K. Satchidananda Murty: The Realm of Between, Lectures on Philosophy of Religion, Simla, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1973, xv, 221 pp., Rs. 25.00.

The author of *The Realm of Between* is well known for his numerous publications in English and in Telugu. After many years of service in Andhra University, he has now become Vice-Chancellor of Sri Venkateswara University, Tirupati. His works have earned him frequent praise and provoked occasional criticism. A group of professors of Andhra University has published recently these appreciations in a special volume: *Collected Criticism of K. Satchidananda Murty*, (Machilipatnam 1, Trivedi Publishers, 1975, xiv, 227 pp., Rs. 18.00). I need not then make an effort to situate the present book in the complete works of Dr. Murty. I shall only mention what we find in *The Realm of Between* and comment on some points.

The book has its origin in three lectures delivered in Oxford and in London, in 1963, and found its more complete form in a set of lectures delivered at Simla in 1970. It deals with "the realm of between". The phrase is of Heidegger, but has many equivalent renderings in Indian thought. The realm of between corresponds to Jaspers' limit-situations: suffering, salvation, religious action. It deals also with some problems of what is here called "transcendental philosophy" or philosophy of God.

In Part I, the theme of "Suffering" is developed through a kaleidoscopic presentation of quotations of Eastern and Western writers, be they poets, philosophers, or religious men. One is thus made to share vividly in the anguish of people who have suffered much or have been very sensitive to the suffering of others. The suggestion, at the end of the chapter, that a bit of "concerted and rational human action can increase the sum of happiness in the world" (p. 26) is no doubt a pertinent one. Nevertheless, it leaves the problem unsolved, since precisely the problem of suffering lies in the fact that, in spite of one's effort, suffering sometimes afflicts the holiest or most reasonable person. The reference to Leibniz's optimistic solution of the problem of suffering can hardly be said to be "the last word a theist oriented

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by Greek and Christian thought can say in justification of suffering" (p. 15). Leibniz's view may be an extreme view of it, but it is far from being the best or the most common view among Christian theologians. Christian authors who after Leibniz have written on the problem of evil have almost unanimously rejected his solution, as much too rationalistic. So did recently Maritain, Journet and Sertillanges in their important studies of the problem of evil.

The theme of "Salvation" is developed in the same kaleidoscopic manner. Most of the solutions given in the East and in the West are exposed briefly. In the end, Murty points to seven possible attitudes one could take before so many positions. This is the part of the book where the reader is led to admire most the erudition displayed in the presentation of so many views, but is least helped to choose any. Even the text of Kafka quoted at the head of the chapter seems too optimistic. It says: "There is a goal, but not way: what we call way is only wavering." On reading this chapter written with such cold impartiality, one does not know even what is the goal, which salvation one should hope for!

In Part III, "Religious Action" is defined as "responsive action towards the supernatural". (p. 83). If this action is done ritually, it becomes a sacrifice. The illustration of what sacrifice is or should be is mostly taken from the Indian tradition, with only secondary references to Socrates, Epicurus, Kant and Heidegger. "Surrender of all that one is to God.... that is the highest sacrifice." (p. 103). This is the Gita view and the most appealing. The author does not impose any view but at least here he lets us feel that this is the best.

In Part IV, on Transcendental Philosophy or the Philosophy of God, the work of Murty takes more definitely the shape of the philosophical discussion of a precise issue: Is there a God or not? Here, the views of European philosophers are given a longer exposition than the views of the philosophers of the East. Anselm, Aquinas, Kant, Hegel, Marx and Pascal are made to speak for or against God's existence. Murty notes well that Aquinas already had criticized Anselm's argument and that one had not to wait for Kant to do this. Murty goes a long way to defend Aquinas' argument and to accept that there should

be a first cause. Yet, he adds, this is not yet the proof of an absolute Spirit or Personality (p. 146). Would not the linking of the First Way of Aquinas with the Fifth Way make a complete argument, because in the Fifth Way it is a supreme Intelligence which is required? I found rather surprising Prof. Murty's readiness to go along with A. E. Taylor who wrote: "It does not seem that anything new in principle has been added either for or against theism since Kant" (p. 155). This is really to make too little of what goes on in contemporary philosophical theology. It brushes asides the works of Bergson, Blondel. Marechal, Lonergan and so many others, to say nothing of the numerous works on Religious Language published in England and America. Very serious attempts have been made in this century to justify the metaphysical principle of causality and use it to prove God's existence. The new Hermeneutics of Gadamer, Ricoeur, etc.... surely contains fresh insights and new approaches to theism.

A point to which Prof. Murty returns several times is that belief in God's existence is not required for one to adopt an ethical attitude. The point is well made and may be well taken. It serves at least to instill greater respect for the atheist. It serves also the purpose of preserving a basic sense of value and purposefulness in life for one who would not be so sure of his theistic convictions. But this does not cancel the fact that the moral order gets a stronger backing when it is seen in its theological perspective.

It is this theological perspective which, after long hesitations, seems to prevail, especially in some of Murty's criticism of the Death of God theology. He concludes with a curious quotation of Nietzsche which is an admission of the faith: "That God is truth and truth is divine" (p. 212).

Jnana Deepa Poona 14.

INDIAN LINGUISTICS

Journal of the Linguistic Society of India,

Founded 1931: Published Quarterly: Now in Volume 36 (1975)

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Gole, (Dr.) Leela: God as the Supreme Value: Analysis and Interpratation of the Idea of God from the Standpoint of Value; University of Poona, Poona, 1974, Price Rs. 20/-.

The development and growth of Philosophical Analysis and Formal Logic sharpened the tools of philosophical inquiry and investigation. With the help of such sharpened techniques and tools attention came to be focussed in modern times, on three areas of philosophical consideration, namely, Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Religion and Philosophy of Mind. The author of the book, however, considers that 'Philosophy of Value or Axiology' is one more important and prominent sphere in the direction of which philosophy developed in modern times. One may not have any objection to this. "The study mainly deals with", the author tells us, "the problem of nature and gradation of values, with a view of deciding the nature and significance of the idea of God as the Supreme Value. As such, it is ethico-religious in character. The point of view underlying the argument presented, may broadly be characterized as Axiological Absolutism". (Preface). The whole programme that is envisaged is to provide for a reconsideration of "the idea of God as the Ultimate Reality and Harmonizing Principle" (Preface). Such Religious Reality is yielded by Mystical Experience into which philosophy and religion culminate. The work does not and did not (the sense of the past tense will become clear as we proceed) claim any originality. Nor does it seek to defend any specific religion. It is "a tentative attempt to discover the truth underlying the Idea of Deity from a value-standpoint." The only kind of originality that the work claims, is "a new arrangement and a slightly different way of tackling the same age-old problem..." (Preface).

The sole aim of stating the central centention of the work in the words of the author herself is to be as faithful to the author's intention as possible. The present work was submitted as a Ph.D. Thesis to the University of Poona and was accepted for the award of the Degree in 1959. The study is now published by the University with the help of a Grant by the U.G.C. Although 15 years have elapsed between acceptance and publication

of the thesis, the author has "kept the original work substantially as it is" (Foreward). Yet the author has taken sufficient care. it is claimed, to make "necessary modifications that were required to correct minor slips in thinking" and to "supplement the argument in a few places" (Foreword). Here one may ask: why did the author not rewrite the whole work? For. although she maintains that her "basic position concerning the Idea of God is almost the same, even today", she would have adopted "a somewhat different mode of exposition" (Foreward) were she to write the thesis again. She also maintains that "while preparing a final press copy of the thesis", "some suitable changes in the thesis" were made "so as to make it up-to-date". The other precaution that was taken, while preparing the press copy, was that "the entire text of the thesis has been carefully examined..... " (Foreword). But, even then, as a matter of fact, she did neither change the mode of exposition nor, except on some unimportant and marginal details, the content of the thesis. Some times authors do not change the central contention as well as the mode of exposition of their works published years earlier. But such a decision is backed by the consideration of the historical importance of the work. I can cite two prominent examples of this sort, namely: A. J. Ayer's "Language, Truth and Logic" and Bertrand Russell's "Principles of Mathematics". Although each one of them is convinced that in the light of the later development of philosophical thought, the later editions should have been either throughly or partly modified, none of them did actually do so. For, each one of the work as it was originally published, has had a tremendously important and profound philosophical and historical purpose to serve. But one thing is very important to remember in this context. Although neither Ayer nor Russell did change the content and mode of the exposition of their work, each one of them has written an extensive introduction and both of them have suggested what parts of their work were affected by later developments and what modifications they would be prepared to introduce in the light of later developments. Has the present work any such purpose to serve? Inspite of this the author did not modify it in the light of the later developments of philosophical thought. But she herself is, in principle at least, prepared

change her mode of exposition. But the fact is that she has not. It is hard to understand the attitude of the author who seems to think that there is not even a minor slip in thinking, that her consideration of the problem of value is complete without involving even a cursory reference to the works of J. N. Findlay, and P. W. Taylor or that her consideration of the arguments for the existence of God is complete without involving any reference to J. N. Findlay, W. P. Alston, N. Malcom, J. J. C. Smart etc., or even that her consideration of Religious Language and Symbolism is complete without a reference to E. L. Mascall, I. Ramsey, F. K. Ben, Rudolf Bultmann, Frederick Frere, Willem Zuuerdeeg etc. As a matter of fact the bibilography at the end of the book includes only three works published after 1959, the year of the acceptance of the thesis (1) H. D. Lewis (Our Experience of God, 1960), (2) W. T. Stace (Mysticism and Philosophy, 1961), and (3) Vessey (ed.) (Talk of God, 1969). Except for these the book leaves, it seems, every other stone unturned. The only point that is intended to be emphasised here is that the author has neither modified her thesis in the light of later developments of philosophical thought nor has she written an extensive introduction, granting that for some reason it was not possible for her to modify or rewrite the thesis, indicating whether, how far and in what way these later development would have modified her central contention and if so what would be her reaction to it. It is this that is to be greatly regretted.

Perhaps, too, one may not mind even this, provided at least the major argument of the work stands up to a rational scrutiny. "The pivotal point" of the work, as stated earlier, is "a reconsideration of the idea of God as the Ultimate Reality and Harmonizing Principle". It also aims at "deciding the nature and significance of the idea of God as the Supreme Value". Anybody who attempts to consider these expressions critically would find them highly confusing. Consider, for instance, the expression "the idea of God as the Ultimate Reality". Not bothering to consider what is meant by "Ultimate Reality", and presuming, for the sake of argument, (although the author has nowhere made it out explicitly), that it amounts to the first-order ontological reality, let us ask what is this Ultimate Reality, God or

the idea of God? If the first, it is extremely doubtful whether God is ontological in the idealistic conception of it to which the author subscribes, and if the second, it can never be ontological unless we confuse between a thing and an idea of the thing. The same God (or idea of God?) we are told, is also the Harmonizing Principle—harmonising principle of various values of course! Now, is God Himself the harmonizing principle or is the principle itself God? If the first, then it amounts to anthropomorphism, while if the second, God ceases to be ontological. God is also said to be the Supreme Value. This contention is highly misleading. But the author does not find it to be so. The reason being "in the last analysis, it", (i.e. value) "becomes identical with Reality" (p. 50). Over and above taking distinguishables and separables to be identical, the entire argument commits two errors: (i) even if it is granted that God or Reality is (assuming that they are the same) saying that each one of them is does not amount to saying that each one of them 'is' in the same sense; (ii) even if it is granted that 'both facts and values are given' (p. 48), they are not 'given' in exactly the same way nor are they identical. But the author does not accept this. Although, according to her "the difference between facts and values is not of kind but of degree" (p. 48), vet ultimately thay are identical. 'Reality', according to her, 'expresses itself through both facts and values, things and minds' (p. 49), and yet in the last analysis, "Reality and Value are identical" (p. 50). I presume, and I think I am not far mistaken in presuming so, that according to her the terms 'reality', 'fact' and 'thing' are synoymous. I wonder whether she would be prepared to make any allowance for 'facts' belonging to different spheres of consideration. But if she is not, she also, it seems. confuses different spheres of consideration like ontological. epistemological or logical. Without dwelling further on this point let us, however, proceed. The whole line of argument through which the author comes to identify reality with value seems to be: "Values are real and Reality has Value" (p. 69). Granting that values are objectively real and that reality has value, it is very difficult to make sense of this argument. Perhaps what is intended to be said is that having value is a necessary condition of something being real. If this is what is intended, it is hard,

if not impossible, to subscribe to it. If, on the contrary, having value is considered to be a sufficient condition of being real. I see no line of argument in terms of which identity of value and reality can follow. What perhaps may be thought is that reality has objective value. But perhaps even this may not follow. What can be said is that that which is real is (objectively) valuable. It of course need not necessarily be so. Now, having value is one thing, being identical with value is quite another. Granting that the real is valuable, what follows is that the real (reality?) has value. But the distinction between them does not vanish. That this kind of confusion the author does make is quite clear. Her confusion, it seems, arises from the fact that in regard to both fact and value, we say that they 'are'. The author fails to notice the difference between the two senses of the verb 'to be'. Perhaps, truth, beauty, goodness are ascribable to God; but thereby God Himself does not become any one of them; nor does He become Supreme Value, even though supreme value is, perhaps, ascribable to Him as the Supreme Reality. God may be considered as supremely valued or supremely valuable but not as supreme value itself.

Thus her central thesis does not stand. No one should, however, think that the central point of the work alone is mismanaged. Otherwise too, the work appears to be not free from errors such as (a) Mis-statement of facts e.g., we are told that according to logical analysis (meaning thereby Logical Positivists or Logical Empiricists) "propositions can be divided" (classified?) "into three kinds (i) Factual propositions, (ii) Analytical propositions or definitions and (iii) the so-called synthetic apriori propositions". (p. 25). (b) Inconsistencies—e.g., we are not only told that difference between fact and value is only of degree and not of kind, (p. 50) but we are also told that "Reality itself is the value-frame..... The value-frame involves the totality of values, which constitute, at the same time, the Absolute Spiritual Reality...., the ground of all values." (pp. 139-40). (c) Flat contradictions—e.g., on the one hand we are told that "owing to the scientific discoveries and their practical utility, nation's and peoples of the world have been brought nearer" (p. 125), while, on the other hand, we are also told that in spite of the scientific investigation 'divergencies and rivalries have

not been mitigated '(p. 125), or although we are told that "every group of people shows a tendency to think of itself as being in some sense or other, 'a peculiar group of people'" (p. 125) yet in the utopian ideal world-state that is proposed to be achieved 'the kingdom of God and world community' (p. 132) the entire world is to be placed under the leadership of 'the real leaders of the world' who are 'those men and women who have directly realised God and, therefore, have been transfigured" (p. 133). The more we consider the work and the arguments presented therein, the more do we meet with specimens of the arguments of the kinds presented above.

Language is a property of the human race. So too is the general syntactical and semantical sturcture of a language open to the entire human race without any restriction, whether geographical, temporal or spatial. In the same way, neither sense nor non-sense have any boundaries. The author maintains: "In addition to the ancient and modern philosophers who are well-known Idealists" (I am afraid one may not agree with her here and perhaps quite pertinently) "-viz., Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Kant, Hegel and neo-Helgelians, there are also some recent thinkers like Sorley, Hartmann, Urban, Taylor etc. who defend the idealistic notion of value. The present work substantially agrees with this idealistic trend...." (p. 15-16). Now, one may not have any objection, in principle, to this. One may adopt any stand point provided one does not ignore the demarcating line between sense and non-sense, however thin it may be. One may perhaps, again, not have an objection to the contention of the author that 'Mystics all over the world agree' in their assertions. What is meant by this is, perhaps, an agreement in the content of their assertions. But the remarkable similarity, nay sameness, not only of content but also of expression, between the present work and some of the published works, referred to is so astonishing that any reader would wonder whether all those authors are also mystics, even if the present author is one. To substantiate this judgment we give below cross-references. It is for the fear of undue length of the review article that we abstain from quoting every instance of this kind. Anybody, who would take sufficient pains, would be in a position

to locate them. We select six authors and give cross-references. They are as follows:

- (i) (a) Hill, T. E.; Ethics in Theory and Practice; pp. 32-35 and pp. 30-31 of the present work; Or pp. 188-189 of Hill's book and pp. 31-32 of the present work.
 - (b) Hill, T. E.; Conteporary Ethical Theories; p. 313 and p. 36 of the present work.
- (ii) Lepley, Ray (ed.); The Language of Value; p. 232 and p. 162 of the present work;
- (iii) Urban, W. M.; *Humanity and Deity*; pp. 166-67 and the paragraph starting from "This arguement...." on page 90 of the present work;
- (iv) Paton, H. J.; Modern Predicament; pp. 191-192 and p. 91 of the present work.
- (v) (a) Taylor, A. E.; Elements of Metaphysics; pp. 337-342 and pp. 112-113 of the present work.
 - (b) Taylor, A. E.; Faith of a Moralist; pp. 61-62 and p. 49 of the present work.
- (vi) Radhakrishnan, S.; An article entitled 'Religion and World Unity, in the book, "Religion in the Modern World" pp. 74-75 and pp. 125-126 of the present work.

These are not the only expressional similarities or samenesses that one can locate. But the examples we have cited, we trust, would at least serve as part of the evidence in support of our contention. What should one say when one notices such similarities without due acknowledgements? I wonder whether mere enlisting the works in the bibliography would suffice. I think the learned and sensitive readers would easily be in a position to form their judgment and hence I leave this matter to the judicious discretion of the learned readers.

DIALOGUE

Canadian Philosophical Review-Revue Canadienne de Philosophie Vol. XV — No. 2—Juin/June 1976

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...Sylvain Auroux

Comptes Rendus-Book Reviews

Sharma, (Dr.) Brajanarayana: Bhāratīya Darşaname Anumāna; M. P. Hindi Grantha Academy, Bhopal (M.P.), pp. 575; Price: Rs. 25/-.

Studying Indian as well as non-Indian philosophers and philosophical disciplines through the medium of Indian languages is gradually taking deeper roots. In order to be able to do this what is required is readily available text-books and reference works useful for students, researchers and teachers. Dr. Sharma's book is a comprehensive reference work dealing with the discussion of the problem of inference and issues connected with it as it occurs in the writings of various thinkers who are also adherents of different philosophical schools and thought-currents in India. Taking into consideration the data that Dr. Sharma has so painstakingly collected, arranged and presented he should be congratulated. His claim that such a comprehensive work on inference in the context of Indian Philosophy is available neither in Hindi nor in English is right and the effort of Dr. Sharma in this direction is commendable.

Notwithstanding this merit of the book, however, I want to draw attention to three very serious shortcomings of the work. If shortcomings of this kind are attempted to be removed successfully either in the future editions of the work or in the forthcoming works of this kind, at the hands of either the present or other authors, posterity will certainly profit from them.

Coming to the first point. Dr. Sharma rightly holds: "It is well-known that we do not have a systematic history not only of different philosophical schools of our country but also of the connected philosophical thought put forth by the adherents of the various schools. Especially, no authentic account of the development of their thought regarding inference is available". (preface p. 7 Translations and italic mine.) This is the case as far as things go. Anybody reading these lines of Dr. Sharma would obviously expect his work to fulfil this lacuna. Now, when anybody proposes to undertake a work of this kind, the kind of development that he may delineate may be either chronological or logical. But unfortunately on any count Dr. Sharma's book fails. It fails not so much because it has left any stone unturned in gathering the requisite data but in putting the data in the developmental model he proposes to put. What one

gathers from the book is: who has said a particular thing and in which work. But beyond this on the developmental count the readers do not gain. One rather gathers tabulation of the data. But just tabulation of the data is not a developmental account of the problem-chronological or logical.

Further, Dr. Sharma grants that Indian Philosophical schools flourished almost contemporaneously. (p. 27) But merely granting this will not suffice. What is further required is an inquiry into following main considerations: (a) what were the intellectual interactions among the various schools of Indian philosophical thought? (b) why were they necessitated? and (c) what were their outcomes? In this context it would have been most appropriate on the part of Dr. Sharma to ask and attempt to answer the question: would it have been both possible and necessary for Nyāya to arrive at the kind of frame of inference it did arrive at within the fold of its former frame of Padārthas? What was the role of its confrontation with Buddhism in this context? But Dr. Sharma nowhere raises questions of this kind.

Secondly, Dr. Sharma holds two theses almost as a matter of commitment: (a) Indian philosophical schools are complete in themselves (pp. 8, 457) and (b) writers like Prof. Keath and Dr. Randle etc. are seriously mistaken in holding that there is a considerable impact of Dinnaga and other Buddhist writers on later Nyāya thinkers (pp. 9, 258). But on both these counts Dr. Sharma is inscrutable. If one grants that there was a cultural exchange between various schools of Indian philosophical thought. to say in the same breath that every philosophical school in India is complete in itself is a grotesque confusion. For, if each one of them is complete independently of the impact of another, then interexchange among them is redundant and serves no philosophically significant purpose. But if each one of the schools becomes 'complete' in itself due to such interaction, its so called completeness is jeopardised. If, on the contrary, what Dr. Sharma means is completeness of all schools of Indian philosophical thought taken together, it is hardly significant. Secondly, criticising the contention of Prof. Keath and Dr. Randle etc. about the impact of Dinnaga and other Buddhist writers on later Nyaya thinkers Dr. Sharma's argument is fallacious on two counts. First, Dr. Sharma himself grants that there is a considerable impact of Dinnaga

on later thinkers of various schools (p. 36). He also grants that Dinnaga was the progenitor of some of the fundamental considerations with reference to the problem of inference (p. 26). Moreover, he also holds that predecessors of Dinnaga like Nagarjuna, Maitreyanatha, and Asamga have explained many issues relating to inference (p. 258). Yet, overlooking this, the main thrust of Dr. Sharma's endeavour is of establishing that it was Dinnāga who is indebted to Praśastapāda and not vice versa as some critics maintain. But, it appears to us, that Dr. Sharma's argument is unconvincing. He has not independently established that Prasastapāda is chronologically prior to Dinnāga. Can they not even be taken to be contemporary of eachother? How is one to establish Dr. Sharma's claim that Prasastapada is closer to Gautama rather than to Dinnaga? Would it not have been possible for Prasastapada to be indebted to Dinnaga on the one hand and yet in his adoption of terminology, formation of problems and style be closer to Gautama on the other? Further, how do we know, independently of later Nyāya thinkers, that either Gautama or Vātsyāyana or both of them had exactly the same kind of development of their thought in their minds as it occurred later at the hands of Prasastapada or Udyotakara? Moreover, accepting interexchange among various Indian Philosophical schools it is hard to understand the attitude of the author not to allow any impact of Buddhist writers and their terminology on the later Nyāya thinkers. Nothing except unjustifiable sense of originality attached to Nyāya thinkers can satisfactorily explain this phenomenon.

Lastly, there are certain errors in the book and we shall merely draw attention to some examples of this kind. They are: (i) the account of Anumāna on page 25 is in correct: (ii) the explanation of Udāharaṇa on page 26 is erroneous; (iii) the account of Anumāna in the first two sentences on page 74 is inconsistent; (iv) the contentiou on page 37 that Dīdh ti, Māthurī, Jāgadīsī are Prakaraṇagranthas is wrong; (v) the contention that Western Logic lacks in Philosophical foundation and what one finds therein is a discussion merely of linguistic problems (p. 26) is totally unfounded; and (vi) there is nothing like Middle Proposition (p. 465) in any Syllogism. To hold that there is, is an error of a very serious kind. More

instances of this kind could be pointed out. We request the author to rectify such mistakes in the next edition.

The value of the book would have been enhanced immensely if it were appended with subject-index and author-index and also if binding was done more carefully. The cumbrous way of giving references at the end of the chapter in running lines should have been avoided. Errors of printing, which are numerous, should be corrected.

In spite of such shortcomings it will have to be unanimously accepted that Dr. Sharma has collected invaluable data and industriously presented them in the work. We whole heartedly recommend the book both to students and researchers of Logic in general and Indian Logic in particular.

Departmet of Philosophy, University of Poona.

M. P. Marathe

ANNOUNCEMENT

The Indian Philosophical Quarterly invites critical studies and assessments of the thought and contributions of contemporary Indian Philosophers. In this connection we propose to publish a few such selected studies dealing with the work of Professor K. J. Shah, Karnatak University, Dharwar. Articles and studies are accordingly invited.

We similarly invite responses to the interesting article "On the Frontiers of Microphysics and Metaphysics" by Shri M. D. Vidwans, published in the present issue.

EDITORS

The Indian Philosophical Quarterly is glad to announce the commencement of a Students' Supplement from this issue onwards. Articles and Reviews not exceeding 10 typescript pages from bona-fide students are invited. Such contributions may be sent to the Editors, Indian Philosophical Quarterly with a bona-fide certificate from the Department or Institution.

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