi pramāṇanupalabdhe hi viṣaye
śrutiḥpramāṇam na pratyakṣādi viṣaye.*²⁴

(In matters which cannot be comprehended through perception, etc., linguistic analysis steps in.)

Śaṅkara intends to draw attention to the fact that perception, inference etc. are accredited sources of knowledge for transaction of business in the world of colour, taste and sound. But when we come to the world of philosophy we leave behind this world and therefore these ordinary sources of knowledge are of no avail here. Śaṅkara seems intent to show the sphere of competence of different *pramāṇas* in this way. The knowledge available through the analysis of language without its objects of reference cannot be of the same type as the knowledge available through language with its objects of reference. One is operative in one's own sphere but not so in another's.²⁵ The philosopher in nobody but a *samīkṣaka* as *Vivaraṇa* terms him. He does not use the instrument of language as it is used in the ordinary plane to make statements in the world. He picks up the instrument itself and examines its function, futility or utility, etc. in abstraction. He studies the structure and behaviour of different linguistic forms and for this task follows the method of reflection and critical analysis.

Śaṅkara starts with the *Brahma Sūtra* or the *Gītā* as his authority and studies them critically and comes to his own conclusions. As a writer aptly puts it, 'The Ācharya's method seems to be to start with the authorities and thus, in the final analysis, to discard them, even as the costly lunar module by the lunarnauts.'²⁶

Now after going through all these Prof. Chattopadhyaya may flatter himself by saying *a la* S. Hampshire, 'let Prof. Misra translate Śaṅkara's doctrine about the ultimate elements of Reality into a doctrine about the ultimate elements of our discourse, but let him not regard at any time that this translation is an account of Śaṅkara's own intention.' As Śaṅkara's version of *adhyāsa* or *śabda* is not found to carry a burden of extra-logical commitment, Prof. Misra may take away the wind from Prof. Chattopadhyaya's sails and say, 'let Prof. Chattopadhyaya translate Śaṅkara's doctrine about the ultimate elements of our discourse into a doctrine about the ultimate elements of Reality but let him not regard at any time that this translation is an account of Śaṅkara's own.' This stalemate would be there until it is

realised that interpretations, strictly speaking, are neither true nor false. They are plausible and acceptable or implausible and unacceptable depending on how and how much they are able to accommodate and co-ordinate and systematise and explain. My humble task in this paper has been to show on whose interpretation — Prof. Misra's or Prof. Chattopadhyaya's — various statements of Śaṅkara and other Advaita Vedāntins on *adhyāsa* and *śabda* appear more coherent, plausible and acceptable.

I have not tried here to place the thesis of Prof. Misra beyond discussion and dispute—that would be dispelling one dogma and developing another. Discussion on his thesis can be profitably carried on in at least two ways. First, one can discuss about the standpoint itself as to whether it is defended convincingly by the interpreter; he would discredit himself if he is vacillating between more than one standpoints. Second, one can discuss whether the interpreter is able to apply the avowed standpoint consistently to all the areas to which it is directed. A thesis is examined on its own merit and not thrown out only because it does not conform to the tradition or orthodoxy or because it does not satisfy somebody's ego. Prof. Chattopadhyaya does not examine Prof. Misra's thesis in either of the above two ways but rejects it without giving it a hearing that it deserves. He does not, therefore, succeed in refuting the thesis of Prof. Misra, neither does he succeed in establishing his overbold pronouncement that 'the linguistic thesis (of Prof. Misra) on *adhyāsa* has absolutely no basis in Śaṅkara's text!' Prof. Chattopadhyaya tries to ignite a big mass of fire which does not blaze, but ends in smoke.

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NOTES

- * I am grateful to Dr. B. Kar, Lecturer, P.G. Dept. of Philosophy for his valuable suggestions in preparing this paper.

1. Vol. III, No. 4, pp. 473-504.
2. Vol. II, No. 3, pp. 225-236.
3. Prof. G. Misra presented his findings on Śaṅkara Vedānta as a whole at the 43rd. session of the Indian Philosophical Congress, 1969 which was published in *Bharati* in the same year and in his *Analytical Studies in Indian Philosophical Problems*, 1971.
4. General Introduction to '*The Library of Living Philosophers*'.
5. Vide his prefaces to *Analytical Studies* and to *The Advaita Conception of Philosophy: Its Method, Scope and Limits*, Bhubaneswar, 1976.
6. *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, London, 1971, p. 780.
7. *Individuals*, London, 1959, p. 10.
8. Jayanta (circa 800-950 A.D.) in his introduction to *Nyāyamanjirī*.
9. G. J. Warnock, 'Philosophy and Imagination' in *The Revolution in Philosophy*, London, 1967, p. 126.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 125.
11. 'A Short History of Analytic Philosophy' in *Classics of Analytic Philosophy*, (Ed.), TMH Edn., p. 1.
12. Preface to the first edition of *The Six Ways of Knowing*, Univ. of Cal.
13. *Ibid.*
14. Although Prof. Chattopadhyaya objects to Prof. Misra's expression 'floating universal' he uses the expression 'floating appearance'.
15. 'The Religio-Philosophic Culture of India' in *The Cultural Heritage of India*, Vol. I, Ramakrishna Mission, 1970, p. 163.
16. Vide, for example, his paper entitled 'Śaṅkara's Philosophy of Language' presented at the all India seminar of that name held at Vani Vihar in 1971.
17. I have tried to elaborate this point in a paper entitled 'Some Remarks on the Foundations of Metaphysics' accepted for presentation at the ensuing session of the Indian Philosophical Congress, 1976.
18. *The Problem of Knowledge*, Penguin Books, 1957, p. 7.

19. Cf. Ayer, *op. cit.*, p. 28.
20. *Yuṣmat asmat pratyaya gocarayor viṣaya viṣayaineos tamaḥ prakāśavat viruddha svabhāvayor itaretara bhāvānupapattau* etc.
21. Also, *Nahi śrutiśatamapi sītaḥ agniḥ aprakāśo vā iti bruvat prāmāṇyamupasaiti. Yadi brūyāt sītaḥ agniḥ aprakāśo vā iti tathāpi arthāntaram śruteḥ vivakṣitam kalpyam prāmāṇyānyathānupapatteḥ* (*Gītā Bhāṣya*, 18.66) and,
Na hi āgamāḥ sahasramapi ghaṭam paṭayitum īśate. Vācaspati, Introduction to Bhāmatī.
22. *Analytical Studies*, pp. 8-14.
23. For example, Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 514.
24. *Gītā Bhāṣya*, 18-66.
25. *Yasya vākyaṣya tātparyaaviṣayibhūtasamsargo mānāntareṇa na bādhyate tat vākhyam pramāṇam. Vedānta Pāribhaṣa*, 4.1.
26. J. Dash, Proc. of the Fifth Conf. of All Orissa Phil. Assoc., p. 5.
27. *Spinoza*, Penguin Books, 1967, p. 219.