

POETIC ANUMĀNA AND VYAÑJANĀ

While establishing the theory of *vyañjanā* in the fifth *ullāsa* of his *Kāvya prakāśa* (between 1050–1100 A.D.),¹ Mammaṭa attacks *anumāna* (inference) as a substitute of *vyañjanā* (suggestion). The sense obtained by the *Vyañjanāvādin*s through *vyañjanā* is arrived at by the Naiyāyikas through *anumāna*. Mammaṭa, while referring to the Nyāya standpoint in this connection, does not mention any Naiyāyika by name. Govinda Thakkura² and some later commentators understand *nanu vācyād asambaddham tāvāna pratīyate*, etc., of the *Kāvya prakāśa* to refer to the views of Mahimabhāṭṭa, the author of the *Vyaktiviveka* (between 1020–1050 or 1100 A.D.),³ though ancient commentators Māṅikya-chandra⁴ and Someśvara read no such reference. Mahimabhāṭṭa; however, cannot be taken to be the first to propound such views. Even Ānandavardhana (about 860–890 A.D.)⁵ knew the Naiyāyikas who fought against *vyañjanā* and included it in *anumāna*. He criticizes their viewpoint.⁶

Mammaṭa first explains in brief the Nyāya standpoint and then offers his own criticism with a view to supporting the theory of *vyañjanā*.⁷ The *vyāṅgyārtha* (the sense suggested) cannot be thought of as having no relation with the *vācyārtha* (the literal sense), otherwise there will be a danger of anything being signified by any word whatsoever. Thus, according to the Naiyāyikas, one must accept the relation of a *līṅga* and a *līṅgī* between the *vācyārtha* and the so-called *vyāṅgyārtha*; and the so-called *vyāṅgyārtha* ought to be regarded as the sense inferred through *vācyārtha*. As one infers a *līṅgī* by means of a *līṅga* or *hetu* endowed with three conditions, viz., *pakṣa-sattva*, *sapakṣa-sattva* and *vipakṣa-vyāvṛttatva*, so one can infer the so-called *vyāṅgyārtha* by means of the *vācyārtha*. Thus one need not accept *vyañjanā* for this purpose. After this brief introduction of the Nyāya viewpoint, Mammaṭa gives an example so as to illustrate how the Naiyāyikas try to prove the *vyāṅgyārtha* to be nothing but the *anumeyārtha*. A woman, fed up with a religious person whose presence poses obstacle to her dalliance with her lover, says to him :

bhama dhammia vīsaddho so suṇao ajja mārio teṇa
golāṇaīkacchakudangavāsīṇā dariasīheṇa ⁸

[Wander ye, the religious one, without any fear; for that dog has been killed today by an arrogant lion that lives in the bower of the marshy bank of the Godāvārī river.]

From the *vācyaārtha* or literal sense it appears that she tells the religious person to wander about near and in the bower fearlessly; but actually what she means and intends to communicate is just the opposite: she wants that the man should no longer come to that place, so that she may enjoy the love of her lover without any hindrance—a meaning that has been regarded as the *vyāṅgyārtha* by the *Vyañjanāvādins* and *anumeyārtha* by the *Naiyāyikas*. A *Naiyāyika* would communicate this sense inferred to others through the following syllogistic argument consisting of five parts (*avayavas*):

(1) *Pratiñjā*: godāvārīkacchakuñjam⁹ bhīrubhramaṇāyogyam.

[The bower on the marshy bank of the Godāvārī is not for a timid person a place to wander about.]

(2) *Hetu*: bhayakāraṇasimhupalabdheḥ.

[Because it has the cause of fear viz., the presence of a lion.]

(3) *Dṛṣtānta*: yad yad bhīrubhramaṇāyogyam tat tad byayakāraṇābhāvavad yathā gṛham.

[Where there is no cause of fear that is a place for a timid person to wander about, e.g., a house.]

(4) *Upanaya*: na cedam kuñjam tathā bhayakāraṇābhava-
vat simhupalabdheḥ.

[This bower is not without the cause of fear on account of the presence of a lion.]

(5) *Nigamana*: tasmād bhīrubhramaṇāyogyam.

[Hence not a place for a timid person to wander about.]

Mammaṭa has the following objections to this syllogistic inference:

(1) Definite inferential knowledge may be accomplished only through a valid *hetu* or *liṅga*. Above, the presence of the lion has been understood as a cause for a fearful person for desisting himself from wandering about in the bower, whereas even a timid person may run such a risk on account of the orders of his elders or master, love for his beloved, or any such reason. This *hetu* is, therefore non-conclusive (*anaikāntika*).

(2) A religious person may fear a dog in order to avoid its contact but may be brave enough not to be afraid of a lion. One has thus in the above syllogistic argument an adverse (*viruddha*) *hetu* also.

(3) The *hetu*, i.e., the presence of the lion, in the *pakṣa*, i.e., the bower on the marshy bank of the Godāvārī, is not beyond doubt; for that religious man has neither ascertained the presence of the lion by perception or by inference but comes to know of it merely through the words of that woman; and one's words might be unrelated to fact. The *hetu* is, therefore, unestablished (*asiddha*) also.

(4) The *hetu* is thus defective. A defective *hetu* (called *hetvābhāsa*) cannot prove the existence of a *sādhya*.

The objections of Mammāṭa may be answered away as under :

(1) The dearest thing for a person, particularly for a timid one, is his own life.¹⁰ A timid person may not carry out the orders of his elders or master, or may not care for the love of his beloved or any such thing if it invites an encounter with a lion and is thus sure to take his own life. Thus the *hetu* here is hardly non-conclusive (*anaikāntika*).

(2) Probably Mammāṭa takes it for granted that the religious person under reference is not of a timid nature; he fears the dog just to avoid its inauspicious contact, otherwise he is courageous enough not to care for the lion. This does not appear to be true. Had it been true, there would have been no point in the woman's telling him of the presence of arrogant lion that has killed that dog; for the man, even after being told of all this, may not keep himself off. The woman appears to be sure of his timid nature as well as of his reaction to know of the presence of a lion. A timid person who fears even a dog will certainly be terrified the moment he comes to know of the presence of a lion and will not dare come to that place again. Thus the Naiyāyikas, and not Mammāṭa, are right in understanding the background of the above verse. The *hetu* is, therefore, not adverse (*viruddha*).

(3) A timid person may not dare confirm the presence of a lion by endangering his own life. Information through the words of some other person is enough to invoke fear in his mind.

It is, therefore, not unnatural that he may believe what the woman says to him. The woman is confident that he will trust her, otherwise she would not have said so to him. We know she is, no doubt, a cunning woman and what she states to the man may be a sheer lie; but we have no grounds to hold that the man knows her nature and intention well. The *hetu* may thus hardly be held to be unestablished (*asiddha*).

(4) The cognition obtained through poetic *anumāna* need not be *pramātmaka* (containing definite knowledge), because its main objective is to afford aesthetic pleasure and not the definite knowledge of a thing. It may, therefore, be well accomplished even through a defective *hetu* or *hetvābhāsa*.¹¹

It is obvious from the foregoing lines that the objections advanced by Mammaṭa against the above syllogistic inference hardly hold water. It appears to us that the Naiyāyikas or *Anumānavādins* are nearer the truth.

Mammaṭa refers to the following verse also and tries to show that the Naiyāyikas are wrong in accepting the *vyāṅgyārtha* as *anumeyārtha* (the sense inferred) :

niśśeṣacyutacandanam stanatataṁ nirmṛṣṭarāgo `dharo,
netre dūram anañjane pulakitā tanvī taveyaṁ tanuḥ
mithyāvādinī dūti bāndhavajanasyā jñātapīḍāgame,
vāpīṁ snātum ito gatā si na punas tasyādhamasyāntikam¹²

[The slopes of your breasts have (their) sandal completely washed off; the lower lip has its redness clean washed out; the eyes are without collyrium at the end; (and) horripilated is this slender frame of yours. O liar, O ye messenger, who have not realized the agony that overtakes (your) friend, you had gone from here to the pond for a bath and not to that wretch.]

“You had gone from here to the pond for a bath, and not to that wretch” is here the *vācyārtha*; and “You had gone from here only to that wretch in order to dally (with him)” is the *vyāṅgyārtha* which the Naiyāyikas take to be *anumeyārtha*. A Naiyāyika would advance his syllogistic argument as follows :

(1) *Pratijñā* : sā (dūti) tadantikam eva rantum gatāsīt.

[She (the lady-messenger) had gone only to him in order to dally (with him).]

(2) *Hetu* : tasyāḥ stanataṭādīnām niśśeṣacyuta candanatvādeḥ.

[Because the slopes of her breasts, etc., have their sandal completely washed off, etc.]

(3) *Dṛṣṭānta* : yatra yatra nāryaḥ stanataṭādīnām niśśeṣacyutacandanatvādikaṁ tatra tatra ramañajanyam.

[Where there is the complete removal of the sandal, etc., from the slopes of the breasts, etc., of a woman, it is due to amorous dalliance.]

(4) *Upanaya* : atra ca tasyāḥ stanataṭādīnām niśśeṣacyuta candanatvādikam.

[Here one finds the complete removal of the sandal, etc., from her breasts, etc.]

(5) *Nigamana* : tasmāt sā tadantikam eva rantuṁ gatā sīt.

[Hence she had gone only to him so as to dally (with him).]

Mammāta says that the *hetus* put forth for inferring the amorous dalliance by the lady-messenger with the *Nāyaka* are non-conclusive (*anaikāntika*); for they are not definitely related with the dalliance only and are possible on account of other reasons also, as they have been described here in the verse as the effects of a bath (Mammāta does not refer to other reasons possible). But we trust no *sahṛdaya* will mistake these for the *hetus* of a bath, etc., for the following reasons :

(1) The sandal on the slopes of the breasts of that lady-messenger may be completely washed off only on account of the passionate close embraces and caresses by the *Nāyaka*. It cannot be due to a bath, as in that condition the sandal from the entire periphery of her bosom, and not only from their slopes, will be removed.¹³

(2) The redness of her lower lip may be clean washed out only owing to the passionate kisses by the *Nāyaka*. One cannot take it as the result of a bath; for in that condition her lips will not be bereft of their natural redness.¹⁴ *Ācāryas* on *kāmaśāstra* (erotics) prescribe kiss only on the lower, and not on the upper one, of a woman,¹⁵ which is generally known as *adhara-pāna*; and hence the washing out of the redness of her lower lip is the *hetu* only of dalliance.

(3) The collyrium might have been removed from her eyes at the ends (*dūram*)¹⁶ through kisses by the *Nāyaka*; for the *Ācāryas* on *kāmasāstra* prescribe kiss at the end of the eyes of one's beloved.¹⁷

(4) The horripilation on her slender body, too, does not appear to be due to a bath. Even if it is admitted that the water of the pond in which she has taken a bath is very cool, her walk from the pond to the house of her mistress should have given sufficient warmth to her body and hence no horripilation due to cold (and the poet does not specifically tell us that the season is winter!). The horripilation is due to the intense sexual enjoyment which she has experienced and the thought of which is still overpowering her.

(5) The *Nāyikā's* rebuking her as a liar (*mithyāvādinī*) and as the one who has not realized the agony of (her) friend, none other than the *Nāyikā* herself (*bāndhavajanasyājñātapiḍāgame*) clearly shows that she has told her a lie that she had gone to the pond in order to take a bath, and not to the *Nāyaka*. It proves that she does not bear the signs of a bath but only those of dalliance.

Mamṇaṭa holds that a *Vyañjanāvādin* reaches the *vyāṅgyārtha* by taking the help of the word *adhama* used of the *Nāyaka*, whereas for an *Anumānavādin* the wretchedness of the *Nāyaka* is not established by valid reasons. The argument is not too solid to be answered away. The *Anumānavādin* may have recourse to *mithyāvādinī*, *bāndhavajanasyājñātapiḍāgame* and *adhamaśya* to reach the *anumeyārtha*. They lend substantial support for taking the aforesaid *hetus* to be of dalliance. So far as the wretchedness of the *Nāyaka* is concerned, the *Nāyikā* alone is an authority. Had she given valid reasons for establishing his wretchedness, the poetic effect of the verse would have been probably feebled or marred at all. She might have a definite knowledge of the love—intrigue between the lady-messenger and the *Nāyaka*, otherwise she should have never called her a liar. Both an *Anumānavādin* and a *Vyañjanāvādin* have to trust the *Nāyikā* for her assessment of her *Nāyaka* as a wretch (who dallies with the maid-servant). If one doubts the *Nāyikā*, the *Vyañjanāvādin* will also have no grounds to believe her. Moreover, one must not forget

that like *vyañjanā* poetic *anumāna* also cannot operate irrespective of context, etc. The poetic *anumāna* is an extra-ordinary *anumāna*, which, unlike the stale *anumāna* of logic, affords aesthetic pleasure.¹⁸ In the poetic *anumāna*, one should not concentrate much on whether the *anumeya* is real or unreal, because in both the conditions it affords aesthetic pleasure (*camatkāra*). To tell the truth, the unreal *anumeya* will be able to afford more aesthetic pleasure than the real one;¹⁹ and therefore, it is not necessary that the *hetu* should always be a valid one; even a *hetvābhāsa* is capable of giving rise to poetic *anumeyārtha*. The *anumāna* of logic is *pramātmaka* (containing definite knowledge), while the poetic *anumāna* need not be so. A *Vyañjanāvādin* may distinguish his *vyañjanā* from *anumāna* by holding that in *anumāna* the *hetu* is always correlated with the *pratīyamāna*, whereas the *vyañjaka* is not so being only ordinarily related to it and consequently can provide us with several *pratīyamānas*; but the treatment of the *vyañjaka* by the *Vyañjanāvādins* is such as leads one to the conclusion that there is a correlation between the *vyañjaka* and *pratīyamāna*: the *vyañjaka* associated with a *vaktṛ* (speaker), *boddhavya* (one to whom something is conveyed), *kāku* (intonation), etc., gives rise to a definite *pratīyamāna* and thus assumes the nature of a *hetu*. Thus the poetic *anumāna* can well replace *vyañjanā*. As is obvious from the above lines, Mammata's criticism of the theory of *anumāna* in reference to the verses *bhama dhammā*, etc., and *niśśeṣacyutacandanam stanataṭam*, etc., does not appear to be justified and speaks volumes of the strained labour he had to put on in finding fault with it.

According to the *Anumānavādins*, there are only two types of meanings: *vācya* (literal) and *anumeya* (inferred), the *lakṣya* (referential) and *vyañgya* (suggested) being included by them in the *anumeya*.²⁰ The purport understood just after listening to a word or a sentence is *vācya* or *mukhya* and that whose realization needs efforts is *gauṇa* (secondary) or *anumeya*. The *anumeyārtha* is realized through some literal (*vācya*) or inferred (*anumita*) meaning and is of three kinds: *vastu*, *alaṅkāra* and *rasa*, etc., first two of which may also be *vācya* but the last (*rasa* etc.) of which is always *anumeya*. The meanings are further divided according to a word (*pada*) and a sentence (*vākya*). Of them, the meaning of a word, being without parts (*niramiśa*), lacks the *sādhyaśāghanabhāva* (the relation of a *proband* and a

probandum) and is consequently always *vācya* and never *anumeya*. The meaning of a sentence is twofold: *vācya* and *anumeya*. The latter is obtained through the former and is always *pratīyamāna*.²¹ The literal meaning of a word is the *hetu* of its meaning inferred (*anumeyārtha*) and the literal sense of a sentence, that of its sense inferred. Thus the *Anumānavādins* recognize that the sentence—meaning has its own peculiarity from the word-meaning.

It will not be improper here to take into account the Nyāya theory of sense (*artha*). It appears that according to the Nyāya logic a word has *śakti* and *lakṣaṇā*, while a sentence possesses *anvaya* and *tātparya*.²² The literal meaning of a word is the one which directly relates the word to its bearer and this peculiar relation is termed by the Nyāya logicians *śakti* (capacity), *sanketa* (desired intention), *icchā* (wish) or *samaya* (the relation of one *occasioning* the other). It almost corresponds to Mill's concept of denotation, or Frege's *Bedeutung* (Reference). The relation between the word and its *śakti* is only arbitrary. The *lakṣyārtha* (secondary meaning) is the *unusual* referential meaning, possible on account of the sense of the word which, through usages, associations or analogies, relates the word to an altogether different object. For example, in *gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ* (There are huts in/on the Ganges) the case-affix *yām* literally conveys the sense of *in* or *on*; but as the situation of huts in/on the Ganges is impossible, we take the locative in *gaṅgāyām* to refer to the bank of the river and thus *gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ* comes to mean that there are huts *on the bank of* the Ganges. The important condition for *lakṣaṇā* is that the secondary meaning should not be directly connected with the direct sense, not that it should not directly follow from that sense. For instance, in *kākebhya dadhi rakṣatām* (Protect the curds from the crows and other creatures) and *yaśṭīḥ praveśayaḥ* (Permit the men with sticks), the word *kākebhyaḥ* and *yaśṭīḥ* are capable of conveying a sense through their literal meaning.²³

A sentence possesses *anvaya* and *tātparya*, and not *śakti* or *lakṣaṇā*. *Anvaya* is the literal sense of a sentence. When a sentence offers a sense different from the literal, it is because of the intention of the speaker, determined by context, etc., and is termed *tātparya* (intentional sense or the sense intended).²⁴ The sentence-meaning follows from the synthesis of *śakti* and *lakṣaṇā*

of individual words and is thus the product or effect of individual words considered separately. The *anvaya* or literal sense of a sentence is the product of the *śakti* of individual words; and the *tātparya*, that of the *lakṣaṇā* of the individual words.²⁵ The Naiyāyikas take *tātparya* to form the grounds for *lakṣaṇā*, suggesting thereby that one has recourse to *lakṣaṇā* only when the sense intended by the speaker is not offered by the denotative sense of a word.²⁶ Similarly when the *anvaya* or the literal sense of a sentence fails to provide the sense intended by the speaker, one resorts to the *tātparya*.

The *anumeya* or *pratīyamāna* sense falls within the pale of the *tātparya*. The *tātparya* represents the sense intended by the speaker when the *anvaya* fails to convey it and thus embraces the *anumeya* or *pratīyamāna* sense. It is for this reason that the *Anumānavādins* distinguish *anumeyārtha* from the *vācyārtha*. Since the sense achieved through poetic inference does not preclude the sense intended to be communicated by the speaker with context, etc., in mind, it will not be proper to take, like *Ānandavardhana*²⁷, the *anumeya* as quite different from the *pratipādyā*. We certainly do not mean that the *pratipādyā*-or the sense to be conveyed is only *anumeya*. It is *vācyā* only when it is the same as the literal sense; but it will be *anumeya* when it is different from the literal sense, because it falls within the pale of the *tātparya*. *Ānandavardhana* appears to have devised a well planned strategy against the *Anumānavādins'* approach. According to this approach, the *anumeyārtha* proves, as we have seen above, to be the *tātparya*. The *tātparya* is held by the Naiyāyikas as the intention of the speaker: *vaktur icchā tu tātparyam*;²⁸ but as is obvious from their treatment, the *tātparya* is not merely the *intention* of the speaker (*vaktur icchā*) but the sense intended by him to be communicated. *Ānandavardhana* holds that it is only the *abhiprāya* of the speaker which is inferred.²⁹ The *abhiprāya* seems to have been confined by him only to the speaker's *intention* to speak out the (audible) form of a word (*śabdavarāpa-prakāśaneccā*) and to express some idea or sense by means of the word (*śabdenārthaprakāśaneccā*). This intention has been distinguished from the *pratipādyā* or the sense which is the subject of the user's desire to express some idea or sense. This *pratipādyā* is of two kinds: *vācyā* and *vyāṅgyā*.³⁰ It clearly shows that

according to him it is only the intention which can be inferred, and not the idea or sense. Ānandavardhana seems to have used the word *abhiprāya* here for the Nyāya term *tātparyā* and mistaken the Nyāya *tātparyā* only for the speaker's intention to speak or express,³¹ or he presents the Nyāya concept of *tātparyā* after distorting and twisting it so as to suit his own view. One cannot delimit the *abhiprāya* only to the speaker's intention. It ought to be taken as embracing the idea or sense which he intends to convey and as equivalent to the *tātparyā*. In fact, if we think from the speaker's side, the intention to speak or express is the result of the idea or sense already existing in his mind; for it is for its communication that he embarks upon speaking or expressing. If we consider from the listener's side, the idea or sense communicated is the result of the speaker's intention. Thus if one finds somebody as intending to speak or as speaking, one can easily infer that there are some ideas or sense which he is to communicate. It is, therefore, difficult to admit, in Ānandavardhana's tone, that only the intention of the speaker is *anumeya*, and not the *pratipādya* or the sense to be conveyed.³² Once the speaker starts expressing his ideas or sense, it is his *pratipādya* and not only his intention that one comes to know of. When the speaker wishes to speak out the *pratipādya*, the listener who understands that he wants to speak *something* knows of it only as *nirvikalpa* (indeterminate); but on its expression he acquaints himself with it and thus knows of it as *savikalpa* (determinate). The *pratipādya* may sometimes be the same as the literal sense and sometimes different from it. In the former state it is *vācya*, being *anvaya*; and in the latter *anumeya* or *pratīyamāna* (or *vyāṅgya* according to the *Vyākṛjanāvādin*s), being *tātparyā*. The *pratipādya* thus need not always be the *abhiprāya* or *tātparyā*. It is *abhiprāya* or *tātparyā* only when it deviates from the *anvaya* and is thus *pratīyamāna*.

Ānandavardhana distinguishes between two types of *vyāṅgyas* *abhiprāyarūpa* (the one which represents the intention of the speaker) and *anabhiprāyarūpa* (the one which does not represent his intention).³³ By doing so he probably wants to establish that the *vyāṅgya* is not always the same as the *tātparyā* of the Naiyāyikas but sometimes, when determined by some other factors than the speaker, different from it. But as the meaning of a

word or a sentence in the final analysis is to be determined by the intention of individual who uses that word or sentence and his intention is determined by context, etc., one cannot think of a meaning which is not the speaker's *tātparyā*. Even then, if one accepts a *vyañgyā* as something different from the speaker's *tātparyā*, one would be recognizing a *vyañgyā* irrespective of context, etc. Does Ānandavardhana's use of the word *tātparyā* in the context of *vyañjanā* or *dhvani*, though interpreted otherwise by his followers,³⁴ not betray the fact that his subconscious mind is haunted by the idea that *vyañgyārtha* is nothing but *tātparyā*? Even the *Dhvanikāva* employs this word in a similar context.³⁵

One should not confuse the *anumeyārtha* with the *vācyārtha*; for the *Anumānavādins*, themselves are well conscious of the distinction between them. The poetic *anumāna* may thus well substitute *vyañjanā*.

Probably we should recognize only two meanings : the *vācya* and the *pratīyamāna*. It is curious to note that the *Dhvanikāva* also admits only two meanings.³⁶ The *vācya* is the literal meaning of a word or a sentence, while the *pratīyamāna* represents the sense which the speaker wants to convey—*lakṣyārtha* in case of a word and *tātparyā* (embracing the *anumeyārtha* or *vyañgyārtha*) in case of a sentence. The *anumāna* functions only in a sentence. So the *vyañjanā* of the *Vyañjanāvādins* should also be recognized to function in a sentence and should not, therefore, be accepted as a *padavṛtti* (function of a word). The *Ālaṅkārikas*, no doubt treat of the *śābdī vyañjanā* (verbal suggestion); but it is not because *vyañjanā* operates in words but merely because certain words with several meanings functioning as *vyañjakas* are inevitable and cannot be dispensed with, otherwise there will be no *vyañgyārtha* at all. *Vyañjanā* should, therefore, be considered only a *vākyavṛtti* (function of a sentence), and not a *padavṛtti*. In case of the *śābdī vyañjanā*, the sense determined by conjunction, disjunction, association, antagonism, motive, context, characteristic, proximity of another word, efficacy, propriety, place, time, gender, accents and the like³⁷ is the *anvaya* (literal sense of a sentence) and the *pratīyamāna* (implied) sense is the *tātparyā*.

NOTES

1. Vide P. V. Kane : *History of Sanskrit Poetics*, Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, 3rd edition, 1961, p. 274.
2. Probably 15th century A.D. *ibid.*, p. 275.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 256.
4. He wrote his commentary in *saṃvat* 1215 (i.e. 1159–1160 A.D.) and a manuscript of the commentary is dated *saṃvat* 1215 *ibid.*, p. 274.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 202.
6. Vide *Dhanyāloka* ed. with *Locana* by Jagannātha Paṭhaka, Chowkhamba Vidyabhawan, Varanasi, 1st edition, 1965, *Vṛtti* on III.33, pp. 484–90.
7. Vide *Kāvya prakāśa* with Vāmanācārya Rāmabhaṭṭa, Jhalakikar's commentary entitled *Bālabodhini*, ed., R. D. Karmarkar, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 6th edition, 1950, pp. 252–56.

8. *Gāthāsaptasatī*, II.75, Sanskrit version :

bhrama dhārmika viśrabdhaḥ sa śunako 'dya māritas tena
godānadīkacchakuñjavāsīnā dṛptasīmhenā ॥

Paramānanda Śāstrī's edition (Prakāśana Pratiṣṭhāna, Ānandapurī, Meerut, 1st edition, 1965) reads *godātaṭavikaṭa*—instead of *godānadīkaccha*—. Abhinavagupta (*Dhanyāloka*, *Locana*, p. 52) reads *godānadīkālalatāgahanavāsīnā*.

9. Mammaṭa's words *godāvarītīre ca śimhopalabdhiḥ* (p. 254) and *godāvarītīre śimhasadbhāvaḥ* (p. 255) prove the existence of the lion on the marshy bank of the Godāvarī, while the poet tells it to be in the bower on the marshy bank of the Govāvarī. The woman who speaks the verse to the religious person wants to ward him off the bower, and not off the bank of the river, as she is not concerned with the entire bank.

10. *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, II.4.5, na vā are jāyāyai kāmāya jāyā priyā bhavaty ātmanas tu kāmāya jāyā priyā bhavati.... na vā are vittasya kāmāya vittam priyam bhavaty ātmanas tu kāmāya vittam priyam bhavati.... na vā are lokānām kāmāya lokāḥ priyā bhavanti ātmans tu kāmāya lokāḥ priyā bhavanti.... na vā are sarvasya kāmāya sarvam priyam bhavaty ātmanas tu kāmāya sarvam priyam bhavati.

11. *Infra*.

12. *Amaruṣataka*, 105.

13. Commentators try to justify it as the *hetu* of a bath thinking that the lady-messenger could only rub during her bath in the pond the slopes of her breasts on account of the presence of many youths there, and not her entire breasts (vide Vāmanācārya Rāmabhaṭṭa Jhalakikar's *Bālabodhini*, p. 20). The poet tells nothing of this. It is just the stretch of their own imagination and can hardly be taken as authentic.

14. Commentators think that the redness of the lower lip washed out during a bath was due to chewing the betel-leaf (vide *Bālabodhini*, p. 20, *Nāgesvarī*, ed. Hariṣaṅkara Śarmā, Kashi Sanskrit Series 49, Varanasi, 3rd edition, 1967, p. 6). The poet does not indicate that the lady-messenger did chew the betel-leaf. It is the play of their own imagination, which betrays the pains they put on in their justification.

15. Vide Vātsyāyana : *Kāmasūtra*, III.3.11-12; also Kālidāsa : *Kumārasāmbhava*, VIII.8-9.

16. Vidyācakravartin in his commentary *Sampradāyaprakāśinī*, takes *dāram* to mean profusely (*atyantam*), (vide *Kāvya-prakāśa*, ed. R. C. Dwivedi, Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, Vol. I, 1966, p. 11). Majority of commentators do not agree with him.

Commentators have accounted for the removal of collyrium during a bath at the ends of her eyes, and not from the rest part of her eyes by saying that one closes one's eyes during a bath and consequently collyrium stays therein; but the argument hardly holds water, as during a bath even in a pond one would rub and wash one's eyes and the collyrium applied to them would be washed out also from the rest part of the eyes.

17. Vide on kiss on eyes Vātsyāyana : *op. cit.*, II.3.4; cf. Māgha : *Śīsupālavadhā*, X.54, vide on kiss at the ends of eyes, *Bālabodhini*, p. 20, *Udāharāṇacandrikā* (*Kāvya-pradīpa*, ed. Pt. Durgāprasāda and Wāsudev Laxmaṇ Śāstrī Paṇṣikar, N.S.P., Bombay, 1933, p. 12); *Nāgesvarī*, p. 6, etc.

18. Vide Ruyyaka on Mahimabhaṭṭa's *Vyaktiviveka*, *Vimarsā* I, p. 69, kāvyānumānaṁ tarkānumānavilakṣaṇaṁ kāvyasya camatkārasāratvāt. nyāyamukhenāpi camatkāra eva viśrānteḥ . tarkānumānaṁ tu karkaśanyāyarūpatayā pravṛttaṁ tarkasya karkaśatām

udvahati. kāvyatve 'tadvaiparityāt sahrdayānām adhiḥkāṛād na vyāptyādīmukhenā 'numānapradarśanasamarthanam iti. Śaṅkuka had already hinted at this extraordinary nature of poetic *anumāna* and *anumeya* in the context of *rasa* (cf. *Kāvyaṣaṣṭakāśa*, p. 90).

19. *Ibid.*, p. 76, atra pratīṣāratvāt kāvyasyānumeyagatam vāstāvāvāstavatvam prayojakam. Ubhayathā camatkāra-pratīṣālakṣaṇārthakriyāsiddheḥ. pratyutā'vāstavatve yathā sidhyati na tathāvāstavatva iti kāvyānumiter evānumānāntaravilakṣaṇate 'ty anumānāvādino 'yam abhiprāyaḥ. Vide also Mahimabhāṭṭa's words : tenātra gamyagamakayoḥ sacetasāṁ satyāsatyatvavicāro nirupayoga eva. kāvyaviṣaye ca vācyavyaṅgyapratīṣṭinām satyāsatyatvavicāro nirupayoga eva 'ti tatra pramāṇāntaraparīkṣo 'pahāsāyai 'va sampadyata iti. tatra hetvādibhir akṛtrimair akṛtrimā eva pratyāyante. tatrai 'śām anumeyatvam eva na vyaṅgyatvagandho 'pi 'ti, kutas tatra sukhāsvādalavo 'pi sambhavati. eṣa eva lokataḥ kāvyādāv atīśaya ity upapadyata eva ratyādau gamye sukhāsvādaprayojano vyaṅgyatvopacāra iti. (*ibid.*, p. 78).

20. Vide Mahimabhāṭṭa : *Vyaktiviveka*, *Vimarśa* I, p. 47; Revāprasāda Dvivedī's gloss on it, p. 48.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 47-49.

22. Vide for details S. S. Barlingay : *A Modern Introduction to Indian Logic*, National Publishing House, Delhi, 2nd edition, 1976, pp. 23-42.

23. Vide Viśvanātha Pañcānana Bhaṭṭācārya : *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī*, *Śabdakhaṇḍa*, ed. Harirāma Śukla, Chowkhamba Vidyabhawan, Varanasi, 3rd edition, 1972, pp. 285-301.

24. *Ibid.*, pp. 315-17; vaktur icchā tu tātparyam, p. 315. Vide for details S. S. Barlingay : "Meaning, Use and Intention", *Indian Philosophical Review*, 1971, No. 1.

25. Vide S. S. Barlingay : *A Modern Introduction to Indian Logic*, p. 38.

26. Vide Viśvanātha Pañcānana Bhaṭṭācārya : *op. cit* p. 285, lakṣaṇā śakyasāmbandhaḥ tātparyānupapattitah.

27. *Dhvanyāloka*, *Vṛtti* on III, 33, p. 486-87.

28. Vide Viśvanātha Pañcānana Bhaṭṭācārya : *op. cit.*, p. 315, Ānandavardhana might have been cognisant with the Nyāya concept of *tātparyā*.

29. *Dhvanyāloka*, *Vṛtti* on III, 33, p. 487, tasmād vaktrabhi-prāyarūpa eva vyañge liṅgatayā śabdānām vyāpāraḥ.

30. *Ibid*, pp. 486–87, dvividho viśayaḥ śabdānām—anumeyaḥ pratipādyas 'ca. tatrā 'numeyo vivakṣālakṣaṇaḥ. vivakṣā ca śabdavarūpaprakāśaneccā śabdenā 'rthaprakāśaneccā ca 'ti dvi-prakārā. tatrā 'dyā na śābdavyavahārāṅgam. sā hi prāṇitvamātra-pratipatti-phalā. dvitīyā tu śabdaviśeṣāvadhāraṇāvāsītavyavahitā 'pi śabdakaravavyavahāranibandhanam. te tu dve 'pi anumeyo viśayaḥ śabdānām. pratipādyas tu prayoktur arthapratipādana-samīhāviśayikṛto 'rthaḥ. sa ca dvividhaḥ—vācyo vyañgyas ca. prayoktā hi kadācit svaśabdenā 'rthaṃ prakāśayituṃ samīhate kadācit śvaśabdānabhidheyatvena prayojanāpekṣayā kayācit.

31. Mammaṭa seems to delimit the *tātparya* only to the literal sense of words used. Vide *kāvyaṅgīyā*, pp. 227–28, upātasyai 'va śabdasyā 'rthe tātparyaṃ na tu pratītamātre. . He confuses the *tātparya* with the *anvaya*.

32. *Dhvanyāloka*, *Vṛtti* on III, 33, p. 487, sa tu dvividho 'pi pratipādyo viśayaḥ śabdānām na liṅgitayā svarūpeṇa prakāśate. . vivakṣāviśayatvaṃ hi tasyā 'rthasya śabdair liṅgitayā pratiyate na tu svarūpam.

33. *Ibid*, p. 487, pratiyamāne tasminn abhiprāyartipe 'nabhi-prāyarūpe ca. .

34. *Ibid*, *Vṛtti* on II, 27, p. 282; III, 39, p. 513 (yadā vakroktiṃ vinā vyañgyo 'rthas tātparyeṇa pratiyate tadā tasya prādhānyam); III, 42, p. 532 (*Saṅgrahasloka*, yasmin rasovā bhāvo vā tātparyeṇa prakāśate). Abhinavagupta interprets the word *tātparya* in *Vṛtti* on II, 27 as : yo 'rtho 'bhimato yatra tatparatvaṃ sa dhvaner mārge itye 'vaṃrūpaḥ. The meaning which is implied predominantly and at which words *finally* aim can be nothing but the *tātparya*. One should have no valid objection if the *Vyañjanā-vādins* give the *tātparya* the denomination of *dhvani*, etc.; for it is not the different denomination that makes the real difference.

35. *Dhvanyāloka*, II, 22, yas tātparyeṇa vastva anyad vyankty uktiṃ vinā svataḥ. It has been explained by Abhinavagupta as : svatas tātparyeṇe 'ty abhidhāvyāpāranirākaraṇaparam idaṃ padaṃ dhvananavyāpāram āha.

36. *Ibid*, I, 2.

yo 'rthaḥ saḥḍayaślāghyaḥ kāvyātmeti vyavasthitaḥ |
vācyapratīyamānākhyau tasya bhedaḥ ubhau smṛtau ||

However, Ānandavardhana takes the meanings to be of three types : *vācya*, *lakṣya* and *vyāṅgya* (or *pratīyamāna*), though the last two, *lakṣya* and *vyāṅgya*, could form a single class, the *pratīyamāna*. [I am grateful to my friend Prof. S. S. Barlingay for inviting my attention to the above *Kārikā*.] Does it point out that the author of the *Kārikās* (*Dhvanikāra*) is different from that of the *Vṛtti*, i.e. Ānandavardhana.

37. Vide Bhartṛhari : *Vākyapadīya*, II. 317-18,
 saṁyogo viprayogas' ca sāhacaryam̐ virodhitā |
 arthaḥ prakaraṇam̐ liṅgam̐ śabdasyā 'nyasya sannidhiḥ ||
 sāmartyam̐ aucitī deśaḥ kālo vyaktiḥ svarādayaḥ |
 śabdārthasyā 'navacchede viśeṣasmṛtihetavaḥ ||

Vide for details Mammaṭa : *Kāvya prakāśa*, *Vṛtti* on II, 19.