KALIDAS BHATTACHARYYA
AND
THE LOGIC OF ALTERNATION

Kalidas Bhattacharyya is, undoubtedly, one of the foremost of living philosophers in contemporary India. Along with K. C. Bhattacharyya and N. V. Banerjee, he may be said to have renewed the tradition of creative philosophising in this country which had perhaps been blocked by the historical necessity of coming to terms with an alien tradition in philosophy which was forced on our notice due to the imposition of British rule in India. Yet, though "Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy"[1] was published as early as 1953, little discussion has taken place regarding the philosophical thesis of this extraordinary book. Unfortunately the book has been out of print for a long time and in fact has been unavailable to students of philosophy both here and abroad as large stocks of it happened to have been burnt in some accident only a few years after its publication. Still, the general neglect which this work has received on the part of most students of philosophy in India is inexcusable, and it is time that it receives the attention which, in my opinion, it so richly deserves.

However, as it is not easy for most students to understand the contentions of the author due to the difficulties of his thought and style in this book, I think it would be helpful if this paper is confined only to an exposition of his major thesis in the work mentioned above. A critical discussion and assessment of the author's contentions must await a proper understanding of what he has said, and may be undertaken later in a sequel to this paper.

The fact of knowledge, as everybody knows, has seemed puzzling to most thinkers. From the Sophists and Socrates to the logical positivists of today, there has been a continuous concern with what has come to be called "the problem of knowledge". However diverse the solutions to the problem, they have generally seemed unconvincing to many, if not most, philosophers. Varying from the indubitable certainty of self at the one end to the equally indubitable certainly of sense-data on the other, the solutions

seem to form a continum where one can choose whatever one likes. Mr. Bhattacharyya's explanation of this variability is so capable and original that any thinker who still wishes to attempt a unimodal[2] explanation must first come to terms with it.

Whenever something seems problematic, it is mostly because we feel the conjoint validity of things[3] which seem to be incompatible in their nature. The solution is generally reached when we come to feel that either the things are not incompatible in their nature or that they are not conjointly valid. The various solutions to the problem of knowledge can be seen as attempts in either of these directions.

The " Knowledge-Situation " can seem problematic *only* if we find two things conjoined in it which reveal themselves to be incompatible in their natures. The occurence of knowledge is a fact from which the thinker takes his start. But " knowledge " is not a thing like tables or chairs; rather, it is more like relations which involve a reference to terms between which they hold. " Knowledge " is always the " knowledge " *of* object and not just knowledge itself. This " *of* ", it should be noted, is not the " of " of identity as in " the City of Calcutta ". Rather, it denotes the *distinctness* of the object *from* the fact of its being known and, at the same time, an *euqually close* unity between them. In fact leaving aside error and illusion, the " knowledge of object " should be the same as the object itself. The other term in the " knowledge-situation " is traditionally called the " subject " or the "self".

Whatever may be one's difficulties with respect to these concepts, a distinction has always been drawn between the way in which self knows itself and the way in which it knows an object. Whatever be the name that has been given to this distinction, the difference between self-consciousness and the consciousness of object has been recognised by most thinkers. It, however, does not seem to have been noticed that the relation between the two is of, at least, seeming exclusion. The movement towards self-consciousness is a movement away from the consciousness of the object and while we are conscious of the object we are just unaware of the fact of consciousness or of the subject that is conscious of of the o bject.

The " Knowledge-situation ", thus, presents a problem, for it reveals a close unity of two terms which, however, seem also

opposed to each other. The usual solutions of this problem have taken either the form of asserting the primacy or even the absolute reality of the Subject or the Object or the denial that there is any opposition between them.[4] The subject has seemed so self-evident to many thinkers and an independent object so inconceivable that they have found it difficult to understand in what the objectivity of the object lies. The movement from epistemological objectivity to metaphysical objectivity is the central problem in almost all the great thinkers from Descartes to Kant and though they all find alternative routes to their solutions (or do not find a route at all) they are convinced that the immediate awareness of consciousness is indubitable in a sense in which the consciousness of the object is not.

On the other hand, the whole movement of modern realism is based on the immediately felt independence of the object from the fact of its being known. The object is, thus, revealed to be independent in its very being, the situation of being known being essentially accidental to its very nature. It, thus, is real, self-subsistent in a sense in which the subject can never be; for it is never known as an object, and seems, at most, the shadowy projection of the grammatical " I " which accompanies most of our judgements. Further, the contingency of knowledge-situation for the object reacts back on the subject and makes it contingent, for while the object reveals itself to be independent of the knowledge-situation, the subject is inevitably bound to and dependent on it.

The opposition between the two terms in the " knowledge-situation " is, thus, the reason for the divergent movements in philosophy. But the very fact of the " knowledge-situation " reveals that there is also a close unity between them. The question, then, arises : " can we intelligibly conceive of a unity of elements which are in mutual opposition to each other ? " Bhattacharyya's answer is that we can, and the answer is extensively elaborated in his doctrine of what we have called in the title of this paper " the logic of alternation ".

The unity of alternatives in a disjunctive judgement, is, according to Bhattacharyya, such a unity. The disjunctive judge-

ment, being a judgement, united in itself elements which are in opposition to each other. The judgement, however, does not assert either the one or the other or both together but only the excluding relation between them which is of such a nature that if one is true, the other is false[5] and *vice versa*.[6] The difficulty, in fact, has been felt because–so Mr. Bhattacharyya contends—almost all thinkers have presupposed that unities can *only* be of the conjunctive type. If the unities were only of the conjunctive type then, obviously, there could be no unities, i.e., conjunctions of incompatible elements. But if the unities can be of types other than the conjunctive then there is, at least, a possibility that even incompatible elements can form a unity.

In fact, Mr. Bhattacharyya contends, the unity formed between a positive and a negative is more intimate than the unity between two positives. He writes, for example, " If on a table an inkpot is absent, and if we say 'the table is without inkpot' ", we mean some unity of the table and the *absence of inkpot*. It is much closer unity than when we unify two positive entities. Between two positive entities (except in one case to be presently mentioned) [7] there is always a *factual* relation which cements the relata into a unity. But between a positive and a negative there is no such factual relation felt; the only speakable relation between them is a *predicative* one, i.e. a relation obtaining only in the judgemental description of the whole affair. We say 'The table is without an inkpot', positing thereby a relation inspite of there being no factual relation corresponding to it—factually the relation is but the indentity of the table ".[8]

What Mr. Bhattacharyya, perhaps, means to say is that in a positive relationship both the entities are affected in a positive manner and, thus, get modified. But in a relationship between the positive and the negative, the positive remains unmodified; in fact, just itself, while the locus of the negative lies nowhere else except in the positive itself.

Now the elements in a disjunctive judgement are actually related in such a manner. Each of the elements is negatively related to the other, but unlike the ordinary negative judgement, the disjunctive judgement does not *assert* as to which of the elements is to be affirmed or denied. The judgement merely asserts the *alternative exclusion* of each by the other and leaves

the question open as to which is to be asserted and which denied. Rather, by its vary nature it suggests that there is no reason to prefer either and, in fact, that *both* are to be asserted but *only* alternatively. The relation between the two elements in the disjunctive judgement, thus, is that the negation of each alternative is predicated of the other. For example, " In ' Either M is N or P is Q ' the reality is alternately ' M is N ' and ' P is Q ' and its very identity is explicated respectively in ' P is not Q ' and ' M is not N ', ' P ' is not ' Q ' is in realility nothing but ' M is N ', and similarly ' M is not N ' is nothing but ' P is Q ' ".[9]

Thus, in the disjunctive judgement we are faced by a unity (which is as close as it can be) of elements which are incompatible, yet real, though only alternatively. But before we can, on this ground, understand the unity of knowledge and object as a disjunctive unity, we should try to dispose of two serious objections that may arise. The first is that the alternative disjunction belongs only to the indecision in our state of knowledge due to our ignorance about the state of affairs as it is. The reality in itself is not indeterminate but is quite specific. When we say, for example, that " he was born either in 1919 or in 1920 ", we do not mean that he was alternatively born in both the years. The " Either–or " belongs to our ignorance and not to reality which was only one and not the other—not even alternatively. The other objection relates to the view that in a disjunctive judgement one alternative is necessarily negated on the affirmation of the other. The commonly accepted view is that the disjunctive judgement excludes only the falsity and *not* the truth of both the alternatives contained in it.

The answer of Mr. Bhattacharyya to these objections takes the form of denying the ultimate relevance of the former and questioning the adequacy of the latter. He admits that " ordinary disjunctions involve ignorance ", but denies that it is intrinsic to the very nature of disjunction itself. Ordinarily we believe that it is because of our ignorance that we are asserting the disjunctive judgement and that it will be removed in a later stage of experience. But from the *mere* fact that ignorance has been removed in the past in the case of our " Either–or " judgements, it cannot be inferred, without sufficient grounds, that it must be

removable in the case of all such judgements. Norman Malcolm has brought out this point in a masterly manner in connection with the complete verifiability of empirical statements.[10]

An irremovable ignorance, however, is ignorance only in a Pickwickian sense. In fact the whole doctrine of ignorance in this case *pre-supposes* the *determinacy* of reality which, unless we have some grounds for believing it in a particular case, cannot be considered as self-evident in its own right. In the case of irremovable ignorance, we can *either* suppose that we are irremediably involved in some metaphysical Māyā *or* that the reality itself is of an indeterminate nature and admits of different formulations. This is, perhaps, the ultimate alternation with which we may be faced in our enquiry about the relations of knowledge and reality. The alternatives, however, are related, as before, in such a way that the affirmation of one involves the negation of the other and *vice versa*. Thus, each is valid but only alternatively.

This brings us to the second objection, that the disjunctive judgement does not exclude the possibility of both the alternatives being true together. It is well known that such a view has been held by most logicians in the past and by almost all in the present. But this view seems, in the main, due to a confusion between what the disjunctive judgement *qua* judgement may be taken to *mean* and the state of affairs as it obtains in reality. As Mr. Bhattacharyya writes : "There is no denying the fact that *both* the alternatives may be, or even are, real; but the question is whether that is *meant* in the disjunctive judgement. That fact *may not be denied*, but non-denial is widely removed from positive assertion. Not to deny does not mean to assert it positively, or even to assert any real possibility of it. *Ratio essendi* and *ratio cognoscendi* ought to be kept apart."[11]

The point is that "we never *mean* 'both' in a disjunctive judgement *as such*" even if it be a fact that both happen to be true in *rerum natura*. The compatibility or incompatibility of the alternatives is undecided within the disjunctive judgement. It neither affirms nor denies it. In the words of Kalidas Bhattacharyya, "If the alternatives *may be* taken as compatible, equally they *may not*, so that the upshot is pure indeterminacy, which means that the affirmed alternative is *completely indifferent* to the other."[12]

The alternatives in a disjunction judgement, therefore, are related in such a way that one alternative either cancels out or *rejects* the other or is *entirely indifferent* to it. Which of these relations obtains depends upon the nature of the alternatives concerned. The term " negation ", thus, is used by Mr. Bhattacharyya in a wide sense. As he puts it : " There may be negation either of the *content* or of the *assertion* of the content. Either that other alternative is itself negated or there may be the negation of *stating* that alternative, i.e., no statement at all of that."[13]

The unity of elements in a disjunctive judgement, thus, is an extremely close unity of alternatives which either actively reject each other or are, at least, completely indifferent to each other. In the wider sense of negation, they negate each other and yet form a close unity, for each is related to the negative of the other. The question, therefore, whether we can *intelligibly* conceive of a unity of elements which are in mutual opposition to each other, gets its answer in the affirmative. The unity, in such a case, must be conceived of as a disjunctive unity—and, at least, the disjunctive judgement is no mysterious or unitelligible affair.

The " knowledge situation ", which has seemed so puzzling to most thinkers, can thus be made intelligible if we conceive of it as a disjunctive unity between subject and object. If we look from the side of the object, it proclaims its *complete indifference* to the fact of its being known. The subject, however, rejects the objectivity of the object in becoming aware of itself and in fact, *transforms* the object more and more into the direction of and in the interest of pure Subjectivity which is itself. The transformation that the object successively undergoes at the levels of sensation, perception, inferred object, memory-image and thought is simultaneously both in the direction of and in the interest of subjectivity. There is an increasing rejection of the object at these levels till we reach a stage where the subject rejects the independent objectivity of the object and finds its *essence* within itself or goes a stage further and rejects the object altogether. Thus, the phenomenological analysis of the " Knowledge-situation " reveals that while the subject *actively rejects* the object, the object is *perfectly indifferent* to it– a situation completely intelligible in terms of the relationsip that obtains between the elements of a disjunctive judgement.

However, the relation between elements in disjunctive unities is of such a nature that each can be asserted and is, thus, valid *but only alternatively*. Similar must, therefore, be the situation in the knowledge-relationship. The subject and the object both can be affirmed and are, therefore, valid but only alternatively. The validity of both cannot be asserted simultaneously except in the form of " the verval trite that *there are these two alternatives* ".[14] The objectivistic and the subjectivistic philosophies can, therefore, both be constructed and are valid but only alternatively. To say, therefore, that only *one* of them is valid, is wrong. But it would be equally wrong to say that *both* are valid. What can correctly be said is that *each* is valid but *only* alternatively. " The only standpoint from which both can be spoken of as real is that of the *verbal* super-philosophic conjunction corresponding to the transdisjunctive togethering of the alternatives. "[15] The subjectivistic and the objectivistic philosophies are, thus, valid alternative constructions from the " Knowledge-situation " which is of such a nature as to permit or rather require both, but only in such a way that the validity of the one negates the validity of the other and *vice versa*.

Among the Subjectivistic philosophies which all involve the rejection of the object, Mr. Bhattacharyya, however, makes a distinction. The rejection of the object through which the subjectivity comes to be aware of itself, may be conceived to be a necessary step as, for example, in the system of Hegel. The subject returns to itself by negating the object and grows richer by this negation. The object, thus, gets a type of non-being with which the subject forms a dialectical unity and grows richer and concrete just through this unity. But the object may be rejected altogether, i.e., even the first-level rejection itself may be rejected. This, it should be noted, does not posit the object once more but rejects it even in its character of non-being.[16] What remains, then, is pure Subjectivity without any distinctions and without any ' other ' to itself. This is the position of Śaṁkara and though Hegel has characterised it as ' abstract idealism '. Mr. Bhattacharyya shows in detail that there is no reason to prefer one view as a more intelligible account of the " Knowledge situation " than the other. If we characterise Hegel's solution of dialectical unity as absolutism, than there is a disjunctive alter-

nation between Subjectivism, Objectivism and Absolutism. Each construction is valid, but only alternatively.

If Mr. Bhattacharyya would have stopped with this formulation alone even then he would have said something so original that a serious consideration of his view would have been incumbent on any thinker who was not hampered by the style of his presentation or prejudiced against the geographical location of the philosopher concerned.[17] But he goes even further and tries to show that the three alternatives are not mere theoretic logical conceptions but actually obtain in our experiential life. " Mere logical establishment of a doctrine ", he writes, " is never convincing until it is confirmed by psychological appeal to immediate apprehension. In the absence of such direct psychological appeal much of the traditional philosophy has been useless logomachy, a hair-splitting that has come to nothing substantial."[18]

He, therefore, undertakes an analysis of experience in its cognitive, affective and conative aspects and tries to test his theoretical formulations on the basis of such an analysis. The result is an extremely original and challenging analysis of cognition, feeling and conation which is sometimes so bold and unorthodox that one is left wondering at the author who could have the daring even to think such things. However, often one feels the impulse to dismiss the author as utterly confuses—and one feels it rather too often—one always returns, if one continues to read, to the conviction that there is some solid ground for what the author is saying and that it was only the novelty of the idea that had made one feel that he was confused.

The analysis, it should be noted, is undertaken for the confirmation or rejection of the theory of knowledge eleborated in the last section. In fact, while trying to understand the " Knowledge-situation ", we were trying to understand the relation between subjectivity and object. But as subjectivity and object are involved in all experience, the relationship postulated between them by the theory of alternation, if true, must throw light on other aspects of experience as well. The analysis, therefore, aims at discovering " the exact subjectivity and the exact object " in each of the psychical processes and the relationship that obtains between them. The results reveal that there is a " correspon-

dence between cognition, feeling and conation, on the one hand, and the subjective, the objective, and the dialectical attitudes, on the other."[19]

However surprising it may seem, that cognition, at its different levels, moves *towards* Pure Subjectivity and involves an increasing rejection of the object, Mr. Bhattacharyya contends that it is such. The movement from sensation to perception, memory and thought is, in his opinion, simultaneously an increasing dominance of Subjectivity and an increasing rejection of the objectivity of the object. Of Course, the reference to object, even at the highest level, does not cease. But the direction of the movement, he suggests, is fairly clear. The view may perhaps become more intelligible if we reflect that even in sciences, when there grows up an increasing theoretic complexity and an increasing distance from ultimate empirical correlation, one begins to feel the receding of the object till it is reduced to mere "pointer-readings" or the reception of visual or auditary signals. The object seems to grow more and more shadowy while the creative aspect of the Subjectivity comes more and more into focus. The philosophers reflecting on cognition have, again and again, felt it difficult to find that bere object which is bereft of any subjective construction altogether. The scientists, on their part, have equally reduced the object to a complex theoretic construct in which the *overwhelming* character of the objectivity of sense-percepts is reduced to its ghostly minimum. The attempt to deduce the whole set of physical phenomena from certain ultimate postulates, called "postulates of impotence" is another pointer in the same direction. The dream or the ideal has always been to weave the whole web of knowledge out of the self-evident necessity of thought. The deductive form that the advanced sciences seem inevitably to take suggests that there is some imperative behind the dream which, even if intrinsically unrealisable, sets up a goal towards which we can perhaps asymptotically approach. There seems, thus, some ground for Mr. Bhattachayya's assertion that the movement of cognition is towards pure subjectivity, though the reference to the object is never completely lacking even at the highest level.

Equally, surprising, at first sight, is his contention that feeling eads us towards objectivity. So obvious does it seem to most

persons that feeling is purely subjective that it would come as a shock to find any one seriously contending that it is not such. However difficult it may be to conceive this at the level of pleasure-pain, it becomes increasingly clear at the succeding levels of emotion, aesthetic creation and aesthetic appreciation. It may, perhaps, make the situation more intelligible if we disabuse our minds of the usual notion that only perceptual objects are objects. The *overwhelming* character of objectivity that belongs to perceptual objects belongs even more so to pleasure or pain. We are completely immersed in them and do not, in most cases, stand back from them. Such a situation obtains at the perceptual level also though even there, in a sense, the subjectivity may be said to be standing back from the object and confronting it. But on the higher levels of emotion, aesthetic creation and aesthetic appreciation the differences are clearly revealed. There is an increasing domination of the object and the absorption of the subject into the Object. The reference to the subject never completely ceases but it receds more and more in the background till it remains almost a mere background.

Whatever be the different theories of aesthetic appreciation, there is a fair amount of common agreement about one thing at least, viz., that we are interested in aesthetic appreciation in the object 'for itself', and 'in itself'. This, if we examine, is just the character of pure objectivity. In fact, there is just this difference between ordinary perception and aesthetic appreciation. Unlike the theoretic transformations that the perceptual object undergoes at different cognitive levels, its objectivity merely gets more deepened at the highest level of aesthetic appreciation. In fact, if we reflect on the constructional character of scientific objects and the concrete character of the objects of aesthetic appreciation, it would perhaps be easier to understand what Mr. Bhattacharyya is saying. There is, at least, hardly any *rejection* of the object in the aesthetic situation and, thus, on a prima facie view, it should be considered to belong more to the objectivity side of the previous analysis. Most writers on Aesthetics have noted the fact of depersonalisation both of pleasure and pain in aesthetic creation and appreciation, a fact that supports the contention of Mr. Bhattacharyya.

If, then, cognition belongs to the Subjective and feeling to the Objective attitudes, it is natural to except that conation be-

longs to the third, i.e., the dialectical attitude. Dialectical unity, if we remember, involved the negating of the object and, through this negation, the returning of the Self to itself. The object had a kind of being (for it was not mere Nothing) and its being consisted just in this that it was negated by the subject. Conation reveals just these characteristics at the levels of (1) instinctive and other unreflective activities, (2) ordinary voluntary will and (3) moral will (i.e.), willing the good.[20] It is the very character of conation to negate an exixting state of affairs. But such a negation necessarily presupposes the actuality of the state of affairs to be negated. At the highest level of the moral will, such a characteristic is clearly revealed. Further, the negation involved makes the subject richer and more concrete and is, thus, necessary to its very being. It is a well-known problem of morality that, if things were as they ought-to-have-been, there would be no place for morality. Morality, thus, presupposes a non-valuational or disvaluational state of affairs in the negation of which the necessary reality or worth of the self lies. But if even this stage is to be negated then the self returns into itself, and we move in the direction of Pure Subjectivity, a direction which would seem both abstract and immoral to the dialectical philosopher.

Conation, Cognition and Feeling, thus, seem to involve in themselves movements towards Ideals which are increasingly, though never completely, realised at different levels. The claims of Pure Subjectivity, Pure Objectivity and the Absolute are felt and a movement made towards them at different levels. But if the logic of alternation has given us any insight, then the relations between these ideals must also be of an alternative character. The relation between Pure Subjectivity (cognition) and the Absolute (conation) on the one side and Pure Objectivity (Feeling), on the other, should on the logic of alternation, be that while the former *reject* the latter, the latter is completely indifferent to the former. The relation between Subjectivity and Absolute, however, should be of such a nature that each can admit the other only as a subordinate movement within itself. The moment the other tries to dominate, it has to be rejected. The movement towards pure Subjectivity admits the first negation involved in the dialectical attitude, but the moment it tries to stop there, it has to be rejected. Similarly, the dialectical atti-

tude can tolerate the Subjective as an abstraction, but if it refuses to move out of this abstraction, it has to be rejected. Each, thus, can tolerate the other as a subordinate movement but has to reject it when it claims to be the dominant one.

Such, in brief, is the tentative exposition of Kalidas Bhattacharyya's thought as delineated in his *Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy*. Many of the points he has made may be understood better if seen in the light of his father's philosophy. But K. C. Bhattacharyya's philosophical writings are filled with such obscure profundity as to vie with Hegel and Heidegger in this respect. Further, his writings were not available to the early students of Kalidas's work, and they could not have placed it in its proper context even if they had desired to do so.[21] Even now when K. C. Bhattacharyya's work has been available in a compact form for more than a decade, few persons have paid it the sustained attention which alone could render it intelligible to students of Philosophy in the country.[22] A critical appraisal must await adequate comprehension of the thought of these two major philosophers of modern India. The present essay, hopefully, is a step in this direction.

University of Rajasthan, **Daya Krishna**
Jaipur.

NOTES

1. Kalidas Bhattacharyya : Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy. Calcutta, Das Gupta & Co. 1953.

2. The significance of this word would become clear in the further course of this exposition.

3. Normally, the compatibility or incompatibility is supposed to be between propositions and not " things ". However, in the context of Prof. Bhattacharyya's thought, the latter usage is more meaningful as would appear from the sequel.

4. The fashionable solution preferred at the present time would, perhaps, be that it is all a linguistic confusion. It is generally forgotten that, in a sense, all confusions can be considered to be linguistic – for, in reality (whatever that word may mean), there can hardly be any confusions. But supposing reality, i. e., the object of our linguistic statements, is itself indeterminate, i. e., of such a nature as to make conflicting statements possible. Is the *order* then linguistic or the confusion ? What are the grounds of our belief either way ? Mr. Bhattacharyya has thoroughly discussed these possibilities which are not even dreamt of by the logical positivists of to-day.

5. The word "false" is too strong for a correct characterisation of Bhattacharyya's position. A more adequate statement would follow later.

6. We are quite aware (and so is Bhattacharyya) that this is not agreed to by any modern logician. We would give later his reasons for his differences on this matter.

7. The case excepted is the inherence of a quality in that to which it belongs.

8. Alternative Standpoints is Philosophy p. 11. Italics author's.

9. Kalidas Bhattacharyya, ibid p. 152. It should be noted that according to Mr. Bhattacharyya, the disjunctive judgement is better symbolised by "Either M is N or P is Q" than by "Either M is N or Q". For, the latter can mislead one to suppose that "M" is the subject of the disjunctive judgement while the former can never do so. In fact, it is only when the former is analysed that we find that in it each clause is alternatively the subject and the negation of the other, the predicate. Further, while the latter can be translated into the former, the former cannot be reduced into the form of the latter. We can say "Either M is N or M is Q" but there is no way of putting "Either M is N or P is Q" into the form "Either M is N or Q."

10. "The Verification Argument" in Philosophical Analysis Ed. by Max Black. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N. J. 1950.

11. Op. cit p. 156. Italics author's.

12. Ibid. p. 158. Italics author's.

13. Ibid. p. 158. Italics author's.

14. Ibid. p. 153. Italics author's.

15. Ibid. p. 159. Italics author's.

16. The denial of the denial, therefore, does not here result in an affirmation but in an absolute negation. Reasons for holding this view are given in detail in the work concerned.

17. The reference to geographical location may surprise some readers, but it is a fact that it is not only Westerners who believe that no meaningful philosophical activity could occur outside the western hemisphere but Indians also.

18. Op. Cit. p. V. Italics author's.

19. Ibid. p. 208.

20. Ibid. p. 257.

21. This paper is a slightly amended version of something that was written long time back. It thus also suffers from the limitation, as the only work of K. C. Bhattacharyya which was then available was *Subject as Freedom.*

22. N. V. Banerjee's monograph on K. C. Bhattacharyya's *The concept of Philosophy* published from Calcutta University and K. T. Kadankavil's *The Philosophy of the Absolute* published from Bangalore (1972) are notable exceptions to this but, as everybody knows, even two swallows do not make a summery.